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Abstract 
 
Many foreign aid agencies promote peacebuilding as a global policy objective. This thesis 
considers how they have operated in practice in subnational, ‘peripheral’ conflicts, using the 
Far South of Thailand as a case study. It asks how the characteristics and causes of the conflict 
affect aid agencies’ approaches and considers the properties of aid agencies that help explain 
why they act as they do. Semi-structured interviews with aid agency staff, supported by other 
empirical data, are used to examine the practical process of foreign aid provision.  
The thesis builds on the concept of horizontal inequality to help explain how typical patterns 
of violence in peripheral conflicts are associated with perceptions of political, economic, social 
and cultural status inequality along ethnic lines within nation states. Foreign aid agencies have 
a mixed record of addressing such inequalities.  
An assessment of aid agencies operating in Thailand, combined with detailed consideration of 
illustrative interventions, reveals a variety of responses to conflict in the Far South and its 
causes. Agencies with larger, more conventional programmes tend not to respond to the issue. 
Other agencies try but do not succeed in implementing their plans, while some agencies 
implement small yet relevant initiatives. The reasons for this pattern are identified through the 
research process with reference to existing literature on foreign aid, horizontal inequalities 
and conflict. Factors include: different motivations behind foreign aid including mixed levels of 
interest in addressing inequalities within conventional development approaches; the varied 
ability of agencies to negotiate with a reluctant recipient government; and practical barriers 
stemming from how agencies operate. 
The research highlights the challenges faced in using foreign aid to address peacebuilding. 
Some increased involvement might be possible if aid agencies place greater priority on 
addressing underlying inequalities as well as building local knowledge and relationships that 
enable them to respond to arising opportunities. 
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Chapter One  Introduction 
 
1.1 Context 
This thesis investigates how foreign aid agencies address violent conflict in the Far South of Thailand and 
considers the reasons for the emerging pattern of engagement. This initial chapter provides a short 
introduction to the conflict before describing the context of the study and the research agenda. 
Long running tensions in the Far South of Thailand escalated on 4 January 2004 when some 30 armed 
men stormed a military depot, stealing weapons and killing four soldiers. The event marked the start of 
a long period of increased violence. By August 2011, an estimated 4,846 people had died in over 9,000 
separate bombings, shootings and other incidents involving insurgents and government security forces 
(Srisompob 2009a, 2011). 
The Far South of Thailand comprises the conflict-affected provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, 
along with four neighbouring districts of Songkhla province. It roughly corresponds with the area known 
historically as Patani.1 People in the Far South are predominantly Malay Muslim,2 while the clear 
majority of Thailand is Thai Buddhist. At the time of writing, low-level, repeated violence continues in 
the Far South of Thailand. Bombings, assassinations, reprisals and harassment are a daily norm. Like 
many other internal conflicts, it receives little attention internationally and is generally marginal to 
national politics. 
As this thesis explains, violent conflict in the Far South of Thailand stems from a range of historically 
enduring ‘horizontal inequalities’ (as distinct from vertical inequality associated with socioeconomic 
stratification or class).3 The education sector is one illustration of this; during the aforementioned 
attack, as well as raiding a military depot, insurgents set light to 20 government schools. Attacks on 
schools had been commonplace for many years, and they continued with added ferocity. In July 2006, 
for example, a primary school teacher was shot dead by four gunmen in front of his students. According 
to the Ministry of Education, 92 teachers and other education personnel were killed between 2004 and 
2007. In some parts of the Far South, teachers travel to work under armed guard and have been issued 
with guns for self-protection. Many schools are also guarded by armed defence volunteers (Unicef 2008, 
ICG 2009). 
Violent assaults on government schools and teachers are manifestations of wider tensions between 
local inhabitants and the state in Thailand and elsewhere, especially in peripheral areas far from the 
capital. Education has been at the heart of the difficult relationship between many Malay Muslims in the 
Far South and the Thai Government since the area formally became part of Thailand (then Siam) in 
                                                             
1
 Patani is the preferred spelling for the former sultanate, Pattani for the current province of Thailand. 
2
 The term Malay Muslim denotes both ethnicity and religion. The term preferred by the Thai Government is Thai 
Muslim, a wider category that includes Muslims elsewhere in the country. 
3
 Stewart (2008b:13) defines horizontal inequalities as “... inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or 
cultural status between culturally defined groups”.  See Ch.2 for further information. Explanations of the terms 
‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘identity’ are given in Ch.2 (Part 2.3). 
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1909.4 For much of the twentieth century, the expansion of government schooling spearheaded 
assimilation. It promoted central Thai language and culture, and extended the authority of the state. In 
the Far South, these efforts ran up against a strong local network of traditional religious schools (or 
pondok). Some pondok have been partially integrated into the state education system, but others 
remain as a strong focus of independent local identity (Madmarn 1999). Most remaining pondok as well 
as more modern Islamic private schools do not promote violent action against the state, although a 
small number of teachers have used them as bases for recruiting students into insurgent groups. In 
addition to insurgents’ attacks on government staff and schools, government-linked groups have also 
attacked pondok on numerous occasions, with students and teachers killed (Askew 2009b:81, Liow 
2009). 
The Thai Government, in common with most other governments, promotes education in pursuit of 
national development. However, in this context pursuit of development cannot be separated from the 
uneasy relationship between the peripheral Far South and the central state. For Malay Muslims in the 
Far South of Thailand, this is highly significant. Statistically, Malay Muslim children in the Far South of 
Thailand have lower school attendance rates than both the national average and Thai Buddhist children 
in the same provinces.
5
  Furthermore, a majority of Malay Muslim parents in the Far South prefer to 
send their children to privately run religious secondary schools rather than the state-run schools that 
dominate among Thai Buddhists and across the rest of the country (NSO 2003). For many Malay 
Muslims in the Far South, education is intimately related to a minority identity that is largely defined in 
opposition to mainstream national identity. As this thesis explains in later chapters, the history 
curriculum, language of instruction, and other state actions and policies that affect the lives of people in 
the Far South continue to be key tools of assimilation that are widely resisted (Uthai 1981, Liow 2009). 
This thesis applies the concept of horizontal inequality in order to explain the complex relationships 
between ethnic identity, conflict and development in the Far South of Thailand. Stewart et al. identify 
distinct political, economic, social and cultural aspects of horizontal inequalities, with the likelihood of 
conflict increasing when inequalities exist across more than one of these aspects (Stewart 2008b). This 
thesis considers all of these interrelated elements of horizontal inequality. Economic and social 
inequalities that are commonly addressed through development initiatives are seen by many Malay 
Muslims in the Far South from a predominantly identity-based perspective, as is reflected in the 
approaches adopted by academic research on the Far South of Thailand (Surin 1985, Che Man 1990, 
Chaiwat 2005 & 2009, McCargo 2008, G Brown 2008, Liow 2009). Meanwhile, the political structure and 
processes of the Thai nation state are central aspects of the genesis and perpetuation of the conflict. 
The typical insurgent in the Far South is a young or early middle-aged man from a rural area where local 
job opportunities are few and sympathy for efforts to resist the Thai state has historically been strong 
(McCargo 2008:Ch.4, ICG 2009). The issue most commonly mentioned as a cause of poverty and 
                                                             
4
 Siam was officially renamed Thailand in 1939. 
5
 In the Far South, secondary school attendance rates for Muslim children are roughly 20% lower than for Buddhist 
children (NSO 2006). 
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associated failed development projects is the ethnic difference between the Thai state and local Malay 
Muslim recipients. A local NGO worker in Pattani province stated: “They *i.e. the government] do not yet 
understand the three southern provinces of Thailand.” 6 A civil servant in Narathiwat Town approached 
the issues from the government’s side, yet felt similarly: “If you do not understand them, you cannot 
solve the problem.” 7 The failure to understand is typically attributed by local Malay Muslims to ethnic 
differences: as a minority group, they feel that the state does not answer their needs. 
Identity is a central theme of much Thai studies literature, from the perspective of national as well as 
minority populations (Anderson 1991, Reynolds 1991 Thongchai 1994, Connors 2007). Ethnically defined 
nationalism is typically regarded in such accounts as a core component of the maintenance of authority 
by powerful national institutions including the military, civil service and royal family. The form and 
function of national identity are related to Thailand’s highly centralized political and administrative 
structures, with government plans and administrative management across all fields being chiefly 
devised at the national level and subsequently delivered through provincial or local bodies. An ethnic 
minority concentrated in a remote corner of the country is especially marginalized, as analysis of 
horizontal inequality that allows for multiple variables and explanations of historical context reveals. 
1.2 Defining peripheral conflict and associated terms 
The context of the conflict in the Far South of Thailand, within a nation state that has experienced rapid 
development, provides a basis for examining the associations between development, conflict and 
foreign aid. The conflict is seen in this thesis as a specific example of what is here termed ‘peripheral 
conflict’. In the Far South of Thailand and elsewhere, peripheral conflicts are typically territorial,8 long-
lasting violent disputes that pit self-appointed representatives of a discrete identity group against the 
central state. As is explained in more detail in Chapter Two, sites of such local resistance against state 
control exist in many countries, often ones that have undergone rapid recent development. Conflict 
areas on the fringes of nation states in Southeast Asia include the Far South of Thailand, Mindanao in 
the Philippines, Aceh and Western Papua in Indonesia, various border areas of Burma, the central 
Vietnamese Highlands, and parts of northern Laos. Across East and South Asia, other active or recent 
conflicts in Xinjiang (western China), Northeast Sri Lanka, and Northeast India also share many similar 
traits.9  
Peripherality is here used in two related senses. First, the location and the ethnic minority status of the 
population of peripheral conflict sites make them marginal within the nation state geographically and 
demographically. Second, both the minority population and the conflict itself are often peripheral 
politically. Many local leaders and the peripheral population at large typically have little influence over 
                                                             
6
 “Pachuban ni yang mai dai mi kan phattana. Yang mai dai khao chai peun ti sam changwat phak tai”. Interview 
with NGO Outreach Worker 3. 
7
 “Ta mai khao chai, gaer khai pan ha mai dai.” Interview with Local Official. 
8
 Territorial here refers to attempts to affect, influence and control people, phenomena and relationships by 
delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area (after Sack 1986:19).  
9
 Recognizing that conflicts are contextually specific (Sambanis 2004), some wider patterns can nonetheless be 
detected. 
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national level political structures and processes, being peripheral both to political settlements and to 
wider constructions of national identity.10 The long-term failure to address the concerns and demands 
of peripheral minorities, along with the lack of influence of peripheral minorities, is one reason why 
many peripheral conflicts continue for many decades or return after periods of relative calm. 
Enduring horizontal inequalities are central to peripheral conflicts, with ethnicity and identity 
particularly salient. The terms are defined below and addressed in greater detail in Chapter Two. The 
term ‘ethnicity’ is employed here in the constructivist sense, recognizing that ethnic groups are chiefly 
products of human social interaction and differentiation, or social constructs, yet are nonetheless 
significant long-term historical phenomena. Identity, a term broader than ethnicity, is defined here in a 
sociological sense to mean the way that individuals consider themselves as members of particular 
groups.11 Ethnicity is therefore a form of group identity. The relationship between ethnicity and conflict 
has been intensively addressed.12 Concepts of ethnicity and identity, both with strong cultural content, 
can be applied alongside political and economic factors rather than being seen primarily as instrumental 
tools of political actors.13 Culture carries many different meanings; its use here implies an interest in 
meaningful or symbolic rather than only instrumental action, leading to a concern over how culture 
interacts with society and economy.
14
 Ethnicity and group identities are recognized as flexible concepts 
that shift over time, often defined in cultural terms and related to common historical and territorial 
bonds. They can be understood as individual or collective perceptions of reality.15 As subsequent 
chapters explain, perceptions of inequality along ethnic identity fault-lines are a key element of 
peripheral conflicts.16 
Nationalism is defined here as the identification of a group of individuals with a political entity defined 
by themselves or others in national terms.17 Nation states are typically constructed around notions of 
common identity and can be approached as imagined communities (Anderson 1984), even if based on 
deeply rooted common cultural norms. ‘Late nationalism’ that flourished in the twentieth century 
across much of Asia is characterized by an ethnic definition based around the ascribed characteristics of 
a core ethnic group  rather than a pluralist or civic definition of the state (Smith 1991). In the Far South 
of Thailand, resentment of what is perceived as a largely alien ethnic nationalism and associated 
assimilation programmes is a fundamental aspect of horizontal inequality and of the conflict, as Chapter 
Five explains.   
                                                             
10
 Political settlements are the outcome of long-term bargaining between powerful groups (Di John & Putzel 2009). 
See Ch.2 for detail. 
11
 Gellner (1964), Anderson (1991, 1998), Smith (1991), Ozkirimli (2000:72), Henders (2004:6). The definition of 
identity applied here contrasts with a psychological definition of identity as self-hood or individuality.  
12
 For example Connor (1994), Gurr (2000), Horowitz (2000), Fearon & Laitin (2003), Kalyvas (2008), Stewart (2008). 
13
 Brass (1991), Cramer (2002), Collier & Hoeffler (2004). 
14
 Alexander (1990). Also Turner (1993), Hall (1996). 
15
 In addition to the above references, see Brukaber (2004).  
16
 See Stewart et al. (2008:293), Brown & Langer (2010). 
17
 See Smith (1991). Also Gellner (1964), Hobsbawm (1990). 
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In understanding peripheral conflicts, it is important to recognize that the way in which horizontal 
inequalities are perceived may be more significant than observable or measurable facts (Stewart et al. 
2008:293). Perceptions of inequality, injustice and unfairness that are often important motivations for 
those instigating peripheral conflicts may be closely related to objective political and socioeconomic 
horizontal inequalities but they do not always coincide (Brown & Langer 2010:30). Where groups do not 
perceive unfairness or injustice, severe objective horizontal inequalities might not provoke conflict. The 
converse situation can also occur, with horizontal inequalities perceived to be severe when objectively 
they may be relatively small or non-existent.18  
1.3 Development practice, foreign aid, and conflict 
The politicized, identity-based and violent context of education in the Far South of Thailand contrasts 
sharply with the typical international developmental view of education as a universal right and a 
foundation of modern progress. International promotion of universal primary education, as enshrined in 
the second of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals, stresses the importance of improving 
access to schools. Where it stresses quality of education, this is normally limited to technical issues 
rather than the more controversial cultural and political context of how and what children are taught 
(United Nations 2009). As this thesis demonstrates in later, empirical chapters, international aid 
agencies that fund education globally and have supported the expansion of education in Thailand tend 
to avoid addressing politically difficult issues that affect how education is provided and are themselves 
significant aspects of conflict in the Far South. 
This thesis explains how national development processes in Thailand have brought socioeconomic 
improvements yet have also perpetuated and even exacerbated the tensions surrounding horizontal 
inequalities that are associated with conflict in the Far South. Similar patterns are also observed 
elsewhere, as Stewart et al. recognize (2008). They create challenges for international aid agencies that 
are typically oriented towards the socioeconomic objectives seen in the Millennium Development Goals 
and that may be poorly equipped to respond to the combinations of political and cultural as well as 
socioeconomic factors that contribute to peripheral conflicts. Development projects in many countries 
have contributed to ethnic tension and other precursors of violent conflict. Various reviews have found 
that critical aspects of conflict including many elements of horizontal inequalities have rarely been 
comprehensively addressed by international aid agencies (Hettne 1993a, Uvin 1998, Stewart 2008b). 
Links between conflict and foreign aid as well as the explicit promotion of peacebuilding through aid 
projects have received concerted attention since the end of the Cold War, building on this mixed 
legacy.19 By the late 1990s, conflict analysis was becoming established as a working tool and 
development agencies were establishing new specialist peacebuilding units alongside existing units 
addressing established fields like health, education, and infrastructure. Despite these changes, reviews 
                                                             
18
 In other words the same facts can be interpreted in different ways (D Brown 2008). 
19 
See for example the Carnegie Commission (1997). 
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report mixed progress in linking aid programmes with peacebuilding, with many failures alongside the 
successes (Paris 2010). Stewart et al. (2008:297) find that international aid policies and statistics are 
often still more blind to horizontal inequalities than are many national policies. This finding is examined 
in greater depth through subsequent chapters, which consider the reasons why many aid agencies may 
or may not be effectively blind both to horizontal inequalities and more specifically to peripheral 
conflicts. The dilemma at the heart of efforts to use development assistance to address peripheral 
conflicts can be seen in this bland statement from the executive summary of a United Nations country 
plan for Thailand: 
Over the last decades, Thailand has made remarkable progress in advancing human 
development and now stands ready to share its experiences with other middle-income and 
developing countries. At the same time, Thailand continues to address internal disparities, both 
regionally and among social groups. (United Nations & Government of Thailand 2006) 
The first sentence follows conventional inter-governmental development etiquette, praising Thailand 
for eliminating mass poverty and emerging as a middle-income country. It shows UN support for the 
Thai Government, especially for its efforts to turn itself from recipient to donor. For donors, this is the 
easier, consensual part of aid programmes that make up the bulk of donor flows in Thailand and 
globally. The second sentence contains the critique of development, presenting the other face of the 
same process that has been, in aggregate socioeconomic terms, successful. It can be read in part as a 
coy reference to conflict in the Far South of the country, more direct language being unacceptable to 
the Government of Thailand.20 Evidence presented in this thesis shows that for UN agencies wishing to 
act on this second sentence in line with their policy commitments to equity, peacebuilding or human 
security, they find the going much harder. Many barriers emerge, stemming both from the domestic 
conditions of conflict in the Far South of Thailand and from the intrinsic characteristics of aid agencies 
themselves. At the same time, some aid agencies have managed to find ways to address peripheral 
conflicts, in the Far South of Thailand and elsewhere. The mixed picture that emerges raises several 
questions worth considering in detail. 
1.4 Research questions and analytical framework 
This study was motivated by an interest in three related fields: the causes of, and likely solutions to, 
persistent violence that affects many geographically peripheral areas of rapidly growing nation states, 
especially in South and Southeast Asia; the links between international development assistance (or 
foreign aid), conflict and peacebuilding;21 and, more specifically, the surge in violence in the Far South of 
Thailand since 2004. 
                                                             
20
 This interpretation is informed by interviews with UNDP Official 1 and UNDP Official 2 (see annexed interview 
references). 
21
 Peacebuilding is defined here as those multiple actions aimed at addressing the structural causes of conflict and 
reconciling relationships affected by conflict (Barnes 2006). 
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The increasing if still limited efforts of foreign aid agencies22  to apply their global peacebuilding agendas 
to the conflict in the Far South offer a fertile and relatively fresh field for research. This thesis provides 
new case study material as well as contributing to a broader understanding of how development 
agencies operate in a particular kind of conflict environment. Through empirical research that 
investigates foreign aid agencies’ policies and actions in the Far South of Thailand, this thesis aims to 
build better understanding of, and explanation for, the patterns of responses to peripheral conflict 
among international aid agencies.  Despite recent efforts on the part of foreign aid agencies to 
incorporate peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity into their approaches, many agencies struggle to do so 
in the case of the Far South of Thailand. The reasons why that is the case, and the reasons why some aid 
agencies do manage to pursue peacebuilding objectives in peripheral conflicts, merit closer attention. 
The research aims to answer the following key research questions: 
1) Do foreign aid agencies pursue peacebuilding objectives in the Far South of Thailand and 
what related patterns of aid practice emerge across different agencies?  
2) How do the characteristics and causes of conflict in the Far South of Thailand affect aid 
agencies’ ability to support peacebuilding? 
3) What properties of aid agencies help explain the pattern? 
This thesis first identifies the chief characteristics of peripheral conflict in the Far South of Thailand. The 
conflict is situated with particular reference to other peripheral conflicts in South and Southeast Asia 
and approached through a theoretical framework derived from notions of horizontal inequality. This 
allows an exploration of the interactions between identity, socio-economic and political conditions that 
perpetuate and exacerbate perceptions of marginalization among the population living in areas affected 
by peripheral conflict.  
From that starting point, the thesis offers an analysis of whether and how aid agencies address 
peripheral conflict in the Far South of Thailand and an exploration of the reasons for emerging patterns 
of engagement. The thesis examines dominant trends within aid practice and the underlying nature of 
foreign aid that limit the scope of aid agencies to address peripheral conflict situations. In addition to 
the common inability of foreign aid to address horizontal inequalities,23 it considers the specific contexts 
of peripheral conflicts including the prominence of acute identity-based tension already mentioned in 
this chapter that create additional barriers limiting  – but not preventing – the use of foreign aid as part 
of efforts to promote peace. 
Through an iterative research process described in Chapter Four and illustrated through the aid agency 
case studies presented in the empirical chapters, three groups of donors were discerned. The 
identification of these separate groups serves as a tool to draw attention to the reasons why donors act 
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 ‘Foreign aid agencies’ (or the shorter form ‘aid agencies’) typically include UN bodies, NGOs, foundations and 
intermediary organizations as well as official (governmental) bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. The term 
‘donor’ can refer to a government or country as well as a specific organization. 
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 According to Stewart et al. (2008:315-316), foreign aid rarely addresses such inequalities even in conflict-affected 
areas and in many cases actually reinforces existing inequalities in countries with ethnically diverse populations. 
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in different ways. The considerable variety between and within aid agencies emerges through the 
analysis. Evidence shows that the reasons why aid agencies address or do not address issues relating to 
peripheral conflict amount to more than blindness or ignorance and can be related to structural and 
practical limitations to how foreign aid agencies operate. The variety of foreign aid agency responses to 
conflict in the Far South of Thailand that emerged through primary research challenges any expectation 
of uniformity in donor actions, suggesting that aid agencies are not always less progressive than national 
governments when it comes to addressing peripheral conflicts.  
While various authors describe how aid agencies act in situations similar to that found in the Far South 
of Thailand,24  there is only a limited body of material which examines in any detail the reasons why aid 
agencies act as they do in such contexts. The available literature on the institutional practices and 
political motivations that condition development assistance more widely nonetheless allows this issue 
to be addressed. Key themes that help explain the reasons why aid agencies act as they do in peripheral 
conflict environments are presented in Chapter Three before being applied in the empirical chapters to 
the patterns of donor behaviour in the Far South of Thailand. 
The main focus of research is therefore on the interactions that aid agencies are involved in when 
formulating interventions in a specific peripheral conflict environment. This process takes place chiefly 
at the national level, even when considering a subnational conflict.25 The ways in which staff in aid 
agencies’ country offices address or avoid peripheral conflicts, and their engagement with institutions of  
the recipient state, receive particular attention. The interface between aid agencies and the Thai state 
institutions with which they engage is of particular interest and complexity given that, in this and other 
cases of peripheral conflict, the state is itself a conflict actor and a critical part of the dynamic in the Far 
South of Thailand as well as a necessary partner in establishing and often in implementing foreign-
funded initiatives. 
Finally, the thesis considers what wider conclusions can be drawn from the emerging pattern of aid 
provision found in the case of the Far South of Thailand and the underlying reasons that explain it. 
Emphasis is placed on understanding the potential for and the limits to approaching peacebuilding 
through aid provision in peripheral conflicts. 
1.5 Summary of thesis structure  
After this introductory chapter, Chapter Two (National Development and Peripheral Conflicts) builds an 
understanding of peripheral conflict and development in South and Southeast Asia through a review of 
the relevant literature. It explores relationships between horizontal inequalities and development 
processes before considering the viability of development interventions as a means to support 
peacebuilidng in peripheral conflict environments. 
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 In addition to Stewart et al. (2008) and other work on horizontal inequalities, see for example Esman (1985, 
2003), Uvin (1998), Herring (2003). 
25
 Literature on aid relationships, for example Eyben (2006) and Morten & Hansen (2008), emphasizes this point. 
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Chapter Three (A Mixed Record: Foreign Aid and Peacebuilding in Peripheral Conflicts) considers foreign 
aid trends and their relationship with peripheral conflicts, summarizes literature that addresses the 
main research questions and offers short comparative cases. The chapter addresses the mixed record of 
foreign aid and explains how and why foreign aid interventions can in some situations support efforts to 
promote peace in peripheral conflict environments. It reviews relevant literature on aid in order to 
explain aid agencies’ actions, establishing a theoretical framework that is pursued in later chapters by 
focusing on the differing motivations of aid agencies, their interface with recipient state institutions, and 
their everyday practice. This framework enables analysis of the actual process of aid provision. 
Chapter Four provides a methodological overview. It explains how the theoretical framework is 
operationalized through a qualitative approach in order to investigate and explain how aid agencies 
address conflict in the Far South of Thailand. It also explains how a typology of three groups of aid 
agency is applied in order to structure empirical material and support the explanation of observed 
trends. 
Chapter Five (The Far South of Thailand: Resistance, Identity, and Development) provides a background 
to the case study area, explaining its characteristics and describing the basis of violence in a long history 
of resistance against state domination. It places the locale in the context of national development, long-
term political processes, and recent political upheavals, as well as explaining the international context. It 
considers the characteristics of the conflict from a perspective of horizontal inequality, stressing the 
significance of perceptions that relate to cultural and political as well as socioeconomic variables.  The 
chapter considers how violence and its roots in the Far South relate to nationalism, political 
contestation, antagonistic identity formation, and highly centralized national development. 
Chapter Six (An Overview of How Foreign Aid Affects Conflict in the Far South of Thailand) identifies key 
historical and contemporary trends of international aid as they relate to the Far South of Thailand. 
Presenting an overview of empirical research, it divides donors into three groups. The chapter 
incorporates information from the aid agencies addressed in the subsequent case study chapters as well 
as material from other agencies. It should be read in conjunction with the more detailed case study 
description provided in the subsequent chapters. The chapter confirms that horizontal inequalities as 
well as peripheral conflicts are often neglected in foreign aid approaches to Thailand for a range of 
structural and practical reasons. It also shows that some agencies do take different approaches, in cases 
managing to turn peacebuilding policies into active interventions. 
Chapter Seven (Conflict Blindness: the Asian Development Bank and the Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand 
Growth Triangle) is the first of three chapters based on case studies of how donors address conflict. It 
describes Asian Development Bank support for a development scheme that demonstrates little 
understanding or concern for longstanding local grievances based around perceived horizontal 
inequalities. The ADB’s involvement did not increase the project’s sensitivity to the problems of 
peripheral conflict in the Far South of Thailand during its formulation in the 1990s, nor in its subsequent 
revitalization. 
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Chapter Eight (The Interface between Donors and Central Government Agencies as a Barrier to 
Addressing Conflict) looks at two agencies that tried to address conflict in the Far South of Thailand but 
which, at the time of research, were blocked at the interface with the recipient government. The 
chapter demonstrates some of the practical reasons why foreign aid agencies often do not address 
peripheral conflict in practice, showing how their work is shaped by the interaction between donor 
interests and national interests. 
Chapter Nine (Islands of Donor-Funded Peacebuilding) introduces two agencies that established 
programmes to address conflict-related problems in the Far South with the aim of supporting domestic 
efforts to promote sustainable and just peace.26 The chapter considers what motivated them to take on 
a difficult challenge that risked threatening their critical relationship with the state, how they negotiated 
the interface with elements of the Thai Government, and what practical barriers limited their impact.  
Finally, findings are consolidated in a concluding chapter that summarizes the factors leading to the 
variety of approaches to peripheral conflict observed in the case studies before reflecting on the 
implications both for aid agencies and for future research. 
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 A ‘just peace’ in this context involves recognition of, and action to redress, at least some of the opponent’s 
grievances. It contrasts with an imposed ‘victor’s peace’ (Goodhand 2010:351).  
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Chapter Two  Peripheral Conflicts, Horizontal Inequalities and Development 
 
This chapter describes the properties of peripheral conflicts, building a basis for the subsequent chapter 
that considers how foreign aid agencies engage with them. Although peripheral conflicts show 
considerable variety, they have discernible common properties. They are characterized by low-intensity 
violent confrontation between self-appointed representatives of a group that is a minority at the 
national level but a majority within the conflict area (typically a border region distant from the capital),27 
and security forces or others representing nation state structures. Significantly, in addition to their 
geographically peripheral position within the nation state, the minority living in the conflict area also 
tends to be peripheral politically and culturally.28 
The concept of multi-dimensional horizontal inequalities used by Frances Stewart et al. (2008) and 
others to explore ethnic and other cleavages between groups and their relationship with conflict 
supports understanding of peripheral conflicts in South and Southeast Asia. The combination of 
different inequalities described by Stewart et al. is especially significant in peripheral conflicts given the 
prominence of ethnic identity and associated cultural factors. After outlining the overall trends and 
characteristics of peripheral conflicts, the chapter describes key processes of political marginalization 
and then relates them to long-term patterns of developmental change and nation state construction. In 
common with the approach of Stewart et al., emphasis is placed on the significance of people’s 
perceptions of inequality. The chapter then explains how many development interventions contribute 
to tensions associated with peripheral conflicts, although some programmes do address related 
horizontal inequalities or otherwise promote peace. 
2.1 The prevalence and common features of peripheral conflicts in South and Southeast Asia 
Analysis of conflict and development has increasingly focused on conflicts within nation states. This 
emphasis is reflected in the Human Security Report which found that over 95% of identified conflicts in 
2005 were civil wars.29 Further analysis reveals particular types of civil conflict. Harbom et al. (2006, 
2008) use Uppsala University data in listing 34 active and significant armed conflicts globally.30 The 
majority of these are classified as ethnic and territorial, most often occurring in border areas, and 
usually within rather than between nation states. This research focuses in particular on such conflicts in 
Southeast Asia, extending the field of study where relevant to parts of South and East Asia. Within this 
wider region, the pattern is still stronger: nine out of the thirteen Asian conflicts listed in the Uppsala 
dataset involve ethnic minority groups near the border of a nation state whose frontiers are not 
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 G Brown refers to the “Double whammy" of ethnic and spatial horizontal inequalities that define peripheral 
conflicts (2008:276). 
28
 The term peripheral conflict is occasionally used elsewhere, for example Wee & Jayasuriya (2002). 
29
 Human Security Center (2005). The general trend identified is consistent with other sources. See also Mack 
(2007). 
30
 The Uppsala data (Uppsala 2009) covers conflicts registering 25 or more battle-related deaths in a year. This 
means that some peripheral conflicts are missed out or included intermittently. Reporting restrictions also limit 
data availability. 
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themselves disputed internationally: three in Northeast India, two in Burma, one in the Philippines, one 
in the Far South of Thailand, one in Sri Lanka, and one in Pakistan. Similar conflicts not listed in the 
Uppsala data but that have nonetheless recently posed serious problems include Aceh and Western 
Papua, Xinjiang, and the Central Vietnamese Highlands. 
Other databases confirm the trend. Croissant and Trinn (2009:19-20) use data from CONIS to show that 
while the prevalence of most forms of conflict across Asia has been largely constant, what they term 
domestic ‘cultural conflicts’ have increased from under ten specific sites at any one time during the 
1970s, up to around thirty from 2000 on.31 The Minorities at Risk project (2008) that lists the global 
incidence of acts of repression including discrimination, rebellion and protest shows that for Southeast 
and East Asia, most recorded incidents involve minorities in peripheral areas, with the conflicts listed 
above dominating the list year after year.32 
Comparative studies of similar conflicts in Southeast Asia include Brown (1988), Islam (1998), Chalk 
(2001) and Liow (2006). Most analyses stress the identity aspects of ethnic groups pitted against the 
nation state in a search for more local power or authority (Esman 1985, McCargo 2008). Similar 
peripheral conflicts occur outside Asia too: in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, northern Ghana, 
Chechnya in Russia, Chiapas in southern Mexico, and elsewhere. These conflicts share many of the 
characteristics of the cases from Southeast Asia and neighbouring regions that are examined here.  
Violence in peripheral conflicts is typified by irregular action classified as ‘terrorism’ by a central state, 
yet justified by rebels as legitimate resistance against state-based oppression.33 It may involve 
conventional combat where rebels hold territory and possess significant weaponry, although more 
often involves sporadic resistance targeting symbols of the state such as the army, police stations, 
schools, or civil servants. Long-term, low-intensity violence is a common characteristic of peripheral 
conflicts, with neither side achieving outright victory. The goals of rebels vary and may be inconsistent. 
They ususally involve changes to national governance arrangements including greater allocation of 
power to the peripheral zone, either in the form of separation or through a federal arrangement. From 
the perspective of the central state, such aims are often seen as a threat to the fabric of the entire 
nation. As is common in irregular conflict, many victims are civilians who do not actively support either 
side.34 
Governments may portray peripheral rebel groups as criminals, or recidivist ruffians hiding in mountains 
or jungle. These myths can be easily countered. In Aceh, for example, government officials were 
surprised to discover during the 2005 peace process that many rebel combatants were not hiding in the 
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 Heidelberg University’s CONIS (Conflict Information System) uses information from publicly accessible news 
sources, assessing it qualitatively according to defined criteria. 
32
 The Minorities at Risk data misses out some civil protest and is limited by the difficulty of defining a minority 
conflict. 
33
 Halliday (2002:70-71) states: “Assigning the descriptor of 'terrorist' or 'terrorism' to the actions of a group is a 
tactic used by states to deny 'legitimacy' and 'rights to protest and rebel’.” 
34
 See references in previous paragraph. 
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hills, but moving in and out of towns and villages where they blended in with the local population 
(Barron & Burke 2008:38). 
Rebels are often involved in illicit networks, however. Smuggling, theft, kidnapping and ransom 
demands are indeed commonplace in rural areas along poorly policed borders with high levels of 
corruption in the security forces. Many peripheral conflict zones have been unruly sites of multiple 
levels of conflict for as long as is recalled in commonly unreliable local histories. Yet the significance of 
disorderly borders can be overstated: these tendencies are also found in other remote areas of 
developing countries and they may contribute to, but not explain, the persistence of peripheral conflict 
(Kalyvas 2001). 
Peripheral conflicts tend to be relatively low intensity and are usually not located within what have been 
termed ‘failed states’, even if internal unrest does on occasion occur outside as well as inside the 
specific peripheral area.35 The persistence of peripheral conflicts in countries with high rates of 
economic growth, relatively low levels of poverty, and improving human development indicators shows 
how conflict itself is not ‘development in reverse’ (Collier et al. 2003), but an element of more complex 
long-term processes (Cramer 2006:51). There is considerable variety between the examples in Figure 2a 
(below) but all are classified in the UN Human Development Index as mid-level rather than poor states. 
Figure 2a:  Key data on significant Asian peripheral conflicts 
Country Site of Peripheral 
Conflict 
Global Peace Index 
 
(ranking out of  
144 countries)36 
Human Development 
Index 
(ranking out of  
182 countries)37 
Longevity 38 
Indonesia 
West Papua  
and Aceh 
 67 111 
From mid-1970s, following earlier 
violence. Aceh ended 2005, West Papua 
ongoing. 
Philippines Mindanao 114 105 
Overt violence from the late 1960s, with 
earlier roots. 
Thailand Far South (Pattani) 118 87 
Recurrent in intermittent bouts since 
1909.  
Sri Lanka Northeast 125 102 From early 1980s until 2009. 
China Xinjiang, Tibet 74 92 Low-level since early 20th century.  
Burma 
Various border 
areas 
126 138 From late 1940s. 
India 
Various conflicts in 
Northeast 
122 134 
Repeated or continual violent unrest since 
1950s. 
Average ranking of  
above cases 
107 110 
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 See Rotberg (2003) among many other sources on failed states. 
36
 Institute for Economics and Peace (2009). 
37
 UNDP (2008). 
38
 On Aceh see Reid et al. (2006); West Papua, Chauvel & Bhakti (2004); Mindanao, McKenna (1998); the Far South 
of Thailand, McCargo (2008); Xinjiang, Gladney (2004) and Dwyer (2005); Sri Lanka, Spencer (1990) and DeVotta 
(2004); Burma, Smith & Allsebrook (1994); Northeast India, Baumik (2009). 
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Addressing horizontal inequalities, Stewart, Brown & Langer (2008:286-288) show that it is not possible 
to draw direct correlations between economic inequalities alone and the presence of violent conflict. 
Indeed, wealth is not spread especially unevenly in countries experiencing peripheral conflict. Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Sri Lanka for instance have considerably lower Gini coefficients than most of middle-
income Latin America (World Bank 2011). Peripheral conflict areas are frequently no poorer than other, 
peaceful areas of the same nation. The conflict-affected Far South of Thailand is not the poorest part of 
the country according to most measurements.39 Similarly, Aceh is not one of the poorest provinces of 
Indonesia. Indeed, it recorded the ninth highest Human Development Index score out of 25 Indonesian 
provinces in 1996.40 By contrast, the five provinces that comprise the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao, an area that has experienced peripheral conflict over several decades, are the poorest five 
provinces of the Philippines (HDN 2009).
41
 
Specific triggers of peripheral violence can in many cases be identified, one example being natural 
resource discoveries in Aceh in the 1970s (Aspinall 2007).42 As is explained in this and subsequent 
chapters, the scope for such events to act as triggers depends on specific and long-term contextual 
factors that are complex, multi-dimensional and comparative (Hettne 1990, 1993a, Ostby 2008:147, 
Chanintira 2009): 
Approaches to explaining violence should avoid isolationist programmes that explain violence 
solely in terms of social inequality and deprivation or in terms of identity and cultural factors 
(Sen 2008:5). 
Summarizing a range of case studies of conflicts and statistical analysis of associated horizontal 
inequalities, Stewart et al. (2008) recognize that the presence of severe horizontal inequalities does not 
necessarily produce wide-scale violence, but it makes countries more vulnerable to the emergence of 
violent conflicts along ethnic lines (Langer 2004). There are many examples of minority groups in 
peripheral areas that are not involved in violent conflict against the state.43 Many peripheral and 
relatively disadvantaged areas with a high ethnic minority presence like Satun in Southern Thailand 
(Parks 2009) or parts of Sabah in Malaysia (G Brown 2008:274) remain peaceful. A horizontal 
inequalities framework explains that political elements of inequality, and the politicization of ethnicity 
by political actors, are critical to determining whether differences spiral into conflict (Mancini 2008). 
Religious and language differences also stand out as particularly overt markers that exacerbate and 
perpetuate group fault lines in peripheral and other conflicts. 
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 See Ch.5 for detail. 
40
 Aceh’s ranking had fallen to 18th out of 25 provinces by 2004, although even this decline can be seen more as an 
effect of protracted conflict than a direct cause given violent unrest that started in the late 1970s and intensified 
in the late 1990s (BPS 2011).  
41
 Higher levels of poverty or a lack of economic opportunity may be an effect rather than a cause of protracted 
violence.  
42
 See Ch.2. 
43
 Fearon & Laitin (1996) find that in Africa there has only been one instance of ethnic violence for every 2000 cases 
that would have been predicted on the basis of cultural differences alone. 
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Where ethnic groups are regionally concentrated, the visibility of differences between them and the 
majority population is likely to be greater. Regionally concentrated ethnic groups also have specific 
historical experiences, which are often drawn upon in mobilizing separatist movements (Brown & 
Langer 2010:41). Colonial boundary demarcations, such as the inclusion of the Far South of Thailand in 
Siam rather than Malaya, or the inclusion of Shan state in Burma rather than Thailand, are key historical 
events that have longstanding repercussions. Stewart et al. (2008:296-297) find that horizontal 
inequalities frequently stem from colonial distinctions between different ethnic groups as with the 
differential treatment by the British of Tamils and Sinhalese in Ceylon.  In Aceh, a history of resistance 
against perceived external oppression stretching back to the province’s struggle against Dutch colonial 
occupation has been commonly repeated for different reasons by Acehnese and Indonesian leaders, 
providing a basis through which to ground perceived oppression from outsiders  –  first the colonial 
Dutch, then the dominant Javanese within the Indonesian state (Reid 2004:ch.15, Brown 2004:43-44). 
Peripheral conflicts tend to last a long time (see Figure 2a). This persistence can in part be attributed to 
commonly found asymmetric security stalemates between conventional armies and rebels, along with 
conflict dynamics that generate their own momentum. Cycles of violence tend to establish a self-
reinforcing dynamic compounded by human rights abuses, lack of justice, arbitrary killings and 
intentional measures to polarize groups (Alker, Gurr & Rupesinghe 2001). Rebel leaders become 
dependent on their own networks for status and safety. For governments and the military, popularizing 
a separatist threat can garner public support and help build legitimacy.44 More directly, it can justify 
large military budgets and create significant business opportunities for military and civil officials posted 
to the conflict area (Thongchai 1994, Aspinall & Crouch 2003). 
The longevity and common recurrence of peripheral conflicts are also reflections of the endurance of 
group affiliations, with a combination of territorial and cultural factors appearing to create deep-seated 
group identities that are intergenerationally transferred and supported by perceptions of inequality. 
Stressing political and economic factors, Stewart et al. (2008:297) comment that group differences have 
been reinforced and perpetuated by unequal access to different types of capital and political influence. 
2.2 National politics and peripheral marginalization 
Peripheral conflicts shift over time, with periods of relative calm followed by further violence. Cyclical 
patterns of conflict in Xinjiang (Gladney 2008:139-141), Sri Lanka (De Votta 2004), and elsewhere can be 
linked to a range of factors including changing state policies, varying from concessions to repression, 
with consequences for peripheral unrest. As this chapter explains, however, the long-term dynamic of 
peripheral conflicts is of persistent political marginalization of the peripheral minority within the nation 
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 Legitimacy of political systems is described by Alagappa (1995:11) as “The belief by the governed in the rulers’ 
moral right to issue commands and the people’s corresponding obligation to accept such commands”. It provides 
a basis for rule by consent rather than coercion (OECD 2010). 
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state. With relatively small minority populations45 and distant locations, there is rarely any pressing 
need or incentive for influential actors within nation states to consider minority interests. Central 
administrations of Southeast Asian states are not usually dependent on raising rural revenue, with 
export industries and the urban economy generating greater levels of taxable wealth (Miller 2011). In 
Thailand, the highly centralized state offers little political or administrative space to the Far South. Key 
actors contesting power at the national level commonly ignore peripheral violence rather than seek 
political settlement. Where they do address the issue, they typically offer either security-based 
responses or marginal concessions that only touch upon underlying horizontal inequalities.46 
Peace agreements and ‘secondary settlements’47 that make some concessions but do not shift 
underlying political conditions in peripheral areas have a poor record of long-term success (Brown 1994, 
McKenna 2004, Reid et al. 2006). In Indonesia, policies promising elements of autonomy to specific 
peripheral regions were repeatedly established only to be subsequently undermined by lawmakers 
responding to powerful and overlapping centralized interests including the military, national politicians, 
the state bureaucracy, and businesses (Robinson 1998). In both the Far South of Thailand and Xinjiang, 
even small concessions like policies promoting translation of official documents into minority languages 
or preferential employment of local civil servants have been approved but only partially implemented 
(Dwyer 2005, Liow 2009). 
Incorporating some elite figures into national politics may not satisfy a sufficiently broad number of 
people to end the tensions leading to peripheral conflict. Prominent figures from peripheral conflict 
areas have assumed senior political office during periods of ongoing violence: Hamid Awaluddin and 
Sofyan Djalil, both Acehnese, served as Ministers in Indonesia, while Wan Muhammad Nor Mattha, from 
Thailand’s Far South, was Interior Minister to Thaksin Shinawatra. Access to power on the part of some 
figures from the peripheral minority may not in itself end violence, with other local leaders able to call 
on shared ethnic affiliation to mobilize further unrest.48 
Stewart et al. (1998:298) also find that multiparty democracy will not facilitate addressing the problems 
behind such conflicts unless specific efforts are made to guarantee ethnic groups and subnational units 
access to power.49 Democratic politics commonly respond to the majority and do not address minority 
interests, while the centralizing tendency of party politics under majoritarian systems can exacerbate 
the exclusion of minorities. Consociational democratic systems that accord specific groups access to 
power, or federal systems that recognize some degree of local autonomy, may in cases provide 
solutions to peripheral and ethnic tensions (Lijphart 2008), although in many peripheral conflicts there is 
little incentive for national level political actors to consider adopting such measures. 
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 The Far South of Thailand contains about 2% of the Thai population, Aceh about 2% of Indonesians, and the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao about 4% of Filipinos. 
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 On political settlements see North et al. (2007), Di John & Putzel (2009). See Ch.5 for detail on the Far South of 
Thailand. 
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 Secondary settlements are formal or informal agreements between locally prominent figures and national 
representatives on how to govern subnational areas (Parks & Cole 2010).  
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 See Ch.5 on divided local elites in Thailand. 
49
 See also Horowitz (2000), D Brown (2008). 
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States that accommodate the needs of ethnic minorities are, according to Stewart, more able to ensure 
that ethnic mobilization does not become violent (2008:20). Stewart et al. (2008:290) draw evidence 
from Malaysia, a state that overtly recognizes horizontal ethnic differences and has aimed since the late 
1960s to redress the imbalance between poorer Malays and others through preferential treatment as a 
fundamental part of the nation’s political fabric and socioeconomic planning. Malaysia’s unusual 
political system with its explicit recognition of different ethnic groups and decentralization to fairly large 
state units has its shortcomings, but it has helped avoid the conflicts that have troubled its neighbours 
(Lo Kok Wah 2002).  However, the situation in Malaysia, with Malays making up a majority of the 
population, differs starkly from peripheral conflict situations in Southeast Asia where peripheral ethnic 
groups comprise a minority at the national level and often have little access to national policymaking 
structures. 
On occasion, escalating violence and associated perceived threats to wider interests draw national and 
international attention to peripheral conflicts (in East Timor and Sri Lanka, for example). However, 
comparative and historical experience shows that many cessations of violence are temporary, with 
peace negotiations failing to stop permanently both the violent conflict and mitigate underlying 
horizontal inequalities. In Mindanao, Xinjiang, Western Papua and elsewhere, attempted negotiations 
have in the past failed to bring lasting peace. In Aceh, initial negotiations between the government and 
rebel representatives following the fall of Suharto in 1998 failed as central government institutions and 
political actors as well as the independence of the military undermined agreements, extending the 
pattern of political marginalization of remote provinces within Indonesia (Aspinall & Crouch 2003). This 
fits a wider global pattern, given that negotiated peace agreements revert to conflict at roughly three 
times the rate of conflicts ended through an outright victory by one side (Call & Cousens 2008).   
A peace agreement that successfully brought peace to Aceh in 2005 was viable as a result of increased 
space to reach a negotiated settlement given fundamental changes in the structure of the Indonesian 
state including increased democracy, decentralization and civil authority over the military (Morfit 
2007:113, Barron & Burke 2008). The agreement included considerable concessions to Acehnese 
aspirations, supporting the transition of the rebel group GAM into a successful democratic political 
party.  Elsewhere, in Sri Lanka, conflict ended after 33 years in 2009 as the government defeated the 
rebel LTTE militarily (ICG 2010). In most peripheral conflicts, however, such a forthright military victory 
is considered unlikely given the unconventional military tactics that rebels adopt and long-term 
stalemate that typically ensues. 
The Aceh case underlines the importance of the nature of the state to peripheral conflicts and 
associated horizontal inequalities (Stewart et al. 2008:295), suggesting that negotiations alone are 
unlikely to satisfy rebel demands over the longer term and sustainably reduce wider grievances unless 
accompanied by the kind of structural changes seen in Indonesia. Bringing a sustainable and just peace 
to peripheral conflicts is likely to involve changing the centre’s relationship with the periphery in order 
to find such common ground (Brown 1988, Liow 2006). It remains to be seen whether the Indonesian 
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state’s historical centripetal tendencies referred to above will threaten the Acehnese peace agreement 
and whether Tamil resentment at political and cultural marginalization in Sri Lanka will reassert itself in 
a violent form in future. 
2.3 Cultural status inequalities: defining ethnicity and identity 
Explanation of peripheral conflicts is supported by taking into account associations between political, 
economic, social, and cultural status inequalities. The following parts of this chapter describe how 
political marginalization of the periphery is part of modern developmental change and ongoing nation 
state construction in much of South and Southeast Asia. Emphasis is placed in particular on the 
construction and maintenance of national and peripheral identities. 
Many of the links between war-making and state-making made by Charles Tilly (1985, 1992) in a 
European context can be applied to peripheral conflicts. From the perspective of ethnic groups and 
peripheral conflict in particular, it is essential to consider the socio-cultural unit of the nation as well as 
the legal and political unit of the state: 
For decades, it was assumed that economic development, modernization and nationalism 
would do away with those messy cultural identities, which is why the extremely problematic 
elision of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ could be overlooked for so long (Ferguson & Whitehead 1999:xix). 
The perceived significance of identity and ethnicity has not diminished as modernity theories had 
predicted (Harvey 1989). The use and construction of ethnic identity in opposition to a central state can 
be considered as part of wider processes that become violent in some contexts (Henders 2004). Key 
elements include the heavy ethnic content of much ‘late’ nationalism that builds on and in cases 
constructs enduring symbols of identity (Smith 1991). These traits can be located within the framework 
of modernist development without reducing identity to a product of economic process alone (Gellner 
1964, Hobsbawm 1990, Anderson 1991). 
Peripheral conflicts therefore cannot be boiled down to a single root cause but involve a complex nexus 
of factors including ethnicity, state-led nationalism and development and counter protest.50 Efforts to 
“Isolate identity as an independent variable” (Fearon & Laitin 2000), or to reduce complex issues of 
ethnicity to quantifiable indices of horizontal inequality or linguistic fragmentation, are likely to miss the 
bigger picture given that identity is itself a multifaceted and complex concept (Connor 1984, Ballentine 
& Sherman 2003, Kalyvas 2008:1044). Economic methodologies typically manage to capture individual 
motivations (Collier & Hoeffler 2004) but do not as effectively address aspects of group identity. Other 
approaches address political structures and ethnicity, focusing especially on how different democratic 
systems manage inequalities and tensions in ethnically plural societies (Gurr 2000, Horowitz 2000). Such 
political analysis needs to capture processes of identity construction and maintenance rather than 
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seeing ethnicity as a fixed precursor to national political systems.51 Analysis of ethnicity or identity often 
involves a more qualitative approach that leans towards political anthropology or sociology and is 
grounded in local context.52 
Ethnicity is regarded in this thesis as something with a heavy cultural content that is found in all 
societies. Construction of ethnicity is an ongoing process in which group boundaries shift over time 
(Anderson 1983). Ethnicities are regularly reinforced or adapted by group leaders, within state 
institutions or outside the state, as a mechanism for mobilizing support or maintaining authority (Cohen 
1974). Being ubiquitous does not in any sense make conflict along ethnic lines unavoidable, however. 
There is certainly nothing inevitable about the ‘clashes of civilizations’ predicted by Samuel Huntingdon 
and others (Bowen 1996). The concept of ethnicity can be applied without adopting a ‘primordial’ 
approach in which the term takes on a meaning far closer to that of the word ‘race’, implying 
permanence grounded in physical difference or immutable cultural properties (Stewart 2008b:8). It is 
also important to move away from an expectation that ethnically defined struggles are somehow 
ancient or instinctive. Analysis of peripheral conflicts supports criticism of the idea that ‘new’ wars are 
more rooted in base instincts than ‘old’ wars (Kalyvas 2001).53 
Recent work on horizontal inequalities has adopted a more subtle understanding of ethnicity and 
identity, emphasizing case study analysis and recognizing the significance of people’s perception.54 The 
importance of how relative differences are perceived emerges from many case studies conducted by 
Stewart et al. (2003, 2008:293-4, 2008b), tallying with constructivist notions of ethnicity that emphasize 
the importance of what people think ethnicities to be (Barth 1969, Anderson 1988).55 Studies of social 
(as opposed to psychological) identity often concentrate on the construction of boundaries, with group 
identities formed largely in opposition to something else. Boundaries can be formed geographically as 
lines on a map, symbolically through cultural expression, or through a combination of the two (Barth 
1969, Cohen 1985). An emphasis on boundaries in identity construction fits the geographical and ethnic 
context of peripheral conflicts, where minorities define themselves in opposition to a mainstream 
national unit that itself is often largely ethnically defined. Such boundaries are in practice both flexible 
and partially permeable, identity-based violence typically polarizing and hardening existing differences. 
Notions of horizontal inequality need to be applied cautiously in order to avoid essentializing a complex 
reality, recognizing both the flexibility of constructed categories and interactions with inequalities based 
around caste, class, gender and other distinctions.56 
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The meanings ascribed to cultural attributes such as language or a shared version of history are core 
aspects of how ethnic groups are defined, binding group members together and differentiating them 
from others (Langer & Brown 2008:42). While recognizing that those with a vested interest and 
sufficient power regularly use and manipulate interpretations of culture for specific ends,57 this thesis 
conceptualizes culture as a combination of beliefs, attributes and actions affected by many aspects 
including geographical and historical circumstance. Stewart et al. (2008:292-293) find that cultural 
status inequalities, such as differential treatment with respect to religion and language use or other 
forms of group discrimination, tend to increase the salience of group identity and become key aspects 
of conflict. Cultural differences are not enough in themselves to cause conflict but comparative analysis 
of horizontal inequalities diagnoses shared cultural ties within identity groups, when combined with 
strong perception of group deprivation, as a powerful source of potentially violent mobilization (Stewart 
& Brown 2005).58 
2.4 National unity and oppositional minority identity in peripheral conflicts 
Primordial uses of ethnicity and race are still prominent in conceptualizations of both national and 
peripheral identity. A notion of belonging or of identification with a place is not normally based on equal 
rights within a multicultural, cosmopolitan society.59 In much of the world, the term race is still used in 
an unreconstructed sense, for example in official Malaysian discourse that defines the natural racial and 
blood divisions of the population and devises policy accordingly (Kahn 2006). Ethnonationalist, 
peripheral identity that typifies peripheral conflict is typically defined by protagonists themselves in 
primordial terms, playing up the rights of a defined group of people to ancestral land (Di Tiro 1982, Che 
Man 1990). 
State nationalism is commonly built on a similar basis: historians and archaeologists in Indonesia or 
Thailand regularly produce new material apparently discovering the migratory routes of their nation’s 
pre-modern ancestors, justifying the present through constructing the past.60 A broad body of literature 
traces the maintenance of national identities, from focusing on specific enduring and self-replicating 
cultural attributes like language and religion (Smith 1991), to emphasizing the role of the state and elites 
in promoting nations as cultural constructs (Gellner 1964), to addressing the emergence of national 
consciousness through modernity.61 Many studies of politics and society in Southeast Asia give 
prominent emphasis to the construction and maintenance of national and other group identities.62  
The role of state institutions in promoting what in peripheral areas are ethnically polarizing forms of 
national identity is especially significant when considering the links between horizontal inequalities and 
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conflict. With many nation states in South and Southeast Asia being dominated by an ethnic majority 
group, efforts to assimilate or at least co-opt minorities into the ethnic majority mainstream receive 
widespread attention.63 As is explained in this section, nation-building regularly alienates ethnic 
minority groups and hardens boundaries, especially where a geographically peripheral concentration 
gives rise to territorial definitions of counter-identity, hampering the assimilation processes that are a 
common part of nation state consolidation.  
The state itself is seen here as a contested political arena, with elites and rising middle classes 
embracing nationalism as a means to exert authority, maintain order and extract resources. Rulers 
across Asia and elsewhere have intentionally promoted a unified national identity as a means to gain 
legitimacy among local elites and the wider population in order to maintain central control over 
otherwise disparate areas that fall within nation state boundaries. Promotion of national identity is 
often a response to a perceived threat, as seen through official encouragement of nationalism across 
much of Southeast Asia in the 1960s in response to provincial insurgency and fear of communism.64 
Even where elements of pluralism are promoted rather than a monocultural national model, 
assimilation of minority groups into the nation state, especially those along border areas, is a key 
element of nation-building and developmental ‘progress’ (Connor 1994). The historical and ongoing 
development of nation states typically involves expansion from a central core to cover the entirety of 
the area within its borders. This involves penetration by government institutions from the capital city 
into rural areas that they may have had little in common with in the past, especially in remote border 
regions where affiliations are often split between competing state powers as well as local leaders (Bates 
2001). Peripheral conflicts are located in such regions. Unrolling universal education, connecting all 
parts of the country through transport infrastructure and mass media, and creating tax-paying citizens 
are all widely seen in international development policy discourse as unquestionably positive acts that 
contribute to socioeconomic progress. In peripheral conflict areas, however, they may be interpreted as 
more controversial aspects of assimilation towards a universal national identity and increased central 
bureaucratic control over daily life.
65
 Claims by central institutions to represent citizens from different 
ethnic backgrounds are countered by the mono-ethnic nature of many states enduring peripheral 
conflict. The application of ‘Unity in Diversity’ as a state motto in Indonesia has parallels in the official 
recognition of different religions in Thailand (rather than Buddhism alone) and in some aspects of 
bilingualism in Sri Lanka. However, the perceived experiences of peripheral minorities are of 
discrimination in favour of minority populations in each case, with peripheral populations effectively 
marginalized in constructions of national identity.66  
                                                             
63
 For example Anderson (1998), Scott (2009). 
64
 See for example Wyatt (2003:271). 
65
 Ch.1 provides examples from the Far South of Thailand to illustrate this point, with further detail in Ch.5. 
Development includes both ‘immanent’ (i.e. unplanned) change and ‘intentional’ (i.e. planned) projects promoted 
by the state (Cowen & Shenton 1996:162). 
66
 See Ch.5 on Thailand and other parts of this chapter for further explanation. 
34 
 
Violence between an ethnic minority and state representatives risks further hardening attitudes, leading 
to polarized positions that become entrenched over time. Peripheral groups in cases form an ‘other’ 
that, alongside other factors, supports the definition of national identity (Thongchai 1994, Scott 2009).67 
In countries that have failed to peaceably manage tensions and demands in the peripheral areas, fears 
that concessions such as increased regional autonomy will lead to the eventual collapse of the nation 
state itself often dominate public opinion and the concerns of senior policymakers. In Indonesia these 
concerns were framed around the rejection of concessions that would lead to what are perceived as 
colonial federal arrangements (see Crouch & Aspinall 2003). In Thailand they have taken the form of 
concern over splitting the ethnic Thai nation’s historically protected territory.68  
A focus on identity as an important aspect of peripheral conflict complements rather than replaces 
political economy approaches. Core-periphery analyses are of particular relevance, stretching back to 
notions of internal colonialism (Williams 1977:274). Case studies stress how expanding nation states 
incorporate not only overseas colonies but also internal colonies (Hechter 1975, Hind 1984, Brown 
1994:160). Of particular relevance to contemporary Southeast Asia, market-oriented export promotion 
policies commonly create considerable wealth alongside equally significant regional disparities and 
relative inequalities. Centrally defined development policies promoting geographically concentrated 
growth poles and economic zones have regularly bypassed local populations, a process that is especially 
noticeable when such differences occur along ethnic lines (Wee & Jayasuriya 2002:478-481). 
In many late developing nation states in Southeast Asia and elsewhere rapid growth has stimulated 
significant opportunist and network-based associations between business and politics (Unger 2003). 
Investment typically expands from a primate capital city through close and often nepotistic relationships 
between the commercial and government sectors. These power networks typically follow, and in places 
displace, a legacy of traditional patronage links and proxy associations between central monarchs and 
local vassal leaders (Wolters 1999, Boege et al. 2008). As with earlier political structures, actions carried 
out by state actors are likely to reflect the interests of specific groups or individuals at different levels 
(Clapham 1985, North 2009). Economic interests and ethnic affiliation interact, with members of 
competitively well-positioned and more influential ethnic groups (Chinese in Southeast Asia being a 
common example) more likely to succeed individually and intergenerationally than other, more 
marginalized ethnic groups (Harvey 1999, Wee & Jayasuriya 2002).  
Some ethnic groups, or some elite figures within an ethnic group, may benefit from links with political 
and administrative institutions and associated secondary settlements. However, a majority of people in 
remote rural areas are often excluded from the direct support afforded by such patronage structures. 
Networks of patronage that channel resources to certain groups and as a result exclude others are 
central aspects of political leaders’ efforts to maintain authority in the semi-democratic regimes that are 
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commonly found across Southeast and South Asia.69 For excluded groups, a negative impression of the 
‘rent-seekers’ and ‘speculators’ who typically dominate emerging business and political structures in 
provincial Southeast Asia exacerbates perceptions of a culturally distant and increasingly invasive state 
(Yoshihara 1988, McVey 2000, Miller 2011). 
Migration from central to peripheral areas, either through planned resettlement projects or simply 
chasing economic opportunity, adds further to a local perception of colonization (MacAndrews 1978, 
Horowitz 2000:247). Migrants are typically considerably wealthier than the sedentary local population in 
peripheral conflict areas including Aceh, the Far South of Thailand, Mindanao, and Xinjiang, benefitting 
from superior networks to access a disproportionately large share of both government employment and 
business opportunities. Better-connected (often ethnic majority) businesses are more likely to benefit 
from new opportunities, while cultural barriers such as language or religious practices may limit 
minority access to education and employment.70 Insurgents and sympathizers in peripheral conflicts 
regularly criticize migration and unequal access to authority and business opportunities.71 
The capacity of government and other local institutions to manage tensions emerges as an important 
factor in studies of horizontal inequalities (Stewart et al. 2008:296). In peripheral conflicts this can be 
related to the relationship between the central state and the peripheral minority population. Different 
patterns emerge reflecting specific contexts. In Thailand, local state institutions that were largely 
established to create a homogenous, controllable nation still effectively act as outreach services of a 
highly centralized state. In the Malay Muslim majority Far South of Thailand, elected local officials 
struggle to gain the confidence of both their constituents and higher levels of government decision-
makers, leaving them with insufficient authority to address arising problems locally (Cornish 1997, 
McCargo 2008).72 Mindanao presents a contrasting political environment in which disputes between 
powerful ‘clan’ leaders, often working in association with higher-level politicians but given considerable 
licence to act independently, are prominent (Champain & Lara 2009). This creates different conflict 
dynamics on the ground involving a more complex range of actors, although the key feature that 
distinguishes the conflict remains the marginalization of a peripheral population and its representatives 
(McKenna 2007). Almost all studies of peripheral conflicts in the region – from Tibet to Western Papua – 
place primary emphasis on this feature. 
2.5 Identity in peripheral conflict areas  
From the perspective of peripheral minorities, negative aspects of rural transformation vary from overt 
violence through to symbolic and material changes to rural life. Expansion of national political and 
administrative systems involves bureaucratic, political and economic penetration at the local level: party 
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political machines canvassing for local support through securing the assistance of local leaders, often 
engaging in direct vote-buying, supplant previous power structures (Doolittle 2006); increasingly highly 
capitalized agriculture places pressure on smaller farmers, many of whom sell out and become landless 
or indebted (Scott 1985). Experiences of mistreatment when encountering representatives of the 
government emerge as a norm for the rural majority in most developing countries (Long 2001, 
Corbridge et al. 2005). Modern technology increases the scope to control private as well as public space 
(Chaiwat 2006). 
The perceived costs of developmental changes can be considerably greater for minorities distanced 
from the mainstream of society through language, religion or culture. Their group identity may be 
directly targeted by development that emanates from the centre. James Scott comments: “… projects of 
administrative, economic, and cultural standardization are ‘hard-wired’ into the architecture of the 
modern state itself” (2009:4). 
The record of cultural damage effected by nation states among peripheral ethnic groups in the name of 
national development is striking, including Turkish denial of the existence of a Kurdish identity, and 
Chinese restrictions on the practice of Buddhism in Tibet (Langer & Brown 2008:42-43). Government 
efforts to integrate ethnic minority identity into an inclusive nationalism rather than assimilating it out 
of existence, as seen in China’s recognition of ‘official minorities’ (Gladney 2008:139), may be seen more 
as attempts to assimilate and control than implying any serious aim to address horizontal inequalities. 
Everyday, universal development initiatives are also imbued with nationalist sentiment: written in foot-
high letters on a school gate in the Far South of Thailand, is the phrase: Education builds people, people 
build the nation.73 This is no different from similar messages adorning schools elsewhere in Thailand and 
in many other countries, but the phrase assumes a different meaning in an area where state authority is 
seen as an unwanted presence and children are being educated in what many parents see as a foreign 
language associated with a different religion (Liow 2009; also Uthai 1991, Jory 1999).
74
 
Just as cultural constructions of the nation state can become more strongly expressed and felt over 
time, so too can territorially based alternative identities. Ethnic ties and sentiments are created and 
perpetuated by many factors: ecological associations, social units, and cultural and symbolic issues such 
as religion, language and the arts. In several peripheral conflicts in South and Southeast Asia, a 
historically and geographically rooted sense of identity acts as a filter that strengthens selective 
interpretions of events. In Aceh and in the Far South of Thailand, local perceptions of the past depict 
their territory as one whose past wealth, religious piety and power have been damaged by external 
oppression (Chaiwat 2005:58, D Brown 2008:59). The comparisons made by people in peripheral conflict 
areas are significant in explaining their perceptions of inequality. In the Far South of Thailand, 
comparisons are typically made with more developed Thai Buddhist majority parts of the country rather 
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than with other, poorer peripheral areas.75 Sri Lankan Tamils frequently look towards the greater 
cultural and political recognition afforded to Tamils in South India and Uighurs in Xinjiang similarly look 
towards Central Asia. 
Studies of horizontal inequalities explain how disaffected elite leaders looking to benefit from division or 
conflict instrumentally promote exclusive or polarized ethnic affiliation (Brass 1991, Stewart 2008:53). 
From a class perspective, much separatism and ethnonationalism would be called popular revolt if it 
took place among the majority instead (McVey 1984:21). There are indeed common features linking 
such revolts and peripheral conflicts, including popular resentment at inequality and abuse of power or 
privileges by elite groups. Some ethnonationalist rebel groups including the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) in Sri 
Lanka and GAM (Free Aceh Movement) in Aceh have employed left-wing rhetoric, criticizing social and 
economic injustice. This was especially common during the 1970s when communist-associated rebellion 
was more commonplace.  
However, rebel leaders’ appeals for popular support in peripheral conflicts are frequently based 
primarily around territorial rights and cultural or religious traditions (Anderson 1991, Horowitz 2000). 
Rebels from privileged and humble backgrounds regularly express shared ethnic motivations.
76
 The 
Memorandum of Understanding signed by GAM rebels and the Government of Indonesia in August 
2005 following closed discussions between a small group of representatives of both sides77 included the 
following conditions: 
Para 1.1.5 – Aceh has the right to use regional symbols including a flag, a crest and a hymn. 
Para 1.1.6 – Kanun Aceh (local laws) will be re-established for Aceh respecting the historical 
traditions and customs of the people of Aceh *…+. 
Para 1.1.7 – The institution of Wali Nanggroe (Guardian of the Nation) with all its ceremonial 
attributes and entitlements will be established. 
The key point here is that identity needs to be understood as a factor in its own right that interacts with 
other political, social and economic factors rather than simply be seen as an instrument. People 
participate in group actions or rituals that symbolically affirm and heighten people’s awareness of a 
shared group identity for a variety of reasons (Cohen 1985:50). Group affiliations are often strongly – 
and emotionally – felt by all group members, including leaders. Group identity can be seen as a 
collective and existential need rather than merely the product of elite manipulation (Simpson 2011). 
Anthony Smith (1991) and others have explained that group identities normally have deep cultural and 
historical bases that cannot be dismissed as fictions. Rebel leaders and supporters in peripheral conflicts 
do not simply use identity as an instrument for their own satisfaction. Many often endure decades of 
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hardship in pursuit of their cause, while some leaders turn down potentially advantageous terms of 
peace.78 
At the same time as recognizing the importance of identity construction, it is important to move beyond 
stereotypes peddled on both sides of a conflict. Peripheral areas may contain as many internal 
differences as similarities. Rebel efforts to present a unified minority identity in the face of a greater 
external threat are in cases undermined by the presence of other minority groups that are themselves 
discriminated against, for instance Gayonese in Aceh (Bowen 1991, Horowitz 2000:267). In Mindanao, a 
discrete peripheral Moro identity is a fairly recent phenomenon imposed largely from outside, 
coalescing a singular mass out of diverse and fluid local groups (McKenna 1998). Even within a rebel 
movement, different personal or family motivations for using violence emerge over decades of conflict 
(Kalyvas 2001:111-112). 
Closer analysis helps challenge misconceptions of the periphery. Work on ‘lifeworlds’ can bring out the 
multiplicity of local perspectives, questioning centrally produced versions of history or the present 
(Chaiwat 2005). A related actor-oriented approach, focusing on the relationships between development 
workers and intended beneficiaries, can be applied usefully to conflict settings (Long 2001, Arce 2003). 
James Scott (1985) shows how the weak resist and challenge authority without resorting to mass 
violence through a range of subterfuges and tactics. Such approaches expose the multiple identities of 
many actors in peripheral conflict areas who negotiate different cultural spheres and spaces without 
necessarily finding it challenging or contradictory (Turner 1993, Hall 1996, Horstmann 2004). Peripheral 
conflicts may affect patterns of behaviour but they are not usually so intense that they thoroughly 
change people’s daily existence through steps such as forced resettlement or total cessation of 
economic activity through chronic insecurity. Indeed, by concentrating on violence it is easy to forget 
that even in a conflict zone most people’s lives continue to be affected by many factors that only relate 
indirectly to violence (Richards 2005:12-13). For example, randomized surveys conducted during 
ongoing low-level peripheral conflict in the Far South of Thailand have shown that people repeatedly 
rate drug abuse and unemployment as more important local issues than conflict itself (Unicef 2008, TAF 
2010). 
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2.6 Globalization and peripheral conflict  
Peripheral conflicts are also shaped by the wider international and regional context, from the significant 
roles of neighbouring countries (such as India in Sri Lanka or Malaysia in the Far South of Thailand), to 
international flows of ideas (including global Islamic identity as a factor in various peripheral conflicts 
involving Muslim minorities),
79
 to specific interventions (such as foreign funding of both rebel groups 
and governments). It is argued here that international influences interact with the centre and periphery 
in complex and sometimes contradictory ways. 
The orientation of national economies around globally defined norms, including the need to attract 
capital flows, has altered relationships between peripheral areas and central state structures. Stewart 
(1998) criticizes imposed neoliberal economic approaches associated with ‘globalization’ in the late 
twentieth century and beyond that limit governments’ capacity to enact policies to address horizontal 
inequalities. She mentions that largely positive government interventions up to the 1980s including 
Malaysia’s New Economic Policy and Sri Lanka’s investment in human development in the years 
preceding ethnic conflict would not subsequently have been possible. 
The effects of cultural and economic aspects of globalization and associated changes can be overstated 
or overly simplified, however.80 Overall, there is little evidence linking increasing cross-border flows of 
capital with a consistent shift in the nature or severity of peripheral conflicts. Peripheral conflicts in 
South and Southeast Asia existed both before and after economic liberalization during the 1980s and 
1990s. Far from being inaccessible and underdeveloped backwaters, many peripheral conflict sites such 
as coastal Aceh or Jaffna in northern Sri Lanka have a rich legacy of connections with the outside world 
(Reid 2008). Both ethnic nationalism and ethnonationalist peripheral resistance have always been 
shaped by interactions between transnational drivers and domestic factors (Sidel 2003), including 
changing economic relationships and shifting identity affiliations at the global, national and local levels. 
In Sri Lanka, for example, rising ethnic tension in the 1970s and subsequent decades of violence have 
been related to the unexpected manner in which liberal economic reforms interacted with long-term 
Sinhalese domination of political space (Spencer 1990, Herring 2003, Richardson 2005).  
Linda Weiss (1997) finds that proponents of globalization seriously underrate the variety and 
adaptability of state capacities, which build on historically framed national institutions. International 
structures continue to promote and guarantee the fixed borders of nation states despite their often 
arbitrary nature (North et al. 2007:34). Michael Mann (1997:472) concludes that changing relationships 
between local, national and international levels show no consistent pattern but are more likely overall 
to weaken local networks than national ones. At the same time, global movements can boost the 
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strength of anti-state movements. For example, expanding diaspora populations directly support 
territorial opposition to national governments in many peripheral conflicts (Appadurai 1990).  
2.7 Can development interventions help end peripheral conflicts? 
We have seen so far that development is an aspect of the processes that lead to and sustain peripheral 
conflicts. This section describes how planned development interventions relate to peripheral areas, 
emphasizing the challenges created by the multi-dimensional aspects of peripheral conflicts. The part 
then considers whether they offer a way to promote resolution of ongoing violence.81 
Development is often an inherently nationalist as well as a more narrowly defined socioeconomic 
project. The pre-eminent unit of modern political organization, the nation state is the key institution for 
developmental action as well as political organization. In most contexts, development is measured, and 
usually framed, in terms of national statistics and objectives.82 The pursuit in Malaysia of modern 
developed status by the year 2020, Buddhist-infused notions of a sufficiency economy in Thailand, rural 
welfarist development in Sri Lanka, developmental elements of Suharto’s notion of pancasila in 
Indonesia, and rapid industrialization under a communist-led free market system in Vietnam and China, 
all link closely with nationalism both in popular perception and in policymaking. The concepts are 
intentionally promoted as nation-building tools that cement the authority and legitimacy of powerful 
groups or individuals. The vernacular terms for development in different languages commonly reflect 
this, typically implying order and stability to be achieved through national progress.83 
Many development schemes suit the interests of majority populations rather than peripheral or 
minority groups. On occasion this is an intentional government policy objective: national resettlement 
projects such as components of the Mahaweli project in Sri Lanka and transmigration (transmigrasi) in 
Indonesia favoured migrants over indigenous peripheral minorities and aimed in part to pacify 
peripheral areas (see Herring 2003). Elsewhere, failures to benefit from development projects may 
reflect the marginalization of peripheral minorities from patronage networks and government processes 
that has already been described. Industrialization programmes in peripheral areas that generate 
opportunities to investors from elsewhere in the country but are perceived to offer little to local 
populations, such as the Southern Seaboard project in Thailand or efforts to build an industrial base 
around natural gas exploitation in Aceh, have generated local resentment and become viewed as 
symptoms of external domination and imposition (King 2005, Aspinall 2007).84 
Governments commonly cast peripheral conflict problems in terms of economic underdevelopment, 
thereby justifying a narrow developmental approach and deflecting the need for political change that 
                                                             
81
 The next chapter concentrates specifically on internationally funded development and peacebuilding initiatives. 
82
 In addition to mainstream approaches, see Bernstein (2006:50-52) on the prominence of the nation state unit in 
the roots of Marxist economic theory and post-war practice. 
83
 The words for development in Thai (kanphattana), and in Malay / Indonesian (pembangunan) connote 
modernity, order and nationalism (Demaine 1986, Arghiros 2001:34-35, Hoey 2003:112). 
84
 See also Ch.7. 
41 
 
more systematically recognizes minority needs and inter-ethnic friction.85 Conservative approaches 
commonly predominate in a post-conflict scenario, aiming to rebuild what conflict destroyed rather 
than change the original conflict-prone status quo or promote deeper reconciliation (Keen 2000, 
Srikandarajah 2003, Denskus 2007). Development initiatives in peripheral areas may be less about 
finding equitable peace than seeking victory by non-military means. Development projects aimed at 
‘winning the hearts and minds’ of restless populations continue a long tradition of pacification. Civil and 
military bodies often apply development aid to curry local favour, from winning over the support of 
village leaders in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao (Cuyugan 2004) to demonstrating the benevolence 
of the military by building roads and local facilities in the Far South of Thailand (Bonura 2003).86 Such 
policies tend to perpetuate the centralized nation-building that has contributed to so many peripheral 
conflicts , with little shift in power relations or changes in policy, as has been observed in the Far South 
of Thailand, Xinjiang and elsewhere (Noiwong 2001, Dwyer 2005). 
This chapter has already demonstrated the significance of people’s perceptions and relative 
comparisons rather than absolutes in driving peripheral conflict. Considering the symbolic and discursive 
power of development interventions as well as their measurable socioeconomic impact helps 
understand how acts of supposed improvement are perceived on the ground (Crush 1993). A wealth of 
academic material addresses aspects of how development is practised and how interventions are 
perceived and whether they are accepted or resented.87 Critical factors include the working language of 
the development agency, the background and attitudes of development workers, and how local leaders 
are engaged. Attention may concentrate on national schemes that might have suited other parts of the 
country yet do not work in the specific peripheral locale, resentment being felt not at ineffectiveness or 
corruption directly but at the imposition of a standard national model that denies difference.88 Criticism 
of opaque contracting procedures and nepotistic networks may dominate local views of development 
projects, irrespective of their developmental impact.89 
For non-governmental or foreign organizations hoping to promote peacebuilding, the need to gain the 
approval of national government regulators in order to operate is a significant practical barrier.90  The 
context is compounded by the practical challenges of development interventions working in areas with 
considerable security risks, as many project studies demonstrate.91 However, as is explained below, 
development initiatives can in certain cases still play a valuable role in promoting peace and 
reconciliation. Many kinds of intervention have in different locations supported sustainable and just 
peace, contributing to structural change processes as well as shorter term negotiations (Smith 2004).  
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Many sources from the vast body of literature on conflict prevention and post-conflict intervention 
address development initiatives.92 Development practitioners or politicians aiming to promote equality 
of outcomes have decades of experience of different approaches, the form of which typically depends 
on specific context. Issues of participation and accountability (Cornwall 2000, Eyben & Ladbury 2006) 
are particularly relevant where the state ignores local interests, as is work on many dimensions of social 
exclusion (Sen 2000, Burchardt et al. 2002), and human rights and justice (Grugel & Piper 2009).  
Three fields of intervention are identified here. The first involves promoting changes in how central 
state institutions operate. Redefining development practice as a field both supporting structural change 
and promoting peace involves a shift towards a more transformative and politically aware approach 
(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2005:209-212). Stewart et al. (2008) place primary emphasis on the 
need for reforms to national political and administrative structures to counter horizontal inequalities. 
They summarize a range of reforms that have been undertaken in different contexts: adaptations to 
political mechanisms to foster political participation by otherwise marginalized minority groups; 
ombudsmen and monitoring bodies to challenge discriminatory practice; preferential ‘affirmative 
action’ to offer employment or education to minorities; restructuring fiscal policies that are otherwise 
blind to horizontal inequalities; land reform or other asset redistribution; reforms to language policies. 
Changes in how states define and promote national identity would be even more fundamental steps to 
address the roots of peripheral conflict. 
A second field consists of decentralization, increased autonomy, and area-based initiatives falling short 
of full separation for peripheral regions.93 Such steps form core aspects of most proposals for solving 
peripheral unrest. Autonomy carries symbolic as well as material and political significance. It has the 
scope to create more legitimate channels for local leaders to seek political power and benefit from 
business opportunities (Hechter et al. 2006). Decentralization fits particularly into developmental 
approaches, from popular participation to restructuring of government agencies, associated at least in 
theory with better management of local problems (G Brown 2008). Decentralized development budgets 
and initiatives can support local autonomy agreements. For example, laws on autonomy in Aceh 
allocated extra national funding amounting to US$250 million annually to newly empowered local 
authorities, an increase in excess of 35% (Barron & Clark 2006). 
Decentralization has in cases been falsely presented as a technical panacea that masks other problems, 
while the reality of implementation rarely follows good governance orthodoxy (Klem & Douma 2008). 
As has been observed in the Far South of Thailand and in Mindanao (McCargo 2008, Balisacan et al. 
(2008),  decentralization can fuel local power struggles, invite abuse of authority, and further ethnic 
discrimination (Batterbury & Fernando 2006, Tranchant 2007). Key factors influencing how 
decentralization affects a peripheral conflict context include the specific dynamics of group differences, 
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the support of powerful local and national figures, the extent of local authorities’ financial 
independence from central institutions, and local administrative capacity (Weller & Wolff 2005, Siegle & 
Mahoney 2006, Diprose & Ukiwo 2008). 
Third, where a peace process is ongoing, development initiatives can support specific elements of it, 
furthering the scope for finding common ground between conflict actors. In the immediate context of 
negotiations, development funding can build areas of initial agreement. Issues range from financial 
assistance to back peace initiatives and associated policies94, economic policy advice (Woodward 2002), 
actual reconciliation processes between opposing groups or victims of conflict (Rosoux 2009), and the 
‘reintegration’ of armed groups (Berdal & Ucko 2009). 
These three fields of action depend on existing political will to address the underlying problem, a rare 
commodity in peripheral conflicts. Groups aiming to address the causes of peripheral conflict frequently 
aim to build political commitment or promote small initiatives in the hope that they will catalyse further 
change. Non-governmental advocacy groups apply many of the lobbying and advocacy strategies 
commonly used in other contexts. Although often marginalized by more powerful political forces,95 they 
can on occasion achieve some success. NGOs have worked to promote accountability and rein in abuses 
of justice by state actors in the Philippines and Indonesia. For example, in the Far South of Thailand, a 
semi-autonomous think-tank working alongside academics in public universities has promoted political 
space for discussion of potential autonomy.96 In other cases, specific government agencies can carry out 
limited reforms even if mainstream political support is absent. Examples include programmes to 
improve education and health outreach to minorities, catering to specific linguistic or cultural needs or 
promoting pluralist values as part of national approaches (Bush & Saltarelli 2000, Liow 2009).  
2.8 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has emphasized the importance of understanding the interaction between different 
aspects of horizontal inequality in peripheral conflicts. It has explained the prominence of cultural 
factors as well as the particular challenges faced by interventions aiming to promote peace.  
Peripheral conflicts have specific historical roots and fluctuating dynamics that reflect shifting local 
contexts, although they also share common resemblances including discrete territorial demarcation and 
ethnic divide between a marginalized minority and the nation state. The long-lasting nature of 
peripheral conflicts is related to the marginalization of peripheral minorities from national political 
settlements and from broader nation-building processes that often contain strong ethnic elements and 
play an important role in legitimizing authority. Secondary settlements between national leaders and 
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representatives of peripheral areas, meanwhile, typically offer only superficial agreements that fail to 
address underlying horizontal economic, social, political and cultural status inequalities. 
In common with findings presented by Stewart et al. (2008), this chapter has explained that the nature 
of the state is of fundamental importance to the form and duration of peripheral conflict. In particular, 
long-term processes of nation state formation, associated constructions of ethnically exclusive national 
identity, and the incorporation of peripheral areas are challenged by peripheral counter-identities that 
can harden in response to attempted assimilation and the perceived marginalization of local authority 
figures. Perceptions of inequality among peripheral populations are especially important. Peripheral 
conflict areas are often not statistically any poorer economically than other remote parts of a country 
but local populations in peripheral areas may nonetheless feel disadvantaged in comparison with 
central areas and ethnic majority populations. 
It follows that efforts to end peripheral conflict sustainably are likely to involve changing how the 
central state engages with the peripheral conflict area. Stewart et al. and others have shown that 
reforms to address the horizontal inequalities that underpin peripheral conflict are possible, through 
moderating national political processes or policies including offering forms of increased autonomy to 
peripheral areas. However, in many cases there is little incentive for governments to undertake these 
steps. In an environment where the national government is pursuing a security-based approach to 
contain or solve violence, and typically employs developmental initiatives as part of efforts to establish 
its authority or to defeat peripheral resistance, the scope for addressing violence and its causes through 
developmental initiatives is likely to be limited. The prominence of contested national and subnational 
identities (and associated cultural status inequalities) in peripheral conflicts further limits the space to 
promote peace through developmental interventions. In the absence of central state commitment to 
significant changes, opportunities to promote peace are likely to be limited to relatively low-profile 
reforms undertaken by specific government agencies and non-governmental initiatives that advocate 
for policy modifications. 
  
45 
 
Chapter Three  A Mixed Record: Foreign Aid and Peacebuilding in Peripheral 
   Conflicts 
 
Having explored the main properties of peripheral conflicts, this chapter focuses on the role of foreign 
aid. It sets the scene for subsequent empirical analysis of how aid agencies address peripheral conflict in 
the Far South of Thailand. 
This chapter first asks whether external intervention, and foreign aid in particular, can play a useful role 
in preventing or resolving peripheral conflict. Referring to assessments of aid and horizontal inequalities 
and presenting supportive case study material, the chapter considers how international development 
agencies address peripheral conflicts. It suggests that, in practice, foreign aid agencies often struggle to 
address peripheral conflicts or underlying horizontal inequalities through their work despite concerted 
attention having been paid to linking peacebuilding policies with development approaches. However, 
some comparatively successful interventions have been undertaken, showing that the pattern of foreign 
aid involvement in peacebuilding varies rather than following a single trend. 
The chapter then explains why this pattern emerges, exploring the reasons why international aid actors 
frequently appear blind to or ignorant of horizontal inequalities (Stewart et al. 2008:297). Drawing from 
literature addressing the practice of foreign aid provision in countries experiencing peripheral conflict 
(and in other settings where relevant), three specific themes are identified and discussed: the 
motivations that dominate policy formulation and priority setting; the interface between foreign aid 
agencies and domestic recipients; and the actual practice of implementing programmes and projects. 
These themes are explained in this chapter and applied in subsequent chapters in relation to empirical 
material. Overall, it is suggested that common properties both of peripheral conflicts and of aid agencies 
themselves limit the scope to turn stated peacebuilding objectives into practice, even where aid officials 
are fully aware of the conflict context and underlying inequalities. 
3.1 Using development assistance to address conflict 
Foreign aid has figured increasingly prominently as an element of peacebuilding alongside diplomatic 
and military interventions since the early 1990s. Most official and non-governmental development 
agencies have peacebuilding policies and many have specialist staff or dedicated departments. United 
Nations reports, international commissions and policy statements are joined by good practice guides, 
academic journals and a consultancy industry in what amounts to a thorough institutionalization of 
peacebuilding (Barnett et al. 2007). 
Recent conceptual thinking over the links between conflict, development and foreign aid covers wide 
ground (Uvin 2000). At the level of development practice, initial emphasis was placed in the 1990s on 
the need to ensure that aid funds at least ‘do no harm’ given a record of unwittingly contributing to 
conflict (Anderson 1999). Subsequent policy-directed analysis has looked more closely at the struggles 
encountered in delivering aid in conflict environments (Addison & McGillivray 2004). Some advocates 
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have promoted ‘conflict sensitive’ approaches (Paffenholz 2005). From a broader perspective, 
reformists have promoted greater attention to peacebuilding as an inherent part of foreign policy, 
stressing a notion of human security (Kaldor et al. 2007). 
The role of foreign aid in peacebuilding has been criticized from various angles. Aid agencies have been 
understandably condemned as major promoters of the liberal economic reforms that destabilized 
fragile peace processes in Central America and elsewhere (Paris 2002). They are also seen on occasion 
as providers of humanitarian and developmental palliatives that help justify military campaigns 
(Newman 2009). Further common traits of peacebuilding operations have included a failure to recognize 
the limits to what external intervention can achieve and a ‘Wilsonian’ expectation that elections and 
rapid democratization from above can override the internal rifts or structural tensions that led to civil 
war in the first place (Paris 2004, Chandler 2006). Such approaches are typically based on the norm of a 
peaceful state that assumes a Weberian monopoly of legitimate violence and acts as a benevolent 
guarantor of domestic peace (Boege et al. 2008), alongside blindness to the politicized and factionalized 
institutions that typify developing countries (Roberts 2009). 
Valid as these criticisms are, Roland Paris (2010) and others find that recent patterns of external 
intervention in peacebuilding are not straightforward.97 Complexity and inconsistency of government 
policymaking and implementation within and between many countries is common and foreign aid, like 
other fields of intergovernmental activity, reflects a range of values and policy objectives (Chandler 
2010:25). Paris (2010:354) points to various positive trends within aid and peacebuilding practice that 
demonstrate the inadequacy of blanket critiques, including concerted efforts made by many agencies to 
promote universal human rights. Paris states that international peacebuilding actors are often aware of 
the need to respect national sovereignty rather than impose external interventions, typically aiming to 
establish peacebuilding interventions only on a strictly temporary basis.98 Some recognized failures, 
such as a tendency to supplant rather than support domestic institutions, have in cases been addressed 
in subsequent initiatives.99 Furthermore, Paris finds that it is simplistic to depict the role of the UN and 
other international bodies as a purely neo-colonial or self-interested imposition (ibid.:350). Cases of 
unjustified and highly problematical interventions exist alongside others that have been more successful 
in conflict contexts as diverse as Bosnia, Guatemala, Sierra Leone and East Timor. Other reviews show 
that foreign aid can promote peace in a range of ways, by supporting long-term incremental 
‘transformative’ steps to promote inclusive political systems and tackle horizontal inequalities as well as 
through narrow technical inputs during ongoing peace processes (Esman 2003, Paris 2004, Chigas & 
Woodrow 2009). 
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3.2 How foreign aid agencies address peripheral conflicts 
Building particularly on assessments of aid and horizontal inequalities, this section explores the diversity 
of responses that can be found in different peripheral conflict contexts, finding that the scope of 
international agencies to engage in countries affected by peripheral conflicts is often limited, with 
‘recipient’ governments regularly resisting perceived foreign interference through aid provision and 
other means. Following a discussion of donor involvement in conflict contexts in Sri Lanka and Aceh, 
reasons for the diverse pattern are considered. 
Stewart et al. (2008:315-316) find through appraising many different case studies of horizontal 
inequalities and conflict that foreign aid often in practice reinforces existing inequalities in countries 
with ethnically diverse populations. They find that horizontal inequalities are often neglected in foreign 
aid policy, even in countries which are conflict-prone. A range of policies that follow the standard liberal 
prescriptions for economic growth and poverty reduction are criticized for being blind to inter-group 
differences, from IMF structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s (Stewart 1998, 2003) 
to Poverty Reduction Strategies of the 2000s (Stewart & Brown 2003, Eyben 2006). 
In terms of actual implementation, Stewart et al. describe how overall aid distribution in Mozambique 
shows a strong geographical bias towards more privileged regions, with a similar picture emerging in 
Ghana. In Nepal, aid agencies paid little or no attention to significant inequalities between regions and 
ethnic groups until after the advent of serious violent conflict (Brown & Stewart 2006:17). The strongest 
example of such trends comes from Rwanda, where international agencies’ failure to recognize rising 
inter-ethnic political hostility led to continued backing for a regime that ultimately pursued ethnic 
genocide (Uvin 1998). 
Specific projects can be seen to have had a detrimental impact on horizontal inequalities and associated 
peripheral tensions in many countries, albeit on a less disastrous scale than in Rwanda. For example, 
Brown and Stewart (2006) consider World Bank support for the Indonesian Government’s 
transmigration programmes that relocated people from heavily populated Java to outlying provinces.100 
The programmes led to or exacerbated inter-group conflict in many areas. Their official developmental 
justification, to help develop underprivileged areas and to ease population pressure elsewhere, masked 
the more political motive of promoting effective internal colonization of the nation’s ethnically diverse 
peripheral regions partly by enabling the Indonesian military to establish zones of control on the 
ground.101 In examining the World Bank’s role, Brown and Stewart find little evidence to indicate 
whether World Bank officials involved in the design and support of transmigration projects were aware 
of this motive or had given any thought to their potential repercussions on ethnicity and the distribution 
of resources, or whether they simply assumed that the expected developmental gains of the project 
would outweigh the adverse impact of any local tensions raised (ibid.:8). 
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Foreign aid agencies do not uniformly fail to address conflicts associated with horizontal inequalities. On 
the contrary, Stewart et al. (2008:315-316) comment that international NGOs have had some success in 
addressing horizontal inequalities. They also find that official aid projects (i.e. from bilateral and 
multilateral agencies backed by government funding) are also able to undertake fairly straightforward 
yet valuable measures such as basic service provision in relatively deprived areas. Others discuss specific 
projects that have overtly addressed horizontal inequalities, such as a relatively successful USAID-
funded rural development project in conflict-affected Sri Lanka (Uphoff 2003). A range of reviews 
provide examples of interventions that can usefully address horizontal inequalities or ethnic conflict, 
many of which tally with the possible interventions listed at the end of the previous chapter (Uvin 1998, 
Esman 2003, Paris 2010). 
In order to illustrate more clearly how aid agencies address or avoid peripheral conflicts, two brief case 
studies follow that complement the more detailed material on the Far South of Thailand provided in 
later chapters. The first case study covers Aceh, the northernmost part of the island of Sumatra, 
Indonesia, with a population of around four million. From the emergence of conflict in Aceh in the 1970s 
until the fall of Suharto in 1998, foreign aid supported government development policies in many fields 
across Indonesia, backing the government alongside military assistance and economic investment. 
Controversial programmes funded by donors working closely with the government included economic 
development initiatives as well as transmigration that were perceived predominantly to benefit the 
central island of Java and migrants from Java, contributing to subsequent unrest.102 During the 1990s, 
with the Cold War over, donors increasingly looked to reform rather than back the centralized and 
undemocratic regime. After Suharto resigned amid acute political and economic unrest, donors and 
NGOs funded peacebuilding initiatives in many peripheral areas of Indonesia. They also supported 
decentralization policies and moves to strengthen democracy nationwide.103 But with conflict still 
ongoing in Aceh, most donors were denied access to the province. Despite Indonesian Government 
desire for international legitimacy, foreigners were rarely given permission by the military to enter 
Aceh. The few aid programmes that did operate either employed Indonesian staff working closely 
alongside government, or were limited to very marginal activities. Without a presence on the ground, 
and with a weighty list of other priorities across Indonesia, aid agencies were in a poor position to build 
any meaningful interventions (Aspinall & Crouch 2003, Barron & Burke 2008:15). 
The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 brought hundreds of donors and NGOs to Aceh for 
humanitarian work, but even then it was fairly simple for the Indonesian Government to keep them 
away from peacebuilding-related issues. Security guidance and instructions for foreign aid agencies 
banned them from working inland, stating inaccurately that the tsunami-hit coastal areas were 
unaffected by conflict. Despite contravening many agencies’ guidance on conflict, and the stance taken 
elsewhere in their Indonesia country programmes, most aid agencies were content to abide by the 
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restrictions, in the process simplifying their difficult humanitarian work and maintaining a good 
relationship with the government. This situation only changed significantly well after a peace process 
gathered momentum in late 2005, when government invited donors to cross the coastal road and work 
elsewhere in Aceh. It also asked them to support specific aspects of post-conflict reconciliation (Burke 
2008). From that point on, even though most donor-funded tsunami reconstruction programmes 
remained isolated from political events, various international aid agencies became increasingly involved 
in assisting the wider peace process. They supported domestically led developments with some success 
through village level funds, awareness campaigns, technical advice and other specific actions – many of 
which offered valued support to the ongoing peace process (Multi-Stakeholder Review 2009). 
Sri Lanka provides the second short case study. The island nation state’s early development successes 
were based on government employment creation and service provision, backed by high levels of donor 
funding. In the 1970s, the government liberalized elements of the economy, with donors providing 
project funding to soften the impact. Throughout this process, chauvinist government policies and 
ethnically skewed patronage systems led to increased resentment within the Tamil minority population, 
laying the ground for the rise of the LTTE and over 25 years of violence. The failure of aid agencies to 
ameliorate deteriorating conditions, effectively continuing to support discriminatory government aid 
through their programmes, have been well documented (Herring 2003, Richardson 2005). Even as late 
as 2001, after eighteen years of violence responsible for at least 65,000 deaths, the bulk of donors were 
still conducting “Business as usual”, funding a standard range of aid programmes that avoided conflict-
affected areas and related politically sensitive issues.104 Over time, more donors and NGOs did begin to 
focus on peacebuilding, to the extent that Sri Lanka became a test-bed for many small projects working 
with civil groups. As a peace process began in 2003, donors swung behind the Sri Lankan Government, 
offering some US$4.5 billion in concessional loans conditional on continued negotiations with the LTTE 
(Burke & Mulakala 2011:161). This turned out to be a false dawn: the peace process collapsed following 
a change of government and limited LTTE commitment, with donor influence shown to be very limited. 
Some aid agencies reverted to mainstream programming and others abandoned their involvement 
entirely, leaving behind a small range of donor-funded initiatives (Goodhand & Klem 2005, Burke & 
Mulakala 2011). 
These two brief case studies illustrate the variety of peripheral conflicts and associated foreign aid 
provision, although some common patterns do emerge. In both cases, major responses could not be 
implemented by foreign agencies, although some engagement was possible. This follows the general 
pattern whereby donor impositions rarely work as planned in conflict contexts and indeed many other 
environments (Killick 1998, Boyce 2002).105 The capacity of foreign aid agencies and other international 
bodies to address peripheral conflict is commonly limited by the desire and sovereign right of a national 
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government to keep them out.106 Foreign aid flows form a small or even economically insignificant 
proportion of national income and a low percentage of government budgets in many countries 
experiencing peripheral conflicts. Donors have little direct influence at the national level as a result. 
Donors have been excluded from Xinjiang and Tibet, from the various conflicts in Northeast India, from 
addressing separatist concerns in Pakistani Baluchistan, and from overt tensions among minority groups 
in the highlands of Vietnam and Laos. For many years they were also kept out of Aceh and Western 
Papua in Indonesia, while their role in Sri Lanka and the Far South of Thailand has been heavily 
circumscribed by the respective national governments.107 
Overall, if donor aims and policies towards peacebuilding are not aligned with dominant recipient 
government interests, they appear to be hard to implement. Where a peripheral conflict is ongoing and 
a government is not pursuing a negotiated solution, donors interested in promoting peace may have 
few options, perhaps providing small funds for NGOs or humanitarian activities as seen in Sri Lanka. At 
the same time, donors were also themselves only partially committed to addressing conflict in both Sri 
Lanka and Indonesia, reflecting patterns that Stewart and others have documented. Foreign aid to 
countries including Sri Lanka and Indonesia typically avoids conflict issues. In Aceh, many foreign aid 
donors showed little interest in Aceh’s violent peripheral conflict even after space to engage gradually 
opened up following the peace process that commenced in August 2005. More widely, some of the 
major proponents of using foreign aid for peacebuilding put remarkably low levels of resources directly 
into it. From 1997 to 2005, the World Bank Post-Conflict Fund disbursed a total of just US$66.7 million. 
Meanwhile, the 2005 budget for the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives was US$48.6 million in 2005, 
which means that it received only 3.5% of a total USAID budget of US$9.1 billion. Barnett et al. (2007) 
comment that although the global peacebuilding agenda might look impressive, it remains minute in 
comparison with the full range of activities undertaken by these and other organizations, in conflict 
areas or elsewhere. 
Yet donors were able in both Aceh and Sri Lanka to address peripheral conflicts in some ways and in 
some circumstances. This shows that aid agencies do occasionally manage to overcome both external 
barriers and their own internal restrictions, finding some ways to support peacebuilding in peripheral 
conflicts even if on a small scale. They have done so in other cases including Mindanao and the Far 
South of Thailand, through a variety of initiatives both before and after peace processes were 
established between governments and rebel groups. Examples exist of foreign aid support for 
peacebuilding in peripheral conflicts with reference to the three relevant fields of developmental 
interventions mentioned in the previous chapter: supporting changes in how the central state operates; 
strengthening local institutions in peripheral areas; and adopting specific measures to back peace 
processes.108 It is therefore important to break down generic, global statements over development and 
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international peacebuilding, since specific contexts and the practices of aid agencies themselves appear 
to affect actions and outcomes significantly. 
Responses to peripheral conflict appear to vary significantly across and even within different aid 
agencies. In post-tsunami Aceh, some international agencies found ways to address peacebuilding 
issues over time. However, other agencies, both NGOs and official bilateral or multilateral donors, kept 
clear of issues that they considered too political (Barron & Burke 2008). Several donors who were 
involved in supporting the peace process including UNDP and the World Bank struggled to link their 
main post-tsunami reconstruction work with their peacebuilding support. A US$600 million joint donor 
fund for post-tsunami reconstruction supported by UNDP and the World Bank stipulated support for the 
peace process as one of its objectives, but a detailed evaluation found that few of the projects it funded 
paid any attention to it (OPM 2009).  A further example comes from Sri Lanka in early 2009, where just 
as Western donors were cancelling some aid projects in protest at civilian casualties, human rights 
abuses and media restrictions during the Sri Lankan government’s military campaign, a US$1.9 billion 
IMF loan to the Sri Lankan Government was agreed (Charbonneau & Sirilal 2009). 
The mixed picture of donor consideration of peripheral conflict is a consequence of a range of factors 
relating to the nature of peripheral conflict and of donors themselves. The subsequent parts of this 
chapter explain in greater detail why a mixed pattern of donor assistance to peripheral conflict emerges, 
regular failures to address peripheral conflict contrasting with some positive steps. They explain how 
foreign aid agencies’ own internal limitations, and the ways in which agencies relate to recipient 
governments, often limit their scope to engage in the potential fields of peacebuilding highlighted in 
Chapter Two.109 The parts stress structural factors affecting the translation of donors’ global 
peacebuilding policies into specific foreign aid practice, providing examples from Aceh, Sri Lanka and 
elsewhere. Emphasis is placed on donor policy formation at the national level given its significance for 
the formulation and implementation of peacebuilding plans, as is later explained. Of particular interest 
is what insight existing literature provides to help explain why aid agencies are at times able to set up 
programmes to tackle peripheral conflict, when in other cases they do not do so despite global 
commitments to promote peace as a central part of aid policy. The rest of the chapter looks beyond 
existing literature on horizontal inequalities and related approaches, considering material analysing 
foreign aid interventions more generally. Some of the core lessons of development practice established 
over past decades have been un-learnt in the peacebuilding field (Neufeldt 2007), indicating a need to 
revisit a wider body of literature in order to take research forward.110   
The following parts of this chapter each apply one of three inter-related themes to enable exploration of 
the core issues and constraints that affect donor peacebuilding in peripheral conflicts. The first theme, 
motivations, considers the reasons behind donors’ differing interests in peripheral conflicts. The second 
theme, the interface, explores how donors engage with domestic recipients, focusing on critical 
                                                             
109
 See Ch.2 (Part 2.7). 
110
 Chambers (1983), Porter, Allen & Thompson (1991), Killick (1998), and Gibson et al. (2005) address wider failures 
to build on knowledge of development practice. 
52 
 
relationships with central government departments. This theme shows that specific bodies within 
recipient governments play a role in shaping whether and how donor aid is provided at the same time 
as being actors in peripheral conflicts. The third theme, practice, considers how recurring practical 
issues of implementation add further barriers to implementing external peacebuilding approaches that 
only some agencies overcome. 
3.3 Motivations: diverse reasons for foreign aid 
Motivation here means the underlying reasons or interests that lead to action and behaviour, 
encompassing both the interests and incentives that affect donor policies and aid funding decisions and 
the structural roots of international development policymaking.111 The motivations of aid actors are 
explained here with reference to political economy analyses of aid. Use is also made of anthropological 
analyses of foreign aid institutions and literature on incentives to help explain the specific interests of 
aid agencies and their staff. Anthropological and political economy approaches are combined in this way 
in analyses of aid provision with specific relevance for peripheral conflict environments.112 
This section first briefly addresses the interests and political incentives that dominate donor countries’ 
foreign policies and aid funding decisions. Structural trends that affect foreign aid decision-making and 
practice can be identified, moving beyond suggestions that ignorance is the main problem (Stewart et 
al. 2008:297). The section then addresses the structural roots of development itself, explaining how 
development as typically conceived and practised by aid agencies focuses on the socioeconomic 
progress of nation state units and struggles to conceptualize horizontal inequality and peripheral 
conflict. Finally, the section considers what properties are shown by aid agencies in cases where foreign 
aid is used to address peripheral conflicts. 
3.3a Foreign aid, political interests 
This short subsection acts as a basis for the following subsections by explaining how foreign aid 
provision in peripheral conflicts should be seen in its wider political context.113 Foreign aid has always 
responded to a variety of interests and influences, with the self-interest of donor governments a 
prominent feature. This can be traced from the Marshall Plan in the 1940s through to former UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s statements that aid for Africa is in Britain’s interest (CNN 2005). Links between 
foreign aid and intervention in conflicts are a perennial element of donor policymaking, often as part of 
wider foreign policy agendas. Agencies as varied as Oxfam, Unicef and the World Bank all have their 
roots in conflict and post-conflict related humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in the aftermath 
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of the Second World War. The Cold War context of the 1960s saw overtly politicized transfers of foreign 
aid to allies of the Soviet Union and the USA alike.114  
More recent engagement in peacebuilding by foreign aid agencies can be seen as a manifestation of an 
enduring development-security nexus (Duffield, 2001, 2007). Aid budgets are still used for wider donor 
government policy objectives, including security. UK donor DFID’s budget for Afghanistan has 
repeatedly been increased since the presence of British troops there. Increased aid expenditure in 
Afghanistan has little in common with the universal objectives found in DFID policy statements or the 
UN’s Millennium Development Goals. DFID’s Secretary of State, Andrew Mitchell, said: "Using the UK's 
aid budget to secure progress in Afghanistan will be my number one priority” (Helm & McVeigh 2010). 
Meanwhile, the more influential former Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, explained what ‘progress’ meant 
for the UK Government in this case: "We are not in Afghanistan for the sake of the education policy in a 
broken, 13th-century country. We are there so the people of Britain and our global interests are not 
threatened” (ibid.) 
Solving peripheral conflict is often of less direct foreign policy concern to donor governments than 
higher-profile conflicts elsewhere. At times, as the cases of Sri Lanka and Aceh showed, peripheral 
conflict may be a minor factor in the overall shape of an aid programme and in cases is passed by 
completely. An extreme example of conflict avoidance in aid delivery existed in Sri Lanka, where 
national data used by many donors simply missed out the affected provinces of the north and east. The 
areas appeared on many maps as a blank space, devoid of people as well as violence (see Figure 3a). 
As explained in Chapter Two, peripheral conflicts rarely present a security threat to donor nations and 
can in many cases be comfortably ignored. In the event that they are perceived as a threat – for 
example through a perceived risk of international terrorism from the group Abu Sayyaf in Mindanao, or 
through the potential for economic losses in Aceh, a province aligning a major international shipping 
lane and with natural gas reserves – the common response of donor nations at a policy level has for 
decades been led by their own security objectives: friendly governments are given aid and unfriendly 
ones are denied it (Addison 2000:406). In some cases, donors support military efforts to win peripheral 
conflicts. Examples are commonplace of donors providing some funding for peacebuilding initiatives 
while also maintaining military links with a government trying simultaneously to win peripheral 
conflicts: the UK’s aid and defence involvement in Sri Lanka from 1999 to 2005, and the USA’s 
engagement in Thailand from 2006 to 2009, are two recent cases.115 
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Figure 3a:  Map of poverty levels in Sri Lanka used by foreign aid agencies116 
 
Relationships that shape aid flows, whether through direct bilateral assistance or indirectly through 
multilateral organizations, are still typically established between donors and recipient nation states as 
part of wider foreign policy agendas encompassing commercial and other interests beyond security 
(White 1974, Hopkins 2000). Existing analyses of Japanese aid to various South and Southeast Asian 
countries affected by peripheral conflict demonstrate clearly the domestically powerful Japanese 
commercial interests that are served by fostering strong relationships with recipient governments.117 
Such interests are unlikely to benefit from efforts to use foreign aid to address controversial issues such 
as peripheral conflict. 
3.3b The deeper roots of development intervention 
Although the foreign policies of donor countries have long exerted a considerable influence on whether 
and how donors choose to attempt to address peripheral conflicts, they are not the only determinants 
of engagement. The motivations for providing foreign aid can also be traced back to the value-laden 
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roots of developmentalism. The notion of development rests on ideas of progress that, at least in the 
dominant form of aid from the mid-twentieth century on, involve the establishment of modern, 
‘civilized’ and peaceful independent nation states in the ‘developing’ world (Cowen & Shenton 1996:5). 
The UN Millennium Development Goals give an illustration of how these emancipatory aims are 
established by development agencies chiefly around socioeconomic indicators of progress, funded in 
part by donors but measured and implemented mostly by nation states.  
Development plans and targets are commonly framed by governments and international organizations 
through national level socioeconomic statistics that do not capture political aspects of domestic 
development processes, including their associations with horizontal inequalities (Boyce 2002:1032, 
Stewart et al. 2008:297-298, Francis 2010). Donor-funded projects are still typically implemented in 
close association with central state institutions (see the next part of this chapter) and are likely to back 
political and economic measures that generate or exacerbate perceived horizontal inequalities in cases 
where the state itself discriminates against minority groups or peripheral areas. In the extreme case of 
Rwanda, as Peter Uvin has shown, aid flows backed a relatively strong regime up to the point of 
orchestrating mass genocide (1998:226). More widely, as was explained in the previous chapter, 
development initiatives are often an aspect of wider nation-building that in many countries contains 
strong ethnic as well as civic properties, their impact stretching beyond the narrow and ostensibly 
apolitical socioeconomic framework adopted by many aid agencies.  
Stewart (2008b:17) finds that the inclusion of horizontal inequalities in development policy dialogue 
appears to require radical addition to socioeconomic debate that is ordinarily primarily focused on 
securing the adoption of an internationally recognized liberal policy framework, promoting efficient 
markets, and achieving poverty reduction. She criticizes this mainstream discourse for its blindness to 
horizontal inequalities and other differences within national populations. The negative impact of some 
structural adjustment policies on internal conflicts including those connected with strong horizontal 
inequalities has been widely addressed.118 It is hard to find direct links between macro-level policies and 
impact on peripheral conflicts in particular, although the effects of specific projects and sectoral 
interventions can be more easily traced. For example, Herring (2003) comments on foreign aid projects 
that accompanied economic reforms in Sri Lanka from the 1970s, finding that while donor funding was 
intended to support continued socioeconomic development, it also effectively financed the continued 
spread of political patronage networks and backed projects like the Mahaweli scheme with highly 
skewed ethnic outcomes. Other case studies reach similar conclusions.119  
Recent peacebuilding interventions have also regularly failed to recognize the challenges presented by 
horizontal inequalities. Although conflict units and other sections within foreign aid agencies do on 
occasion address peripheral conflicts directly (for example in Aceh), we have already seen that they 
typically offer relatively small sums of money for such peacebuilding efforts in comparison with overall 
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aid budgets. We have also seen that larger projects such as reconstruction work after the 2004 tsunami 
in Aceh tend to avoid such politically sensitive terrain unless given a political lead by both donor nations 
and the recipient government. Donors regularly steer clear of political issues with little apparent 
immediate relevance for programming or policymaking (Leftwich 2001:152-153). Some, including the 
multilateral lending banks, have no official mandate to engage in anything overtly political, while others 
including UN agencies maintain a strong respect for national sovereignty over what are commonly 
considered domestic concerns beyond the reach of international agencies.120 Socioeconomic 
approaches framed within mainstream development policy discourse are effectively depoliticized, 
thereby justifying involvement in conventional activities but limiting the scope to address more 
controversial issues like peripheral conflict and associated inequalities.121 
Where foreign aid agencies do engage with domestic politics rather than remaining ostensibly apolitical, 
many of their efforts are criticized by Frances Stewart (2008), Peter Uvin (2000) and others who 
promote greater attention to ethnic conflict. Support for ‘good governance’ rarely addresses the 
exclusion of minority groups from political power according to various assessments (Eyben 2006, 
Stewart 2008:298). Promotion of democracy may fail to incorporate adaptations to ensure minority 
representation in national or subnational political forums (Brown 2004, Paris 2010:341). 
Even aid agencies that make an effort to recognize political context still struggle to integrate 
perceptions of identity into planning, despite a wealth of academic literature on sub-national identities 
and the complex interplay of horizontal and vertical divisions. The proposed ‘ethnodevelopment’ of 
Bjorn Hettne and others has had little impact, having been reduced internationally to specific policies 
and safeguards on avoiding unintended impact on indigenous people (Hettne 1993). Critics have 
recognized the inherent ethnic bias of many international development processes: “...the neglect of the 
ethnic question in development thinking is not an oversight but a paradigmatic blind spot” (Stavenhagen 
1986). 
While it is possible to include ethnicity and identity in political economy analysis and policy preparation, 
as some exceptions demonstrate,122reviews have found that such considerations remain marginal to 
mainstream aid delivery (Castellino 2009). Aid officials may be aware of ethnically skewed project 
outcomes or state policies and patronage that commonly shape who benefits and who loses out from 
development processes yet remain powerless to address them.123 John Cohen (1995) describes how, 
despite recognising that a government capacity-building programme in Kenya was supporting civil 
servants belonging to some ethnic groups and marginalizing others, there was little that foreign aid staff 
could realistically do about it given a lack of control over domestic patronage relationships and 
networks that affected government agencies. 
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The patterns described here are seen in recent mainstream liberal approaches to development but are 
not limited to them. There is no guarantee that other models of development will enable foreign aid 
agencies to address concerns relating to peripheral conflict more effectively. Approaches that give a 
greater role to state institutions (rather than the market) may also marginalize the periphery and focus 
overwhelmingly on socioeconomic factors rather than a wider balance of considerations. Addressing 
peripheral conflict, and recognizing ethnicity more widely, did not figure prominently in donor 
assistance prior to the advent of neoliberal approaches in the 1970s, nor does it feature as a significant 
factor in foreign aid from non-Western countries. 
The long-term growth of non-Western donors is a significant trend of relevance to this discussion.124 
Many peripheral conflicts occur in middle-income countries, where the more poverty-focused of the 
Western donors rarely still run large programmes. This increases the importance of Japan, China, India 
and various Middle Eastern and other countries, along with the regional concessional lending banks. In 
Thailand, for example, the two largest donors since the mid-1970s have been the Asian Development 
Bank and Japan.125 International competition among donors can work to increase recipient 
governments’ bargaining power, as has been seen in Sri Lanka, where recent reluctance to lend or grant 
funds to Sri Lanka lost what little policy leverage Western donors once had.
126
 The Sri Lankan 
Government instead received up to US$1 billion annually from China in development and military 
assistance. This includes the construction of a large port that is likely to be used as a regional logistical 
and servicing base by the Chinese navy (Page 2009). Further support has been provided by Iran and 
South Korea (Goodhand & Walton 2009:312). 
Non-Western donors have generally presented a still more consensual model of foreign aid as part of 
inter-state diplomatic relationships than that emerging from Western donors, with greater expectations 
of state involvement in development processes and less domestic civil society or NGO activism. Aid is 
seen by many Japanese bureaucrats as a strictly state-to-state interaction (Arase 2005, Harmer & 
Cotterrell 2005). Asian governments also tend to maintain stronger respect for each other’s sovereignty. 
For example, the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) is mandated to deal with cross-border 
disputes, but not to engage in the internal affairs of member states (Askandar et al. 2002).127 
3.3c Variety within foreign aid 
Foreign aid is rarely uniform, however, with a disparate range of voices and influences shaping 
development policy and spending, leading to diverse practices and outcomes (Hopkins 2000). Just as it is 
naive to expect a single international community that responds coherently on the diplomatic stage, so 
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are notions of a development community based around shared principles also misplaced (Weiss 
2001:423).  
The following example as well as the more detailed primary data introduced in later chapters 
demonstrate cases where donors have, for various reasons, broken with the pattern described so far in 
this section and addressed peripheral conflicts. The World Bank’s promotion of peacebuilding in Aceh 
and elsewhere in Indonesia shows both how important specific context can be in determining whether 
an aid agency takes peripheral conflict seriously, and also the variety of approaches that can exist within 
one agency. Its work on peacebuilding in Aceh has been led by its social development unit, which is 
dominated by professionals coming from anthropology and political science backgrounds rather than 
the economists found in other sections of the agency. This unit ran various conflict-related programmes 
supporting the wider peace process in Aceh with some positive impact (Multi-Stakeholder Review 
2009).  
The most significant role of the social development unit across Indonesia was managing the World 
Bank’s involvement in the Kecamatan Development Programme (KDP), an initiative that absorbed US$1 
billion of loan funds (Murray Li 2007:230). KDP is an extensive national network of village-level funds 
rather than anything directly related to conflict, but its prominence within Indonesia and its importance 
for the World Bank’s overall country portfolio enabled social development specialists in the World Bank 
to use it as a basis for supporting peacebuilding in Aceh (Barron & Burke 2008, Barron et al. 2009). This 
was a result of specific circumstances and the interests of an aid agency in maintaining its reputation. In 
the 1990s, both the World Bank and the Government of Indonesia became mutually unacceptable 
partners in mainstream development fields: the Indonesian Government was associated with corruption 
and human rights abuses, while the World Bank became seen by many in Indonesia as an icon of the 
corrupt, cronyistic Suharto era of excessive borrowing that led eventually to financial crisis and political 
strife. By 2005, projects with a social development ethos that could be distanced from a publically 
discredited mainstream constituted a majority of the World Bank’s lending portfolio to Indonesia.128 
More conventional development approaches were effectively politically non-viable. With KDP as the 
basis of the World Bank’s portfolio, staff interested in peacebuilding interventions were able to use the 
opportunity and positive reputation that KDP had fostered to support many other initiatives in Aceh 
aiming to back the peace process including the reintegration of former combatants, local livelihoods 
projects for widows, and support for impartial local media reporting.129 
As this case shows, it is misleading to expect consistency even within a single aid agency. Internal 
contestation and hypocrisy are not uncommon, with different units involved in long-term struggles to 
capture resources or exert influence. Economists, conflict specialists, sector specialists, experienced 
field workers and bureaucratic office managers are all likely to have very different views of the world 
and respond to specific interests. Specialist divisions within agencies commonly promote contrasting 
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approaches.130 NGOs also present a varied range of approaches and motivations, from highly 
conservative purveyors of charity to more radical supporters of change (Duffield 2007:25). 
Donors have addressed peripheral conflicts to varying degrees in Aceh, Sri Lanka, Mindanao, the Far 
South of Thailand and elsewhere. A combination of the factors described in this chapter appears to 
explain their interest in peacebuilding. First, as already explained with reference to Aceh and Sri Lanka, 
aid agencies require an amenable recipient policy environment that often includes government pursuit 
of a negotiated peace. More contextual institutional political issues, such as the positive relationship 
with recipient government representatives that enabled World Bank staff to launch peacebuilding 
initiatives in Aceh, are also significant.  
Second, aid agencies are more able to respond where political motivations to do so exist within donor 
governments. Where parties to a conflict are considering negotiations, donor countries may be able to 
bolster rather than damage diplomatic relations by supporting peacebuilding objectives, as occurred in 
Aceh in 2005-2006. Elsewhere, donor interest in promoting peace may result from perceived global 
security risks associated with continued conflict (as seen in Mindanao), although such concerns often 
lead to efforts to support governments militarily rather than find a negotiated peace, as has already 
been explained. Donor concern may stem from a range of other influences and interests: international 
or domestic advocacy from vocal diaspora populations (for example Sri Lankans in Europe and North 
America), religious groups (for example Western concern for minority Christian groups in Burma) and 
human rights campaigners. Certain national contexts encourage broad concern for minority groups and 
victims of state oppression, including Sweden’s background of solidarity (Danielson & Wohlgemuth 
2005) and a Canadian vision of internationalism as part of its own national identity (Munton & Keating 
2001). Japan’s violent modern history and consequent limits on foreign security interventions lead to 
promotion of human security principles as part of closer associations between aid and peacebuilding 
(Tan 2005, Gilson 2007). Some countries (Norway, Switzerland) and organizations (the UN, the European 
Union) actively pursue opportunities to associate themselves with peace processes, employing donor 
assistance as well as diplomatic interventions in the process.131  
Third, aid agencies’ overall approaches to development affect their ability to address peacebuilding 
concerns. Agencies that diverge from narrow perspectives of development based around aggregated 
national or even global goals and consider aspects of horizontal inequality are more likely to address 
peripheral conflict. Many donors have sufficiently nuanced perspectives to commission political 
analyses that often address issues of group marginalization, commonly leading to new initiatives or 
shifts in country programme priorities (Landell Mills et al. 2007, United Nations undated). Elsewhere, 
Unicef’s focus on minority groups in Thailand is a result of a partial reorientation of the agency around a 
broad vision of child rights and related issues of justice rather than concentrating on narrower poverty 
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reduction goals.132 Foundations like the German state-funded Stiftungen have developed programmes 
that stem from their focus on political aims around justice and equality rather than socioeconomic 
development in many countries. This, along with their non-government status, enables engagement in 
fields of peacebuilding or promotion of equality that most aid agencies, including many development-
motivated NGOs, struggle to enter.133  
In other cases, agencies need to be subdivided or considered in depth in order to understand their 
internal variety and often their contradictions. Motivations for allocating development funding change 
over time and space in response to many variables. Institutional factors including rivalry and market 
positioning between and even within agencies (Cooley & Ron 2002), pressure to disburse budgets, and 
changes in aid delivery mechanisms (Gibson & al. 2005) all make critical differences to agency 
orientation. For the World Bank in Aceh, the unusually prominent role of their social development unit 
that emerged through circumstance rather than design created space to address peripheral conflict. Aid 
agency staff state that key individuals took advantage of specific circumstances to devise a set of 
peacebuilding interventions. Prominent figures include the long-term head of the World Bank’s social 
development unit in Indonesia and the country director at the time, along with staff based in Aceh from 
2005.
134
  
3.4 The interface: donors and recipients 
Analysis of patterns of aid interventions also need to consider how donor officials’ actions are shaped at 
the interface with government officials. The interface is viewed here as a significant influence on 
international agencies’ efforts to address peripheral conflicts in contexts where the scope to operate is 
restricted by state institutions, especially at the national level. Although the term interface commonly 
refers in development studies to interactions between extension workers and farmers (see Long 
2001:73), the higher level that is addressed here is particularly significant in assessing why foreign aid 
agencies often struggle to address peripheral conflicts. 
One of the defining elements of foreign aid is the complexity of the relationship between the donor and 
the recipient state.135 It affects how aid is provided and what impact it has. This relationship, or 
interface, is an upstream issue occurring before implementation with considerable influence on 
subsequent outcomes (Eyben 2006). The interface described here is in essence a bureaucratic and 
centralized encounter between aid agency staff and senior recipient government officials, despite some 
donor promotion of wider participation and critical analysis of domestic political systems. Studies of 
development practice often focus on interface dynamics where bureaucrats and officials meet, 
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especially in Asian countries with low levels of dependency on aid flows and relatively strong 
government bureaucracies (Mosse 2005, Gibson et al. 2005:61, Jerve & Hansen 2008). 
As is explained below with reference to peripheral conflicts, foreign aid typically requires the support 
and action of figures in the recipient government in order for funds to be transferred and spent. Even 
donor support for non-governmental organizations often needs government approval. For foreign aid 
providers, the way in which they interact with recipient governments affects how they operate and is of 
considerable importance in determining whether they address peripheral conflicts. As seen in Chapter 
Two, many governments of countries experiencing peripheral conflicts do not demonstrate sustained 
commitment to finding peaceful and just solutions to violent unrest. In such situations the interface can 
effectively pull those foreign aid agencies interested in addressing peripheral conflict away from 
programmes or policies aiming to promote sustainable peace.136 
The donor-recipient encounter is typically highly centralized and excludes those living in peripheral 
conflict areas. As seen in the previous chapter, national political processes including the practice of 
foreign aid provision tend to marginalize local elites and wider populations from peripheral conflict 
areas. Donors normally work to design and establish country programmes and projects with elite 
planning institutions or sections within government ministries such as the Indonesian national 
development planning agency BAPPENAS or the External Relations Department in Sri Lanka. Many such 
agencies were originally established with foreign aid assistance, providing donors with a national 
counterpart in order to enable them to disburse funds.137 
Interface patterns are hard to research. For example, donors and governments rarely publish or even 
disclose information on programmes that are proposed but turned down.138 Various anthropological 
and political studies examine policy level interactions, considering the roles of donor and recipient 
bureaucrats in aid relationships as a subset of broader appraisals of the anthropology of organizations 
(Wright 1994, Verlot 2001, Eyben 2003). Specific studies of aid relationships explore how donors 
interact with governments, with emphasis often given to ‘bargains’ agreed in private between officials 
on both sides (Jerve et al. 2008). In an insightful and detailed study, David Potter considers the tactics of 
Japanese donor representatives and government ‘partners’ in Thailand and the Philippines. In both 
countries, donor and recipient officials predict the other party’s position through anticipatory bargaining 
processes that enable common ground to be reached. Donors and the government habitually 
manoeuvre around each other to find mutually acceptable approaches, anticipating each other’s 
positions and adapting accordingly (1996).  
Economists have addressed ‘ownership problems’, with external agendas that shape foreign aid rarely 
fitting domestic priorities (Martens 2005). In considering the ‘broken feedback loop’ that stops donors 
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responding to domestically defined needs, Elinor Ostrom and others have emphasized the importance 
of listening to final beneficiaries themselves rather than the more immediate recipients that donors 
engage with, typically central government representatives (Ostrom et al. 2002:251). However, as seen in 
the peripheral conflict cases of Sri Lanka and Aceh, donors effectively work predominantly alongside 
one party to the conflict, with international recognition of state sovereignty and legitimacy normally 
being far stronger than recognition of rebel groups. Donors that do wish to consult representatives of 
non-state conflict actors face significant problems. In many peripheral conflicts (such as the Far South of 
Thailand), insurgents and their leaders remain underground. In other cases, even where some leaders 
are openly identifiable and at times accessible, diplomatic and legal barriers limit access. American 
foreign aid officials had limited scope to engage with representatives of the LTTE in Sri Lanka after the 
USA designated them a foreign terrorist organization in 1997.
139
 
Aid agencies’ engagements with representatives from peripheral areas who are not affiliated with rebel 
groups are also rarely comprehensive. Aid bargaining processes between donors and recipients are 
usually restricted to capital cities, especially in those developing nation states with relatively strong 
bureaucracies and centralized authority that are often affected by peripheral conflict. Typical donor 
practices reinforce this trend.
140
 In Aceh, as has already been explained, aid agencies needed to broker 
agreement with central government actors before they could approach local figures. In other peripheral 
conflict cases too, the local interface between field worker and farmer or even negotiations with local 
officials tend only to take place if central government approval is granted first.141 Efforts by donors to 
consult beyond a limited number of central government counterparts do occur, although a tendency to 
revert to norm is strong. IMF and World Bank-led Poverty Reduction Strategies that were introduced in 
2000 included ‘civil society’ consultations in order to move decision-making away from the centre. In 
some places this was considered at least partially effective (Eyben 2004). Consultations with non-
governmental actors were never obligatory in middle-income nation states, however, and even in 
poorer recipient states were widely seen as superficial in practice (VENRO 2003, Curran 2005). In many 
places the World Bank and other donors that followed its lead subsequently downgraded civil 
involvement in planning to a minor role (World Bank/IMF 2005). Stewart et al. (2008:298) find that 
ethnicity and horizontal inequality are particularly absent from Poverty Reduction Strategies, even in 
countries that are evidently heterogeneous. 
Peripheral conflicts regularly involve politically sensitive issues.142 Acute concern over foreign 
involvement is apparent not only in insular states like North Korea or Burma whose governments 
actively resist external involvement in their internal affairs, but also many others on relatively good 
terms with Western powers: Indonesia, India, Thailand and so on (Newman 2009). Key departments 
within recipient governments are still less likely to accept foreign intervention in the field of 
peacebuilding than in many others. This chapter has already described how in Aceh only a trickle of 
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international involvement in conflict-related programming was allowed by the Indonesian Government 
both before and immediately after the huge international humanitarian response to the tsunami of 
December 2004. Following the peace agreement of August 2005, more donors gradually began to work 
on peacebuilding issues. This involved several levels of protracted negotiation with government in Aceh 
and in the capital, Jakarta.143 
Gradually, as Indonesian Government concern over external interference lessened, a select number of 
donors that had maintained close relationships with the government throughout were allowed to 
address peacebuilding-related issues. The projects that emerged reflected the interests and practical 
capacities of both donors and the government. Donors continued to keep away from issues like human 
rights that were controversial in the circumstances. They avoided logos and signs at project sites so that 
work would appear to be government-funded.144 Despite strong international goodwill in the aftermath 
of the tsunami and additional donor resources made available specifically for addressing the conflict, 
the government still chose to pay for most peacebuilding- related work out of the national budget 
(Barron & Burke 2008). 
In many cases the sensitivity of the issues concerned and the pressure for donors to maintain a good aid 
relationship means that efforts to address conflict may be ineffective. International funding for the 
Mahaweli project in Sri Lanka is one such case.145 American and Canadian officials tried in the 1970s to 
improve the ethnic balance of future beneficiaries in the huge irrigation and settlement scheme, but 
their complaints were mostly ineffective and the project went ahead. Efforts to change its form had 
little impact given the broader political and economic development agendas agreed by the government 
and donors alike. Mahaweli consumed a huge share of national public investment once work began in 
the early 1980s, with sizeable donor support. It was regarded by Sri Lankan politicians as a symbol of 
national identity. The unequal settlement schemes under the project have since been identified as a 
salient example of government action that fuelled resentment and laid the ground for the emergence of 
the Tamil Tigers (Herring 2003). 
Where foreign aid does flow, bureaucratic elites in relatively strong central government structures have 
considerable influence over how aid is used, especially in middle-income environments (Goodhand & 
Walton 2009:315). Powerful figures and key government agencies in recipient nation states are able to 
negate, accommodate, and even direct high levels of international involvement for their own ends 
(Ottaway & Lacina 2003, Mallarangeng & van Tuijl 2004). Even if technocrats operate transparently they 
often back policies that reflect the typical urban bias of modernization including the marginalization of 
peripheral minorities (see Harrison 2001, Barnett & Zuercher 2008). Understanding these processes and 
the responses of aid agencies requires case-specific analysis.146 
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For aid recipients, donors represent a potential supply of funds but are commonly also perceived as a 
risk to sovereignty. A critique of foreign aid as imperialism that appears radical in the West has long 
been mainstream in much of the rest of the world, with little need to disprove expectations of donors as 
purveyors of “Disinterested international munificence” (Hayter 1971:5). Fear of interference related to 
legacies of colonialism, of nationalism founded around struggles for independence, and of postcolonial 
American or occasionally Soviet impositions run deep in the popular psyche (Piew 1971, Buruma & 
Margalit 2004). The Indonesian military, for example, only accepted the intervention of the international 
Aceh Monitoring Mission when it was agreed that neighbouring Asian countries would contribute up to 
half of the monitors. European countries were seen as too interfering and UN involvement was wholly 
unacceptable to a military stung by the earlier separation of East Timor (Barron & Burke 2008:20-21). 
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Malaysian Government has regularly banned NGO as well as donors 
and United Nations agencies from operating inside the country (Tan 2005). Thailand has acted similarly 
(Killick 1998:67), while Burma reluctantly and belatedly allowed international aid after Typhoon Nargis 
in 2008 on the condition that ASEAN rather than the UN or the World Bank assumed a coordinating role 
(Bellamy 2010:152). 
Rosalind Eyben et al. (2007) explain how Western donor representatives, with technical perspectives 
and a belief in universal improvement, fail to grasp that they are regularly viewed by recipient 
governments as a threat to sovereignty and a continuation of a colonial tradition. Technical assistance, 
for example, is regarded by many donors as a key step for reforming structures and institutions. For 
recipients meanwhile, a foreign expert may be accepted into a government department as a necessary if 
unwanted condition of wider financial assistance, rather than as an agreed strategy to achieve results 
(ibid.:171-2; also Eyben 2006).147     
More forceful efforts to influence reluctant central government elites led to the rise – and subsequent 
fall – of conditionality as a donor policy. Its overall achievements have been mixed at best, with 
evaluations suggesting that stipulations of what governments need to do in order to continue receiving 
aid rarely achieve their purpose (Killick 1998). This is especially the case in countries that are not 
typically dependent on donor funds, including many experiencing peripheral conflict. Aside from 
important debate over the flaws of the structural adjustment policies to which conditions have in many 
cases been attached, most political or conflict issues are seen as sovereign issues outside the ostensibly 
apolitical remit of the IMF, the World Bank and other key donors. Where conditions beyond 
macroeconomic policy are attached to aid provision, they regularly fail to be implemented – even in 
nation states that depend on donor resources.148 Efforts to apply conditionalities over issues linked with 
peacebuilding confront a lack of interest on both sides of the interface (Boyce 2002:1031). Donor 
countries are often insufficiently motivated to damage relationships by insisting that commitments be 
honoured, while recipient governments have shown themselves able to adopt and adapt terms attached 
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to aid to reflect existing dominant domestic political interests (Killick 1997, World Bank 1998, Orlandini 
2003). The conditions necessary for conditionality to work on peacebuilding are simply not present in 
most cases (Goodhand & Sedra 2007:15). Donor promotion of conditionalities as a lever to secure a 
peace process in Sri Lanka from 2003 to 2005 failed. Neither the LTTE rebels nor the government 
accepted the terms, and donors were not themselves fully committed (Frerks & Klem 2006). 
Donors have over time dropped many elements of conditionality and aimed to focus on supporting 
rather than instructing aid recipients (White & Dijkstra 2003). More recent post-conditionality 
approaches commonly return to the earlier donor stress on statebuilding, along with what are 
presented as recipient-led agendas: moving from ‘donorship’ to ‘ownership’ (Oxfam 2004, OECD 2006). 
However, in doing so donors have not necessarily gained greater understanding of how the relationship 
with recipient governments operates. It is argued below that associated recent trends including the 
promotion of aid ‘partnerships’ and ‘harmonization’ further limit the scope of aid agencies to address 
controversial issues like peripheral conflict. 
The notion of an ’aid partnership’ between donor and recipient has become a near-universal mantra in 
aid agencies.149 Donor-government aid partnerships appear to offer efficient ways to deliver aid, 
reducing ‘transaction costs’ by avoiding strings of projects and associated time-consuming negotiations. 
However, although aid partnerships may enable transfers of funds or skills that further existing 
dominant development trajectories, they are less likely to change policy or practice.150 As already 
shown, ownership and partnerships are in reality more issues of brokering common ground, or agreeing 
on aligned interests, than sharing the same agenda. Given differences between donors and recipients, it 
is impractical to expect fully shared interests except in narrow technical areas. Efforts to address issues 
relating to peripheral conflicts are made particularly hard by expectations that consensual partnerships 
can be formed given that the aid recipient (i.e. state institutions) is often a violent protagonist. As 
explorations of the partnership agenda have noted, considered relationship-building is a more realistic 
approach than promotion of full partnerships (Khan & Sharma 2001, Eyben 2006). 
Critiques of donor partnerships tend to concentrate on the different forms of direct and indirect 
authority that they bestow on the donor, given asymmetric power relationships and a relatively 
disempowered recipient (Harrison 2001, Crawford 2003, Abrahamsen 2004). Studies of aid partnerships 
in Asia, where many recipient governments have the economic independence and institutional capacity 
to decline or re-channel aid to suit their interests, take a different approach by examining the interface 
closely rather than assuming that donors dominate relationships (Jerve et al. 2008). Where the state is 
relatively empowered, the risk may be more of what Maxwell and Riddell (1998:258) term an “Inflexible 
partnership” than of external imposition. In inflexible partnerships, donors support recipient 
governments to pursue policies that they themselves do not approve of. 
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A concurrent trend towards donor ‘harmonization’ further limits the scope to adapt aid provision.151 
Stemming from a desire to end the coordination problems that undermined conditionality, common 
agenda-setting by groups of aid agencies alongside the recipient government shifts aid delivery 
‘upstream’. It moves the emphasis from individual projects towards sectoral approaches and even from 
sectors towards generalized budgetary assistance (Foster & Fozzard 2000, OECD 2006). This shift places 
still more emphasis on the relationship between donors and the central government. It means that 
donor officials have even less incentive to meet anyone outside a small group of foreigners and senior 
bureaucrats. In countries where policymaking is already an exclusive domain, harmonization risks 
constructing a lowest common denominator that reinforces the power of ruling elites and makes it still 
harder to tackle peacebuilding issues (Eyben 2007). By focusing the interface on a single central level, it 
restricts the more sensitive approaches necessary to support domestic advocates of change (Brocklesby, 
Hobley & Scott-Villiers 2010), as is explained in the following section.152 
3.5 Constraints in practice 
The universal difficulty of turning plans (even if agreed at the donor-government interface) into practice 
is a key determinant of outcomes rather than a secondary issue and should be considered as such in 
explaining how donors act (Koponen 2004, Richards 2005:18).153 The practical challenge of 
implementing peacebuilding policies affects the scope of donors to address peripheral conflicts and 
needs to be integrated into analysis alongside other considerations. Many practices common to aid 
agencies limit their scope to address peripheral conflicts, while the common properties of peripheral 
conflicts create particular practical challenges. This section addresses these challenges by looking at the 
difficulty of adopting conflict-sensitive approaches, before considering how institutional practice limits 
the scope for positive involvement in peripheral conflicts even where donors are ‘sensitive’ to the 
problems. It then considers what practical steps enable donors to promote peacebuilding given the 
common properties of peripheral conflicts. The section builds on literature from the sub-discipline of 
development practice that has evolved over several decades and has specific relevance to international 
aid agencies. 
International donor guidelines state that agencies should “...systematically consider the positive and 
negative impact of interventions on the conflict context in which they are undertaken...” (OECD 2007). 
Many donors have responded with policy initiatives, although simply promoting conflict-sensitive 
policies or pointing out how conflict stops attainment of Millennium Development Goals does not 
guarantee any changes to practice (Fukuda-Parr 2010:124). One wide-ranging review found that donors 
rarely provide any internal sanction for neglecting to perform the necessary assessments to ensure 
conflict-sensitive programming (Woodrow & Chigas 2009). It also found that the practical steps needed 
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are rarely adopted, with donor institutions’ own practices often being inappropriate for difficult 
peacebuilding agendas. 
Donor country office representatives spend a high proportion of their time attending meetings in 
central government ministries, ingratiating themselves with the senior civil servants or politicians on 
whose goodwill their projects depend.
154
 Aid programmes often stem from the relationships forged 
through such work, the fulcrum of turning wider policy into practice. This process discourages donors 
from addressing controversial issues, especially ones that are only of concern to marginal and peripheral 
groups with little access to the donor-recipient interface. On a personal and professional basis, strong 
incentives discourage raising difficult issues that will make a complicated job harder. Through pragmatic 
self-censorship, donors avoid challenging topics.155 As David Mosse (2005) describes, developmental 
realities are commonly presented by institutions in ways that suit existing capabilities or agendas, 
enabling them to fulfil new peacebuilding policy obligations without considering the more fundamental 
changes that would be required to address them meaningfully.156 Various researchers have explored 
how aid agency staff justify ongoing aid programmes by denying the reality of conflict and its structural 
causes in Nepal, Uganda, and Sudan (Caddell & Yanacopoulos 2006, Marriage 2006). This is in part a 
logical response to the institutional incentives that have already been described, but can also be 
interpreted more psychologically. Denial of contradictory stances and hypocritical actions form part of 
everyday living strategies (Cohen 2001:57, Demick 2010). 
Eyben (2006b) links such patterns of denial with the tendency of bureaucracies to privilege ethics of 
technical disinterestedness in which individuals are considered as uniform objects. Officials in aid 
agencies or recipient government institutions nonetheless inevitably reproduce many of the attributes 
of the society and the institutions of which they are part. Discriminatory attitudes to restive peripheral 
minority populations are therefore reproduced by officials while being presented as part of neutral 
technical management.157 
On other occasions, donors would like to address peripheral conflict but the practical changes required 
to take forward a peacebuilding agenda that falls outside narrow socioeconomic development aims are 
a significant barrier. Aid itself generally consists of a fairly limited array of inputs: funding, training, 
construction of buildings or infrastructure, and on occasion more imaginative ways of transferring skills 
or ideas including policy advice. It is in many senses a blunt practical tool. Research has explored and 
documented how perverse incentives and constraints within donor institutions and across the interface 
limit what aid can achieve, even for donors that prioritize human rights and justice like the official 
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) (Gibson et al. 2005). 
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Large projects in tune with recipient government objectives are likely to suit donor bureaucracies, 
enabling loans and grants to be disbursed faster than the more complex, politically sensitive and 
devolved approaches typically needed to work on peripheral conflicts. Some donors overtly recognize 
this, aiming for example to reduce the ‘transaction costs’ of financial transfers almost as an end in itself 
given widespread criticism of wasteful expenditure.158 Donor systems established to ensure that 
standards are met further reduce the flexibility to respond to specific circumstances. Management tools 
like logical frameworks prescribe measurable, contained project aims (Gasper 2000). Social, indigenous 
and environmental ‘safeguards’ are conducted during project appraisal to ensure that negative 
implications are minimized, in effect implementing more cumbersome procedure in order to protect aid 
flows and at times limit some unintended damage.159 These technologies have been criticized for their 
tendency to promote narrow, technical solutions to complex political problems (Dale 2003).
160
 The 
burgeoning field of peacebuilding and development has generated its own array of management tools – 
guidelines, checklists, monitoring frames and training programmes – that also in practice limit what 
agencies can do. 
Such management tools are institutionally useful, promoting application of conflict-aware policies 
without risking any loss of control by devolving management. Chains of accountability that stretch back 
to capital cities in donor nations lead senior managers of many agencies to assert and maintain 
centralized institutional control. In conflict areas, travel bans and security risks can compound these 
problems. Where individuals find ways of crossing these barriers, rapid staff rotation ensures a rapid 
return to the status quo. DFID, the UK development agency, has repeatedly been told through internal 
and external management reviews that it should enable localized responses by committing staff to 
longer international postings and investing in language skills, but it has not done so. Practical constraints 
of limited administration budgets and overall human resource planning reinforce central interest in 
maintaining control.161 In this way, the structure of aid agencies can inhibit the localized responses to 
circumstance that appear to enable engagement in peripheral conflict environments.162 
Involvement in peripheral conflicts generally requires modifications to aid agencies’ standard 
institutional practice, the first of three common elements of donor practice enabling them to address 
peripheral conflicts that are identified here. The challenges of tackling institutional change have been 
addressed in many sectors and disciplines. Significant issues in this context include an avoidance of 
guidelines and prescribed approaches, placing more emphasis on devolved responsibility and the scope 
to find specific solutions or build local relationships. Long-term evidence suggests that devolved and 
process-based approaches can assist donor efforts to work on challenging issues. The value of localizing 
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decision-making and moving away from rigid blueprints is well recognized in the aid practice literature, 
although often poorly integrated into aid agency structures (Salmen 1987, Rondinelli 1993). These 
lessons are especially relevant to peripheral conflict contexts in which relevant aid interventions need to 
move beyond the standard aid interface already described. Process-based approaches that engage with 
a wider range of actors enable programmes to be built up over time, taking into account and responding 
to conditions and perceptions at both local and national levels. The participatory approaches 
undertaken in eastern Sri Lanka and described by Norman Uphoff (2003) are one example of an 
approach in a conflict-prone area that puts such lessons into practice at the local level. 
Experienced operational specialists express scepticism of technocratic approaches to highly political 
issues, for example the emerging field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), 
preferring to stress political dialogue rather than technical programming (Knight 2008). Those donors 
trying to work on conflict issues in Aceh during the peace process achieved some success through 
combining a capital city presence with strong field capacity. Given sufficient devolved authority, it was 
possible over time to build experience and negotiate ways of engaging with the local government and 
other partners on the ground including former rebel leaders. The World Bank’s KDP programme was 
applied and adapted alongside other initiatives to provide local-level post-conflict assistance (Barron & 
Burke 2008, Multi-Stakeholder Review 2009). 
A second common element of donor practice when addressing peripheral conflicts is carefully 
considered engagement with the state, occasionally in combination with support for non-governmental 
bodies. Analysis of aid practice underlines the importance of committing sufficient time and resources 
to find willing partners within government and to gain understanding of where the boundaries lie 
(Potter 1996, Eyben 2006, Jerve & Hansen 2008). Such commitments can in cases help agencies achieve 
enough ‘common ground’ to gain government permission for work addressing peripheral conflict. This 
typically involves laborious and continual ‘interface management’, in cases spending years building 
contacts with central government institutions. Further contacts must be fostered with relevant line 
ministries or local levels of government.163 These laborious practical steps receive little attention outside 
tight donor circles. They are especially important in situations where achieving the objective of aid 
provision involves finding ways to change elements of government policy and practice, as is often the 
case in peripheral conflict contexts.164 
Selective negotiation over time on specific issues also requires strong understanding of the concerns 
and sentiments of state officials, including a degree of self-reflection on how donors themselves are 
perceived (De Herdt & Bastiaensen 2004, Eyben et al. 2007). In peripheral conflicts it also requires the 
flexibility to respond rapidly to shifting political circumstances and seize opportunities to work with 
different officials or institutions, in cases proactively seeking and supporting incremental changes to 
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government policy or practice or backing specific government agencies rather than waiting for official 
invitations or full-scale peace processes. The work of The Asia Foundation in building support for local 
government reforms addressing the Far South of Thailand is one such example.165 In cases, personal 
relationships underpin involvement: the International Organization of Migration’s work addressing 
conflict in Aceh was partly made possible through good personal dynamics between their head of 
mission for Indonesia and Hamid Awaluddin, the minister of justice and human rights.166 
Breaking down a government into its constituent parts often reveals certain fields of activity or 
government departments that share common ground with donors (Potter 1996). Detailed policy analysis 
and lengthy experience helps show where change is likely. It also demonstrates the value of indigenous 
peacebuilding approaches above generic international models (MacGinty 2008). For example, sub-units 
within various ministries of the Thai Government are seen by some donors as sharing their own policy 
objectives on minority rights.167 Similarly, domestic non-governmental bodies can use donor funding to 
build on entry points that are not too threatening to the state, yet still conduct advocacy on challenging 
issues. Many aid agencies would need to alter their practice considerably in order to conduct careful 
interface management of this sort, for instance taking a far more realistic approach to donor 
harmonization and aid partnerships. 
Investment in knowledge and contextual understanding is a third common element of practice. Stewart 
et al. (2005) find that the first requirement for devising policies that address excluded groups is careful 
diagnosis to identify the most salient characteristics. Closer reading of the political incentives of local 
actors and the ways in which they interact with external interventions are seen to produce some useful 
initiatives (Richmond 2008), enabling locally relevant responses and avoiding universally applied and 
technical views of governance or unidimensional promotion of multi-party democracy. Various aid 
agencies prioritize knowledge and local understanding, whether formally developed as applied research 
or built up through long-term local experience. The Asia Foundation has built programmes with local 
NGO partners on the basis of decades of work and networks of contacts in many countries. Staff within 
the World Bank invested heavily in research in Indonesia, while Unicef commonly commissions detailed 
situational analyses.168 
These steps enable aid agencies to identify and respond to specific opportunities that may arise or 
disappear as the dynamics of peripheral conflicts and national politics shift over time (even where 
underlying horizontal inequalities commonly persist over long periods). 
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3.6 Chapter conclusion 
Overall, existing research shows that although foreign aid can play a variety of valuable roles in 
peacebuilding it has only done so to a limited extent in peripheral conflicts. Explaining the pattern of 
foreign aid involvement with peripheral conflict is not straightforward and is worth examining in closer 
detail. Rather than being explained as a result of ignorance or blindness on the part of donors, as writing 
on horizontal inequalities has tended to do, this chapter has shown how common structural tendencies 
of aid agencies make it especially challenging for them to address peripheral conflicts. Many donors fail 
to address peripheral conflict and in cases their programmes may reinforce existing inequalities, as 
Stewart et al. (2008:315) and others have found. Evidence from peripheral conflicts suggests that 
donors are not necessarily less progressive than states in this regard (ibid.:297). Influential domestic 
political actors in states experiencing peripheral conflict regularly have little interest in attending to the 
concerns of marginalized minority peripheral populations or pursuing steps towards a negotiated peace 
that may challenge constructions of national identity and existing political structures. They may also 
have strong reservations about foreign involvement in highly sensitive issues, as this chapter has shown.  
Foreign aid officials, for their part, also have many reasons to avoid addressing peripheral conflict even 
if peacebuilding is a stated global policy priority of their organization. The reasons that lead aid agencies 
away from peripheral conflict have been described in this chapter through sections explaining the 
motivations, interface negotiations, and practices of aid agencies. Barriers are created partly but not 
only by a lack of political interest in donor nations. Even where foreign aid is applied to promote 
universal goals rather than as part of a donor nation’s self-interested foreign policy, implementers 
struggle to avoid relying on state institutions for the delivery of their aims and commonly restrict 
interventions to technical issues that sit within a narrow and predominantly socioeconomic vision of 
what constitutes development. 
Given the politically embedded nature of horizontal inequalities associated with peripheral conflict, 
relevant interventions often involve efforts to change policies or political structures within the central 
state rather than simply funding area-based projects or backing government schemes.169 Even basic 
service provision, proposed by Stewart et al. as a fairly simple measure that foreign aid can support, can 
be highly sensitive given difficult relations between local people and state employees. The middle-
income status of many countries experiencing peripheral conflict furthers the lack of relevance of many 
traditional development approaches. Many donor interventions do aim to promote changes in policy or 
government practice rather than simply transfer resources and expertise, but the steps typically needed 
to address peripheral conflicts are particularly challenging. Approaching controversial issues of political 
marginalization and national identity rather than sticking to more consensual socioeconomic 
interventions risks damaging relationships with the recipient state and is harder to implement in 
practice, whether working with central institutions or aiming to engage in the periphery. Where there is 
no ongoing peace process to support, this leaves aid agencies with little room for engagement. At the 
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same time, a relatively small-scale conflict that has little impact on national development statistics and 
generates little international political attention is easily passed over with few if any repercussions for aid 
agencies themselves. 
There are, however, many instances of interventions that have had a positive role in reducing tensions 
or redressing the perceived inequalities that typically lie behind peripheral conflicts. Aid agencies are 
more likely to find ways to establish relevant programmes when recipient governments are pursuing 
some form of negotiated settlement, as occurred in Aceh for example from 2005, or on a wider scale 
during the aborted peace process in Sri Lanka. Elsewhere, however, incremental initiatives that promote 
change in the periphery or centrally can also be supported, as a small number of  donors have achieved 
in the Far South of Thailand.170 
Most often the opportunities for involvement are relatively slim, though, and require specific efforts 
and attributes on the part of aid agencies. As has been explained, agencies (or units within agencies) 
that do address peripheral conflicts typically diverge from mainstream socioeconomic approaches and 
recognize horizontal inequalities as structural problems. Continual changes since the 1960s have 
stimulated many different ways of promoting development. Some donors regularly move away from a 
state-centred focus on national economic goals towards a wider agenda addressing human rights, 
justice, social exclusion, inequality and democracy. They also display practical properties that enable 
them to convert their motivations into interventions, adopting practices that have long been 
recommended by development specialists addressing conflict environments (Uvin 2002, Esman 2003). 
Evidence presented in this chapter from Indonesia and elsewhere supports development practice 
literature criticizing management tools that reduce flexibility.  Aid agencies that devolve responsibility to 
the local level are more likely to take advantage of circumstantial opportunities that arise. One 
especially critical step in peripheral conflict environments is the ability to manage the interface with 
state actors, both to gain permission for engagement and to find reformist bodies within government or 
elsewhere that can be backed. Modifications to aid agencies’ standard institutional practice, carefully 
considered engagement with the state, and investment in knowledge and contextual understanding all 
appear to be important practical steps.  
Given that aid programmes aiming to address peripheral conflict are usually implemented through 
domestic institutions, assume many different forms, and often support incremental change rather than 
direct tangible impact it is impossible to evaluate and attribute precisely their overall impact on 
peacebuilding. This research does not try to do so, concentrating instead on the design and 
implementation of donor approaches. When looking at peripheral conflicts, examples presented in this 
chapter and more detailed material on the Far South of Thailand presented in subsequent chapters 
suggest that, overall, much foreign aid does not concern itself directly with peripheral conflicts, while 
donors that do aim to address peripheral conflict confront a range of barriers that limit their 
effectiveness. 
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Chapter Four  Methodology  
 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter outlines the overall methodological approach before explaining key elements of the 
research process. Answering the research questions described in Chapter One involved building an 
understanding of the conflict in the Far South of Thailand and its implications for foreign aid agencies, 
before exploring how and why aid agencies address the conflict. Primary data was gathered chiefly 
through semi-structured interviews with foreign aid agency staff and their counterparts. 
Emphasis is placed on understanding policy level processes rather than on evaluating impact.171 The 
research approach avoids a narrow focus on project level outcomes, asking instead how and why aid 
agencies choose to address peripheral conflicts. Assessments of impact also run into many 
methodological problems over attribution.172 This is especially the case in contexts like the Far South of 
Thailand, where at the time of research only a few foreign aid agencies were funding small-scale 
initiatives designed to influence wider processes and promote policy change rather than generate 
clearly defined and direct impact. 
This research follows an iterative process that built a theoretical basis over time through combining 
both inductive and theoretically derived approaches. Categories of aid agency and of emerging themes 
that explain the reasons why agencies act as they do emerged through the research process, as primary 
data from interviews and other sources were interpreted, drawing on a range of literature addressing 
development practice and building on anthropological as well as social science sources relevant to the 
field.  At the same time, theory was applied to guide the sorting and classifying of information (i.e. 
analysis) into a structure that could be used to present meaningful argument (Lincoln & Guba 1985, 
Ragin 1994:55-57). The process, described in this chapter, draws on the methodology of grounded 
theory in its approach to building a framework through the research period, applying an open-ended 
and exploratory approach to interpreting emerging data (Glaser 1998, Pidgeon & Henwood 2004, 
Charmaz 2005).173 The form and content of later, empirical chapters reflect this process. 
4.2 Constructing knowledge and the positionality of the researcher 
Qualitative social science research commonly recognizes that meaning is socially constructed by 
individuals in interaction with the world around them. Social constructions are typically best understood 
through interpretive approaches that stress the value of understanding the perceptions and experiences 
of humans (Bryman 2001, Flick 2009). Studies of horizontal inequality have adopted increasingly 
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interpretive approaches. Ostby (2008:145) finds that more individualistic approaches to inequality do 
not recognize the importance and subtlety of constructed group identities, while Brown and Langer 
(2010) place greater emphasis on ethnographic approaches to constructions of identity in case studies 
of conflicts including the Far South of Thailand.174 
In defining and responding to the main research questions, initial concerns included finding a way to 
ensure that the subjects of field research could be approached without objectifying them as abstract 
entities to be understood through the isolation and testing of specific variables.175 Interview-based 
approaches are commonly used to understand different aspects of international development practice, 
penetrating official policy statements and project reporting. The approach followed here adopts 
elements of what Mosse describes as a ‘new ethnography of development’ that employs multiple 
research sites in analysing policy construction as well as the translation of policies into practice (2005). 
By using semi-structured interviews alongside a range of other sources of data in a grounded approach, 
the study recognizes the significance of people’s perspectives and also considers the wider context that 
affects how perspectives are formed. People’s perceptions of their own and others’ ethnicity176 are 
integrated into explanation of the context of the Far South of Thailand, while the importance of aid 
actors’ perceptions when turning policies into practice (Shore & Wright 1997) is a main aspect of the 
primary research. 
Emphasizing the roles of individual employees helps demonstrate how policies are translated into 
practice in ways that do not follow the functional expectations of development planning (Long 2001:25). 
At the same time, a narrow focus on the specifics of agency risks passing over the chiefly political drivers 
of development funding that are particularly significant when dealing with conflict, and the implications 
of foreign aid’s close relationship with institutions of the recipient state (Gledhill 1994:134). Donors’ 
agendas and ways of working are usually more accessible and amenable to fine-grained analysis than 
accounts of foreign aid’s almost conspiratorial contribution to Western hegemony sometimes attest.177 
In exploring how and why donors act, the research draws on existing studies that focus in particular on 
‘upstream’ actions surrounding project formulation rather than on implementation at field level.178 
These include negotiations between donors and governments as well as agencies’ internal bureaucratic 
processes. It is possible within this approach to consider the incentives or interests that donor 
institutions and their individual employees respond to, recognizing political process without seeing 
development practice as a singular expression of authority and control (Grillo 1997, Long 2001, Barbero 
et al. 2003). 
The approach adopted was also influenced by the institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
used to appraise the Swedish official donor SIDA (Gibson et al. 2005). The research design adopts a 
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multidisciplinary and to some extent multi-level approach to look at operational situations, policy-
making environments, and the wider rules or processes that shape aid agencies’ responses. The 
emphasis here is less on applying quantitative and economic frameworks premised on expectations of 
rational economic action179 than on understanding the institutional and political interests that affect 
donor decision-making in order to interpret data on donors’ actions and views. Development 
institutions are seen here as multifaceted and internally contradictory institutions that continually shift 
their discourses and incorporate new ideas (Bebbington et al. 2007, Hilhorst 2003). 
A significant implication of recognizing the constructed nature of knowledge is the need for a closer 
examination of the role and positionality of the researcher. It is especially important in research 
approaches with significant inductive elements that otherwise risk passing by the researcher’s own 
influence on interpreting findings. Influential texts by Thomas Kuhn (1996[1962]) and Karin Knorr-Cetina 
(1999) have demonstrated how human subjectivity imposes itself on those scientific facts we take to be 
objective. In social science, outside the confines of experimental methodologies, the subjective role of 
the researcher is perhaps still greater than in natural science. Since anthropology’s ‘crisis of 
representation’ (Clifford & Marcus 1986), the specific context of any research project, as well as the 
individual perception and past personal experiences of the researcher, are increasingly recognized. 
Cross-cultural environments further add to the complexity of research: development workers and 
researchers alike from former colonial powers need a clear awareness of the power imbalances that can 
affect their own perceptions and others’ perceptions of them (Asad 1973, Ferguson 2005).  
Recognizing subjectivity and adapting accordingly within a broadly humanistic frame of analysis helps 
maintain a rigorous approach to the greatest extent possible (see Marcus 1986, Aunger 1995). In this 
research, I recognize the unavoidable subjectivity of the researcher and its impact on the direction of 
this study, including my own background. After growing up in multicultural London, the earliest research 
projects I undertook explored issues of identity and social change. Subsequent professional 
development work, often addressing the interests of minority groups in both conflict-affected and 
peaceful settings, furthered these experiences. I have been a native within the institutional culture of 
various different international development agencies in Thailand and elsewhere, observing at close 
quarters the translation of global development policy into country level practice (Gupta & Ferguson 
1997, Mosse 2005:11). My academic background in human geography and then anthropology, followed 
by professional development experience, encourages an emphasis on specificity, eschewing value-laden 
and pre-ordained design processes (Olivier de Sardan 2005). 
The research process could not be perfectly replicated by another researcher in the classic objective 
scientific fashion. With personal connections often necessary to gain access to initial interviews with aid 
agencies, and inside knowledge of aid agencies an important asset in framing questions to elicit valuable 
answers, the dynamic subsequently established and data gained were in some regards a unique result of 
circumstance. 
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Accepting that knowledge is socially constructed and that the significance of facts commonly lies in how 
they are interpreted does not invalidate the value of knowledge itself, nor does it necessitate 
questioning the presence of a concrete reality. Some accounts and explanations of events are more 
plausible than others according to grounds that may be constructed but are broadly agreed in most 
academic environments (Seale 1999:471). Such grounds do not force research approaches into 
oppositional or stereotyped expectations of constructivism or rationalism, but provide considerable 
space for different approaches that negotiate between the two (Hammersley 1995, Fearon & Wendt 
2002).  
In short, addressing subjectivity should further rather than detract from methodological quality 
(Golafshani 2003). While recognizing the validity of different interpretations and interpretive methods, 
specific techniques can still support efforts to approach ‘authenticity’ even if a search for absolute 
‘truth’ is forgone (Guba & Lincoln 1994). Formal scientific validation (accuracy of measurement) and 
reliability (the extent to which research ‘tests’ would yield the same results under repeated trials) 
require more flexible application in qualitative work, with emphasis placed on credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability (Denzin & Lincoln 2005:24, Tracy 2010). The various strategies 
employed here to achieve methodological rigour are explained through this chapter. 
4.3 Using case studies 
An instrumental case study approach is employed, involving “...an intensive study of a single unit or a 
small number of units [...] for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units” (Gerring 
2007:37).180 The case study approach applied here operates on two levels, providing a degree of variety 
that responds to the research problem.181 First, I selected the Far South of Thailand as a sole case of a 
specific peripheral conflict that shares many characteristics with other similar conflicts, enabling wider 
conclusions to be proposed. Second, I selected particular relevant aid agencies and projects within the 
case study. This was achieved through purposive sampling, sifting out relevant and “Information-rich” 182 
cases from an initial assessment of all current international aid agencies in Thailand (see Figure 4c). The 
relatively small number but diverse range of international aid agencies currently operating in Thailand 
made it possible to map all active programmes before selecting specific examples for closer attention, 
avoiding some of the risks of selection bias (Mahoney & Collier 1996). The small scale of donor 
involvement in Thailand when compared with many other, poorer conflict-affected countries has pros 
and cons: donors have less influence, although this means that a false expectation of high levels of 
impact is avoided, obliging analysis of how donors relate to and work with the government and other 
domestic partners rather than operate directly. 
The selection of specific aid agencies for analysis emerged during research as the main argument was 
developed and themes and categories determined. A concentration on international agencies including 
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NGOs whose primary purpose is closely related to development narrowed the research to a realizable 
field.183 Other agencies not addressed directly in the case studies are still considered through an overall 
survey of donors that covers Western and non-Western agencies. 
The research process did not identify a specific, single project to examine as is typically undertaken in 
ethnographic approaches to donor practice.
184
 In practice no such project existed given that area-based 
donor-funded projects are uncommon in Thailand, but in any case such an approach would have offered 
a partial and limited set of data. Projects operate within time and space limits, while key donor actions 
and impact regularly occur around the margins of a project, or before the project even starts (Porter, 
Allen & Thompson 1991, Bond & Hulme 1999). Study of a discrete project is also likely to overlook other 
(often less conflict-aware) projects that may be more representative of overall aid provision. 
The influence of national-level donor decision-making on whether and how peacebuilding objectives are 
operationalized emerged as a critical factor through the research process. A concentration on the 
national level of donor engagement rather than on global policymaking or on local political economy is 
considered valid for several reasons. The relative lack of detailed research on the dynamics of donor 
policy implementation at the national level makes it a valuable research field.185 The approach followed 
also brings out the highly centralized nature of the Thai state and its significance for the maintenance of 
horizontal inequalities and related peripheral conflict in the Far South, as is explained in Chapter Five.186 
Furthermore, research data presented in later chapters shows that many donors aim to promote policy 
change in Thailand within the national government rather than to transfer resources or make a direct 
impact through their own interventions. Few donors operating in the Far South even have interventions 
with a direct ‘footprint’ or defined project area, and those that do typically aim to use such initiatives as 
pilot cases to promote government policy change rather than directly affect local conditions. All aid 
agencies transfer resources through domestic governmental or non-governmental partner 
organizations, most of which operate at the national level. Overall, this means that it is not possible to 
map the direct impact of aid on any specific locale.187 While recognizing the limitations of the approach 
adopted in terms of addressing local dynamics, I also interviewed a wide range of people in the Far 
South and compiled secondary data in order to understand the local context of the conflict. Additional 
field level analysis would not have added significant relevant material. 
Various other possible approaches were considered. A comparative study of different conflict areas was 
rejected over concerns that it would not have offered enough contextual depth and would also raise 
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problems of equivalence.188 The lack of an available or sufficiently insightful set of projects to study 
ruled out the option of focusing on one specific sector, for example education. Investigating 
domestically funded initiatives as well as foreign aid could have added useful data but required local 
counterparts and contacts in Thai institutions that were not available. 
4.4 The research process 
The first stage of research included analysis of relevant literature. This covered various fields, most 
notably international development practice and peacebuilding, identity and ethnicity, nationalism and 
statebuilding in Southeast Asia, and contextual Thai Studies literature. Further background material, 
including information on the evolving political and security situation on the ground, was gathered 
throughout the research process. Sources included English language and vernacular mass media as well 
as discussions with contacts accumulated over time. Field visits during the research period to Aceh, 
Indonesia, as well as past research conducted in Aceh and Sri Lanka, provided additional comparative 
material acquired through interviews in those locations and through literature reviews.189 Field visits to 
towns and villages in the Far South involving interviews and group discussions added understanding of 
local level dynamics. 
A historical overview of development assistance to Thailand was an important requirement in order to 
place current donor involvement in context. Published and grey literature including material only 
available in Thailand provided data, along with interviews with experienced aid officials.190 Existing data 
on contemporary foreign aid to Thailand was gathered from a range of published and unpublished 
sources as a basis for interviews and to test the accuracy of interview data, although academic literature 
addressing donor policy in Thailand, especially concerning the Far South, is very limited, while data on 
aid policies and funding flows released by aid agencies presents only a partial picture.191 It was 
necessary to seek information directly from donor representatives or other close informants including 
consultants, staff of domestic aid recipient organizations, and government officials who work with aid 
agencies. 
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Figure 4a:  The research process 
Phase i. Initial data gathering 
Early context interviews, grey literature, data on donor 
programmes and policies (c.four months from October 2007), 
building on previous understanding of Thailand, of other 
peripheral conflicts, and of foreign aid. 
Phase ii. Initial case study interviews  Starting with accessible interviewees (late 2007/ early 2008). 
Phase iii. Mapping emerging themes 
Analysing coded interview data, outlining common issues and 
categories, selecting case studies (as above). 
Phase iv. Deeper analysis 
Building case studies and identifying emerging themes / 
classifications through further interviews, data analysis, 
literature review. Revising research sub-questions (particular 
emphasis over four months from February 2008). 
Phase v. Revision of themes 
Triangulating different data sources, international and 
domestic comparisons for validation (throughout, with 
particular emphasis over three months From May 2008). 
Revisiting themes / classifications. 
Phase vi. Follow up interviews 
Further validity testing with additional interviewees (over long 
period). 
Phase vii. Writing process 
Logic testing during writing, including final update interviews 
(over long period). 
 
Interviews with aid agency staff were structured around issues, or subquestions, that evolved as 
information was gathered and assessed.192 The following subquestion that enable a response to the first 
research question (considering the different ways in which foreign aid agencies addressed the conflict in 
the Far South of Thailand and what patterns of aid provisions emerged) were pursued: how the agency 
defined its policies including political oversight and the influence of funding sources; whether the 
agency followed policies or approaches for addressing conflict in general and for the Far South of 
Thailand in particular; how the conflict was understood by agency staff including different aspects of 
horizontal inequality; whether the agency had any interventions in the Far South or national 
interventions that affected the Far South at the time of research or historically; how interventions were 
designed to address the conflict and its causes; how approaches were devised; details of 
implementation and challenges encountered; relationships with ‘partner’ agencies and with Thai 
government departments; staffing patterns and background; intra-agency differences and tensions; and 
the availability of monitoring and evaluation data. From the information that emerged it was possible 
gradually to identify groups of donors and potential emerging themes that affect donor practice, 
although the typologies were not finalized until later in the research process. Definitive decisions over 
case study selection were also made later in the research process, emerging through 2008. 
In addressing the second main research question (asking how the properties of the characteristics and 
causes of conflict in the Far South of Thailand affected aid agencies’ ability to support peacebuilding), 
primary data on donors were considered in relation to contextual material from academic literature as 
well as interviews with aid agencies and other informants. Interviews explored how aid agencies 
addressed or were affected by key aspects of the conflict in the Far South of Thailand: the conflict’s 
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peripheral status in relation to national political processes; its low international profile; acute 
government sensitivities over external involvement; the prominence of horizontal inequalities; and the 
particular significance of identity and associated cultural aspects of inequality that lie outside aid 
agencies’ typical fields of engagement. 
Addressing the third research question on the properties of aid agencies that help explain the identified 
pattern involved devising and applying the framework of three themes as described in the following 
section. Specific issues were identified and refined under each theme as interviews and other empirical 
research proceeded and specific aid agency case studies were constructed.193 
The main process of data collection involved extended periods of interviewing and associated research 
in Bangkok, where aid agencies working in Thailand have country offices, along with field visits to the 
Far South. Interviews evolved during the research process. Preparatory interviews, mostly conducted 
near the start of the primary research phase with a range of different actors in Bangkok, built 
background information, tested ideas, and established contacts for further interviews. Potential key 
informants were avoided in the initial stages, given the risk that there would be no second chance to 
follow up an interview if what later emerged to be important questions were not asked. Early emphasis 
was also placed on improving Thai language ability. Interviews conducted from October 2007 in Bangkok 
with representatives of international agencies and their operating partners from government 
departments or non-governmental organizations facilitated understanding of the overall situation of 
donor assistance and the Far South of Thailand. 
Later interviews involved donor staff and others associated with the agencies selected as key case 
studies. As is typical for open interview research (Kvale 1996), later interviews addressed more specific 
issues of interest and tested earlier findings. They explored agencies identified as specific case studies in 
greater depth. They also engaged other actors (from other aid agencies for example) whose responses 
were used to cross-reference and check emerging themes as well as specific facts. By continuing to 
conduct background interviews with other donors and also referring to wider sources of information 
throughout the research process it was possible to situate the emerging material on aid agency case 
studies within a wider survey of donors and of the broader site of research, thereby checking its validity 
(see Chenail 1995). 
Interviews with aid officials were predominantly conducted in Bangkok. Following time spent in the Far 
South of Thailand before starting this research, initial interviews with academics and NGO workers as 
well as informal discussions in villages in Pattani took place in October and November 2007. Interviews 
with students, rural development outreach workers, and academics were held in November and 
December 2007.194 Informal discussions and interviews were also held in Kuala Lumpur and in Kelantan, 
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the Malaysian state bordering the Far South of Thailand. Further interviews with local officials and 
informal discussions took place in the Far South during 2008 and 2009. 
Maintaining a consistent approach to recording and managing data is less arduous for a sole researcher 
than a field team (Maxwell 1992). There is still a need for a consistent transcription protocol, however 
(MacLellan, MacQueen & Neidig 2003). Key issues were noted down for all interviews: main discussion 
points and opinions, specific facts, salient quotations, and so on. The wider dynamics of each interview 
were also recorded including the location, circumstances and overall tone. Personal reflections were 
noted during and after interviews, using initials to distinguish them from interviewees’ comments. 
Interview transcriptions were entered onto a computer within one or two days, using a consistent 
recording method while recognizing the specificity of each interview and the limits of formal data 
comparison such as quantified content analysis (see Huberman & Miles 1994, Kowal & O’Connell 2004). 
Translation and interpretation challenges would have stymied any effort to conduct formal content 
analysis given that interviews were conducted in several languages – English, Thai and some Malay – 
and many interviewees who spoke in English were not native speakers. 
An overview of donor programmes in Thailand was gradually established as interview data and 
secondary sources were gathered. Cross-referencing between different agencies (i.e. asking 
interviewees for their knowledge of other agencies as well as their own) increased reliability. 
Understanding why patterns of donor assistance emerged was a more challenging exercise. It involved 
using interview transcripts as a primary evidence source for identifying common themes that emerged 
across different aid agencies. Common themes were coded once a body of interviews had been 
conducted (early in 2008), rather than waiting until all data was gathered. This enabled subsequent 
interviews to check and explore emerging themes (Miles & Huberman 1994:196, Glaser 1998). I 
followed through original and transcribed notes using codes and highlighting to identify emerging 
common themes before collating comments accordingly (see Patton 1990, Bowen 2008). Drawing rough 
‘spider maps’ further helped to cluster and compare data. Data analysis continued in this way as further 
information was gathered in 2008. Additional theoretical literature was reviewed throughout the data 
gathering process (see Shenton 2004). The initial list of research questions and sub-questions was 
revisited and gradually focused down. 
I relied on the concept of ‘saturation’, or the point at which no new information or themes are observed 
in the data, to decide how many interviews were enough (Guest, Bunce & Johnson 2006). This demands 
explanation of how such a qualitative judgement call is made (Bowen 2008:137). In this case, it was 
assessed through iterative analysis of emerging themes, and comparison between results achieved 
through interviews or other sources. By sorting and verifying data as the process unfolded, emerging 
gaps could be addressed through further research. Once saturation was reached, interviews tended to 
repeat already established facts or arguments, and it became increasingly possible to predict the 
answers that interviewees would provide. Over time, an empirical basis was established and themes 
distilled. 
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Linking theory with emerging empirical data from a range of sources in a partially inductive fashion does 
not cancel out the risk of bias (Huberman & Miles 1994:190, Van Maanen 1998). Triangulation was 
employed as part of the research process in order to reduce ‘background noise’ and test and strengthen 
the validity, reliability and consistency of findings (Flick 2004). Considerations included the need to 
distinguish widely repeated trends or institutional perspectives from unrepresentative statements or 
events; and a need to balance the perspectives of donors and others in Bangkok with views from the Far 
South of Thailand. 
Triangulation of interview data both within and between cases was undertaken repeatedly to test the 
consistency of conclusions being drawn (Constas 1992), follow-up interviews enabling additional 
comparison. A similar approach was taken to writing up case studies, with material including quotations 
only being used when representative of a wider set of responses. Specific comparison was also made 
through applying a wider range of sources beyond interview data. Such comparisons considered aid 
provision in other peripheral conflict sites, notably Aceh and Sri Lanka. Explanation of the context of the 
Far South of Thailand is supported by comparison with other border areas and minority groups in 
Thailand, while violence in the Far South is compared with national level political violence in Thailand 
(see Chapter Five). Informal comparisons were also made with the actions of aid agencies working 
elsewhere in Thailand and not formally part of this analysis.195 
4.5 Classifying aid agencies: three groups of donors, three conceptual themes 
Expectations of what patterns of aid delivery would emerge shifted over time, as is common during 
iterative research (Ragin 1994, Charmaz 2005). Cross-case comparison of aid agencies facilitated a 
process of grounded analysis, building up a framework and testing it through comparison between 
groups. In this way it was possible to cluster cases into categories.196 As data from interviews and other 
background research was gathered, a clear distinction emerged between a group of agencies that had 
current programmes addressing conflict in the Far South, and those that did not. A further group that 
had tried but failed to address the conflict then emerged, leading to a classification into three groups. 
Group One consists of donors that avoid conflict issues or simply do not address them. This group 
accounts for the bulk of aid funding to Thailand. Group Two consists of donors that try to address or 
‘work on’ conflict (Goodhand 2001), but that do not succeed in starting programmes. This group 
illustrates some of the barriers that restrict donor attention to peripheral conflict. Group Three donors 
manage to implement programmes working on conflict, finding ways to bypass the barriers that stymied 
Group Two donors. 
The group classification adapts existing comparisons of aid actors in conflict contexts, most notably that 
of Goodhand (2001) (see Figure 4b). The classification enables an exploration of the salient issues that 
cause donors to fall into different groups, as is explained in greater detail in Chapter Six. Chapters Seven 
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to Nine provide case studies representing each of the three groups in turn. The groups can be seen as 
tendencies that may shift over time (and vary between peripheral conflicts). Reflecting the complexity 
of aid institutions, donors may move between groups or fund programmes in two different groups at 
the same time. 
Three conceptual themes were also diagnosed over time (motivations, interface and practice), as 
already explained in Chapter Three (see also Figure 4b). The themes help explain the reasons why 
donors belong to different groups in the case of the Far South of Thailand, while their theoretical basis 
offers a way of exploring how donors address peripheral conflicts and the reasons why certain patterns 
emerge. The themes were finalized through the research process. Reviews of relevant literature 
including case studies of aid provision in peripheral conflicts suported the identification of significant 
findings within the mass of primary data. A larger number of sub-themes were initially diagnosed before 
the three themes were refined over time. The themes inter-relate, with each of the three groups of 
donors demonstrating certain properties across all of them. The selection of the three themes reflects a 
need to understand the influences that shape the individual and institutional decision-making of donors 
(motivations) as well as the constraints on actual implementation (practice), as explained in various 
other studies (see Porter, Allen & Thompson 1991, Mosse 2005). Interviews repeatedly demonstrated 
that the relationship between donors and government departments was significant to explaining how 
and why donors act in certain ways. This led to the interface being designated as a separate theme. 
Charting of interests and themes to identify common threads enabled a selection of specific 
representative case studies that yielded useful information on critical issues. The case studies of aid 
agencies selected in Chapters Seven to Nine illustrate the main trends that are outlined in Chapter Six 
and summarized in figure 4b.  
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Figure 4b:  Aid to Thailand: three groups of donors, three conceptual themes 
 
 
 Group One: 
Mainstream aid 
Group Two: 
Trying but failing 
Group Three: 
Working on conflict 
 
1) Motivation 
 
 
 
Conflict avoidance or 
blindness. Main state-
centric aid. 
 
Stymied efforts to work 
on conflict. 
 
Working directly on 
conflict 
 
 
3) Practice 
  
Case Study in Ch 7: 
Asian Development 
Bank IMT-GT project. 
 
Case Studies in Ch 8: 
UNDP and the World 
Bank. 
 
Case Studies in Ch 9: 
Unicef and the Asia 
Foundation. 
  
In constructing a narrative for each case study, attention was given to specific illustrative issues that 
emerged through the research process and demonstrate the attributes and external factors affecting 
how agencies address conflict in the Far South. Over time, themes were revised and assessed in the light 
of existing literature, including material on donor practice as well as studies of how aid interventions 
address conflicts and related inequalities. Draft text was later reviewed by various practitioners with a 
strong academic background or concurrent role in academic institutions. 
The relevance of each case study is summarized here. Finding a representative case in Group One (see 
Chapter Seven) presented the greatest challenge yet remained critical to research given that most aid to 
Thailand, both historically and recent, falls into the category. Given an absence of involvement in 
peacebuilding, the researcher is confronted by a lack of material to work with and little incentive on the 
part of potential informants to cooperate. While a simpler approach might have been to exclude all 
Group One agencies, this would have presented an unrepresentative set of case studies that focused on 
a small percentage of overall aid flows. It would have failed to adequately tackle the reasons why aid 
agencies address or avoid conflict in the Far South. The Asian Development Bank’s role in the Indonesia-
Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle Project emerged as a potential case study on the basis of a wide 
body of available literature documenting its past history as well as its contemporary actions, 
complemented by involvement in the peripheral conflict zone of Aceh in Indonesia as well as the Far 
South of Thailand. Past as well as present ADB staff and consultants were able to provide further 
information. Success in identifying consultants and former employees willing to talk openly about the 
2) Interface 
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project’s past record also facilitated research. The ADB is one of the largest donors in Southeast Asia, 
and has historically been a major concessional lender to Thailand. 
In the cae of Group Two agencies (Chapter Eight), access to agency staff and other informants, as well as 
their prominent role as development agencies that address conflict situations globally, made both UNDP 
and the World Bank clear candidates for case studies. Selecting both of them rather than only one 
enriched the evidence available for analysis and enabled comparison between the two agencies. The 
selected Group Three cases, The Asia Foundation and Unicef, were identified as the two agencies with 
the most extensive programmes in the Far South. As with UNDP and the World Bank, the contrast 
between them affords useful comparisons. 
Figure 4c:  Case studies and interviewees 
Key case study Key informants Comments / further sources 
ADB: IMT-GT project 
(Group One)  
Current ADB staff in Bangkok; international 
consultants and ADB staff involved in original 
design. Thai academic consultants to original 
plans and current new phase. 
Discussion and interviews with informants in 
Aceh (also part of IMT-GT). 
UNDP 
(Group Two) 
Staff of UNDP Thailand, other UN agencies.  Repeat interviews and discussions over time. 
World Bank 
(Group Two) 
Current staff in Thailand and elsewhere; staff 
of partner agencies.  
Supported by experience from the World 
Bank’s engagement in conflict elsewhere. 
Unicef 
(Group Three) 
Staff of Unicef Thailand at different levels.  Detailed interviews, open provision of 
information. 
The Asia Foundation 
(Group Three) 
Current and past staff members, with repeat 
discussions. Staff of partner agencies. 
Also interviewed staff of main funding agency 
(USAID).  
                                                                                Other key informants  
International bodies in Thailand: European Union; French Embassy; German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ); Royal 
Netherlands Embassy; British Embassy; UK Department for International Development; The Canada Fund; Australian Embassy; 
US Agency for International Development; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Japan International Cooperation 
Agency; Japan Bank for International Cooperation; United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); International Labour Organization 
(ILO); Raks Thai (Care Thailand); Oxfam UK; Actionaid Asia; Save the Children; Internews; International Commission of Jurists. 
Thai bodies: Thailand International Cooperation Agency / Ministry of Foreign Affairs (TICA); Southern Border Provinces 
Administrative Centre (SBPAC); Peace Operations Centre, Royal Thai Armed Forces; King Prajadhipok’s Institute; government 
representatives from provincial administrations and line departments in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat; Deep South Watch; ISRA 
news agency; Thailand Centre for Muslim and Democratic Development; Young Muslim Association of Thailand; Chulalongkorn, 
Mahidol, Thammasat, Prince of Songkhla (Pattani and Hat Yai campuses), and Yala Islamic Universities. Many unaffiliated 
individuals were also interviewed. 
 
  
86 
 
4.6 Conducting interviews 
Interviews are considered an appropriate method when seeking detailed information from a relatively 
small population of people who have specialist knowledge on potentially sensitive issues (Patton 1990, 
Kvale 2006). In total, over a hundred semi-structured interviews were conducted with aid agency staff, 
implementing partners, and other key informants. The interviewing process applied many of the 
principles considered important for ‘elite interviews’ (Goldstein 2002), although only a few interviewees 
could accurately be described as elite unless employing a very broad definition of the term. An open-
ended approach was employed, enabling open discussion and encouraging informants to provide 
valuable detail rather than simply repeat policy statements or answer a series of structured questions 
(Aberbach & Rockman 2002:673-674). Interviews were designed to gain understanding as well as 
establish facts, accepting multiple perspectives rather than trying to extrapolate singular positions 
(Fontana 2003). 
The research process and findings were inevitably influenced by whom I was able to meet.197 Although 
an overall survey of foreign aid agencies working in Thailand (and especially those addressing conflict in 
the Far South) was established over time,198 the selection of aid agency case studies was to some extent 
affected by access constraints. Reaching valuable informants who were willing to discuss the details of 
how aid agencies translate peacebuilding policies into practice would not have been viable within a 
short research timeframe. ‘Cold-calling’ usually elicited no response or at best an invitation to interview 
a junior member of staff or public relations officer. Occasional formal meetings arranged through official 
channels typically led to formulaic policy responses that provided little insight into actual practice. The 
relatively thin existing body of published research at the level of the donor country office is partly a 
reflection of these challenges. 
On average, approximately ten informants were interviewed for each of the five key agency case 
studies, with some informants interviewed on more than one occasion.199 Funders and recipients as well 
as direct staff members were interviewed. From initial entry points by email or phone, normally 
following an introduction through existing connections, it was possible to access further subjects 
through a modified form of ‘snowball’ sampling within a limited, specialized group (Christopoulos 2009). 
The sample expanded from initial contacts within a very small total population of potential interviewees 
by the use of various starting points rather than one centre, involving increasingly directive decisions 
over whom to interview. 
Group Three international agencies that did address the conflict in the Far South were relatively 
accessible, offering plentiful data. For other agencies it was necessary to find willing interviewees from a 
wider range of people, in cases waiting to build contacts over more than a year. The most useful data 
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was normally provided by mid-level professionals and specialists rather than senior managers or public 
relations officers, being less concerned about institutional reputation and often better informed. 
Beyond case study agencies, over fifty interviews with aid agency staff and informants provided data on 
other aid agencies and the wider context. Accessing government counterparts at the national level was 
challenging but made possible by working through contacts.
200
 However, government informants only 
occasionally offered data of significant value. The difficulty of eliciting information through interviews 
with Thai civil servants and other domestic counterparts of foreign aid agencies is a limiting factor in this 
research.  
Semi-structured guiding questions were prepared before each interview (see Kvale 1996:129). For 
interviews with aid agency staff, I usually emailed a brief outline of the research objectives in advance. I 
prepared for interviews by consulting available written sources and my acquaintances about the 
interviewees, their organization’s structure, and relevant projects. Interviews with aid agency staff 
generally followed a similar sequence in addressing core questions of donor policy and practice. As the 
research process continued, it became increasingly possible to test emerging hypotheses that aimed to 
explain aid agencies’ actions and positions regarding peripheral conflict through asking more pointed 
questions (see Kvale 1996:132). Where informants addressed specific issues I asked for facts to back up 
statements. 
Gaining access to staff in different aid agencies and government organizations rarely gives the 
researcher the luxury to define the location or dynamics of the interview, although on occasion I could 
propose a suitable venue or suggest follow up meetings (see Aberbach & Rockman 2002). Interviews 
were often conducted in agency offices, a typical interview lasting one to two hours although some 
were shorter.201 For many interviews I spoke with individuals separately, although in some cases it was 
not possible to separate colleagues. Repeat interviews, where possible, gave opportunities to follow up 
specific issues, check and verify outstanding concerns, and enable informants to speak in a relaxed 
environment.  
I applied what have been termed “Elicitation techniques” 202 that are appropriate to situations where 
cultural and political sensitivity are paramount. For example, I did not use a voice recorder, having 
found that few people speak candidly on controversial issues in such environments when being 
recorded. With experience it is possible to take accurate notes, including quotations of a reasonable 
length, and transcribe shortly afterwards with little if any loss of accuracy. Operating as a single 
researcher with no institutional agenda enabled a flexible approach to interviews, helped foster 
personal ties, and reduced fear of repercussions on the part of informants. Discussion was for the most 
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part kept fluid and neutral phrasing was preferred in order to avoid leading questions. I was careful to 
withhold difficult questions around conflict issues until a rapport had been developed. Depending on 
how an interview proceeded, it was often possible to use increasingly probing questions in response to 
emerging issues (see Babbie 2010:183).   
At times interviews resembled a discussion rather than an imposed research tool (see Denscombe 
2007:185). Unlike the classic ‘neutral’ interviewer, at times I offered my own opinion and let a 
conversation flow in order to encourage an informant to speak more directly (see Fontana & Frey 
1998:56).  Informants often appeared more comfortable discussing their own organization or sensitive 
political issues outside an office environment and many interviews took place in a café or restaurant. In 
this way, it was possible to move beyond the public face or ‘front stage’ of institutions, with 
interviewees at times revealing more about ‘back stage’ actions than I had expected (Goffman 1959). On 
several occasions interviewees directly (and often confidentially) criticized their own organizations.203 
The interviewer’s status influences what information is provided and how it is interpreted. Interviews 
are inevitably a reflexive process to a greater or lesser extent (Hammersley 1990:9, May 2001:140). The 
level of access and openness achieved with aid agency staff and other informants is in part a 
consequence of my own professional experiences and my position as a European in Thailand. Foreigner 
status probably helped me to gain access both to donors and to informants in the Far South, although it 
hampered my ability to seek information from government informants given the sensitivity of 
international stances on the conflict in the Far South.204 
Recognizing and using my own status helped elicit open responses. With a varied set of interviewees, it 
was important to consider carefully how I presented myself, and to be flexible. In interviews with 
donors, I emphasized my own past work experience with aid agencies and used appropriate 
terminology. Different approaches were employed when interviewing others including government staff 
(with whom I avoided confrontational discussion of the political context of conflict and concentrated 
instead on development issues) and Malay Muslim interviewees in the Far South (many of whom 
responded positively to comparisons between Aceh and the Far South of Thailand). Cross-cultural 
challenges were lessened by careful preparation, thereby reducing the risk of mistranslation. 
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4.7 Research ethics 
Overall consideration of ethical issues began before fieldwork started and it influenced the shape of 
research. I used the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s 2005 Research Ethics Framework as a 
basis for appraising ethical risks and followed University of London procedure. I consider here points 
specifically relevant to the research undertaken.
205
  
Conflict environments present specific dilemmas, most immediately through physical risks to 
researchers and to interviewees (Barakat & Ellis 1996). Even though I was in little personal danger given 
the relatively low level of random violence and no efforts to target Westerners to date, I carefully 
considered the interviewees’ safety. The act of an outsider asking questions in an area of active conflict 
between pro- and anti-government groups will almost certainly raise attention (Jacobsen & Landau 
2003:193). In the Far South of Thailand, such problems are most likely to occur in rural villages with a 
strong active rebel and government security presence, although they can also arise in towns or in 
institutions like universities and hospitals. 
Close understanding of context, achieved through preliminary visits and establishing local contacts, is 
especially important given heightened concerns in a conflict area (Goodhand 2000). When in the conflict 
area, I located interviewees through reliable contacts, checked that people were willing to speak to me, 
and aimed to avoid direct discussion of the conflict. On several occasions interviews were either 
cancelled or discussion was too bland to be of interest. When this occurred, I did not push hard to 
rearrange meetings or extract more useful information, regarding my own research as less vital than 
people’s security and right to silence. I ensured the anonymity of any interviewee or other informant 
who requested it. Even where not requested, I withheld names (and in cases provided intentionally 
vague organizational affiliations or job descriptions) in order to protect informants where potential risk 
was diagnosed. In some cases I did not ask informants in the Far South for a full name in order to avoid 
associated suspicions.  
In addition to risks of violence in the conflict area, staff within national or international organizations 
may risk damaging office relationships and potentially their careers by speaking openly (Harper & 
Jimenez 2005). This was an ongoing concern given that many interviewees and acquaintances openly 
offered information that could harm their organization’s reputation. The anonymity of all comments 
made ‘off the record’ was also respected. Throughout the research process, I remained alert to any 
negative feedback from interviewees or other figures over the conduct of interviews and other steps. 
In order to maintain a balanced position, I continually checked against drift towards centralized 
mainstream perspectives that stigmatize or marginalize peripheral views. I also ensured that a critical 
stance towards centralized authorities did not lead me to overlook unjustified violence or discrimination 
perpetrated by anti-government insurgents. I intentionally exposed myself to different views, 
                                                             
205
 See also Association of Social Anthropologists (2007). 
90 
 
maintaining involvement through seminars, interviews and informal discussion in the Far South and in 
Bangkok throughout the research and writing period. 
Careless handling of information on peace promotion could potentially damage efforts to support 
peace. For example, given nationalist concerns over rebel efforts to ‘internationalize’ the conflict in the 
Far South of Thailand, compiled and packaged data could help government control the activities of 
international initiatives to promote peace. I was careful not to release publically information that was 
provided in confidence and also avoided providing detailed breakdowns of relevant projects and 
funders. 
Maintaining an honest approach includes accurate representation of others’ views, as well as open 
treatment of the researcher’s own position both in written outputs and during interviews. While it is 
important to present oneself in a manner most likely to elicit information from interviewees (for 
example by selecting which language to use or by stressing specific elements of the research objectives 
according to the background of the subject), I was careful to avoid intentionally misinforming or 
misleading subjects. I also made a conscious effort to avoid overtly adopting any stance on the conflict 
during the research period, avoiding public statements and maintaining a low profile. While recognizing 
inevitable subjectivity within social research, I also worked to maintain an even stance by judging all 
actors including belligerents against the same set of values.206 
It has been suggested that researchers should contribute to improving the lives of people that they are 
documenting as well as remaining objective (Burr 2002). My interest in answering the questions posed 
in this study stems from a desire to help find just solutions to long-term conflicts as well as expand 
academic understanding. While I designed the methodology for academic purposes, I also recognized 
that building grounded contextual knowledge increases the likelihood of producing material and 
argument that can be used more widely (Jacobsen & Landau 2003). 
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Chapter Five  The Far South of Thailand:  
   Resistance, Identity, and Development 
 
This chapter describes the characteristics and causes of peripheral conflict in the Far South of Thailand, 
providing a basis for later empirical chapters that consider whether and how foreign aid agencies have 
addressed the conflict. Many of the properties of peripheral conflicts identified in Chapter Two can be 
seen in this case, with localized violence in a remote border zone recurring in bouts over many decades.  
The chapter explains how specific triggers of violence can be identified in political changes at the 
national level, while longer-term structural marginalization of the Far South has persisted. Malay 
Muslims form the majority the Far South, but the area itself contains a small fraction of Thailand’s 
population and at the national level Malay Muslims remain politically and culturally, as well as 
demographically and geographically, peripheral. 
As well as explaining the roots of violence in the Far South, the chapter also considers the history of 
Thailand’s political structure and upheavals at the national level, showing how partial democratization 
and recent national unrest have perpetuated the long-term marginalization of the Far South within what 
remains a highly centralized nation state. The chapter explains how the Far South is vested with little 
political authority nationally or even locally. Local leaders are caught between incompatible national 
expectations and local demands, with little influence over the contestation and shifting settlements that 
characterize the Thai national polity. Successive national governments have aimed to end conflict in the 
Far South through defeating insurgents,207 at times offering concessions but little significant political 
reconfiguration.  
The chapter considers how horizontal inequalities encompass cultural and political as well as 
socioeconomic factors in the Far South.208 It stresses that the importance of these related forms of 
inequality depends on the perception of those involved, explaining how perceptions of marginalization 
fuel resentment against the Thai state. As Chapter Two showed, statistical analysis of actual inequalities 
often only makes sense alongside broader description of the context of a specific case, revealing the 
local comparisons that people make and the related historical basis of grievances. 
Academic explanations of the conflict consider the effects of the construction and maintenance of a 
national Thai identity on one side and of an oppositional ‘Patani’ Malay Muslim identity on the other 
(Surin 1985, Chaiwat 2005, Thanet 2009, Liow 2009).209 While it is necessary to break down and look 
beyond polarized explanations, this central theme is a consistent thread through explanations that draw 
both on the local context and on a main theme of Thai Studies more widely in explaining the significance 
of identity for maintaining national authority. In a detailed analysis, Duncan McCargo concludes that the 
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conflict in the Far South is a war over legitimacy,210 showing how the Thai state has acted to extend 
nationalist identity from the centralized bureaucracy and monarchy out to peripheral areas, attempting 
to assimilate minority populations in the process (2008:183). 
The significance of identity is especially important for researchers and practitioners approaching 
conflicts from a developmental perspective that prioritizes socioeconomic above cultural explanation. 
Perceived inequalities affect how development initiatives are both formulated and received by many 
local inhabitants, with government policies and programmes commonly seen as a cause of increased 
antagonism rather than a vehicle of reconciliation. As is explained in this chapter, many initiatives for 
the Far South have been associated with pacification policies and are often perceived by Malay Muslims 
as part of long-term efforts to promote assimilation and assert central control. 
5.1 Overview: long-term peripheral conflict, limited political settlement 
Contested histories demonstrate the dominant and enduring fault lines of peripheral conflict In the Far 
South of Thailand. It is common for young Malay Muslim children in the area to receive two parallel 
versions of their own past. In a government school, they learn how the benevolent management of King 
Chulalongkorn in the late nineteenth century enabled the Thai kingdom to avoid colonization, absorbing 
into a modern and centralized nation state those peripheral protectorates that it managed to hang 
onto. This is seen as a nationalist achievement under pressure from the colonial powers of Britain and 
France who were chipping away at the kingdom from all sides (Smith 1991, Streckfuss 1993, Thongchai 
1994). 
Patani identity, meanwhile, draws on the history of the traditional sultanate. After school, often in a 
community-run tadika class, children learn about the past glories of the Patani sultanate and the 
centuries of struggle with the distant Siamese throne before sovereignty was lost in 1906 following an 
agreement between Britain (the colonial authority in the lower Malay Peninsula) and Siam. Patani was 
incorporated into Siam and subsequently split into the three provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat 
(Liow 2009). A key text in reproducing the historical basis of contemporary Patani identity is the Hikayat 
Patani, a historical account that chronicles the history and legends of the area (Teeuw & Wyatt 1970). 
Violent resistance to Thai authority in the Far South has a long record. As is common with other 
peripheral conflicts, violence has recurred in bouts. The Thai state has never managed to establish full 
authority or broad-based legitimacy in the Far South. Malay Muslim resistance increased under the 
nationalist government of Phibun Songkhram, who reversed earlier efforts to grant Malay Muslims 
rights to cultural distinctiveness on his return to power in 1947 (Forbes 1982). Unrest flared up as local 
leader Haji Sulong mobilized dissent and was subsequently imprisoned. In the 1948 Dusun Nyor 
incident, up to 400 Malay Muslims and 30 police are thought to have died (Surin 1985:161, Chaiwat 
2006b). Haji Sulong was later to disappear, probably murdered by Thai security forces (Thanet 2004). 
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The divide between the Thai state and Malay Muslims remained, with violence led by several separatist 
groups returning in the 1960s and increasing in the 1970s before petering out in the early 1980s. 
Contributory factors to the end to violence in the 1980s included a set of complementary state actions: 
more effective security policies, an amnesty offered to insurgents, major development expenditure, and 
more careful local administrative management (Ornanong 2001). General Prem Tinsulanond, Prime 
Minister for much of the 1980s, established the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center 
(SBPAC) in 1981. New security and governance arrangements gave a major role to the army in the Far 
South, while gaining the support of many of the Malay Muslim elite through political privileges and 
development funds (McCargo 2008). 
However, the period of calm turned out to be temporary, demonstrating that no enduring settlement 
had been achieved, with the state’s response devised following the transitory demise of insurgents 
rather than through negotiated settlement or fundamental reform. This pattern is consistent, with the 
Far South being too marginal to affect national political process. Key actors within the Thai state have 
also had little incentive to offer meaningful reforms or significant compromise as a ‘secondary 
settlement’ (Parks & Cole 2010) to representatives of an area whose 1.8 million inhabitants form under 
3% of the Thai population (NSO 2005). 
By the late 1990s, incidents including arson of school buildings were rising once more. Insurgent 
fragments had consolidated under a network often termed BRN Coordinate (Barisan Revolusi Nasional 
or National Revolutionary Front), a legacy of earlier unrest, and set about reorganizing (Human Rights 
Watch 2007). Violence flared again in a series of attacks on military bases in January 2004 and continued 
threreafter. From January 2004 to August 2011, violence in the Far South caused an estimated 4,846 
deaths. Insurgents are believed to have been responsible for a clear majority of the deaths. Shootings 
were the most common cause of death, followed by bombings (Srisompob 2011).211 
The number of incidents dropped from mid-2007, probably in response to more intensive military 
operations, but the actual rate of casualties only declined slightly as insurgents switched to a smaller 
number of higher-intensity attacks (ibid.). Overall, 59% of those killed were Muslims, the majority of 
whom were targeted by the insurgents and the rest by state security forces. The remaining 41% were 
Buddhist, almost all of whom were killed by insurgents.212 Attacks on schools, government offices, and 
state-related bodies were the most typical form of violence. Almost half of all casualties are categorized 
as civilians, many of whom were government employees. Casualties among government civilian 
employees (civil servants, teachers, etc.) have outnumbered casualties among government security 
personnel (soldiers, police, and defence volunteers) (ibid.). 
Insurgent tactics are typical of a weaker party in an asymmetric conflict, involving assassinating 
government workers and alleged informers or collaborators, planting small bombs in public places, and 
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burning government buildings. Insurgents are organized on the ground into small groups of around six 
people (usually local residents) operating mostly in rural areas of the Far South (ICG 2009).213 Although 
Malay Muslim groups have detonated small bombs in Bangkok in the past, violence since 2004 has been 
restricted to or near the area corresponding to the former Patani sultanate.214 Insurgent leaders have 
aimed to polarize the situation, targeting moderate Malay Muslims and inducing sufficient fear for many 
among the Far South’s Thai Buddhist minority to leave the area. Some others have formed both 
government-sanctioned and illegal amateur defence forces (ICG 2007). 
The state’s main reaction has been security-led and often clumsy. A series of well documented excesses 
in 2004 included the killing of 32 insurgents who rallied in Pattani’s ancient Krue Se mosque, the 
accidental suffocation of 78 protesters rammed into trucks following an anti-government rally in Tak 
Bai, and the disappearance of Thai Muslim lawyer and human rights activist Somchai Neelapaijit, 
probably murdered by police or other state officials.215 Further detainment, disappearances and torture 
have been commonly reported and documented (Human Rights Watch 2007, NHRC 2010). Insurgents, 
meanwhile, working through small cells and using modern communications technology, have continued 
to operate. Local operatives work clandestinely and typically reside within their communities across the 
Far South, while the location and identity of senior leaders remain largely unknown (Human Rights 
Watch 2007:64, ICG 2010b). 
A reasonable if incomplete picture of the cohesion and structures of insurgent leadership can be 
established from reports based on military intelligence and other sources. Various different Malay 
Muslim individuals from the Far South claim authority over insurgents on the ground. Many of them are 
exiled or amnestied leaders from previous periods of unrest.
216
 Insurgent groups such as PULO (Patani 
United Liberation Organization) have continued a propaganda role in exile although their degree of 
influence on the ground is widely questioned.217 Most accounts accept both the locally rooted nature of 
the insurgency and the presence of these different leadership structures, although one group, BRN-
Coordinate, is widely recognized as the dominant structure (McCargo 2008:174, ICG 2009, Helbardt 
2011). BRN-Coordinate appears to share some features of a network rather than a traditional hierarchy 
while also maintaining an effective control structure, being able for example to organize multiple 
attacks and bombings in different locations across the Far South on the same day.218 
Active insurgents rarely encounter their peers in other cells or any insurgent leaders beyond their 
immediate organizer, thereby frustrating military intelligence gathering efforts. The overall number of 
insurgents is not known. One comprehensive review offers a figure of 3,000 operationally active 
insurgents and some 30,000 members overall (Helbart 2011:28-29).219  Recruitment is carried out 
                                                             
213
 These groups are sometimes termed RKK or Runda Kumpulan Kecil (Small Patrol Group).  
214
 Separatists planted some bombs in Bangkok and in Hat Yai, Songkhla, 1977-1980 (Yegar 2002:150). 
215
 See ICG (2005). 
216
 The identities of current insurgent leaders are unknown. 
217
 Discussions with Don Pathan, Bangkok, 2011.  
218
 Such incidents have occurred repeatedly. See for example McCargo (2008:135), ICG (2008b:7-8). 
219
 A figure of 1800-3000 active insurgent fighters is offered by ICG (2009), based chiefly on police data. 
95 
 
through several channels. Some potential insurgents are encouraged to join by peers, while many 
recruiters are teachers or others connected with educational establishments (ICG 2009, McCargo 2008). 
Recruitment often takes place in relatively privileged schools and colleges. For example, Thamma 
Wittaya school, a large, well-funded private Islamic school in Yala, has long been seen as a bed of active 
insurgent recruitment (Human Rights Watch 2007:22, Liow 2008:38-39).220 Interviews with insurgents 
carried out by various researchers suggest that recruits are typically relatively young men, aged 
between 16 and 35. They are rarely from especially deprived backgrounds, with brighter, dependable 
young men preferred for clandestine training (McCargo 2008:149, Askew 2009a).  
Insurgent calls to action are framed in ethnonationalist terms as well as appeals to wider religious 
(Islamic) and racial (Malay) solidarity (ICG 2005, Wattana 2006). Training for insurgent recruits and 
wider propaganda focus on repeated, emotional appeals to help in the struggle to recreate the glories 
of the past Patani Sultanate, with the Thai state presented as an illegal occupying force and religious 
oppressor (McCargo 2008, ICG 2009). Current insurgent leaders do not state their demands in specific 
terms, while lower-level cadres sometimes express vague political ambitions of an Islamic dominion of 
Patani (Askew 2009a). The aim of this approach appears to be to propagate within Malay Muslim 
communities an image of violence as a popular, justified reaction to state neglect and suppression 
(Helbardt 2011:7). Where insurgent claims that fall short of full independence are vocalized, for 
example through informal discussions or on internet websites with leaders from groups other than BRN-
C, they are broadly similar to the still-unmet demands made by Haji Sulong in 1947 and repeated over 
subsequent decades: greater autonomy under locally elected leaders, official recognition for the Malay 
language, and implementation of Islamic customs and laws.221 Leaders of older insurgent groups and 
others claiming close associations with active insurgent leaders have talked informally with 
intermediaries and Thai government representatives about the scope for some degree of autonomy for 
the Far South within the Thai state. However, it is not clear how close they are to instigators and 
perpetrators of the current unrest (Deep South Watch 2009). 
5.2 The local context 
The difficult relationship between a Malay Muslim peripheral minority and the nation state, and 
associated perceptions of horizontal inequality, are the dominant fault-lines of conflict in the Far South 
of Thailand, as this section explains. Ethnic difference is not in itself a cause of violent confrontation in 
Thailand. While a legacy of ethnic antagonism may be strong in the Far South, ethnic differences also 
exist in many other peripheral areas of Thailand that remain peaceful.222 Most border provinces of 
Thailand contain large minority populations –often constituting a majority locally – who speak the same 
language as relatives across the border, including Khmer, Lao dialect, Malay, and minority languages 
spoken in Burma. Yet in contrast to the Far South, these areas of Thailand remain free of ethnic 
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violence. Religious difference is a factor that affects the Far South more than other peripheral areas, 
with a Muslim minority more clearly differentiated from the Thai Buddhist majority than is the case for 
those other minorities within Thailand who are themselves predominantly also Buddhist. Yet many of 
Thailand’s Muslims reside fairly peacefully in other parts of the South that are not affected by conflict, in 
Bangkok, and in smaller numbers elsewhere in the country. Muslims living elsewhere in Thailand are 
generally more likely to accept state legitimacy and are better assimilated (Gilquin 2002). The relative 
calm of Satun, a Malay Muslim majority province that borders Malaysia on the western side of the 
peninsula, shows again that there is little inevitability about violent minority resistance (Parks 2009). 
The overall population of Thailand is overwhelmingly Buddhist, with a Muslim population of below 5% 
(NSO 2000). Muslims live in all regions of Thailand but are concentrated in the Southern region, where 
30% of the population is Muslim (see Figure 5a). The Far South (the southernmost part of the Southern 
region with a population of around two million) is around 80% Muslim, a proportion that increases in 
rural areas (see Figure 5b).223 
 
Figure 5a:  Religious composition of Thailand224 
 
 Population age 15 and over (thousands) % of population 
Region Buddhist Islam Christian Total Buddhist Islam Christian 
National 46,902  2,213 361 49,476 94.8% 4.5% 0.7% 
Urban 16,109 482 147 17,737 96.2% 2.9% 0.9% 
Rural 30,793 1,732 214 32,739 94.1% 5.3% 0.7% 
Bangkok 6,461 157 66 6,683 96.7% 2.3% 1.0% 
Central 11,458 174 63 11,695 98.0% 1.5% 0.5% 
North 9,046 13 86 9,145 98.9% 0.1% 0.9% 
Northeast 15,798 5 137 15,940 99.1% 0.0% 0.9% 
South (including Far South) 4,207 1,864 10 6081 69.2% 30.7% 0.2% 
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Figure 5b:  Religious composition in the three main provinces of the Far South225 
 
 
 
The Muslim population of Thailand generally follows a brand of Islam similar to that in most other 
Muslim parts of Southeast Asia, following the Shafi’i school of Islamic jurisprudence. In the Far South, 
the former area of Patani enjoyed considerable historical independence and developed close cultural 
links with lower parts of the Malay Peninsula (Liow 2009:13-14). Islamic practice in the Far South is 
relatively uniform internally, with few internal divisions. Some other forms of Islam are practised in the 
Far South, notably the reformist Salafi line promoted by Ismail Lutfi, the rector of Yala Islamic University. 
Joseph Liow explains that while Salafi Islam has been seen by some both in Bangkok and internationally 
as a dangerous form of Saudi-inspired extremism, it is more accurately seen in this location as part of a 
long-term pattern of externally influenced religious scholars challenging traditional and at times 
syncretic practices (ibid.:94-95). 
The conflict-affected area is small. It covers roughly 13,500 square kilometres (DOPA undated), slightly 
larger than Yorkshire and slightly smaller than Connecticut. The main provincial towns are little over an 
hour away from each other by vehicle, while most rural areas are within an hour’s journey of the 
nearest provincial town, normally on covered roads. The population mostly lives in small towns and 
dispersed villages situated along the coast or on rolling low hills. Inland areas are more mountainous 
and heavily forested, with low populations. Farming and coastal fishing are significant economic 
activities (Ward 1996). Small and medium-sized rubber plantations are commonplace along with rice 
paddy cultivation, small-scale vegetable farming and small-scale livestock rearing (Askew 2009b:63). 
Other typical occupations include construction, transport, food vending and government work. The 
main towns are oriented around services. Cross-border trade with Malaysia provides a further source of 
revenue and employment. As in many areas of Thailand, local employment opportunities are limited, 
especially for less educated people. A survey conducted in 2009 found that unemployment was the 
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most commonly cited problem facing communities in the Far South (TAF 2010). Many people in the Far 
South migrate for work to other parts of Thailand and to Malaysia.226 
Analysis indicates similar overall levels of violent incidents in all three provinces of the Far South.227 
There is a fluctuating disparity between high-incident and low-incident districts within every province. 
Maps of government-designated ‘red’ (i.e. higher levels of violence) and ‘green’ (lower levels) zones 
resemble a patchwork, while the overall pattern is of widespread, low-level violence across the entire 
area.228  
The Buddhist population in the Far South can be differentiated between mainstream Thai and Thai 
Chinese groups, although decades of Chinese assimilation means that boundaries are often blurred. 
While the Thai Chinese population is overwhelmingly situated in urban areas and engaged in various 
forms of commerce, some Thai Buddhists live in rural areas. Political and economic links between 
Chinese-Thai businesses and state officials across much of provincial Thailand received close attention 
from researchers in the 1980s and 1990s,229 but such analysis has not been applied with any success to 
help explain recent insurgency in the Far South. Insurgents have on occasion targeted Thai Chinese-
owned businesses as part of an unwelcome alien presence, while bombs were detonated in several 
commercial centres in the Far South over the Chinese New Year, February 2007 (ICG 2007b). However, 
these attacks are sporadic and small-scale in comparison with violence directed against more overt 
state-related targets (ibid.). 
Specific incidents can often be related to local events. With insurgents operating in small, decentralized 
cells, patterns of violence reflect ongoing tensions and local concerns as well as security measures and 
the relative availability of soft targets such as schools or low-ranking state officials (ICG 2009). As occurs 
in many conflict environments, different sources of tension can lead to violence. For example, in one 
rural part of Narathiwat in 2007, business disputes over timber contracts ended up pitting local Thai 
Buddhist members of a voluntary village defence group against Malay Muslim supporters of a rival 
business interest.230 
Local factors and criminal activities are not the root cause or the main driver of unrest, however. 
Respected sources uniformly agree on this point, contradicting government claims (based on evidence 
of links between insurgents and illegal acts including cross-border smuggling and drug trafficking) that 
                                                             
226
 Little detailed socioeconomic assessment of the area exists. See Thant & Tang (1996), Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(2011). 
227
 Violence-related Injury Surveillance data indicates 907 incidents in Yala, 915 in Narathiwat, 1036 in Pattani, and 
84 in the four southernmost districts of Songkhla province from 2007 to 2010. A similar pattern is documented by 
Srisompob (2010). 
228
 Several incidents have occurred in Hat Yai, the largest city in the South of Thailand, situated just outside the 
conflict area. 
229
 See for example Montesano (2000). 
230
 Interview with Diana Sorosi. See also Askew (2009b) on tensions over land deals. 
99 
 
violence is essentially a criminal problem.231 Criminality has long been a serious issue in a poorly 
governed border area where corrupt authorities and underground groups have profited from irregular 
business. However, the well-documented and deeper ethnonationalist roots of the conflict show that 
such conservative explanations are inadequate. The porous borders and associated criminality that are 
sometimes cited as an element in the conflict in the Far South are common to all of Thailand’s land 
frontiers.232 Similarly, local political violence is a serious issue both in many parts of the Far South and in 
other parts of Thailand, but its impact on the dynamics of conflict is considered secondary to the main 
ethnic fault-lines and associated motivations for violence. In pressing this point, Srisompob (2010) has 
calculated that local politicians, village chiefs and subdistrict (tambon) representatives in the Far South 
amount to a small minority – little over 5% – of all victims in the conflict since 2004. 
While most conflicts are to some extent multi-causal and multi-layered, the close relationships between 
informal sources of revenue (often from natural resources), contesting local elites, and insurgency that 
are found in some subnational conflicts are relatively insignificant in the Far South of Thailand. The clan 
feuding or rido found in Mindanao (Magno Torres III 2007, Lara & Champain 2009), or the disputes over 
land access and government-bestowed privileges between Gayo, Acehnese and Javanese settlers in 
central Aceh (Schulze 2006:235), do not have clear equivalents in the Far South of Thailand. Where 
researchers do address local causes of violence, they relate them to long-term central state penetration 
of the Far South and associated resistance.233 Natural resources also play a relatively small and indirect 
role in the conflict. Where significant sites of natural resource exploitation do exist, notably the offshore 
natural gas that is piped across the northern end of the conflict zone and on to Malaysia, the perceived 
capture of benefits by a predominantly non-Muslim elite supports the existing local discourse that 
stresses the resentment of the central state and its associates.234 
5.3 National politics: continued marginalization 
Specific triggers contributed to the marked increase in unrest from early 2004, including the polarizing 
impact of aggressive and bigoted state reactions to acts of violence and even peaceful protest in the 
subsequent months. In response to the mass suffocation of protesters rammed into trucks by the 
military in Tak Bai, October 2004, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006) is widely 
reported as having hinted that victims died chiefly as a result of fasting during the holy month of 
Ramadan.235 Thaksin had already upset the uneasy consensus established in the 1980s by removing the 
the state bodies that had been established in the early 1980s to manage security, promote development 
and liaise with local leaders, including SBPAC (Askew 2007:39). Pursuit of a national campaign against 
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illegal drugs that started in 2003 effectively gave the police a green light for extrajudicial killing of 
suspects of all descriptions exacerbated tensions in the Far South further (Ockey 2008:149-150).  
Understanding the reasons behind the repeated outbreaks of violent conflict in the Far South and the 
failure to achieve an enduring settlement involves placing the region in the wider context of Thailand’s 
recent history. Absolute monarchy only ended in Thailand in 1932, leaving a highly centralized state and 
a relatively powerful civil service. Following the decline of the monarchy at that time, the military fairly 
rapidly established itself as the key powerbroker, with subsequent decades seeing a sequence of 
governments typified by high levels of military involvement and frequent coups. Political settlements 
were typically achieved through struggles between elite groups (Wyatt 2004). Military authority 
persisted through the 1960s as economic growth accelerated, partly supported by American economic 
and military aid (Muscat 1990). 
It was at one point fashionable to describe Thailand as a ‘bureaucratic polity,’ in which a highly 
centralized bureaucracy ensures order and directs developmental policymaking (Riggs 1966). The 
description may be dated and overly functionalist, yet it retains some validity. High-level bureaucrats, 
and civil servants more widely, have retained a strong role alongside the military. Civil servants are still 
mostly appointed centrally and rotated around the provinces. As part of the hierarchical chain of 
command that in principle leads ultimately to the king, and was fully established during the 
consolidation of Siam in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they have tended to see their 
role as guardians of independence against external threats and purveyors of assistance to the 
uneducated poor through acts of paternalistic benevolence carried out by government agencies or by 
the royal family directly (Wyatt 2004:270). Government officials tend to exert authority over those 
lower down the chain, even after steps taken towards decentralization. Meetings for village 
representatives are more likely to involve lectures than any form of participatory discussion (Arghiros 
2001:30). 
As Thailand modernized, mass involvement in political contestation grew. The period from the late 
1950s through to the late 1970s witnessed communist insurgency in many rural parts of the country. 
Efforts to tackle the problem involved promoting social and economic improvements alongside 
nationalism based around the monarchy and a vigorous if often ineffective security response (Wyatt 
2004:286 & 297; Marks 2007). By the 1970s, Bangkok’s growing wealth had led to the emergence of a 
significant middle class. Students in particular pushed for democratization, leading to protests that were 
violently suppressed in Bangkok in 1973 and 1976. After a hard-line response and a subsequent period 
of instability, ‘semi-democracy’ prevailed through the 1980s. The government headed by Prem 
Tinsulanonda from 1980 to 1988 included many senior military figures, with limited power accorded to 
elected politicians (many of whom were former military officers). Justifying their semi-authoritarian 
approach mainly through a need to defeat communism, the government introduced many initiatives to 
101 
 
address inequality: strings of rural development projects targeting poorer areas addressed irrigation, 
infrastructure and education (Phongpaichit & Baker 2005:234).236 
From the 1980s, representative politics came to the fore, in part displacing the “Nonelected ‘holy trinity’ 
of monarchy, military, and bureaucracy” (Thitinan 2008:140).237 Gradually increasing representative 
politics that reflect a widening of the democratic mandate and expanded business power in a growing 
economy have repeatedly threatened more established elite groups in Thailand since the 1980s (Wyatt 
2004, Pasuk & Baker 2009). The passage towards greater levels of representation has not been smooth, 
with further military coups in 1991 and 2006. Coups against civilian governments have been justified on 
the grounds that elected leaders and the web of business interests that surround them and their 
cabinets are corrupt and self-serving. Bangkok’s middle-class population and many in the South have 
generally favoured the Democrat Party, with close links to the monarchy, military, and bureaucracy. The 
rural population elsewhere (especially in the heavily-populated and impoverished North-East) that make 
up a majority of the overall electorate typically vote for populist leaders with ties to large business 
concerns and entrenched rural patronage networks. 
The 1997 Constitution emerged out of the 1991 military coup and subsequent withdrawal of the military 
from direct political intervention. The result of an exhaustive process of negotiation between groups 
with more conservative and liberal interpretations of democratic reform, the Constitution aimed to limit 
military intervention, nepotistic business interventions and corrupt practice in politics while ensuring 
commitment to democratic principles and party-based politics (UNDP 2003:36-37, Connors 2007:164-
169).  
Given a long history of hierarchical governance, impunity, and manipulation of institutions to suit 
specific personal or group interests, the 1997 Constitution was unlikely to create an accountable 
democracy in one step. In the event, billionaire businessman-politician Thaksin Shinawatra won the 
national election of  2001. A National Counter-Corruption Commission finding that Thaksin was guilty of 
failing to disclose assets and therefore ineligible for office was overturned by the newly established 
Constitutional Court shortly after the 2001 election, raising questions about the judges’ impartiality. 
Subsequent manipulation of institutions and heavy-handed efforts to limit media independence 
followed (Painter 2006, Connors 2007:170-172). Thaksin won a further election in 2005 by a clear 
majority, before being removed from office in 2006 through a military coup that followed months of 
street protest and parliamentary stalemate. The 2006 coup removed a government that had itself 
repeatedly removed or ignored democratic and institutional checks on the role of those in positions of 
authority, providing some ground for military claims that they were tackling corruption and 
unaccountability. A long legacy of impunity on the part of both security institutions and politicians that 
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affects the Far South and other parts of the country stretches from before the disappearance of local 
leader Haji Sulong in 1948 through to beyond that of Somchai Neelapaichit in 2004 (Anderson 1990, 
Human Rights Watch 2007). 
5.4 Democratization, national protest and the peripheral minority  
The Far South of Thailand remained marginal to the national political arena through a period of acute 
instability from 2006. The political context at the national level was characterized by extreme 
polarization into rival pro-Thaksin (‘red’) and anti-Thaksin (predominantly ‘yellow’) camps with different 
support groups. It can be summarized as a struggle between two rival patronage networks (McCargo 
2010b), on each side involving mass mobilization by rival elites allied to different business networks 
(Connors & Hewison 2008:9). 
Protests against Thaksin’s elected, populist and capitalist authoritarianism from late 2005 pulled 
together different voices under a ‘yellow-shirt’ coalition, backed by elite interests that included 
elements of the royal family, military, and Democrat Party (Pye & Schaffar 2008). Over a tumultuous 
subsequent few years following the 2006 coup in which Thaksin’s party won an election and was then 
forced into opposition, a pro-Thaksin ‘red-shirt’ coalition gained momentum. Protests that began 
relatively peacefully became increasingly violent in Bangkok in early 2010, with frequent bombings, 
grenade attacks and shootings widely and plausibly attributed to red-shirt elements (Todd Ruiz & Sarbil 
2010). By the end of 20th May 2010, repeated use of live ammunition by the military, continued grenade 
attacks, and other incidents had resulted in an estimated 90 deaths, along with a string of burnt 
buildings in central Bangkok and in provincial capitals (ICG 2010b, Karuna 2010).
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One of the few points of agreement between the two opposing sides at the national level was on a 
conservative, nationalist response to violence in the Far South. Leaders and members of mass 
movements on both sides had little interest in supporting a Malay Muslim minority that shares a 
different group identity or addressing a minority conflict that could be presented as a threat to the 
nation. Efforts to address the complex inequalities and denial of cultural space that are associated with 
unrest in the Far South were not among either side’s priorities. While red-shirt protesters opposed 
many elements of the Thai establishment, they showed little sympathy for the plight of Malay Muslims 
in the Far South. On 22 April 2010, a red-shirt group in the northeast held up a military transport train 
and refused to allow the soldiers inside to travel to Bangkok where military and police were deployed 
against fellow red-shirt protesters. The military responded that the troops were destined for the Far 
South, not Bangkok. Once red-shirt leaders were convinced that this was true, they were content to let 
the train go (Matichon 2010). 
Government responses both to the crisis in the Far South and to the colour-coded conflict at the 
national level shared striking similarities. As prime minister in 2005, Thaksin established the National 
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Reconciliation Commission for the Far South, chaired by the venerable establishment figure, Anand 
Panyarachun, with Prawase Wasi as deputy. In 2010, with Thaksin in self-imposed exile overseas, the 
government established another reconciliation commission, this time in the aftermath of national 
unrest. It enlisted the same two figures as chairman and deputy. In both cases, the desire of the 
incumbent government to undertake any fundamental reforms has been minimal. Reconciliation has 
held little genuine meaning and significant attempts at negotiation have been avoided. 
To summarize, Thai state legitimacy (which, as we have seen, is reliant on popular acceptance of 
paternalistic nationalism) has been challenged both at the national level and in the Far South. Lack of 
access to political process, along with manipulation of popular sentiment by protest leaders, has led to 
violence. National level political turmoil reflects a failure of agreement over methods of governance, 
with a defensive paternalistic elite threatened by Thaksin’s business connections and populist patronage 
networks that tap into the resentment felt by many Thais against abuses of power and continued 
inequalities. Both sides involved in national contestation are in many senses products of the same 
system, with little genuine commitment to democracy, independent institutions, or constitutional 
process, nor to reforms that would address the resentment felt by many in the Far South. 
Despite significant changes in Thailand’s politics since the 1980s, including the irregular growth of 
representative politics already described, the country remains highly centralized. Policymaking relevant 
to the Far South is overwhelmingly conducted in Bangkok, with little responsiveness to local opinion, 
especially for a small, minority area of little electoral significance. The perceived marginalization of 
Malay Muslims in the Far South manifests itself in long-term challenges over language policies and the 
education system (Liow 2008), continued perceptions of unjust treatment of Malay Muslims by civil 
servants (see Figure 5c), specific incidents of miscarriages of justice including the Krue Se and Tak Bai 
incidents in 2004, and a lack of domestic political leadership with influence at the national level, as is 
explained below. 
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Figure 5c:  Residents’ perspectives:  the most significant underlying cause of violent conflict 
  in the Far South239 
 
 
 
5.5 Divided peripheral elites   
Thailand’s gradual democratization was expected in the 1990s to help permanently end conflict in the 
Far South by creating greater space for marginalized voices including Malay Muslims. However, changes 
that were institutionalized in the 1997 Constitution to promote a party-based democratic system 
coincided with a subsequent rise in violence, first in the Far South and then nationally (Chaiwat 
2005b:xii). The space for local leadership credible both to government in Bangkok and to people in the 
Far South, never large to begin with, was further squeezed. Duncan McCargo explains how, despite the 
rise to prominent national positions of power by Malay-Muslim politicians from the Far South, the form 
of representative politics that led to and was subsequently shaped by Thaksin fomented the resumption 
of violent conflict (2008). Thaksin’s role exacerbated a longstanding crisis of political authority in the Far 
South, contributing to the failure of politicians and other elite figures from the Far South to establish 
recognized and non-violent ways of representing Malay Muslim interests. Leaders from the Far South 
have little scope to push for changes or accommodation at the national level, while also finding that the 
process of engagement in national politics has often reduced their local support base. The role of 
alliances or bargaining between central and local elites has been a less prominent feature of recent Thai 
history than it has in many neighbouring countries, with centralized government departments and 
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appointed provincial governors dominating the political scene (Wyatt 1969). Despite their relative lack 
of prominence, local elites have nonetheless managed to prosper, in cases intergenerationally, primarily 
through building ties with the central state as well as maintaining a local support base (McVey 2000:5-
7). However, as is explained below, the divide between the population in the Far South and the central 
authorities of the Thai state limits the space for such negotiation, with no formal secondary settlement 
and little devolved political authority. 
The gradual displacement of respected local educational, religious and political leadership in the Far 
South is a recurring theme in historical studies (Surin 1985, Marmarn 2002). The reverence accorded to 
heads of local religious educational establishments, or pondok, is often stressed. Young men who have 
had the opportunity to pursue study overseas or otherwise gain qualifications have traditionally gone on 
to assume low-income but high-status positions as pondok heads and traditional teachers (Madmarn 
2002, ICG 2007). The assimilation of pondok into the Thai government education system has involved 
increasing collaboration with central authorities, with many schools having been transformed into state-
accredited private Islamic schools offering both religious and secular education largely in the Thai 
language (Liow 2008). Private Islamic schools are offered subsidies some of which are calculated on a 
per capita basis, leading business-minded owners to compete for students.
240
 Over time, local pondok 
and the status accorded to their owners or senior teachers have declined (McCargo 2008:42-43). At the 
same time, pondok have borne the brunt of government counter-insurgency efforts since 2004, being 
blamed for anti-government activities. Efforts to encourage pondok to register formally were stepped 
up and some were also subjected to surveillance (ICG 2007). 
Senior religious leaders in the Far South are caught between seeking approval locally and gaining the 
assent of central state institutions. The Thai monarchy and state have placed emphasis on nationally 
recognized Muslim structures, including the Chularajamontri – a royally appointed leader of Muslims 
who is widely respected by Thai Muslims in much of the country. Since at least 1945 the 
Chularajamontri has never been a Malay Muslim from the Far South, however, and the figure is not seen 
there as a legitimate representative of community aspirations (Liow 2008:22). Islamic Provincial Councils 
supervized by the Chularajamontri, as well as other measures including the publically funded 
construction of central mosques in major towns in the Far South, have raised widespread cynicism over 
government intrusion into Malay Muslim affairs (Farouk 1988, Surin 1988, McCargo 2011). 
Local secular leaders are also seen as compromized. The 1997 Constitution furthered decentralization 
through elected provincial, district and sub-district officials. Over time, increasing numbers of Malay 
Muslims in the Far South have been able to speak sufficient Thai to access government positions in 
tambon (sub-districts) as well as in the local operations of line ministries such as agricultural extension 
(Cornish 1997). However, in conflict-affected districts of the Far South, sub-district officials often have 
to stay subservient to higher-level military and civil representatives. Malay Muslim local authority 
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figures must tread a difficult line between government security forces who often see them as insurgent 
sympathizers, and insurgents themselves who regularly assassinate those considered too close to the 
state (McCargo 2008:80-83). Villagers, meanwhile, lose respect for village chiefs as well as sub-district 
officials and other local government employees through their involvement in the commonplace corrupt 
practices that link local politics, administration and business (McVey 2000, Wyatt 2004:286-287). 
Higher levels of Malay Muslim elites have also found themselves estranged from both their local 
support base and the hub of political power in Bangkok. At the provincial level, new elected 
administrative organizations were effectively sidelined by the subsequent direct appointment of 
unelected ‘CEO’ Governors from Bangkok (Painter 2006, Ockey 2008:150). The elected Chairman of the 
Provincial Administrative Organization for Pattani province, Zahid Al Yufry, complained in 2008 that as a 
result he was no more than a “Seua kradat”, or paper tiger.241 In order to move beyond a local and 
relatively marginal level of political office in Thailand’s centralized political system it is generally 
necessary to engage with Bangkok-centred political parties and networks of well-connected actors. 
Various older and newer entrants into electoral politics from the Far South aligned themselves with the 
Wadah faction of Malay Muslim politicians, which during the 1990s was able to exert some influence 
and build connections with central power-brokers like General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, whose New 
Aspiration Party held power for a period in the 1990s. Thaksin’s subsequent monopolization of the 
political landscape led to the Wadah faction being incorporated along with the New Aspiration Party 
into his Thai Rak Thai party, in the process losing what small leverage they previously had and further 
marginalizing Malay Muslims (Chaiwat 2009:98-99). Association with Thaksin became toxic in the Far 
South after the Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents of 2004, further damaging former Wadah politicians. 
Several of them, including Wan Muhammad Nor Matha, who rose to become interior minister in 
Thaksin’s first government, were further discredited in the Far South through their involvement in the 
money politics and evident personal enrichment that typified Thaksin’s administrations (McCargo 
2008:77-78). Den Tohmeena, a founding Wada member and the son of Haji Sulong, lost credibility in 
Bangkok after he was accused by Thai government authorities of separatist inclinations following the 
upsurge in violence in 2004 (ibid:63-69). 
5.6 Perceptions of inequality 
Analyses of horizontal inequalities have increasingly recognized the significance of the cultural context 
of identity formation in understanding cases of conflict related to horizontal inequalities (Brown & 
Langer 2010:51-52), while also acknowledging the importance of perception (Stewart et al. 2008). It is 
argued here that the economic facts of horizontal inequality are significant insofar as they feed 
perceptions of injustice along ethnic lines that have deep historical roots and contemporary resonance. 
Various commentators have found a ‘worldview’ in the Far South that is detached from other situations 
and in many senses informed by religion as much as socioeconomic evidence.242 Responses and 
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attitudes shaped by views on group identity may not seem very rational to observers investigating 
political and economic aspects of conflict. However, when approached from an angle that incorporates 
notions of identity and recognizes perception as an aspect of horizontal inequalities, attitudes in the Far 
South can be adequately explained. 
Economic explanations of poverty that are often repeated by Thai government representatives as a 
precursor to announcements of new development expenditures reflect a conservative perspective that 
denies the wider context of marginalization and injustice (Srisompob & Sobhonvasu 2006). In any case, 
the Far South is not especially poor in comparison with other rural or border provinces far from 
Bangkok. According to UNDP’s overall Human Achievement Index, not one of the three provinces of the 
Far South was in the poorest ten out of 76 nationally in 2003 (UNDP 2003).243 The three provinces 
became considerably wealthier along with the rest of the country as Thailand underwent massive 
changes from the 1950s to the present day, emerging as a middle-income economy.244 
Per capita state expenditure in the Far South has typically been in line with the national average (Unicef 
2006:26). Analysis of household survey data by district across the Far South does not reveal any clear 
correlation between the severity of violence and economic well-being at the local level.245 Overall 
figures show little demographic change over time in terms of ethnicity, unlike some other peripheral 
conflict areas where migration and other demographic shifts (often in favour of the national majority) 
are a major cause of resentment. The proportion of Malay Muslims in the area has remained broadly 
constant or slightly increased as the impact of some inward migration of Thai Buddhists from elsewhere 
in the country is more than compensated for by a higher birth rate among Malay Muslims (G Brown 
2008:260-261). 
More careful comparisons do shed light on the context of the Far South, when accompanying a broader 
approach to peripheral conflicts. Appropriate areas to compare with the Far South that resonate with 
residents’ lived experiences are the national capital, Bangkok, and the neighbouring Buddhist majority 
province of Songkhla rather than remote provinces in the Northeast. While the Far South is no poorer 
than many other remote and border areas of Thailand, it is considerably poorer than Bangkok, and 
moderately poorer than Songkhla (see Figure 5d).  Over a longer period, provincial GDP per capita in the 
three provinces of the Far South declined by around 20% relative to the overall national average 
between 1978 and 2003 (G Brown 2008:272-273), a trend that has not since reversed.246 
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Figure 5d:  Gross Domestic Product per Capita: comparison of selected areas (Thai Baht / year) 247 
 
 
 
Trends of stagnating rural economies and increasing differentiation across Thailand are replicated in 
other border areas of Thailand. But in the Far South, comparisons are made along lines associated with 
ethnic identity and religion. In the early 1990s, a period of rapid economic growth and high rates of 
foreign investment, 60% of foreign direct investment into the five southernmost provinces of Thailand 
was directed to Songkhla, the only one of the five with a Buddhist majority population (Rao & Newton 
1996).248 Songkhla, in contrast with the Far South, increased its GDP in line with the national average at 
least until the mid-2000s after the onset of violent conflict. 
Within the Far South, urban areas with proportionately larger Buddhist populations are wealthier than 
rural areas that are overwhelmingly Malay Muslim.249 Rural incomes are on average 53.6% that of urban 
incomes across Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat.250 A survey conducted in 2010 found that Malay Muslims 
are generally over-represented in lower income groups: in urban areas, one in five (21%) Muslim 
households reported income of less than 8,000 Thai Baht per month, compared with only 11% of 
Buddhist households (TAF 2010). Health statistics also become more revealing when disaggregated by 
religion. Data on the prevalence of underweight children under 5 years old show that Muslim children in 
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the Far South are disadvantaged in comparison with their Buddhist neighbours as well as against the 
overall national average (see Figure 5e). 
 
Figure 5e:  Percentage of children 0-59 months significantly underweight 251 
 
 
 
Education is a continual issue in the Far South that demonstrates the gap between many local people 
and the state. Many Malay Muslim parents choose not to send children to mainstream secondary 
schools, preferring Islamic private schools or occasionally more traditional pondok (Unicef 2006, Liow 
2008). While offering religious instruction, most of these schools are considered to be of mixed standard 
in terms of the secular education that they provide. Young people often fail to achieve sufficient 
qualifications (and gain enough Thai language ability) to be able to access and perform successfully in 
government or private sector jobs.252 
The overall conclusion is that while Malay Muslims in the Far South are not necessarily disadvantaged in 
comparison with people in other poor regions of Thailand including many Buddhist-majority border 
provinces, they are clearly worse off than their Buddhist neighbours in the same area and in 
neighbouring Songkhla. 
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5.7 Nationalism and failed assimilation policies 
The construction of Thai nationalism affects how horizontal inequalities between Malay Muslims and 
Thai Buddhists are perceived and interpreted in the Far South. As already explained in Chapter Two, 
national identity is here seen as a symbolically constructed concept that often has enduring features.253 
The spread of rapid transportation, mass education and national television increased central authority 
and a sense of common identity across Thailand. By the 1990s almost every village in Thailand could be 
reached overland from Bangkok within a day. Yet expectations that modernizing development would 
reduce identity affiliations have long been disproved in the social sciences; more complex explanations 
of group affiliation and its interaction with modernity are by now well established (Barth 1969). Rather 
than facilitating smooth assimilation, increased penetration of the nation state into the village has 
repeatedly generated resentment in the Far South (McCargo 2008). 
Thongchai Winichakul (1994) describes the creation of an imagined Siamese nation within defined and 
recognized borders. A cultural and ethnic model of citizenship – ‘Thainess’ 254 – has been created, chiefly 
from ruling authorities in Bangkok. This conception of Thainess rests on acceptance of principles 
propagated from the top, rather than through either straightforward repression or a shared sense of 
rights. The strength of attachment to the notion of Thainess as a basis of national identity is considered 
to make many Thais at all levels resistant to notions of increased autonomy for the Far South (McCargo 
2011). 
Although Thailand is a multi-ethnic kingdom incorporating Chinese, Lao, Khmers, Burmese, Mons, 
Malays, Indians and numerous other minorities as well as ethnic Thais, governments have stressed 
homogeneity for over a century (Jory 1999). Streckfuss (1993) argues that constructions of race in 
Thailand are a consequence of efforts to legitimate the ruling authority of the Royal Chakri dynasty over 
territory in the face of French colonial expansion (1993). The construction of a ‘Thai’ identity involves 
essentializing ‘otherness’ – creating simplified opposites against which uniformity can be highlighted. 
Racial – and racist – constructions include not only the notion of Thai, but also various opposing and 
negatively stereotyped group identities with accompanying monikers: Chinese (chek), Western (farang), 
and khaek – a term literally meaning ‘guest’ which is used to describe Muslims as well as others from 
South Asia or the Middle East and unsurprisingly is considered derogatory in the Far South (Kasian 
2009:267). 
Assimilation policies that were expanded in the late 1930s pushed all those living in Thailand to adopt 
centrally determined cultural habits including clothing and Thai surnames as part of overt efforts to 
build a modern, unified nation (Uthai 1991, Phongpaichit & Baker 2005:132-133). Siam was renamed 
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Thailand255 in 1939 in reflection of an ethnic ‘Thai’ identity. In the late 1950s, Field Marshall Sarit 
Thanarat engaged in an explicit project to create: “…a unifying authority under which all elements of the 
nation can rally.” 256 As Connors explains, notions of democracy that took hold in the 1930s were 
subsequently incorporated into a national identity that defined people as royal subjects rather than 
citizens (2007). Thai nationalism has continued to be centred on the royal family over periods of military 
and civilian rule since the 1950s. The promotion of a unified national identity is pervasive (Vandergeest 
1993). Elements include compulsory participation in the village scouts for all school children, a 
movement that in Thailand has focused on rooting out communists and promoting patriotic values 
(Bowie 1997), while loudspeakers broadcast the national anthem twice daily in many villages and public 
spaces. 
The Far South is the one part of the country that has not accepted assimilation into a sense of Thainess. 
While the king is still widely revered there, police and other state officials are more likely to be seen as 
illegitimate at root. For example, the police-inspired murders of some 2,500 people in the campaign 
against drugs started in 2003 were accepted by most Thais as a way to improve the social environment 
and reduce crime, but they were resented in the Far South as yet another example of oppressive state 
brutality.
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For many Malay Muslims in the Far South, subsidiary tolerance (the state triptych of ‘Nation, Religion, 
King’ is clear in not asserting Buddhism as the only religion) represents a colonial imposition that 
impinges on traditional values and relegates their identity to an unacceptable secondary position (Surin 
1985, Chaiwat 2005).258 A website aligned with exiled leaders of the insurgency group PULO states: “The 
Thai concept of nationhood is via complete assimilation in identity, culture, language, lifestyle and 
mindset into a single ‘Thai’ identity as [...] perpetuated by present-day Thai policies” (Patanibook 
undated). 
A (Thai Buddhist) headteacher of a multicultural primary school in Narathiwat Town I interviewed in 
2009 expressed the need for tolerance and understanding, yet frowned when hearing children speak 
Yawi (Malay dialect) in the playground, commenting: “Mai yom hai puud malayu” (“We don’t allow 
them to speak Malay”).259 Underlining the sensitivity of the language issue confronting the education 
system in the Far South, Yawi is referred to by many older Malay Muslims as Bahasa Islam (Islamic 
Language), fusing religion with dialect. Language reforms were one of the key proposals of the 2006 
National Reconciliation Commission on the conflict in the Far South, recommending some limited official 
recognition of Malay,
260
 and stimulating an elite nationalist backlash. Privy Council chairman General 
Prem Tinsulanonda, the chief adviser to the king, responded: “We cannot accept that [proposal] as we 
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are Thai. The country is Thai and the language is Thai ... we have to be proud of being Thai and having 
the Thai language as the sole national language” (Nation 2006). 
For many rural Malay Muslims, a perception of a corrupt and intrusive external world is perpetuated 
through the definition of their own identity in opposition to it (McCargo 2008:81). These trends have 
been opportunistically exploited by insurgents who cast their message in spiritual and religious 
language, targeting Malay Muslims who associate with the state.261 It is not surprising to see symbolism 
taken seriously in the Far South given its critical role in strengthening Thai as well as Malay Muslim 
group identity. In the Far South, the subsidiary position of Malay Muslim identity within the Thai state is 
represented symbolically in the fences surrounding the most culturally significant site in the Far South, 
Krue Se mosque (see Figure 5f). 
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Figure 5f:  Krue Se Mosque, Pattani 
28 insurgents and 3 security officers died at the historically and culturally significant Krue Se mosque in a stand-off 
that ended violently in April 2004. The dark fence in the foreground topped with a Thai Buddhist style post-head 
surrounds the mosque. It follows a generic design used at historical monuments across Thailand, unwittingly 
encircling a revered Muslim site within Buddhist imagery. The fence is an apt symbol of contested assimilation in the 
Far South of Thailand (Photograph by author, 2008). 
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5.8 Development and continued peripheral tensions 
This section outlines the developmental history, current context and relevant government policies of 
Thailand and the Far South before explaining how development is perceived in the Far South. While 
poverty has declined across all parts of Thailand, the enduring horizontal inequalities already described 
in this chapter mean that development initiatives are often poorly perceived by many Malay Muslims in 
the Far South and typically end up feeding rather than lessening resentment.   
Rapid economic growth began in Thailand after central planning authorities and ministries laid down the 
basis for capitalist industrialization along lines similar to those of other East Asian developmental states. 
Government development plans from the 1950s to the 1980s prioritized infrastructure – transport, 
energy, irrigation – along with efforts to promote foreign and domestic private sector investment. 
Military rulers worked closely with business leaders in planning the country’s economic direction, with 
government developing the basic infrastructure for growth while encouraging domestic and foreign 
investment through measures including efforts to keep labour flexible and wages low (Pasuk & Baker 
1995). By the late 1980s, Thailand was seen as part of a second wave of rapidly modernizing market-
oriented East Asian ‘tigers’ (World Bank 1993). An average real growth rate of 7.5% was sustained from 
the late 1950s up to the late 1990s. The percentage of people classified below the poverty line fell from 
57% in the early 1960s to 6% in 1998 (UNDP 2003:28). 
In a classic pattern of transition, what had been chiefly a rural economy was rapidly becoming 
predominantly industrial and urbanized (Rigg 1997). An extreme example of urban primacy, greater 
Bangkok’s population is some 20-30 times larger than the next largest city.
262
 Increasingly export-
oriented industrialization, tourism and other service industries created jobs for millions of previously 
rural Thais (UNDP 2003). Thailand’s economy was liberalized and increasingly oriented around exports 
after an economic downturn in the early 1980s, leading to greater flows of foreign investment and a 
boom that continued until 1997. The economic crisis of 1997 caused a temporary reverse, although 
growth rates of 5% or more resumed within several years. Adult literacy, estimated at around 33% 
nationally in the 1950s, had risen to 85% by 1980, and was near-universal by 2005 (World Bank 2006c).  
As the economy expanded and liberalized, the longstanding authority of bureaucrats and the military 
gradually became increasingly linked with business interests at all levels (Anek 1992). As elements of 
democracy were fitfully introduced from the 1970s on, local and national commercial actors used 
financial weight to gain political as well as economic power (McVey 2000, Arghiros 2001). Successive 
governments made repeated efforts to promote inclusive growth, tackle inequality, and encourage 
participation in the political and economic spheres but they generally took second place to central 
support for industrialization within what was still a very centralized structure (UNDP 2003:28).  
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For many Thais, developmental change is seen as a broadly positive process, with relative acceptance of 
the legitimacy of the state and of changes that have on aggregate brought higher standards of living. Yet 
rapid development has brought problems as well as benefits. The predominantly urbanized and largely 
assimilated Chinese minority generally benefitted from economic growth in Bangkok and in provincial 
towns (Ueda 2000:164). Rural populations in many areas profited less directly and were also affected by 
rising land prices, environmental degredation, natural resource depletion, and increased indebtedness 
through the repeated failures of rural development initiatives (Parnwell 1996). While eliminating mass 
poverty, Thailand also became increasingly unequal in economic terms from the late 1950s through to 
the mid-1990s.263 
In the Far South, developmental change is commonly viewed cynically as part of unwanted external 
intervention.264 We have already seen that traditional forms of political authority have been 
undermined through recent changes. As is explained below, development interventions are often 
perceived to feed ongoing horizontal inequalities (Unger 1998).  
Detailed and accurate documentation of recent developmental initiatives in the Far South is limited. 
Typically poor project performance reflects the difficulty of working through local leadership structures 
given an environment of mistrust between citizens and state officials. Other problems encountered 
include poor diagnosis of local needs and misallocations of funds through unaccountable and 
hierarchical government agencies.265 Anthropological research has documented the lives of Malay 
farmers and fishermen in the Far South over several decades (Fraser 1966, Cornish 1997, Dorairajoo 
2002, Supara 2004 & 2008, Tan Mullins 2007, Askew 2009b, Tsuneda 2009).  Often stressing the 
significance of local identity largely in opposition to a changing and increasingly penetrative external 
Thai environment, various development initiatives have been addressed. Agriculture and fishing have 
undergone major commercialization in Thailand. Rubber and fish are both priority export commodities 
at the national level as well as a source of local livelihood in the Far South, with associated government 
assistance including credit, technical advice, and infrastructure development seen as benefiting larger 
businesses before smaller producers (Rigg 1997:81). May Tan Mullins shows how local level corruption 
as well as formal assistance benefits commercial (and often Thai Buddhist) fishing interests in Pattani, 
whose large trawlers are officially banned from a zone stretching three kilometres from the shore in 
order to protect smaller (predominantly Malay Muslim) local fishermen and maintain fish stocks. In 
practice, the ban is not always enforced, with larger trawlers avoiding punishment by bribing officials or 
paying small official fines (2007:355). 
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Andrew Cornish describes the impact of a government project promoting increased rubber production 
through village level education and cooperatives in rural Yala, part of the Far South (1997). The gap 
between local Malay farmers and the mostly Thai Buddhist civil servants who implemented the project 
led to the failure of many of the project’s initiatives. Cornish describes local farmers’ perspectives of an 
alien government, divorced from the lives of Malay Muslim villagers by language, culture and attitude. 
Unsurprisingly, when such distance is combined with common institutionalized corruption, many rural 
people in the Far South have a low opinion of civil servants.266 
A key element for farmers in Yala and fishermen in Pattani is the interpretation of the development 
encounter through an ethnic prism that greatly increases the level of cynicism with which civil servants 
are viewed. In Cornish’s study, project failure was largely seen as symptomatic of an alien Thai state. 
Where farmers benefitted, success was attributed to individual effort or to Malay community leaders in 
spite of the government (Cornish 1997:105). Tan Mullins refers to common beliefs that the Thai state is 
inevitably corrupt as a result of its bankrupt culture, quoting a small-scale fisherman: “There is no one 
that I can ask for help in the village, or in Thailand, as no one is honest and not corrupted. This is rabob 
mueang thai – the Thai ‘model’ or Thai way” (2007:356). 
Perceived discrimination by officials against Malay Muslims when visiting local government offices or 
passing through checkpoints has been reported from the Far South over many years (Supara 2004:175). 
Condescending attitudes among government officials are hardly unique to the Far South of Thailand, 
while long-term patterns of more serious human rights abuses including disappearances and torture are 
documented across the country (Anderson 1981, Human Rights Watch 2004, 2007). But their frequency 
in the Far South and the context of perceived oppression mean that even minor incidents can trigger 
strong reactions: “One normally mild-mannered Narathiwat imam [religious leader] became so enraged 
over his treatment by an obnoxious land department official that he now understood why some people 
decided to shoot civil servants” (McCargo 2008:57). 
These perspectives are not confined to the rural poor. A director of a Muslim Youth Council in the Far 
South whom I interviewed in late 2007 felt that: “The way government thinks and people think are 
contrary ... Buddhists come here to control.” 267 Many Malay Muslims see government projects as 
clumsy efforts to win their support: “We do not need the money, we need understanding; we need the 
government to understand our culture and our religion.” 268 
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5.9 Using development to win 
Development as a pacification tool has a long history in Thailand. Associated policies were implemented 
in the 1980s as part of a broader approach to build peace in the Far South and they figured in earlier 
efforts to defeat wider rural communist insurgency (Demaine 1986, Muscat 1990). Under the national 
leadership of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat and his successors, a series of five year plans from the late 
1950s emphasized expansion of irrigation, roads, electricity and education, by doing so bringing 
development and incorporation of rural and peripheral populations into the state for security and 
national integration purposes (Wyatt 2003:272-273). 
Senior Thai officials informally cite the phrase ‘ao setakit thalai chon’, or ‘use economic growth to 
defeat the bandits’. Connors (2007:66) discusses the Community Development Department, created in 
1962 as part of the Ministry of the Interior, to bring villages more closely into a nationally unified and 
controlled structure. Muscat (1990:174) quotes a field report on related local government development 
initiatives in the late 1960s: “...the villager must be involved in meaningful activities with officials, and in 
a fashion that permits the villager to relate favourably to the government officials.” 
More recent policies have followed similar trends. Following the surge in violence in 2004, Thaksin 
Shinawatra announced a special budget of 12 billion Thai Baht annually (US$400 million) for 
development in the Far South in 2005 and 2006, with funds channelled through existing organizations – 
most notably the military.269 These policies were continued after his removal from office in 2006. The 
Democrat Party-led coalition that took power at the end of 2008 set out to design an economic 
development policy that would “Win hearts and minds” (Post Today 2009). In March 2009, a three-year 
budget of 76 billion Thai Baht (US$2.2 billion) was passed by the government for development in the Far 
South (Mangeronline 2009).270  
A combination of strong influence over how budgets are spent, and genuine concerns over security 
threats, means that the military implement many projects in the Far South that are funded from civil 
budgets. Military projects from the 1980s and the 2000s have included infrastructure as well as various 
community schemes, some established as a direct basis for intelligence gathering and counter-
insurgency measures (Bonura 2003, Public Relations Department 2008). Bonura documents the mixed 
impact of military development projects in the Far South in the 1990s, with security objectives and local 
mistrust inevitably limiting actual developmental impact. 
Even beyond these pacification initiatives, developmental actions in Thailand often promote respect for 
authority. Thai NGOs, at times the government, and especially royal projects under the patronage of the 
king or queen, promote a range of programmes under the title ‘sethakit phophiang’ or ‘sufficiency 
economy’ (UNDP 2007). Critics of sufficiency economy thinking have targeted its paternalism, regarding 
it as an effort by urban elites to legitimize authority and keep in place the rural population (Hewison 
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2008:207). Many royal projects are located in border areas of Thailand including the Far South, clearly 
designed to instil loyalty amongst minorities by demonstrating the benevolence of the national, royal 
hierarchy. 
The Thai word for development, kanphattana, carries a set of meanings that are not commonly 
associated with typical Western developmental ideas of pursuit of affluence or social justice. 
Kanphattana implies progress towards a clean physical environment, achieved largely through 
investment in infrastructure – new roads, buildings and irrigation. The word evokes an organized, urban 
and modern setting, with a strong undercurrent of associated positive virtues of nationalism, order and 
respect for authority (Arghiros 2001:34-35). An illustration of this is a police promotion notice posted 
outside public buildings that states: “Good behaviour and discipline. Thai police stepping towards 
development.” 271 
Even within more varied recent approaches to development, kanphattana is still associated with 
national progress and an ordered, respectful society, a set of values that overlap with the notion of 
Thainess and invite competitive comparison with other countries (Demaine 1986). Nationalist 
developmentalism is applied when tackling social problems: a young boy in Pattani, presumably having 
listened to government anti-drug campaigns, phrases social problems in a nationalist context by 
commenting: “Marijuana stops the country from being developed” (Unicef 2008:25). 
A widely repeated comment attributed originally to the king states that the government should: 
“Understand, reach out and develop.” 272 This typifies a wider benevolent and paternalistic expectation 
that top-down development, some limited participation, and security measures will help solve problems 
in the Far South as it appeared to have done in the 1980s (Ornanong 2001), with little perceived need 
for any more fundamental change in the political organization of the Thai state or the constructed 
identity of the Thai nation. 
There is, however, a risk of presenting a thoroughly polarized picture by concentrating solely on unrest 
and depicting all efforts by the state to compromise as cynical hegemonic co-option rather than 
concessions.273 Popular and state attitudes are rarely totally polarized (Horstmann 2004:76-99). A Unicef 
survey of youths in the Far South revealed common desires for security forces to provide more safety by 
doing their job better, rather than leave the region entirely, among Malay Muslims as well as Thai 
Buddhists (2008). Many Malay Muslims operate more comfortably within Thai society than separatists 
would like. Almost all young, and many middle-aged, Malay Muslims in the Far South speak Thai, and a 
significant number of local people are educated to a high level in the Far South itself or at universities 
elsewhere in Thailand (Chaiwat 2005, Bonura 2008:388). 
Pragmatism and common desire for improved standard of living also exist in Thailand as elsewhere (see 
Mosse 2005:5). Where a policy or project is in people’s interests, it is often accepted, unless too closely 
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associated with perceived oppression. These sentiments are captured by the following quotation from a 
local leader referring to the impact of the inept and deadly military response to protests at Tak Bai, 
Narathiwat in 2004: 
In fact, the people here used to like Thaksin's policies, like boosting rubber prices and even his 
modernisation policies ... Before Tak Bai the people here participated in government 
development projects, now we're not interested in government projects any more (Janssen 
2005). 
Some national and local NGOs have intentionally been crossing ethnic divides for some time (Dorairajoo 
2002). One network supports sustainable small-scale fishing, where NGOs along with researchers from 
Prince of Songkhla University have cooperated with the Department of Fisheries.274 More politicized 
engagement between local and national campaigners for rural rights has occurred over the Thailand-
Malaysia gas pipeline, and over specific human rights abuses.275 Some Malay Muslims and Buddhists in 
the Far South state that the sufficiency economy approach promoted by the king and Thai government 
agencies is also compatible with rural community needs and with an Islamic ‘moral economy’.276 
Many government officials do not aim to pacify insurgents through development initiatives. Civil 
servants in the Ministry of Justice, for example, see their work hindered by official impunity for the 
military and police through emergency legislation for the Far South, as well as unofficial impunity given 
political interference and a failure to pursue miscarriages of justice.277 Even the conservative Ministry of 
the Interior contains internal groups pushing for concerted changes to policies that would promote 
more official acceptance of the local Yawi dialect and improve community-based planning. In support of 
such initiatives are various academic institutions and think tanks aiming to push the boundaries of what 
the state will accept.278 On the ground, engagement by Buddhist local government staff in Malay 
Muslim areas is seen by many as perfectly possible with the right attitude and experience. A failure to 
achieve improvements for local people in the Far South is often attributed not to a lack of concern or 
oppression but more prosaically to inappropriate national projects pushed down from Bangkok – for 
example subsidizing small-scale cattle rearing when people in the Far South prefer chicken or goats.279 
Still more significant is the SBPAC, reconstituted once more in 2006. It had in the past played a 
significant consultative and advisory role, settling local disputes and proposing development policies 
that included greater consideration of local context. External critics regularly accuse the reconstituted 
SBPAC of being dominated by paternalistic and often corrupt Bangkok-based bureaucrats (Askew 
2007:49). Internal critics within SBPAC complain about military interference.280 SPBAC does in cases 
offer the scope to consult with local leaders and to plan development projects that can involve the rural 
majority, moving beyond the army’s ‘hearts and minds’ schemes or pork-barrel projects hijacked by 
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influential political and business interests. One such potentially positive scheme involved promoting 
farming on some 95,000 hectares of abandoned paddy fields, through support for oil palm, rubber 
plantations or a return to rice cultivation (Pakhawan & Pathan 2007). 
The record of following through steps that promote reforms to reflect Malay Muslim concerns, like the 
2006 education sector strategy that was published in Malay, local Yawi and Thai, remains weak, 
however. Barriers on the ground and within the bureaucracy repeatedly block progress even if 
progressive policy is enacted (Liow 2009:30-33). For example, colleges and universities have lowered 
local entrance requirements for Malay Muslim students to allow for weak Thai language ability. This 
enabled more youths to enter higher education, but meant that standards then dropped to such an 
extent that many were unemployable once they graduated.281 Forward-looking policies have repeatedly 
been undermined by a lack of institutional and political commitment (Manageronline 2009), consistent 
with a government approach that offers minor concessions but little fundamental changes to address 
grievances in the Far South. 
5.10 Locating the conflict in the Far South internationally 
As with other peripheral conflicts, international influences affect both the Thai nation state and 
insurgent groups in a range of ways. Perhaps most significantly, Thailand’s borders and national security 
have long been supported by regional and global institutions.282 Thailand has long been an ally of the 
USA, gaining preferential trade status and security guarantees during the Cold War. Since 2003 it has 
been a major non-NATO ally. Joint manoeuvres with US forces called Cobra Cold are undertaken 
annually in Thailand (Connors 2006). 
Insurgent groups are also affected by international factors. Some insurgents and sympathizers draw 
parallels between Patani’s struggle with the Thai state and a wider struggle of Islamic peoples against 
the USA. Anti-American sentiment exists alongside the typical suspicion of outsiders that alienated rural 
communities often exhibit. False rumours of CIA involvement are common in the Far South (McCargo 
2008:xiii, Wheeler 2009). Any simplistic narrative directly relating the conflict to global tensions 
between Islam and the West is unfounded, however. No clear associations have been found between 
figures in the Far South and international extremist groups including Al Qaida and the regional grouping 
Jemaah Islamiya, even by security specialists with a keen interest in demonstrating such links 
(Gunaratna et al. 2005, Abuza 2009). Thailand’s repressive response to rising violence in the Far South 
was not justified as part of a wider War on Terror, but as a crackdown on criminals (Ukrist 2006). Thai 
government relationships with the USA are also rarely straightforward, involving as much resistance as 
acquiescence and regular policy changes (Kavi 2004, Wheeler 2009).283 
More diffuse flows of ideas are significant for insurgents’ interests, though. For those promoting 
violence, global discourse of religiously motivated struggle against injustice influences local definitions 
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of identity and provides justification (Roy 2006; Jory 2007:20). This is not a new trend; international 
linkages were in fact stronger in the past and insurgent leaders have talked openly since the 1970s of 
their prior links with the Governments of Libya, Syria and Iran (ISRA 2009). Wider religious, educational, 
migratory and trade links between the Far South of Thailand, the Middle East and other Islamic states 
are commonplace today as they have been for many centuries (Bradley 2008, Liow 2009). The worldview 
of Malay Muslims in the Far South looks in a different direction from most of the rest of Thailand, with 
less interest in the USA and East Asia and more regard for Muslim majority countries, compounding the 
domestic horizontal divide (Chaiwat 2005).  
International military or diplomatic intervention in the Far South has been limited. Some informal, 
exploratory initiatives to engage insurgent leaders have been made by representatives of the Thai army 
and political leaders. Use has been made in these of neutral third parties, including on different 
occasions Mahatir Mohamad (former prime minister of Malaysia), Yusuf Kalla (then vice-president of 
Indonesia), and the non-governmental Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Pathan 2008, Bangkok Post 
2008). Discussions have remained unofficial and low-key, with the Thai Government aiming to ensure 
that the United Nations and other international bodies including the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) do not offer recognition to insurgent groups or their aspirations (ISRA 2010). 
As the next chapter explains, the incentives for foreign aid agencies to address conflict in the Far South 
are fairly limited given few foreign political or security concerns and concerted domestic government 
interest in avoiding international attention. 
5.11 Chapter conclusion 
Conflict in the Far South of Thailand exhibits many of the characteristics of other peripheral conflicts 
and horizontal inequalities more widely, with members of a minority group resisting central state 
authority in a geographically discrete area. Many factors combine to generate and maintain the causes 
and dynamics of the conflict, encompassing the dominant political economy and culture of the nation 
state and its interactions with a peripheral part of the country. Some aspects of peripheral conflict also 
seen elsewhere are especially prominent in the Far South of Thailand: the clash between national and 
peripheral identities is pronounced, the state is especially centralized, and while the Far South is not 
poorer in economic terms than many other border areas of the country it remains politically and 
culturally marginalized at the national level. 
In keeping with the approach followed in this thesis, this chapter has stressed how local level 
interactions need to be seen in the wider context of a history of conflict that is founded on the 
relationship between people in the Far South and the highly centralized Thai nation state. 
Understanding the impact and role of socioeconomic development in the Far South, including 
intentional development initiatives which are principally implemented through state institutions or 
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ministries,284 requires approaching the peripheral region from a wider perspective. Four main points are 
highlighted here.  
First, as has been explained, the specific history and geography of the Far South of Thailand and of its 
inhabitants are important in explaining the current conflict. Graham Brown draws a comparable 
conclusion in assessing conflicts associated with horizontal inequality across Southeast Asia, placing 
emphasis on similar contextual variables (2008:252). Second, the significance of both identity and 
perception of inequalities along identity-based lines recognized by Stewart et al. (2008) as common 
characteristics of many civil conflicts are especially significant in the Far South of Thailand. The long-
term promotion of ethnically rooted nationalism as a means to create unity and legitimacy through 
explicit policies including the assimilation of minority groups is a key contributor to conflict in the Far 
South. The Far South of Thailand is not the poorest part of the country, and has gradually improved in 
terms of average socioeconomic status. But socioeconomic comparisons between Thai Buddhists (who 
are on average better connected to the state) and Malay Muslims in or near the Far South reveal strong 
disparities that run in the same direction as cultural status and political inequalities.  
Third, the Far South is marginalized politically within the nation state. This point is particularly 
significant for international development agencies whose chief point of engagement in Thailand is at the 
level of the nation state, as subsequent chapters explain. The absence of inclusive power-sharing is 
significant in explaining the level of violence in the Far South. The form of the Thai state and its modes 
of engagement in the Far South leave little scope for alliances between local leaders and central 
authorities, while the population across all of Thailand are conceptualized as subjects rather than as 
citizens (Connors 2007, McCargo 2011). Thailand’s centralized and hierarchically structured polity has 
shifted over time, but a lack of interest in tackling the Far South through enacting any fundamental 
changes or committing to a negotiated settlement has remained through both military and civil-
dominated governments. Recent shifts towards more representative national politics had a damaging 
impact as previous government mechanisms to manage state-society relationships in the Far South 
collapsed, while Malay Muslim concerns remained peripheral to political protest at the national level. 
Even government organizations established to promote peace like SBPAC remain wedded to central 
government approaches and attitudes rather than based on local concerns: while having offices in the 
Far South, SBPAC is chiefly staffed by civil servants on rotation from national government departments 
and is closely linked with the central National Social and Economic Development Board.  
Fourth, this chapter has shown how, across a range of fields from education to natural resources to 
employment, both government development initiatives and economic change more widely are in 
practice heavily shaped by horizontal political and cultural status inequalities. Typically forming part of 
efforts to build local allegiance to the state, many development initiatives are viewed cynically by a 
majority of Malay Muslims. Over-represented in poorer and rural demographic groups, they are more 
likely to experience the negative sides of developmental change and of poorly executed initiatives. 
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The evidence in this chapter confirms Stewart’s statement that the nature of the state is important in 
determining whether serious conflict breaks out and persists (2008:19-20). It follows that development 
interventions need to change how the state operates if they are to help promote peace in the Far South. 
However, with the maintenance of national identity closely associated with the state’s centralised 
authority, the notion of autonomy agreements and negotiated settlement as a means to resolving the 
peripheral conflict in the Far South is contrary to the construction of the nation for many influential 
Thais (McCargo 2010). At the same time, international experience and some positive examples from 
within the Thai state suggest that developmental inputs can present opportunities to address some 
causes of the conflict, reduce grievances, increase pressure on the government to change policies, and 
find common ground across divides.285 The mixed experiences of aid agencies aiming to pursue such 
opportunities are covered in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter Six  An Overview of Foreign Aid and Conflict in the Far South of 
   Thailand 
 
This chapter provides an overview of past and contemporary foreign aid flows to Thailand, grounding 
the aid agency case studies that are discussed in the following three chapters. Primary research findings 
are summarized, with evidence drawn from a range of donors and placed in the context of literature 
addressing salient points that emerged through the research process. Contemporary donors are divided 
into three groups following the structure already introduced in the methodology.286 This structure helps 
to illustrate the diversity of approaches across agencies and to explain the pattern of aid provision in 
relation to conflict in the Far South of Thailand. 
In appraising donor flows to Thailand, methodological challenges emerge from the limited availability of 
primary information. Much historical material on aid provision is either not in the public domain or is 
only held in archives located in countries providing aid. It was possible to access data held in Thailand, in 
the UK, and online. Various reviews of foreign aid to Thailand including those by Caldwell (1974), Lobe 
(1977), Steinberg (1986), and Muscat (1990) provide further material. Available primary and secondary 
information on historical and contemporary aid flows that specifically target the Far South is extremely 
thin.287 Databases (such as OECD/DAC development statistics) and information offered by aid agencies 
themselves also give little information on how much funding is directed towards addressing conflict in 
the Far South. As a result, interviews with aid agency staff and other informants comprise the main 
source of information for this and the subsequent three chapters. 
6.1 Introduction to foreign aid in Thailand 
Many donors still operate in Thailand (see Figure 6a for detail). Overall flows are relatively small, 
however, given both the reduction of grant assistance over time as Thailand became a middle-income 
country and Thai government policy decisions not to borrow from concessional lenders including the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Overall aid flows are relatively low when compared with 
non-concessional state borrowing and private sector capital inflows. Recent donor funding is equivalent 
to under 3% of government revenue (Bank of Thailand 2008, OECD 2009). 
In financial terms, Japan is the only remaining large aid donor to Thailand, with annual net positive 
transfers that ranged from US$118 million to US$854 million between 2002 and 2008 – roughly half of 
all contributions over this period. The far larger short-term loans provided by the IMF and other 
agencies following the Asian economic crisis of 1997-8 were mostly repaid by 2003.288 The key 
multilateral lenders in Asia, the ADB and the World Bank, have maintained small programmes of 
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  See Figure 6b. 
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 One exception is the material on the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle Project (see Ch.7). Lack of 
information reflects the low levels of donor attention to the Far South and the tendency of donors to work 
through national programmes that do not address the area’s specific needs, as this thesis explains. 
288
 US$17.2 billion in short-term financing provided in 1997-8 by a range of agencies led by the IMF was mostly 
repaid by 2003, ahead of schedule. Data from Pasuk & Baker (2000), Bank of Thailand (2009). 
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technical assistance given Thai government policy not to borrow from them.289 Around a dozen other 
bilateral donors and UN agencies all ran grant programmes of between US$5 million and US$50 million 
annually between 2002 and 2008. In addition to official aid, many international NGOs and foundations 
operate programmes in Thailand, often channelling official donor funding.290 
The low profile in Thailand of the so-called ‘like-minded’ bilateral donors from northern Europe, Canada 
and Australasia is largely a result of Thailand’s emergence as a middle-income country. Often vocally 
dominant even where financially small, their absence affects patterns of donor engagement: the 
common multi-donor agendas and focus on human rights, gender equality and poverty reduction that 
like-minded donors promote are rarely in evidence in Thailand.291 Given little government interest in 
supporting common planning with aid agencies, and low overall donor influence, the shared approaches 
and pooled funding mechanisms commonly found elsewhere do not exist. Absent mechanisms include 
poverty reduction strategies, sector-wide approaches, and even the annual joint donor ‘consultative 
group’ meetings. The Thailand country programmes of most donors have focused neither on shared 
global poverty reduction goals nor on ‘donor harmonization’ (OECD 2005).292 
Official and non-governmental foreign aid agencies have worked on many different issues in Thailand 
with little common thread.293 Common areas of engagement include continued mainstream economic 
development and poverty reduction through loans and smaller grants. Donors promote issues seen as 
significant globally, including environmental management and pollution control, and social concerns 
including the welfare and rights of ethnic minorities. The influx of people from neighbouring countries 
attracts donor attention: there are somewhere between one and two million foreign migrants living in 
Thailand, the majority of them Burmese.
294
  
Some donors have limited their programmes to specific issues. For example, the official German aid 
agency GTZ has concentrated primarily on strengthening the competitiveness of small and medium-
sized enterprises (GTZ et al. 2009). Other donors retain a collection of initiatives that reflect their own 
diverse interests rather than a coherent set of priorities. Japan has provided a variety of small-scale 
grants for a wide range of social issues that loosely fall under a ‘human security’ banner (but generally 
avoid the Far South), in addition to infrastructure loans and continued provision of more traditional 
technical assistance (Embassy of Japan 2007). 
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 This policy shifted in 2009 under the administration of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva. See Ch.9 (Part 9.1). 
290
 Aid flow data is unreliable given problems including non-reporting, double-counting, disparities between 
disbursements and commitments, exchange rate fluctuations, fund-raising within Thailand by international 
agencies like Unicef, and loan repayments. Statistical difficulties are greater where overall flows are small. For 
example, OECD/DAC statistics (2009) show Thailand as a net provider rather than a recipient of aid in 2007-2008, 
reflecting loan repayments. Figures used in this chapter are cross-checked against data sources from international 
bodies, the Thai Government, and aid agencies. 
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 Informal ‘like-minded’ groups of donors form according to themes in some nation states in order to pursue 
common interests (OECD 2006:21). 
292
 Thailand is used as regional hub by some aid agencies. 
293
 This pattern was also seen when Thailand was a major aid recipient in the past (Muscat 1990).  
294
 The International Organization of Migration (IOM 2010) estimates the number of migrants in Thailand at 
1,157,000, or 1.7% of the population, although other estimates are higher. 140,000 Burmese live in official camps 
in Thailand (Thailand Burma Border Consortium 2010) and many more live elsewhere. 
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Historically, as the following section explains, donors helped build the capacity of the Thai state to 
achieve mainstream development objectives. Repeated projects over many years extended 
infrastructure, health and education across much of the country. Foreign aid gradually strengthened the 
state bureaucracy and contributed to mass poverty reduction. It supported a private-sector-led and 
export-oriented economy that in the late 1980s and early 1990s reached spectacular rates of growth. 
The Far South received little targeted donor or NGO support even when aid flows were greater in the 
1960s and 1970s. It remains a low priority area for many donors. Literature on aid to Thailand has rarely 
mentioned the Far South in any context; the difficult relationship between local people and the state, as 
well as overt violence, is very rarely referred to. 
Of the three groups of donors identified in this research, Group One represents the norm or 
mainstream, consisting of donors that have avoided conflict issues in the Far South or simply do not 
address them. In financial terms, historically and at present, this group includes the bulk of foreign aid 
to Thailand. Group Two donors have tried to support peacebuilding, but have struggled to do so. The 
barriers that donors in this group encountered are chiefly the result of their relationship with the state. 
Group Three consists of donors that managed to implement programmes working on conflict, typically 
aiming to address conflict through promoting state reform or improving service provision. These donors 
found ways to bypass the barriers that stymied Group Two donors but they are few in number and the 
scope of their operations was relatively limited. 
Figure 6b provides a table summarizing the characteristics of the three groups of donors. The data that 
informs this table is summarized in this chapter and explained in greater depth through the more 
detailed case studies provided in the subsequent three chapters. Care needs to be taken in analysing 
donor positions since many donors that aim to address conflict try to maintain a low profile. For 
example, they may discreetly fund other agencies (often NGOs) in order to avoid attracting attention. In 
addition, any single donor may have funded simultaneously programmes characteristic of more than 
one of the three groups here identified. For example, Group Three donors may have funded some 
peacebuilding work at the same time as other programmes that did not have any intended impact on 
tensions in the Far South. Nonetheless, the group categorization is a useful means of understanding 
how and why aid flows assume specific forms. 
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Figure 6a:  Foreign aid to Thailand and the Far South, 2006-2008295 
International 
Agency 
Wider programmes for Thailand Focus on Far South 
GROUP ONE – Mainstream aid, not considering conflict 
Asian Development 
Bank 
Major lender, totalling over US$5 billion from the late 1960s. 
Very few loans today. Current focus on public-private 
partnerships for large-scale infrastructure projects, reforms to 
domestic capital market, environmental management. 
Technical assistance to projects that affect 
conflict-affected area but no focus on 
conflict. 
Japan – JBIC and 
JICA 
Largest aid donor to Thailand. Focus on major transport 
infrastructure, technical education and research, industrial 
expansion and pollution control. 
None 
IMF Major loans following 1997 Asian crisis repaid by 2003. None 
France ‘Trilateral partnerships’, education links, industrial assistance. None 
Germany Strengthening small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and 
environmental work. 
None beyond the work of autonomous 
government-funded political foundations. 
Other Bilaterals Range of small programmes, mostly relating to trade, higher 
education, high profile social and environmental issues. 
Some small Embassy funds. 
Most International 
NGOs & UN 
Agencies  
Wide range of work focused on local empowerment, usually 
with Thai NGO implementing partner. 
None 
GROUP TWO – Reformers trying but failing to address conflict 
World Bank Major donor in past, very few recent loans. Three loans for 
transport, electricity management, environment. Larger loans 
and reform promotion after 1997 Asian economic crisis 
completed by 2004. 
Grants programme, likely civil society 
emphasis. Stalled. 
UNDP Promotion of Thai Development Goals (local version of 
Millennium Development Goals) and broad governance-related 
aims. 
Little progress on promotion of linked up 
UN approaches especially around 
governance. 
European Union  Range of funds for projects in health, environment, higher 
education, ‘stability’, ‘capacity building of Non-State Actors’, 
trade and investment. Support for displaced populations along 
Burma border. 
Failed to establish planned links with 
government departments. Funding for 
NGOs, foundations on Human Rights, 
education.  
GROUP THREE – Promoting peacebuilding with some programmes 
USA: USAID and 
other agencies 
Major donor in past, now less significant. Support for NGOs on 
social issues. Other support for specific issues: child labour, 
environment. 
Range of programmes, mostly with 
NGOs. Military assistance to Thai 
Government. 
Unicef Increasing focus on marginalized children – migrants, ethnic 
minorities. 
Promoting reforms and extension of 
services to meet needs in conflict 
affected area. Working with government 
and NGOs. 
Various 
international NGOs: 
Raks Thai, Oxfam 
Wide range of work focused on local empowerment, usually 
with Thai NGO implementing partner. 
Livelihood initiatives with community 
focus, typically linking with advocacy for 
policy change. 
Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung 
Programmes across Thailand with governance / democracy 
focus. 
Particular efforts to support domestic 
bodies. 
Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung 
National programmes on rights, equality, governance. Supporting advocacy initiatives. 
The Asia Foundation National programmes on education, democracy. Long-term involvement in education, 
advocacy on decentralization. 
Internews Media approaches for improved access to information and 
democracy. 
Major US-funded programme of 
assistance for local media. 
Human Rights NGOs Wide range of human rights issues. Support for domestic NGOs, research, 
awareness raising. 
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 Data sources include OECD/DAC statistics, Thai Government data, aid agency data, and interviews. 
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Figure 6b:  Characteristics of the three groups of donors with reference to conflict in the Far South of Thailand 
 GROUP ONE GROUP TWO GROUP THREE 
 
Attributes limiting work on 
peacebuilding 
Attributes enabling efforts to 
address peacebuilding 
Limitations hindering 
implementation 
Attributes enabling implementation  
on peacebuilding 
Limitations 
Motivations 
 Prioritizing poverty reduction and 
economic growth of nation states; low 
interest in subnational inequalities. 
 Weak understanding of horizontal 
inequalities, ethnicity and identity. 
 Technical international outlook masks 
political national context. 
 Low political prioritization of conflict. 
 Elements of broad vision of 
development encompassing 
rights, equality, justice; 
recognition of negative 
aspects of socioeconomic 
development. 
 Some awareness of horizontal 
inequalities, ethnicity and 
identity. 
 Continued commitment to 
national targets such as 
MDGs. 
 Low institutional 
prioritization of peripheral 
conflict. 
 Broad vision of development 
encompassing rights, equality, justice; 
recognition of negative aspects of 
socioeconomic development. 
 Politically aware rather than 
technically oriented. 
 Understand the significance and policy 
implications of horizontal inequalities, 
ethnicity and identity. 
 Inability to ‘mainstream’ conflict 
concerns across programmes. 
 Inconsistency of donor policies at 
country level.  
 Unrealistic expectations of what 
democratic change ordinarily offers 
minorities. 
Interface 
 Relationships with central state 
institutions fundamental to operations.  
 Low levels of interaction with other 
agencies / individuals. 
 Institutional and individual ‘denial’ 
enables smooth relationships. 
 Aim to address state policy in 
order to have impact. 
 Central state support sought 
for interventions addressing 
conflict. Some relationships 
with other state actors and 
non-governmental bodies. 
 Wider relationship 
(‘partnership’) with central 
state based around other 
priorities. 
 Insufficient focus on 
building relationships with 
government institutions. 
 Recognition of diversity within state 
institutions. 
 Careful management of relationships 
at different levels. 
 Work with non-governmental agencies, 
closer involvement with ‘beneficiaries’. 
 Restricted by what state institutions 
will allow. 
 At times conservative in supporting 
modest reform agendas. 
Practice 
 Use of national level statistics and 
targets. 
 Skill-sets prioritize macro-economic 
approaches and top-down planning. 
 Uniformity within institution / strong 
top-down management culture, less 
devolved authority. 
 Broader skills and outlook of 
some staff. 
 Some procedural flexibility 
and freedom for staff to 
pursue more varied 
development agendas. 
 Poorly equipped to build 
gradual relationships with 
state and other actors. 
 Limited knowledge base. 
 Funding constraints. 
 Restrictive operational tools 
and mechanisms. 
 Emphasis on local engagement with a 
wider aim of policy change. 
 Building knowledge as evidence base. 
 Flexible to local concerns rather than 
applying set policy agendas. 
 Variety within institutions: a range of 
approaches and fields of action. 
 Often still centralized, ground 
presence restricted. 
 Limited by institutional structures 
and processes, need for local 
‘partners’ to disburse funds 
according to required methods. 
 Lack of scope to evaluate impact.  
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6.2 Group One: mainstream aid, not considering conflict 
As this section explains, the two largest donors to Thailand in recent history, Japan and the ADB, have 
not appeared to take account of the conflict in the Far South in any significant sense through direct 
funding allocations or policy decisions. Other donors, including China, Germany and France, also 
appeared to pay very little attention to the conflict in their main aid engagement with Thailand.296 Some 
other aid agencies did demonstrate a concern for conflict problems in the Far South with some of their 
assistance, although even then the rest of their work still fell into this Group 
The previous chapter showed that many Thai government development initiatives have supported 
nation-building and the consolidation of central control, in the process abetting the perpetuation of 
resentment among Malay Muslims in the Far South. This section explains how Group One foreign aid 
has tended to support the expansion of Thai state agencies with little consideration for horizontal 
inequalities and peripheral tensions in the Far South. It addresses issues raised in the literature review 
(Chapter Three), showing that many donors have had little political motivation to address conflict in the 
Far South, while following technical approaches that have prioritized socioeconomic development at the 
national level and have insufficiently appreciated relationships between the nature of the Thai state and 
the causes of ongoing peripheral tension.  
6.2a  Historical overview: supporting state expansion 
Group One donors have made up the bulk of past aid flows to Thailand. They supported government 
development programmes and backed state policies that fostered economic growth and reduced 
poverty. Dominant contemporary aid trends stem back to American assistance along with World Bank 
loans that supported Thailand’s rapid modern industrialization from the late 1950s. Thailand was at that 
time a mid-sized aid recipient, with the USA, the World Bank, other bilaterals and UN agencies 
contributing significantly. Total US aid to Thailand from the 1950s through to the early 1980s is 
estimated at around US$1.5 billion, at 2004 prices.297 The USA was by far the largest donor, reflecting its 
broader political interest in supporting a Cold War ally in Southeast Asia. Major investments were made 
in infrastructure, including a network of roads to and from the northeast with military as well as 
developmental applications (Muscat 1990). At its height, US support represented some three-quarters 
of total donor flows (Amnuey 1968:63).298 
Thailand’s government budget was never heavily dependent on aid, though: overall aid flows rarely 
exceeded 10% of the budget in any given year.
299
 This low level of aid dependency was not unusual: for 
the US Government it was a typical country programme, more so than in the small number of 
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 Information from interviews with GTZ Official, French Aid Programme Officer, and Jean-Philippe Thouard. 
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 This figure is derived from US congressional data (see Muscat 1990:31-32) and the OECD/DAC database (OECD 
2009). 
298
 The focus on the US aid programme in this section reflects its historical prominence and availability of data. 
299
 Figures from Muscat (1990). Short-term IMF loans created some temporary dependency in the early 1980s and 
late 1990s. See  Ch.6 (Part 6.3). 
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strategically important countries where their aid volume was at times large relative to the recipient 
economy, such as South Korea, Taiwan, or Israel (Muscat 1990). 
In keeping with the dominant modernization model, aid increased the capacity of the state in many 
fields, assisting its geographical spread into peripheral areas. Thailand’s progress up to the 1970s, 
described in the previous chapter, involved the extension of infrastructure and administration out from 
the centre. Aid projects increased the government’s technical competence, especially in line ministries 
such as health and education, and in central planning agencies including the National Economic 
Development Board. Foreign aid supported a cadre of experts at senior levels of government: by 1986, 
40% of permanent secretaries, director-generals, provincial governors, and other key senior position 
holders had been trained under USAID support (Muscat 1990:55). Government institutions increasingly 
reached down to the level of the village, often for the first time. Donor funding was instrumental in 
enabling Thailand to be one of the few developing countries to introduce primary health care on a 
national scale by the 1980s, according to Unicef (1986). Thailand’s relatively closed, centralized and 
elite-dominated government became more efficient and developmentally oriented over this period, 
although it never approached the guided developmentalism of Singapore, South Korea or Taiwan (Pasuk 
& Baker 1997:26-27). 
The US Government and other donor governments paid concerted attention to communist-linked 
insurgency until the mid-1970s, with Thailand considered vulnerable both to invasion and to domestic 
insurrection.300 The Thai Government welcomed military and development aid linked with suppression 
of internal rural communist unrest. Western donor nations were interested in providing it as part of 
efforts to reduce Soviet and Chinese influence in Southeast Asia (Muscat 1990:149-151). As Connors 
(2007) and others describe, US development aid was initially used for projects that promoted national 
integration. Subsequently, as war in Vietnam and fear of communist insurgency inside Thailand 
escalated, the overt aim was counter-insurgency. Government projects concentrated especially on 
“Unconquered rural peripheries” (Connors 2007:61) across Thailand, with foreign aid backing the 
expansion of irrigation, roads, electricity and education and enabling the state to extend its reach into 
local areas where central authority had in the past been tenuous. Foreign, chiefly but not only American, 
funding backed the extension of departments of the Ministry of the Interior including the Local 
Administration Department and the Community Development Department down to the village level. US-
funded aid projects concentrated on the north and northeast of Thailand, the poorest areas and also 
those where the risk of both internal communist insurgency and external invasion (from Vietnam) was 
considered greatest. Levels of US military aid to Thailand during much of this period exceeded US 
foreign aid, with security objectives also being the primary determinant of the kinds of projects funded 
through development assistance (Caldwell 1974:27). 
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 Some commentators link the unrest across much of Thailand at that time to development processes that 
increased rural resentment of the state (Wyatt 2003, Connors 2007:71-72). 
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Caldwell (1974) and Muscat (1990:175) state that rural development projects across a wide range of 
sectors promoted economic improvements primarily as a means to increase contact between state 
officials including teachers and villagers. Many different income generation projects stressed reaching 
out to local people, although the terms under which participation was permitted were defined by the 
centre, heavily guided by state information dissemination and fear of oppression if countering the 
official line, while affording little democratic space at a higher level (Connors 2007:72). The success of 
these efforts in increasing local people’s support for the state is considered uneven. Communist 
insurgency continued well into the 1970s. Caldwell (1974:136) found that many American-funded 
projects succeeded in improving rural livelihoods, yet still did not foster any greater sympathy among 
rural people for the government. Parallels exist with more recent efforts to ‘use economic growth to 
defeat the bandits’ that do not appear to have helped to stem violence or build public sympathy for the 
state in the Far South of Thailand, as described in the previous chapter. 
In the mid-1970s, US involvement declined along with the end of conflict in Vietnam. Japan and the ADB 
became Thailand’s largest donors. Despite increasing cynicism in the USA and other Western donor 
countries over the role of the state in development, the main trends of donor funding continued. While 
less overtly focused on counter-insurgency, Japanese aid has typically provided similar flows of capital 
and technical expertise to governments, in the process showing considerable respect for authority and 
sovereignty (Arase 1995). The most common form of Japanese assistance to Thailand has involved 
concessional loans for power, transport and other infrastructure carried out by parastatal bodies like the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand. Oversight typically rests with the Ministry of Finance, while 
implementation is sub-contracted to Japanese companies or Thai-Japanese consortia. The Asian 
Development Bank’s assistance is similarly composed.301  
A range of views on the overall benefit of foreign aid provision to Thailand suggests that its impact has 
been mixed, supporting both positive and negative aspects of political and economic change in Thailand. 
Robert Muscat (1990) provides a positive historical assessment from an insider’s perspective, showing 
how aid-funded projects helped to increase wealth and reduce poverty, despite the odd glitch. 
Undoubtedly, aid flows contributed to mass poverty reduction and improved health and literacy, as 
basic services were rolled out to a majority of the population within one generation. In addition, they 
contributed to a subsequent boom in the non-governmental sector (Gary 2004:58-59). Less positive 
assessments indicate that aid flows might have helped reduce poverty but also supported a state largely 
captured by elite interests and hardly capable of providing a coherent direction. Unger compares 
unfavourably Thailand’s weak dirigiste developmentalism with more rapidly growing East Asian states 
(1998). A further critical standpoint holds that foreign aid exacerbated the vast gulf between an 
increasingly middle-class capital city and the predominantly rural hinterland (Chai-Anan & Morrell 1981). 
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 From 1987 to 1991, Japan’s foreign assistance to Thailand consisted of 91 billion Thai Baht of concessional 
lending and 20 billion Thai Baht of grants – 16.7% of total capital expenditure during Thailand’s sixth national plan 
(Pranee 1990:52). 
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The impact of export-led industrialization and subsequent financial deregulation promoted from the 
1970s on by the World Bank, IMF and other agencies can also be seen as mixed. The changes increased 
both internal divisions and vulnerability to external shocks, while also furthering economic growth and 
poverty reduction (Pasuk & Baker 1998:316-319). Indirectly, foreign aid further opened up economic 
opportunities for well-connected entrepreneurs at all levels to benefit from government contacts, make 
fortunes, and then cement their positions by seeking political office (McVey 2000, Arghiros 2001).302  
The impacts of both the extension of the state into peripheral areas and the deterioration of local 
authority structures in the Far South were addressed in the previous chapter, which showed that many 
Malay Muslims who question overall state legitimacy are likely to stress the negative aspects of 
developmental change, associating it with wider long-term political and cultural marginalization. Donors 
have supported overall socioeconomic improvements but, as we have already seen, the basis of 
resentment in the Far South that fuels insurgency rests with a range of horizontal inequalities that 
Group One foreign aid was not designed to address. 
6.2b Donor decision-making 
Whether promoting liberalization or encouraging state expansion, many initiatives in Thailand that have 
been supported by foreign aid  show little evidence of efforts to address horizontal inequalities and 
related ethnic differences. For several reasons, many recent donors to Thailand still tend to overlook the 
conflict in the Far South despite their global peacebuilding commitments. First, and perhaps most 
significantly, donor nations have little political motivation to promote engagement with the Far South. 
At the policy level, there is limited international donor concern over conflict in Pattani. Politically, 
Thailand remains an ally of Western and Asian donor countries. Diplomats in Bangkok informally agree 
that it would take a more obvious threat to their national interests, such as a bomb attack on an 
international tourist resort, for their countries to take conflict in Pattani sufficiently seriously to risk 
damaging their relationship with the Government of Thailand.303 The conflict in the Far South has 
presented few if any risks for other nations to date, with foreigners hardly having been targeted and 
little evidence linking insurgents with international networks.304 The area is not relevant to international 
pursuit of development objectives as it contains a small proportion of Thailand’s population and has 
little direct impact on aggregated national level goals. 
Second, significant elements of foreign aid practice that are underpinned by overly technical 
conceptualization of the state further restrict interest in addressing conflict in the Far South.305 The 
typical donor conception of the state has long been recognized as simplistic (Ferguson 1990, Pincus 
2002, Fine 2006:122). Expectations of a functional and technical (or ‘Weberian’) state are especially 
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 One USAID adviser with many years of experience in Thailand stated unofficially that ADB’s success in enforcing 
local private sector sub-contracting of road construction had the greatest impact of any aid intervention that he 
had seen in Thailand (Interview with Dennis Zvinakis). 
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 This view was repeatedly mentioned in confidence during interviews with aid officials, including AUSAID 
programme officer, USAID Official 2, and British Embassy Diplomat. 
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 See Ch.5 (Part 5.10). 
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 On depoliticized aid and technical approaches see Ch.3 (Part 3.4). 
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pronounced in Thailand. Cultural tendencies towards conflict avoidance in social situations that are 
immediately apparent to any visitor give a false aura of a relaxed, trouble-free environment.306 Given 
strong vestiges of the ‘bureaucratic polity’ first described in the 1950s (Riggs 1966), donors often 
encounter sufficient technocratic expertise and efficient management to form an impression of 
effective, rational authority.307 Meetings in Thai government offices usually start and end on time. An 
outward impression of consensus around a hierarchical system of control is maintained, it being unusual 
in Thailand to question authority in a public, formal environment.308 Planning workshops that donors 
like to fund as part of project design usually end in mutually agreed lists of future actions.309 The 
impression received by many aid agency staff on a short visit or a typical three-year posting is of 
smooth, managed governance. It takes longer to realize that actions agreed on in workshops or 
meetings are rarely followed through unless they coincide with existing dominant interests.
310
 
Along with most aid receiving nations, and mirroring highly centralized government structures, donor 
offices – even specific project offices – are overwhelmingly concentrated in Bangkok, Thailand’s capital. 
For most donors in Thailand, a lack of directly implemented field projects means that they have had 
little if any presence outside the capital. Most international donor officials in Thailand that I interviewed 
liaised with partner institutions – government agencies and departments, or NGOs – whose head offices 
were also usually in Bangkok, giving them a view of Thailand that looks from the centre outwards. 
Many elements of horizontal inequalities were rarely explored by donors interviewed for this research, 
let alone addressed effectively. Despite the prominence of identity-based as well as more conventional 
political analyses of the Thai nation state in academic literature, both interviews and existing published 
sources show that many donors remained wedded to technical views of the state.
311
 A detailed review 
of donor policy and project literature conducted during this research provides little historical evidence 
of awareness of horizontal differences in Thailand. The exceptions are a few American aid-funded 
reviews that for security reasons considered the relevance of ethnic difference for irredentist or anti-
government movements in the 1960s, focusing in particular on the predominantly Lao-speaking 
northeast (Lobe 1977). Donors have also given attention to the socioeconomic status of impoverished 
minority upland groups in the far north. On the other hand, Malay Muslims and ongoing latent or overt 
violence in the Far South have typically not attracted donors’ attention.312 With donor policies and 
interventions mainly driven by the message of national statistics and socioeconomic indicators, at the 
same time as being overseen by politicians preoccupied for many decades with security concerns in 
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 An assumed norm of peaceful consensus begins in tourist brochures, with the country marketed as a tropical, 
feminine, faux-Buddhist paradise. 
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 Interviews with international donor officials recently arrived in Thailand repeated this perspective, for example 
interviews with DFID Senior Adviser and European Union Official. 
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 On conflict avoidance in the Thai workplace, see Wasita (2007). 
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 I participated in many such meetings in Thailand and elsewhere between 1999 and 2006 while working for 
agencies including DFID, ILO and Save the Children (UK).  
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 Several donor officials who had spent longer in the country mentioned this point during interviews (interview 
with Michael Stievater and interview (a) with UNDP Official 4). 
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 Subsequent chapters contain case study evidence. 
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 For some exceptions see Thieme (1965) and Thomas (1977). As well as websites, academic sources, and 
interviews with long-serving foreign aid officials, information used includes grey material accessed in Thailand. 
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Southeast Asia, there is little evidence that donor officials questioned the formal discourse of Thai 
national unity in any meaningful sense. Rather they effectively accepted the official line that Thailand 
was a successful assimilationist state (Reynolds 1991, Chai-Anan 1991). 
Overt conflict in the Far South was ongoing throughout much of the 1960s and 1970s, but remained 
localized and of low intensity, with few if any direct implications for Western donor nations. In any case, 
as in many other Asian states, Western donors were soon overtaken in size by the ADB and Japan, 
whose greater respect for national sovereignty and tendency to support national development policies 
made them even less likely to focus on a difficult and sensitive conflict area.313  Support for Thai NGOs 
has also largely bypassed the Far South, where many local civil groups have been poorly linked into 
national NGO networks and insufficiently resourced to be able to bid for funds on their own.314 Available 
NGO literature, like official donor sources, has rarely mentioned the Far South. 
Chapter Five explained how national policies and development initiatives have typically ignored 
horizontal inequalities in the Far South even though they frequently have an unintended impact on 
them, reproducing perceptions of inequality among many Malay Muslims. Many examples exist of 
foreign aid programmes that backed national policies and initiatives without considering their likely 
impact on horizontal inequalities in the Far South. In addition to the case presented in Chapter Seven, 
the education sector offers further evidence. Donor-funded technical assistance has continued a long 
trend of building government capacity in the education sector, in overall terms helping the government 
address higher national human development targets and the labour needs of economic growth (Nairn 
1966, World Bank 1988). A Japanese funded project begun in 2001 to provide computers and 
information technology skills for secondary schools is a typical example. The project supported centrally 
defined objectives with a team of specialists based in the Ministry of Education in Bangkok, whose aims 
did not extend beyond narrowly defined transfers of technical skills.315 The structure and aims of this 
and other similar projects emphasize that alignment with government objectives has been regarded by 
donors as a critical element of success, echoing the findings of a regional Asian Development Bank 
education sector review: 
 All successful projects were relevant. They reflected governments’ education strategies and 
were aligned with the countries’ expressed development needs (Hutaserani 2006). 
Interviews conducted with Group One aid agencies revealed no evidence of any incentives for project or 
country office staff to jeopardize success by challenging the appropriateness of ‘expressed development 
needs’, especially if approaching sensitive issues of nationalism. In the Far South, assimilation through 
schooling and language tuition has long been a contested pillar of government pacification policy. An 
apolitical donor view of education as a technical issue of economic or human development 
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demonstrates the gap between most foreign-funded development interventions and the roots of 
conflict in the Far South. 
The failure of Group One donors to account for conflict and related ethnic tension (documented in more 
detail in Chapter Seven) does not seem to be a result of naivety or lack of understanding. Many of the 
donor officials I interviewed expressed personal interest in problems in the Far South, often showing 
genuine concern or frustration at the failure to find a solution.316 But these thoughts were effectively 
left at the office entrance, not being relevant to their work. Officials appear to have demonstrated the 
common practices of denial necessary to continue with daily office life (Caddell & Yanacopulos 2006). It 
is not only a matter of personal denial. Donors were aware of the context of conflict in the Far South of 
Thailand, and indeed of conflicts across Southeast Asia, but many simply did not see it as an issue of 
pressing professional concern. An economic adviser covering Southeast Asia for DFID, the official UK 
donor, said: “Conflict is an issue, we’re aware of it, but I’d be lying if I said we put serious time into it.” 317 
Conflict had to compete for attention with nine other DFID policy priorities in Southeast Asia. 
Interviewees explained that it was only considered a key issue where it was a political priority for the 
UK.318 
The French bilateral aid effort has encountered similar issues. A former aid programme manager with 
their embassy in Bangkok saw their work in Thailand as involving: “...a broad range of objectives which 
you have to merge if you want a successful programme.“ 319 Interviewees from both DFID and the 
French aid programme stated that maintaining a bilateral programme that fulfils institutional 
requirements involves satisfying many internal interests: different sections of the head office, various 
ministries, the personal concerns of the ambassador, and lobbying groups in the donor country. Where 
a conflict did not show up strongly in national development data, and was kept away from international 
political attention, there was little motivation for aid officials to make their own lives harder by trying to 
address it.320 
6.3 Group Two: reformists trying but failing to address conflict 
In response to increased violence in the Far South from 2004, some donors tried to implement local 
adaptations of global peacebuilding policies although they often found it hard to do so. Interviews with 
donor officials from Group Two agencies including the World Bank, UNDP and the EU showed that using 
aid to promote reform or change confronts greater practical barriers than funding the state to extend 
existing structures, with considerable resistance from the Thai state stopping or delaying their plans. 
These statements are explained and justified below before being addressed through case material in 
Chapter Eight.  
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Group Two is perhaps best seen as a phase or a characteristic: donors may plan some programmes that 
fall into this category, while funding other programmes that do not consider conflict at all. Or they may 
eventually find a way past the interface with the state over time.321 In any case, the category serves to 
show how the translation process from external policies into domestic practice, and the continued 
significance of domestic sovereignty, mean that foreign aid has struggled to address peripheral conflicts 
even where it prioritizes peacebuilding and related issues of equality and justice. 
Frustrated donor efforts to change how the state works and to promote more equal development 
outcomes have a long history in Thailand. David Steinberg (1986) documented how in the late 1960s 
rural insurgency fed on resentment at perceived exploitation by local government officials in Thailand. 
The situation induced the USA to promote improvements in notoriously corrupt provincial 
administrations and to extend service delivery and infrastructure to poorer areas. Awareness grew 
among US officials that their own earlier ‘top-down’ support had in cases exacerbated inequality and 
heightened local corruption. USAID projects increasingly aimed to improve accountability and 
decentralize government systems, rather than simply provide funding, equipment or training (ibid.). 
But projects hit barriers when attempting to reform rather than to support the way in which 
government works. Assessments conclude that projects were more effective when supporting the 
interests of domestic power brokers, especially in central government.322 As already explained, 
government efforts to decentralize or promote participation were limited in practice. For example, one 
internal review of US policy on decentralization conducted in 1967 suggested that projects should not 
aim to devolve significant power to the local level even if considered good practice, since Thai officials 
did not envisage any departure from a unitary state.
323
 Elsewhere, externally motivated efforts to 
promote local level decision-making failed to achieve the required approval of senior Thai officials 
(Muscat 1990:283). US financial support to the Thai police is an example of this trend (Lobe 1977). It 
achieved results when it aimed to strengthen the capacity and power of central command. When efforts 
were made to support village-level security measures through local community policing initiatives, the 
result was a counterproductive failure. With a police establishment that held no real experience of 
participatory engagement, greater power vested in authorities at the local level simply resulted in 
further repression. This probably increased popular resentment – the very problem that the project was 
aiming to reverse at the outset. 
Over this period, foreign aid interventions were largely unable to change the way in which the state 
operated if significant modifications in political relationships and distribution of authority were needed. 
For example, donors made little headway in promoting steps towards decentralization that included 
elements of local participation in decision-making and oversight of government procedures (Wilson 
1970). Examples of failed externally promoted ‘reform’ projects abound, from progressive education 
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projects of the 1950s (Nairn 1966), to decentralization efforts in the 1970s (Muscat 1990:279), to 
conditionality attached to IMF loans in the 1990s. Even interventions held up as examples of influential 
external intervention, stretching back to a famous World Bank mission in 1958 that allegedly assisted 
the alignment of Thailand’s development policies around liberal economic principles, appear to have 
done little more than support an already increasingly influential group of reformers at high levels of 
government who saw advantage in gaining foreign support for their arguments (Unger 1998:62). 
More recent efforts by donors to impose changes directly have also had little success. IMF policy 
prescriptions following the bailout of 1997-8 were largely circumvented, even though the 1997-8 
financial crisis had put the Thai Government on an unusually weak footing and IMF agreements with 
stipulations for significant reform measures had been reluctantly accepted (Killick 1998:62). Only some 
measures were ultimately implemented, with Thai bureaucrats and politicians largely able to reinterpret 
them into a form that suited their pre-existing categories and objectives. Barbara Orlandini explains how 
the technocratic content and power implications of global ‘good governance’ policies were ‘consumed’ 
or reinterpreted to fit a domestic discourse, stressing a very different model of governance from the 
expected international norm (2001; also Chairat 2000). In this and other similar cases, people in 
positions of authority within central departments of the recipient government who manage donor 
flows, including politicians with executive responsibilities as well as senior civil servants, may have had 
more power to use aid as they saw fit than is often perceived, even at a time of crisis (Orlandini 
2001:134-138). In Thailand, externally promoted reform objectives are repeatedly incorporated into 
prevailing domestic interests: liberal international development discourse is translated to fit dominant 
domestic interests (Connors 2003:434). So even if international good governance prescriptions or other 
donor stipulations had included issues relating to the roots of conflict in the Far South, they would 
probably not have been implemented.324 
Donors’ ultimate need to disburse funds regardless of whether reforms are implemented, along with 
their inability to impose policy change, often make imposed conditions unenforceable; typically they are 
either only accepted if the measures were ones that the government was already planning to undertake, 
as occurred with earlier IMF aid to Thailand from 1982 to 1984, or they are not carried out at all (Killick 
1998). The conditions identified by James Boyce (2004) as necessary for peace conditionalities to work 
certainly do not exist in the Far South of Thailand, nor in most other peripheral conflicts: the political 
context could not be described as open to considering change, aid flows are relatively small, and neither 
donors nor recipients have made peace their top priority. 
Outside short periods in the early 1980s, and again during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, the Thai 
Government has not been dependent on external assistance and has been able to pick and choose the 
loans or grants that it wishes to receive. Influential figures at high levels of government could effectively 
select the donor with the most preferential terms: the best loan repayment terms and the lowest levels 
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of interference in domestic affairs.325 This means that donors have had limited scope to address 
controversial fields including unrest in the Far South. 
In almost all interviews I undertook with donor officials, interviewees stressed the importance of central 
government approval and subsequent support for effective aid delivery in Thailand.326 The ways in 
which donors engaged across the interface with government emerged as a result to be a critical 
determinant of the scope to use aid to approach conflict-related issues. With few directly implemented, 
area-based aid projects, donors dealt predominantly with national-level technocrats or politicians. 
Rather than being co-opted locally, as may occur in less centrally controlled contexts (Barnett & 
Zuercher 2008), aid in Thailand was more likely to be captured centrally. It is important therefore to look 
more closely at how the donor interface with central state institutions has operated and at the Thai 
Government’s position over external involvement in conflict-related issues in the Far South. 
Scope to work on conflict has been restricted chiefly by the Thai Government’s desire not to 
‘internationalize’ the situation.327 Interviews with Group Two donors in Thailand revealed that a main 
reason why some aid agencies have failed to engage more in peacebuilding work is simply that the state 
did not allow them to do so directly, as Chapter Eight explores in more depth with reference to UNDP 
and the World Bank.328  Discussions with such donors revealed how the dynamic of the interface with 
central government bureaucrats was a key element of donor officials’ daily lives in Thailand.329 Most 
donors aiming to engage in the Far South had to gain approval from at least one of several layers of 
government. Group Two donors (notably UNDP, the World Bank, and funding from the European Union) 
were held up at this interface at the time of research. 
In the case of the European Union, the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs was highly resistant. The EU’s 
large annual trade deficit with Thailand might in theory have provided leverage given an export-
dependent Thai economy, motivating Thai politicians and bureaucrats to maintain good relations. In 
practice, EU plans for a moderate programme of support (sourced from its global Instrument for 
Stability Fund) to work on the roots of conflict in the Far South were blocked.330 The EU office in 
Bangkok tried to find a common Thai government position that would enable assistance to flow, given 
the initial interest shown by line ministries in receiving funds that had stimulated their initial efforts. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs chose simply not to respond following an initial meeting, in the process 
letting the proposed plans quietly die.331 
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The EU then paused before deciding to continue with a smaller programme of support channelled 
through international NGOs.332 This did not in itself guarantee a route around the interface with 
government. Even if central control were circumvented, mechanisms that rein in all international aid 
workers include procedural issues like work visas and official red tape. Freedom of movement has 
historically existed across most of Thailand but donors and many international NGOs have been 
discouraged from setting up offices, or denied permission to do so, in or even near the Far South.333 The 
international NGO registration process appears to have been used by the government as a tool of 
control, with fear of being refused work permits acting to keep international staff to a consensual 
line.334 
Donor efforts to provide assistance to national rather than international NGOs also hit barriers. The Thai 
non-governmental sector has received donor funding for several decades (Linklater et al. 2001, Gary 
2003).335 Many NGOs in Thailand challenge government policy and practice through grassroots 
movements and actions. NGOs are often involved in advocacy and campaigning through networks like 
the Assembly of the Poor (Missingham 2004). At the same time, it has been charged that NGOs and 
other civil organizations supported by donors function within existing ways of working, rather than 
outside them. Much of the Thai NGO movement works within many of the conservative and nationalistic 
expectations of the central state bureaucracy and associated elite groups (Connors 2003:433). 
Signficantly, national NGOs have repeatedly encountered barriers if trying to engage with the Far South, 
where many community leaders are initially sceptical of interference from outside (as Chapter Five 
explains). One experienced NGO activist from conflict-affected Yala province dismissed organizations 
working in the Far South yet not run by people from the area as opportunist and irrelevant.336 
6.4 Group Three: promoting peacebuilding with some programmes 
6.4a Donor motivations that promote engagement with peacebuilding 
This research finds that several international agencies managed to address the conflict in the Far South 
of Thailand through their programmes, despite the barriers already described. From 2006 to 2008, 
agencies engaging in the Far South supported initiatives ranging from one-off meetings to programmes 
of several million dollars. Active donors included Unicef, The Asia Foundation, and the US Government 
aid agency USAID. Other bilateral donors provided some small aid grants, with several foundations and 
international NGOs also active. These agencies generally engaged through intermediaries, implementing 
very few programmes or projects directly. The bulk of donor funding on conflict issues in the Far South 
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flowed through NGOs, although government departments and agencies were also involved in 
implementing some initiatives. 
Group Three donors were varied. Different strategies and tactics were adopted at the national and local 
levels, supporting advocacy on policy issues, academic debate, and pilots for policy reform within central 
ministries. By examining how these donors worked, and the limits they encountered, further light is 
shed on the relationship between aid and peripheral conflict. This section outlines their main 
characteristics (with more detailed case material found in Chapter Nine). It applies in turn the three 
themes of motivation, interface and practice both in considering the qualities that enabled these donors 
to work on peacebuilding in the Far South and in highlighting the drawbacks that limited what they 
could achieve.  
With few forcibly displaced people, functioning markets, and the continued provision of at least basic 
services by the state, there has been little need for short-term humanitarian assistance in the Far South. 
Interviews and related research show that donors working on conflict in the Far South have chiefly been 
involved in small steps to address specific aspects of ongoing violence or to promote a negotiated 
settlement. These efforts have covered a range of fields, including: equality of access to services; justice 
and human rights; rural livelihoods and community development; discussion and advocacy on peace; 
and proposals for new policy on decentralization. Islamic organizations, often from the Middle East, 
provided religious and educational support.337 
Agencies promoting peacebuilding in the Far South of Thailand have responded to different motivations 
and interests, although they all shared some properties. As shown in the examples of Unicef and The 
Asia Foundation in Chapter Nine, a broad vision of development that extends beyond socioeconomic 
considerations at the national level appeared to be a prerequisite for work on a conflict that only affects 
a small part of the country directly and is rooted in identity and nationalism. Literature produced by, and 
staff interviews with, Group Three aid agencies typically revealed a clear understanding of the basis of 
the conflict in horizontal inequalities and the role of a nationalist, centralized state in perpetuating 
tensions. The Asia Foundation, for example, comments that the area’s “…unique identity has long been 
threatened by Thai ethno-centric government policies” (2009). 
Group Three donors tended to adopt a more critical view of the state than other donors and emphasize 
human rights, justice and equality as part of their global objectives. It is perhaps surprising to see Unicef 
figuring highly in this group, an agency of the United Nations that typically works closely alongside 
governments. Their work in Thailand has increasingly promoted child rights and supported conflict-
affected groups as well as minorities more widely: Unicef staff in Thailand showed firm commitment to 
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these goals, a message put across repeatedly during interviews.338 Careful management of close 
relationships with the state has enabled Unicef, despite some problems, to implement programmes in 
what would otherwise usually be seen to be controversial areas, promoting policy change on specific 
issues including education and service delivery.339 
For NGOs like Raks Thai and Oxfam, the motivation to address conflict comes from an institutional focus 
on community-based approaches and the experiences of the rural poor.340 Other Group Three agencies 
prioritize democracy and justice. For example, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) is the international 
charitable arm of the German Social Democrat Party, with a mandate for promoting democracy, peace 
and human rights. It has worked in the south of Thailand since 1992, emphasizing the rights of Muslims, 
and in particular Muslim women, alongside local and national partner agencies (FES undated). After the 
upsurge of violence from 2004, staff adjusted their focus to look more concertedly at the Far South.341 
Although FES originally budgeted only US$30,000 for the initiative, its work has been more overtly 
political and challenging than that of other agencies, with efforts to bring local voices and perspectives 
to the attention of more senior figures around issues of social justice. In the run-up to Thailand‘s general 
election at the end of 2007, they facilitated meetings between leaders of political parties and 
representatives of a network of women’s groups from across the Far South, a level of engagement 
beyond the scope of most foreign aid agencies. They have worked quietly behind the scenes on other 
occasions to promote specific issues of concern in the Far South, using a string of political and 
institutional contacts.342 
The EU, a provider of a far larger volume of foreign aid, managed to assist various human rights groups 
after its initial aims were frustrated by the Thai Government. Since Thailand is not one of the EU’s 
priority aid recipient countries, funding was not managed by the unit responsible for the standard aid 
programme but by the foreign relations section which maintains a greater interest in democracy, rule of 
law and human rights.343  EU officials saw pursuing justice in the Far South as an important element of 
their global obligation to promote human rights, a result of pressure from governments and non-
governmental groups within Europe.344 Other donors, including diplomats overseeing small embassy 
funds in Bangkok, pursued a human rights agenda that places the significance of individuals above that 
of the state, although the sums involved were often very small.345 
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USAID, the US Government aid agency, has taken conflict in the Far South more seriously than other 
bilaterals and dedicates more staff time to the issue. With a more political and less technical approach, 
USAID (and other US government agencies engaging with issues in the Far South) did not share the 
preconceptions of a rational government bureaucracy that influenced Group One donors’ programmes. 
USAID staff stressed that the agency has always tended to keep clear of purely technical approaches and 
remains unashamedly politically engaged, as one part of the US State Department.346 USAID takes an 
openly politicized perspective on Thailand, stressing the significance of peacebuilding for promoting 
democracy as well as reducing tensions with a Muslim minority.347 USAID has provided funding to NGOs 
and foundations including Internews and The Asia Foundation. Their Thailand programme strategy 
review of 2008 recommended a clear focus on the Far South including further support for ‘civil society’ 
around peacebuilding (USAID 2009). 
Such overtly political engagement, along with longstanding cynicism over the role of the USA, has 
generated suspicion of ulterior motives.348 US Government interest in the Far South certainly reflects 
their own security concerns among other considerations, given the context of violent conflict and a 
Muslim population. Furthermore, the basis of wider American engagement is of support for a central 
Thai state that has not done enough to recognize the specific needs of the peripheral Far South (USAID 
2009). Strong American-Thai diplomatic relations are underpinned by a long history of trade agreements 
and security cooperation. US military aid to Thailand is a very small proportion of the overall Thai 
military budget although at the time of research it was greater than the US development assistance 
budget to Thailand. In 2006, the US Government spent US$7,843,000 on security and military support to 
Thailand and just US$3,302,000 on development assistance including peacebuilding.349  
However, actual initiatives on the ground contradict a singularly critical perspective on American 
involvement. Given no significant international extremist links with the Far South, the American 
response since 2006 has been dominated by straightforward peacebuilding objectives. Despite 
continued popular suspicion, researchers have found no evidence of direct US engagement beyond 
cautious and constructive initiatives that recognize the limits of external intervention in a conflict that 
can only be solved through policy changes made in Bangkok.350 Even US security and military support 
has been more considered than may be assumed: funding for security forces emphasized human rights 
training, while for police and other law enforcement officials it concentrated on improved forensics – a 
field in which lack of expertise reduces the scope to follow transparent judicial process (Wheeler 2009). 
For USAID officials and most international staff in US-funded NGOs or foundations, their desire to build 
programmes promoting peace in the Far South of Thailand reflected a longer-term commitment to 
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justice and non-violence, as well as an interest in presenting a positive face of the USA.351 Involvement 
was not comparable with earlier concern over communist rebellion in Thailand during the 1960s and 
1970s, nor with more recent actions in the Middle East and Afghanistan. 
6.4b  Negotiating the Interface 
Group Three agencies adopted different techniques in managing the interface and engaging with 
different parts of the Thai Government (see Chapter Nine). Some agencies including USAID and the EU 
partially avoided the interface by funding other agencies to do work for them. A desire to maintain good 
relations with the Thai Government rather than prioritize a conflict that remains peripheral encouraged 
this approach.352 USAID in particular has sub-contracted programme management and funded large US-
based NGOs and foundations directly. While we have already seen that these bodies remained subject 
to Thai government approval and monitoring, meaning that there was no guarantee that sub-
contracting would offer a route to successful implementation, it may have removed the burden of 
interface management from donor officials.353 One USAID official in Bangkok stated that in this way “The 
US Embassy can have its cake and eat it,” by funding activities yet also keeping a low profile that avoids 
negative overtones of US engagement and was less likely to affect relations with high-level figures in the 
Thai Government.354 
Direct funding from overseas, rather than through in-country offices, also avoided some interface 
negotiations, effectively bypassing annual aid talks between donor and government. German political 
foundations including FES and Adenauer receive funding directly from the German Government on a 
global basis, while some international NGOs receive funds in a similar way.
355
 International human rights 
groups rely on global legitimacy to maintain a presence.356 The US-based NGO Human Rights Watch 
makes it hard for the Thai Government to accuse it of foreign pro-insurgent bias or infringements of 
sovereignty by openly criticizing insurgent abuses as well as those of the state and by employing 
experienced Thai staff (Human Rights Watch 2007). 
Scope to negotiate the interface with government was influenced by the relative power of donors, with 
US funding apparently less closely scrutinized by Thai authorities than other sources. For example, US 
Government aid programmes and the US-associated Asia Foundation were the only funding sources that 
openly promoted programmes on the Far South on their websites, suggesting less need to tread 
carefully. The US Government may not have been able to act in Thailand with the impunity that it 
enjoyed during the early Cold War years (Caldwell 1974), but has nonetheless been bolder than other 
donor countries. 
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Experienced Thai and foreign development specialists working in Thailand recognized that rather than 
trying to bypass the interface with the Thai Govenment, it was usually more effective to manage the 
relationship carefully over time.357 Jon Ungkpakorn, chair of the Thai NGO Coordinating Committee, 
stated that despite concern over sovereignty, agencies wishing to work on building peace in the Far 
South through applying development approaches could find space to engage.358 It is wrong to paint an 
impression of a homogenous state uniformly hostile to outsiders: the experiences of Unicef, TAF and 
others show how the diversity and incoherence of the Thai government system usually make some 
involvement possible without being fully co-opted by an incompatible agenda. Subgroups and 
departments within several ministries often held positions on conflict in the Far South that diverged 
from main government policy, some being more conservative and others considerably more tolerant. 
For example, certain units within line ministries encouraged foreign assistance that would help them 
improve how justice, health and education services respond to Malay Muslim needs in the Far South.359 
These units provided entry points that some Group Three agencies pursued.360 
The German foundation FES followed a politically engaged approach that required especially careful 
brokering. Their programme supported efforts to advocate for policy reforms that would recognize the 
Far South’s particular circumstances, engaging political parties as well as government officials in debate. 
Difficulties encountered included strong pressure exerted by the Thailand International Cooperation 
Agency (TICA) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Suspicious of FES’s plans, TICA insisted on detailed 
monthly reporting – a highly unusual step.361 Careful management of the relationship, through regular 
meetings and dedication of staff time, gradually built TICA’s confidence until engagement was possible. 
The considerable investment of time and effort by FES in order to gain permission to operate a small 
programme on the Far South reflected a commitment to work in the area that many donors did not 
demonstrate.362  
As explained in greater depth in Chapter Nine, the interface limited activities even for those agencies 
that did manage to negotiate a path with government counterparts. Such agencies often had to 
moderate their work in the process. At times, this led to fairly consensual approaches, supporting 
modest reform efforts within Bangkok-based bodies including government departments (e.g. Ministries 
of Education and Justice), semi-autonomous agencies (King Prajadhipok’s Institute), and prestigious 
universities (Mahidol and Chulalongkorn).363 
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6.4c  Practice 
Finally, certain elements of practice typified Group Three donors. The difference in levels of local 
knowledge between donors across Groups 1-3 is shown in the case studies presented through the 
subsequent three chapters. Interviews with staff of agencies including Unicef, FES and The Asia 
Foundation, as well as their operating partners on the ground, repeatedly emphasized the need to gain 
local knowledge. Attention to practical detail emerged through interviews with donor officials as 
necessary even for basic operational issues, for example to avoid the uninformed impression that the 
conflict area is a ‘no-go’ zone.364 
Local operating partners emerged as essential to most international agencies’ programmes in the Far 
South. Those agencies working there stressed the need to spend more time than in other parts of 
Thailand building good relationships with government and non-governmental bodies through whom aid 
is delivered, moving beyond rhetoric about ‘partnership’ towards practical associations.365 The level of 
local understanding required extended to self-awareness of how a foreign aid provider is perceived by 
officials and citizens: international agencies working in the Far South adopted a low profile, often 
removing logos and branding from sponsored vehicles, buildings, and publications.366 Stress was placed 
on building relationships and funding local bodies rather than imposing answers – steps that 
independent reviews recommend to development agencies globally, but that are less commonly put 
into operation.367 
Despite many positive steps, explained at greater length with reference to TAF and Unicef in Chapter 
Nine, Group Three agencies still found themselves constrained by practical operating challenges that 
were intrinsic to the operations of most donors. A Thailand-based UN official said: “…progress can be 
made, there are ways in, but the blockages are as much from within the donors as with the government 
…” 368 
USAID was limited by procurement and contracting rules that reserved key roles for US-based 
organizations and kept assistance away from recipient governments. Funding stipulations gave high 
levels of everyday managerial authority to USAID staff, rather than allowing partners the scope to devise 
and amend appropriate approaches over time.369 Other agencies found that their need for accountable, 
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documented project management made it hard to find local partners in the Far South, where local 
organizations are rarely formally structured.370 
A lack of evaluation also held back donors. It is one example of how aid practice tends to reinforce 
conventional aid approaches and limit the scope for alternatives. Aid agencies working on conflict in the 
Far South have conducted little assessment beyond routine monitoring of expenditure and activities.
371
 
A weak evidence base on peacebuilding-related work adds further practical reasons why donors were 
likely to steer clear, encouraging a focus on easily monitored work like construction projects associated 
with Group One donors. With fairly small sums being spent, and little external scrutiny given a conflict 
that is far from the global spotlight, agencies have not allocated funds for evaluation. A senior 
representative of a US Government-funded NGO that works in the Far South and elsewhere in Thailand 
commented: 
No one pays for it! The biggest problem is that when you are given some tiny budget, and 
proper monitoring and evaluation can cost upwards of twenty thousand dollars, it really 
becomes a question of whether it is worth it.372 
Demonstrating peacebuilding impact is not easy.373 Evaluation can in itself become a difficult political 
act that affects conflict dynamics and is consequently simpler to avoid (Roche 2001, Cracknell 2001); in 
Thailand, publicly available evaluations would draw attention and could antagonize some government 
agencies: if any evaluations had been conducted by the time that this research was carried out, 
information was not placed in the public domain. The result was a lower profile for all work in the Far 
South, with less material on which to make funding decisions – further reducing donor interest in the 
area. 
Along with evaluations, donors often use generic guidance in devising national approaches. Practical 
efforts to promote the use of aid for peacebuilding globally have focused heavily on guidance to 
promote better working methods, including ‘toolkits’ on conflict sensitivity, conflict mapping, and other 
technical approaches (Barbero et al. 2003). Interestingly, donors that were working in the Far South 
appeared rarely to have adopted such technical approaches even where addressing the conflict. The 
Asia Foundation and FES did conduct some strategic conflict mapping processes, but by 2008 neither 
they nor any others had overtly followed conflict sensitive guidelines, undergone training, or conducted 
specific assessment exercises.374 
One related technical approach is ‘mainstreaming’ – integrating specific objectives into more 
conventional, or mainstream, donor programming. New initiatives and specialized units that aid 
agencies establish in response to particular policy agendas often encounter institutional and attitudinal 
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barriers that block implementation or limit it to isolated interventions (ADB 1996, Moser & Moser 
2005).375 Donor mainstreaming is especially relevant given evidence that aid’s greatest long-term impact 
in Thailand has resulted from slow changes achieved across many programmes. Furthermore, Chapter 
Five explained how changes in national policy rather than isolated and localized initiatives are likely to 
be an essential component of any successful and sustainable peace process in the Far South.  Little 
mainstreaming of peacebuilding into donor programmes in Thailand appears to have happened in 
practice, however. Even Group Three donors rarely addressed related concerns across their overall 
programme for Thailand and provide small amounts – typically 10-20% of their funding – to the Far 
South.376 
6.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of foreign aid as it relates to the Far South of Thailand. It set out 
the general trends that became apparent through the research process, described the patterns of aid 
provision that emerged, and explained why aid agencies acted as they have done. 
The chapter has explained how many Group One donors have not addressed peripheral conflict in the 
Far South of Thailand. A repeated inability of foreign aid programmes and projects across Thailand to 
recognize horizontal and other inequalities is of particular note. Earlier and contemporary flows of funds 
have been channelled mostly through the central Thai state, whose approach to development has been 
associated with assimilation efforts and related incorporation of minorities into a national polity that 
have perpetuated the marginalization of Malay Muslims in the Far South (as outlined in Chapter Five). 
Foreign aid has in cases funded national development initiatives that are often perceived negatively in 
the Far South. Examples referred to in this chapter include programmes in the education sector that 
made no effort to recognize the specific context of the Far South despite the sector’s salience to 
identity-based tensions in the area.377 It is rarely possible to map the direct impact of donor support for 
such programmes down to the local level as they are brokered through national state instititutions. 
Generally, however, antagonistic identity construction in the Far South is linked with economic, political 
and cultural status inequalities that have persisted through decades of economic growth, much of it 
supported by donor funding and policy prescriptions that have not addressed the area’s specific 
problems nor the role of the central state in perpetuating them. The findings in this chapter support 
other research which notes the common failure of foreign aid to recognize and account for horizontal 
inequalities, even in conflict-affected areas (Stewart et al. 2008). 
A combination of various factors introduced in Chapter Three and discussed in this chapter with 
reference to the Far South of Thailand means that foreign aid has tended to steer clear of a complex 
problem like peripheral conflict: donor interest in maintaining diplomatic relations; a state-centric view 
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of security; development models based around improving national-level socioeconomic statistics that 
inadequately recognize minority rights and horizontal inequalities; the inability of donors to challenge 
the sovereign authority of the recipient; and practical weaknesses when negotiating the interface with 
the state or implementing projects. 
Yet foreign aid is varied and some donors have attempted to address horizontal and other inequalities in 
the Far South of Thailand, most commonly by aiming to promote shifts in government policy and 
occasionally by promoting community-level development. Donors are not always less responsive than 
central states to issues of horizontal inequality. Indeed, in this example of a peripheral conflict that is 
marginal to mainstream government policymaking, the opposite is at times the case and it is the state 
that restricts donor efforts to address horizontal inequalities.378 Where aid to Thailand has aimed to 
change how the state works in ways relevant to the conflict in the Far South – for example, through 
devolving authority or promoting local accountability – it has on many occasions failed to make an 
impact, chiefly as a result of domestic government reluctance to accept such perceived infringements of 
sovereignty. 
Studies suggest that foreign aid projects in Thailand have been more likely to achieve their stated aims 
when supporting rather than trying to change domestic policies.379 Of particular relevance to conflict in 
the Far South, donors have rarely been allowed to approach issues that are seen as relating to national 
identity or sovereignty, such as language policy in education. Many initiatives stalled at the interface 
with the state, donors not having the level of commitment or practical aptitude to negotiate a successful 
path. Foreign involvement in peace promotion in the Far South has been discouraged by the Thai 
Government. There has been little in the way of brokered negotiations, peace monitoring, or other 
related peacebuilding measures including foreign aid designed to address conflict.380 
Group Three exceptions exist where donors successfully integrated peacebuilding objectives for the Far 
South into their national strategies and implemented programmes on the ground. As this chapter has 
shown and Chapter Nine illustrates in greater detail, such donors were motivated by commitment to 
objectives that diverge from the narrower socioeconomic foundation of most Group One donors 
(notably the ADB and Japan but others too), with more politically astute agendas and priority given to 
various issues including justice, human rights, equality, democracy, and also security. They possessed 
the commitment and wherewithal required to negotiate the interface with the state. Finally, they placed 
emphasis on flexible, knowledge-based practice and engagement with different local bodies at a range 
of levels.  However, even then, Group Three donors typically only addressed problems in the Far South 
through a small proportion of their funding for Thailand. 
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Chapter Seven Conflict Blindness: The Asian Development Bank and  
   Planning the Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand Growth Triangle 
 
This chapter explores the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) support for the design of the Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), a project that includes the Far South of Thailand within its 
geographical reach. It reviews the genesis and design of IMT-GT in the 1990s, focusing on the role of the 
ADB. It asks whether and how international involvement in the project took into account the dynamics 
of the conflict in the Far South including associated horizontal inequalities. It then considers the reasons 
for the ADB’s approach and actions in the project. The chapter addresses the implications of the ADB’s 
engagement with specific sections of the central government rather than with people or institutions 
more representative of the population in the Far South itself. The chapter describes how, as a 
mainstream aid intervention that pays little if any attention to peripheral conflict, IMT-GT is an example 
of the first and largest of the three groups of foreign aid projects explained in the previous chapter. The 
chapter finds that even though the Far South lies within the IMT-GT project area, issues surrounding 
conflict and horizontal inequalities were almost entirely avoided in project design and implementation. 
The chapter also describes the project’s work in Aceh, a separate site of peripheral conflict, before 
moving forward ten years to detect similar ongoing patterns within a revival of the same scheme in both 
places. 
Given the perennial difficulties of evaluating the impact of foreign aid projects on conflicts,381 especially 
for initiatives that support several intermediary agencies across a range of activities, this chapter does 
not aim to assess the direct effect of the ADB’s support to IMT-GT on horizontal inequalities. It looks 
instead at the documentation and disputes surrounding the ADB’s role in the planning of IMT-GT in 
order to establish how the ADB considered factors relevant to peripheral conflict. Assessing impact 
would in any case be a forlorn effort, since IMT-GT did not come fully to fruition. With the onset of 
economic crisis across the region in 1997, the plans that ADB assistance helped to devise were mostly 
not realized.382 The chapter considers the lack of attention paid by foreign aid-funded projects to 
horizontal inequalities in the Far South even in fields of intervention that have fuelled perceptions of 
inequality in the area. The significance of perceptions of inequality in the Far South of Thailand has 
already been noted in Chapter Five and related to the wider findings of Stewart et al. (2008). 
As already explained in Chapters Two and Three with reference to work on horizontal inequalities by 
Stewart et al. (2008), donors’ support for national economic growth rarely raises questions over how 
proposed reforms and investments are filtered through state institutions and how they may affect 
relationships among different horizontal groups within a nation. In the case of IMT-GT, as this chapter 
explains, the project’s cross-border element was based on broad expectations that increased 
international trade is beneficial, with little understanding of how economic changes may affect 
horizontal inequalities and associated peripheral conflict within the Far South of Thailand.  
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Chapter Two showed how perceptions of inequality and injustice are critical aspects of peripheral 
conflict (Brown & Langer 2010). This chapter describes how the planning processes of the Thai 
Government and the ADB alike were geared around larger-scale economic interests. IMT-GT became 
aligned with a development vision responding to central government directives and business sector 
lobbying. The chapter shows how planners gave little consideration as to how benefits would be shared 
between different ethnic groups or indeed how they would affect the majority of people in the Far 
South. ADB assistance was provided to national planning authorities that devised initiatives reflecting 
the dominant political economic trends in Thailand and their implications for horizontal inequalities. 
With an emphasis on increasing trade and maximizing economic comparative advantages across 
national borders, internal ethnic divisions and a history of violent conflict effectively passed ADB project 
planners by. 
The ADB's involvement in the planning of IMT-GT is selected here as a representative case of Group One 
foreign aid for several reasons. First, it is a rare example of an internationally funded initiative that 
focuses on the Far South of Thailand. Most Group One aid projects may affect the Far South indirectly 
through interventions at the national level but do not specifically concentrate on the area. Second, as 
this chapter shows and as is typical of much external assistance to Thailand historically, it has promoted 
top-down planning to stimulate economic growth while giving little attention to how benefits might 
accrue to different groups or lead to skewed outcomes in a specific local context. 
Third, IMT-GT’s cross-border reach and long time frame – starting in the early 1990s, being largely 
suspended in the late 1990s, and then resuscitated in 2006 – offers useful additional perspectives. It 
enables comparison of its role in the Far South of Thailand with its role in Aceh, another site of 
peripheral conflict. The long project time frame means that ADB’s role can be related to controversial 
economic development plans for the south of Thailand. These include investments linked to a new gas 
pipeline between Thailand and Malaysia, along with still more ambitious plans to develop a ‘Southern 
Industrial Seaboard’. 
Finally, considerable information on IMT-GT was available: IMT-GT has been extensively documented by 
ADB staff, independent academics, and consultants.383 Communication with former ADB consultants and 
staff was also possible, giving access to undocumented versions of events as well as official histories. 
Focusing on historical aspects of IMT-GT enabled greater openness among informants. Information on 
how Group One agencies operate with respect to horizontal inequalities is hard to gather and no purely 
contemporary project would have offered such information. Group One donor officials and government 
counterparts were reluctant to discuss negative implications of ongoing projects during interviews 
carried out for this research, while existing published and grey literature provides little information. 
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7.1 An overview of Asian Development Bank support for the planning of IMT-GT 
The official account of IMT-GT starts in 1993 with a meeting between the former Prime Minister of 
Thailand, Chuan Leekpai, and his Malaysian counterpart, Mohammad Mahathir. With agreement also 
gained from President Suharto of Indonesia, the project was begun with the aim of increasing economic 
development in neighbouring regions of the three countries. The regions included the northwest 
Malaysian sultanates of Kedah, Penang, Perlis and Perak, the Indonesian provinces of North Sumatra 
and Aceh, and the five southernmost Thai provinces: Satun, Songkhla, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. This 
area covered some 200,000 square kilometres and included 20 million people (ADB 1995, Thant 1996). 
According to the key ADB official involved, all three governments then wrote a joint memo asking for 
assistance in formulating a masterplan for implementation.384 
IMT-GT was established during a period of record economic growth for Southeast Asia. Thailand, 
Indonesia and Malaysia appeared to be following in the footsteps of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong 
and Singapore. The ADB was asked to undertake an extensive set of appraisal studies, using technical 
assistance grants to fund international consultants and separate national consultant teams in each of 
the three countries. The ADB’s most significant task in the IMT-GT was the provision of technical 
assistance for the design phase. Subsequent implementation was designed chiefly to be a government 
undertaking without donor support (Thant 1996). 
The large numbers of consultants employed by the ADB to design the project raised some minor 
concern among government officials at the time, even though they were funded through the ADB grant 
funds rather than loans to governments.385 International and domestic appraisals of all three regions 
covered what are described in project documentation as five core sectors: trade, investment and labour 
mobility; industry and energy; agriculture and fisheries; tourism; and transport and communications.386 
This led to the formation of working groups for each sector, and three major conferences. In all, the ADB 
states that it identified nearly 100 projects, programmes and policies required to develop the growth 
triangle over ten years (ADB 2008b). High-level government leadership supported the project from the 
start, with discussions of IMT-GT taking place at the margins of annual ASEAN ministerial meetings as 
well as between civil servants.387 
The Thai corner of the growth triangle includes the three conflict-affected provinces of Yala, Pattani and 
Narathiwat. The other two provinces of the Far South also included in the scheme are the small, 
peaceful west coast province of Satun, and the economically more dominant Thai Buddhist majority 
province of Songkhla (ADB 1995). Songkhla includes the trading town of Hat Yai, the region's commercial 
capital, which is host to the bulk of the area’s industry. The early 1990s was a period of calm in terms of 
tension and violence between government forces and Malay Muslim insurgents, the unrest of the late 
1970s having died down. 
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The notion of a cross-border growth zone had already been applied with some success elsewhere in 
Southeast and East Asia, for example in the Pearl River delta of southern China and Hong Kong (Thant 
1996). The overall goal of the IMT-GT was to accelerate private-sector-led economic growth and 
facilitate the economic development of its regions by exploiting underlying economic complementarities 
and comparative advantages. Economic growth, largely fuelled by continued inward investment from 
outside the region, was expected as a result of facilitating trade across borders, maximizing factor cost 
differentials to maintain productivity despite rising wage levels (ADB 2008b). 
The ADB has supported cross-border growth regions since the early 1990s, following commitments in its 
charter to promote regional economic cooperation. It has also backed economic linkages within country 
blocs, including the six countries of the Greater Mekong Subregion (ADB 1993).388 Such projects enable 
the ADB to promote its international role as: “...an ’honest broker’, a catalyst for dialogue and 
cofinancing, provider of advisory and secretariat services, and major financier of projects” (Bryant for 
ADB, undated). 
7.2 Disputing the project’s initial direction 
At the international level, IMT-GT was presented as a concrete opportunity to promote political and 
economic linkages (ADB 1995). The three governments involved in IMT-GT may have shared common 
interests in economic growth although each inevitably had specific goals related to domestic political 
and economic concerns. National governments played a key role in project formulation including the 
selection of project sites (Srisompob et al. 2000). Of particular relevance to IMT-GT in two of its three 
sub-national zones is continued lack of trust of government on the part of a local population: in the Far 
South of Thailand, and in Aceh, Indonesia. Although overt violence had declined to a low level in the Far 
South of Thailand at the time of project design, underlying conditions that led to unrest had not been 
fully addressed – as the upsurge in violence roughly a decade later eventually revealed. In Aceh, 
meanwhile, high levels of tension were ongoing as IMT-GT was established (Smith 2002). 
For Thailand, reasons for involvement in IMT-GT were less clear than for Malaysia and Indonesia, with 
more obvious benefits to be had from linking west coast Malaysian capital and industrial production to 
Indonesian natural resources and labour.389 The project was taken seriously by several Thai government 
departments, however, as seen by a commitment of US$120 million to projects promoted under the 
IMT-GT banner by 1996, following initial rounds of ADB-supported appraisal work (Thant 1996). 
A closer reading of events reveals some of the varied motivations for involvement at the Thai corner of 
the triangle. As has often been the case in the Thai political system, a range of powerful voices held 
different and at times contradictory concerns and interests (Pasuk & Baker 1997). Thailand's 
engagement commenced under the first government led by Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai of the 
Democrat Party, with a strong support base in the south of Thailand. Chuan’s own home town is only 
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just outside the IMT-GT area. As with all Thai political parties, the Democrats in the south rely on 
networks of local members of parliament and influential business associates (Askew 2008), whose 
influence may well have shaped IMT-GT. Meanwhile, the government's central planning unit, The 
National Economic and Social Development Board, appears to have been primarily interested in future 
national industrialization strategies, most notably the long-term promotion of a new industrial zone, 
known as the Southern Industrial Seaboard and associated with exploiting the availability of offshore 
natural gas from the Gulf of Thailand (NESDB undated, NRCT & PSU 1994, King 2005). 
Such interests stand in contrast with earlier public statements from the Thai Government on IMT-GT 
that had stressed a different concern – for welfare and stability in the three provinces of the Far South – 
as a motivation for involvement (Srisompob et al. 2000:42). A concern for welfare and stability is 
consistent with a series of developmental overtures towards peace pursued in the Far South through 
the 1980s. Early on in the formulation of IMT-GT, concerns within the Thai Government over conflict in 
the Far South appear to have resurfaced. Security policy statements from SBPAC in 1997 suggested that 
the emergence of IMT-GT could help solve security problems in the area if 'properly administered' 
(ibid.:44). On one occasion, Thai officials unsuccessfully asked Malaysian officials to include Kelantan, 
the Malaysian state across the border from Narathiwat, in the project's scope. This would have widened 
the project beyond the main transport link between the west coast of Malaysia (including Penang) and 
the industrial area around Songkhla, a narrow corridor that bypasses the conflict area of the Far South, 
potentially extending the project’s reach and impact more comprehensively into the rural Malay 
Muslim-dominated periphery. The request went unheeded.390  
Most documents on IMT-GT, however, show little concern for security. Any overt connections with 
peacebuilding were actively avoided. Chueng Chatariakul, a government planner with experience of 
designing government peace and development programmes for the Far South throughout the 1990s, 
commented that as an international project IMT-GT was steered away from sensitive conflict related 
issues, despite statements made by SBPAC.391 For its part, the ADB was encouraged to keep clear of any 
issues that counterparts in the Thai Government (chiefly the National Economic and Social Development 
Board) felt were politically sensitive.392 
Beyond government agencies, various observers hoped that IMT-GT could be used to promote broader, 
more equitable development needed to underpin peace. Preeda Prapertchob from Chulalongkorn 
University in Bangkok proposed a more human-focused approach to IMT-GT that would consider 
economic growth from the perspective of rural Malays. He comments on the generally mixed experience 
of Muslim majority villages across the south of Thailand during periods of economic transition, with 
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greater social problems and persistent economic hardship than in most Thai Buddhist majority 
communities (Preeda 1995). Muslim commentators from the Far South shared similar concerns, 
worrying that IMT-GT would exacerbate inequalities and damage community mechanisms (Hanateh et 
al. 1996).393 Preeda proposed placing stability and security as a primary objective of IMT-GT, without 
which investment would not spread out from a narrow corridor between Songkhla and Penang into 
conflict-affected areas. Since that narrow corridor was already more developed than the surrounding 
areas, and also disproportionately Thai (or Chinese-Thai) Buddhist rather than Malay Muslim, the 
concern was that increased horizontal inequalities would result.394 
Emphasis, Preeda states, should have been placed elsewhere: on community level approaches rather 
than large initiatives; human development and skills training rather than human resource mobilization 
and labour mobility; small scale investment rather than large foreign direct investment; and the 
promotion of cultural conservation for local interest rather than mass tourism (ibid.). These proposals 
may not have addressed deeper-seated problems over access to political power in the Far South, but 
they did present a viable means of addressing problems over government-community relations and the 
perceived marginalization of Malay Muslims.  
7.3 The role of the ADB  
As I explain below, the constraints and incentives under which the ADB’s contribution to IMT-GT has 
operated are circumscribed by the Thai state institutions receiving the ADB’s technical assistance, as 
well the ADB’s own respect for sovereignty and its orientation around creating an enabling environment 
for international capital flows. In Thailand, published material shows little if any consideration by the 
ADB of any issues related to conflict or ethnic tensions, even where they directly affect how the state 
operates (Thant & Tang 1995, ADB 1993, 1995, 1995b, 1995c). 
For its part, the ADB tends assiduously to avoid any links between its programmes and political issues, 
especially violent conflict. As an international publically owned bank, the ADB’s mandate is for non-
political, economic development.395 Asian board members including Japan, India and China hold a high 
proportion of shares and exert corresponding influence in pursuing a stronger non-interventionist policy 
than other multilateral agencies with a greater Western presence. This means that the ADB has a 
mandate for criticizing or attempting to reform a nation state’s economic policies, but on all other issues 
is effectively obliged to refrain from criticizing or acting against recipient governments.396 
At the same time as keeping out of politics, the ADB claims publicly at times that cross-border regional 
projects and increased international trade bring peace, stating for example in a review of Greater 
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Mekong Subregion projects: “The biggest dividends are the prevalence of peace, the increased trust and 
confidence among the countries, a sense of common purpose, and the inroads being made to reduce 
poverty.” 397 
The supposed peace dividend of increased trade through economic liberalization and infrastructure 
investment is taken here and in other the ADB reports as established fact. Extensive research has 
documented more widely how changing trade patterns in fact have a range of impacts on conflict 
depending both on wider circumstances and specific context (Saez 2008). The ADB’s statements on 
peace hide the potential risks inherent in such projects.398 Policy-level expectations that private sector 
investment stimulated by IMT-GT would inevitably lead to peace (as encapsulated in the above 
quotation) misread the political economy of the Far South of Thailand, as the subsequent sections of 
this chapter discuss. 
From the ADB's perspective, its technical assistance to IMT-GT supported measures for enabling private-
sector-driven growth (ADB 1995). However, a closer look at both the political economy of the Far South 
of Thailand and at the practice of the ADB's engagement demonstrates that the likely impact would 
have been to further strengthen those business interests closest to government, with a strong ethnic 
bias. Srisompob et al. comment that for the Far South of Thailand: “...the engine of growth involves 
complex webs of interplay between socioeconomic and political realities at the international, regional 
and local levels” (2000:41). Close and exclusive relationships between privileged business actors and the 
state are the norm in many developing countries and they certainly dominate in rural areas of Thailand 
including the Far South (Arghiros 2001, McCargo 2008).399  Srisompob et al. found that: “...whereas the 
emergence of growth triangles in the region reflects a recognition of the limits of state-led liberalization 
activities, the market-driven dynamic does not operate outside the constraints of state sovereignty and 
control” (Srisompob et al. 2000:41). 
The research of Sribompob et al. confirmed outstanding concerns that IMT-GT would fail to provide the 
specific inputs that local Malay Muslim business leaders felt that they needed to compete with other 
better-funded and better-connected firms. Interviews with business leaders from the Far South revealed 
a strong perception that IMT-GT’s approach fed the existing dynamic in which Malay Muslims 
repeatedly lost out when new opportunities were promoted by government (and in this case 
international) concerns from outside the Far South. These sentiments were summarized by one 
businessman who stated: “The government is focused only on narrow issues ... in which the local Malay-
Muslim people did not directly take part” (ibid.:45). According to Srisompob et al., local business leaders 
felt that while development initiatives could benefit the local Malay Muslim population and improve 
relations between Malay Muslims and Thai Buddhists by promoting opportunities for all ethnic groups 
and economic classes, government-sponsored schemes were unlikely to do so. 
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Furthermore, there is no guarantee that addressing the concerns of Malay Muslim business leaders 
would in itself ensure that IMT-GT or other initiatives help mitigate tensions leading to conflict in the Far 
South. Chapter Five reviewed literature describing splits within Malay Muslim elite groups, figures that 
form close political, business or vocational relationships with Thai state institutions often being locally 
discredited as a result of their actions. In this light it is fair to assume that unless IMT-GT were to engage 
or offer benefits to a wide number of Malay Muslims, rather than those best positioned to access 
government support or engage in project planning, the overall results may be little better in terms of 
addressing conflict than if it bypassed Malay Muslims entirely. 
The following paragraphs investigate the ADB's practical involvement in IMT-GT, including how its inputs 
were formulated and what it recommended. Research reveals little engagement by ADB staff with the 
political economy of the regions concerned, and a weak understanding of the role of the state or of the 
concerns expressed by local businessmen. It shows very low recognition of tensions between local 
people and the state. IMT-GT was a multi-country project and the ADB's input was directed from Manila 
in the Philippines rather than from respective country offices.400 International consultants were 
contracted to provide the assessments, divided by sectors rather than by country. This left little in the 
way of domestic knowledge or attention to issues that cut across all sectors, including political, cultural 
and social analysis, as well as environmental considerations. As a technical assistance package rather 
than a loan, the ADB's involvement was also subject to fewer 'safeguard' checks than would otherwise 
have been the case.401 
Aid agencies regularly try to hire consultants with context-specific experience, but often fail given 
English language requirements, tight deadlines, and a preference for sectoral knowledge.402 For a multi-
country project covering specific areas within three different countries, local knowledge is still less likely 
to emerge. One consultant contracted for the initial studies with little contextual background found 
himself responding to a last-minute call: “I was only hired a few days before, heard about it the end of 
one week and was on a plane to Manila [ADB headquarters] over the weekend. I knew nothing about 
it”.403  
The scope of these initial studies was defined by the dominant discourse employed by the ADB and IMT-
GT member governments, chiefly promoting government actions to facilitate larger, capital-intensive 
development initiatives. Operating to specific terms of reference that did not emphasize conflict, 
ethnicity or horizontal inequalities, and selected for technical fields of engagement, international and 
domestic specialists appear to have engaged in limited local consultation and relied largely on expert 
knowledge or statistical information.404 In a pattern also observed elsewhere, the advisory process 
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established by the ADB led to reports that follow a predictable and narrow format.405 The key 
recommendations emerging from the reports were for a range of infrastructural programmes, 
regulatory measures, and transport investment to increase cross-border trade (ADB 1995). 
For each of the three countries involved in IMT-GT, domestic teams of consultants were also hired. In 
Thailand, research centres at Chulalongkorn and Thammasat Universities in Bangkok, and the Hat Yai 
campus of Prince of Songkhla University, were involved (Thant & Tang 1996). Country-specific studies 
that followed the international studies do provide more specific local content. But with the experts 
involved again being sectoral specialists, and given little focus on wider readings of social context or 
political economy, a similar pattern of recommendations emerged.406 
Counter-statements expressing a different interpretation of how development interventions might 
affect economic growth and development in different sectors were presented in some reports, although 
they appear as the individual concerns of specific consultants rather than a proposed trajectory. The 
IMT-GT international agriculture and fisheries sector review, for example, suggests that subsidies or 
other limits to a free market may be in the interests of both smaller farmers and overall development 
performance. However, with little scope to link such a statement to the broader proposed measures 
that are framed in the context of facilitation of free trade, the observation did not influence the overall 
proposed planning framework (ADB 1995b). 
A failure to engage in a reality that is more complex than suggested by the economic model being 
promoted is evident in the tourism sector. Knowledge of the geographical area appears weak. For 
example, the IMT-GT international consultancy report states that the southernmost area of Thailand has 
no valuable tourism sites (ADB 1995c:56). This is accurate only so far as there are no existing centres for 
long-haul visitors from developed countries. However, Pattani and Narathiwat provinces do contain 
significant Muslim and Buddhist religious centres that are important pilgrimage stops for coach tours 
within Thailand, as well as from Malaysia and Singapore (Horstmann 2002). The provinces are also 
endowed with national parks and abundant beaches, as even a vague understanding of the area or a 
superficial field trip would have revealed.  
Analysis of the political economy of tourism in the Far South of Thailand would also have shown a close 
web of connections between hoteliers, property speculators and the state. In a pattern seen across 
Thailand and more widely, tourism development has involved highly contentious links between 
powerful local businessmen and high-level politicians or civil servants (Cohen 2008; Hitchcock, King & 
Parnwell 2008:33-34). Reports by both international and domestic consultancy teams hardly touch on 
any of these issues. Although the domestic consultancy report provides more local detail than the 
internationally written overview, the issues mentioned here are not addressed (Chula Unisearch 1997). 
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Sensitive issues surrounding tourism are avoided through employing technical language. The domestic 
consultancy report finds that: “It is the basic difference in attitudes between the Thai and Malaysian 
cultures regarding permissible types of entertainment that enables this activity to thrive along the Thai 
side of the border” (ibid.:55-56). This explanation, in addition to shoe-horning a notion of culture into an 
economic model of factor price differentials, is presumably a euphemism for prostitution, the dominant 
tourist business of Hat Yai and a range of other smaller towns in the Far South catering mostly for 
Malaysian male visitors. The likely social impact of promoting increased cross-border movement, in this 
case an expanded sex industry, is not addressed by the ADB. Apart from the associated likelihood of 
labour and gender exploitation, the sex industry is also a propaganda tool for insurgents, demonstrating 
the moral corruption of the Thai state. ‘Entertainment’ areas in the Far South have been targeted with 
remote-controlled bombs on several occasions since the upsurge in violence from early 2004 (Askew 
2006). 
In defence of the ADB's role in IMT-GT, it could be argued that the huge economic and human 
development improvements in Thailand since the 1960s have largely been a result of top-down 
strategies promoting state support for private sector investment. The point here is not to contest this 
broader argument, but to relate it to continued conflict in the Far South. The social and economic issues 
discussed above bear direct relation to the scope for peace and justice in the area, given widespread 
and deep-seated local perceptions that the fruits of development are unevenly distributed by an often 
oppressive and discriminatory state, as described in Chapter Five. This context is hardly recognized in 
ADB project documentation. Even if it had been, there is little space in their approach to accommodate 
it. 
This same overall discourse is repeated throughout the IMT-GT reports and confirmed through 
interviews with those involved. Myo Thant, the ADB manager responsible for developing IMT-GT in the 
1990s (and by 2007 their principal economist for regional cooperation), commented that conflict and 
related concerns over horizontal inequalities were simply not considered at the time.407 Wichien 
Chatupote, associate professor at Prince of Songkhla University in Hat Yai and contributor to the 
domestic reports in the 1990s, feels that IMT "Just flew over" local political, security, and cultural 
issues.408 
These issues are not just specific to the Thailand corner of IMT-GT. In one report, an international 
consultant diagnoses weak local government involvement in top-down schemes as a drawback. It 
mentions as a final comment that social equity is a matter of concern. However, this statement is then 
coloured by misjudgement: “The fact that all three subregions *in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia] are 
relatively homogenous, ethnically and culturally, should help to reduce the potential for social 
disharmony.” (Naseem 1996:52) 
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It is unclear whether the author was oblivious of or simply chose to gloss over simmering tension and 
social exclusion in the Far South of Thailand along ethnic lines, as well as ongoing violent separatist 
conflict in Aceh. At the time that IMT-GT was conceived, recent violent conflict had been considerably 
more acute in Aceh than in Thailand: from 1989 until the late 1990s Aceh was under effective martial 
law, and witnessed thousands of deaths through military and insurgent action. Aceh gained a global 
reputation as the site of human rights abuses committed by the Indonesian security forces and suffered 
from a long-lasting breakdown in relations between the local population and the Indonesian 
Government.409 Yet from the perspective of IMT-GT, one international consultant felt that conflict was 
“Background noise” both there and in the Far South of Thailand. On visiting the Acehnese provincial 
capital of Banda Aceh for a couple of days, he found that: "...there didn’t seem much of a problem ... we 
walked around the market and it seemed peaceful." 
410
  
Aceh may have seemed quiet during a short visit, largely because it was under martial law at the time 
(DOM – Daerah Operasi Militer or Military Operations Area) (Smith 2002). Quite apart from any broader 
concern for suffering induced by conflict, the significant economic implications of conflict for the 
promotion of inward investment flows were practically ignored. The more complex relationships 
between the roots of conflict and Aceh’s economic growth, including the industrial complex based 
around a large natural gas field situated near the heartland of the insurgent movement, were not even 
touched upon.411 
How was such a depoliticized economic discourse perpetuated? The overriding impression is that it was 
simply not in the interests of either the ADB or of most of those in the government agencies involved in 
the project to raise issues of political conflict. Domestic consultants may have provided some more 
detail in their reports than their international peers, but they were employed to address a similarly 
narrow set of objectives. By virtue of their role and position in main academic institutions, Thai 
consultant teams presented a national rather than an international voice, but one that did not represent 
the Malay Muslim population of the Far South and tallied instead with the general IMT-GT planning 
process. There was very little effort either to gain the views of local people, or to listen to the concerns 
raised by academics outside technical fields.412 
Interestingly, personal communication and interviews with various people involved in the ADB's 
contribution to IMT-GT revealed considerable personal knowledge of conflict and horizontal inequalities 
in both Aceh and the Far South of Thailand. This understanding appears to have been lost in the 
technical approaches used in formal settings, suggesting that professional approaches encourage the 
technical rendering of known reality as a product that supports the underlying interests or received 
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discourse of those concerned. As has been addressed in many critical accounts of development practice, 
the technical tools, jargon, project planning mechanisms and other implements of the development 
practitioner promote professional engagement along narrow, consensual lines and an avoidance of 
politically contentious issues (Murray Li 2007, Ferguson 1990:270). 
7.4 IMT-GT’s decline and reincarnation 
All three countries involved in IMT-GT suffered massive economic shocks during the Asian financial crisis 
that hit in 1997. Virtually all new investment was suspended. Most IMT-GT plans were shelved except 
for small low-cost initiatives like academic exchanges between universities.413 After a short hiatus, wider 
development planning in the Far South of Thailand then continued. The most notable project to go 
ahead since then in the Far South of Thailand was the Thailand-Malaysia gas pipeline, a long-term goal 
of successive governments as well as related private sector and state-owned industrial interests. The 
pipeline programme included plans for major industrialization along Thailand’s southern shoreline, in an 
area of predominantly Malay Muslim farming and fishing communities (King 2005:102). 
Recent industrial development in the Far South of Thailand has been largely confined to the corridor 
that the pipeline follows, from Songkhla to Sadao on the main route towards Penang. Indeed, fifteen of 
the twenty-one major IMT-GT projects proposed by the ADB for southern Thailand were originally 
concentrated in this narrow corridor (King 2005:100). The gas pipeline hits the shore in Chana district of 
Songkhla province. Once a quiet rural backwater, it now looks desolate, the remaining fishing villages 
nestling between largely polluted scrub and salt marsh that surrounds new industrial developments: fish 
processing plants, a power plant and a gas separation facility.414 According to King’s study and a wealth 
of reports from activists and academics415, the new industrial developments were carried out with little 
if any consultation or participation of local people, who were subjected to a barrage of government 
propaganda over the supposed positive impact of development in the area and yet subsequently felt 
that they had few benefits to show for it (King 2005). One group complained that developers breached 
Islamic principles by laying the pipeline through what was labelled holy soil near Ban Pa Ngam mosque, 
as well as commenting on sewage emissions and foul smells from the gas separation plant. They vowed 
to protect their rights, lifestyle and religion from attack by government officials, the national Electricity 
Generating Authority (EGAT) and the national petroleum company (PTT) (King 2005:102, Nation 
2007).416 
As the pipeline project inched forward over the course of a decade, local groups and national NGOs 
organized popular protest. According to a public inquiry and extensive coverage by local activists, 
developers ignored planning regulations before intimidating, deceiving, and attacking protesters 
(Lohmann 2008). The pipeline, and associated industrialization in the area where it hits the shore, 
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became a symbol of the struggle between local citizens and nationally defined development priorities as 
outlined in IMT-GT. Surveys carried out as part of the environmental assessment for the gas separation 
plant accompanying the pipeline show that 80% of villagers in Chana thought that their quality of life 
would suffer as a result of the development (Allison 2000). At one point, local protesters in villages took 
the rare step of appealing, ultimately in vain, to the Malaysian prime minister, a fellow Malay Muslim, 
for assistance (King 2005:103). In a further unusual turn, protesters also appealed to the Thai military to 
stop the pipeline and associated industrial development (Nation 2007b).  
Non-participatory, top-down development initiatives are not unique to the Far South and the ADB has 
been the target of similar protest elsewhere in Thailand.417 The ADB’s role in the gas pipeline has been 
indirect, with the government and state-owned PTT taking the brunt of the criticism. Protesters typically 
link general criticism of abusive state practices with the ethnically charged context of the Far South.418 A 
perception of the external environment, and especially the Thai state, as a threat is commonplace in the 
Far South. One response to increasing and what is often perceived as overwhelmingly negative 
encroachment by the state is to retreat into a rural, closed existence, in keeping with James Scott’s 
observations on highland minorities in the far north of Thailand and neighbouring areas (2009). Inward-
looking reactions to perceived external threats are seen in a common reluctance to migrate for paid 
work despite high levels of under-employment in rural areas. These tendencies are most noticeable 
when the external engagement would imply exposure to mainstream Thai Buddhist government or 
private sector institutions.419 Where the state does operate at the village level, it may be seen as 
exploitative and invasive (Cornish 1997, Supara 2004).420 Fear of eviction over disputed land rights, a 
common issue across Thailand and elsewhere, becomes further charged in the ethnically-fraught 
context, leading to assertions of indigenous rights: “It is our land, why must we move?” 421 
Withdrawal from economic development and engagement with the external world is not a universal 
norm in the Far South, however. Complaints are often directed at the lack of development rather than a 
desire to reject any change. A common view is that top-down projects simply never happen, as for 
example with a proposed industrial estate outside Narathiwat Town that was budgeted for but never 
built.422 Other investments fail to have any impact on the rural, conflict-affected zones, leading to 
widespread cynicism: “Maybe there are projects but I do not see any development in the conflict areas. 
From the ground there’s very little.” 423 
The pattern repeatedly demonstrated through the sources referred to above suggests that many local 
residents do not oppose industrial development, but they do feel that the way in which projects like the 
gas pipeline have taken place has further cemented perceived inequalities. Although new investment 
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may indeed generate jobs, its impact has to be read politically through the horizontal social fractures of 
the area. Across the spectrum there is a wide sense of alienation from the state, as explained in Chapter 
Five. Concerned government officials, NGO fieldworkers, businessmen and local residents repeatedly 
express the need to listen more to the views of Malay Muslims and present a different form of 
intervention. One NGO worker, expressing commonly stated views, felt that the government “...does not 
understand the ground reality of the three southern provinces.” 424 Staff from the Narathiwat 
Community Development Department, the local branch of a normally consensual government agency, 
bemoaned the failure of state development efforts to engage more effectively by responding to 
people’s needs.425 
There is no evidence to suggest that the ADB recognized or addressed this situation. Even 
uncontroversial efforts to promote local level consultation were not conducted, according to one 
published assessment (King 2005). A more positive response to the ADB’s role was given by researchers 
at Prince of Songkhla University’s Hat Yai Campus, who were involved in the local study for IMT-GT 
carried out in the early 1990s. They felt that a focus on the region supported growth and built local 
institutional capacity, in the process supporting wider decentralization processes essential to spread 
economic development beyond the zone around Bangkok.
426
 While the potential value of 
decentralization as a way to build locally responsive governance is understood by many in the Far South, 
in this case it assisted a narrow set of government and industrial interests along a corridor that 
effectively bypassed most of the Malay Muslim Far South (King 2005:101-102). 
As I explain below, IMT-GT’s inputs have been filtered through the relationships and contradictions that 
define the political economy of development in the Far South of Thailand, involving a mixture of dirigiste 
planning, clashing departmental interests and political nepotism. The dirigiste side is seen most clearly 
in the long-term plans of the National Economic and Social Development Board for the Southern 
Industrial Seaboard, reflecting the perceived need to find a new area for industrial expansion given 
concerns over shortages of water and power in the main existing industrial areas nearer Bangkok rather 
than any more parochial issues. The gas pipeline and IMT-GT fell within this broader long-term objective 
(NESDB 1998). One option being considered by NESDB was to locate a new industrial expansion area 
across the Far South, with infrastructure and industrial projects stretching from Pattani on the east coast 
to Satun in the west. 
Clashing departmental interests were seen in the continued development perspectives of the NESDB 
and SBPAC, the body responsible for peacebuilding initiatives in the Far South. SBPAC’s interests in 
promoting greater confidence of the local population in government led it to continue questioning the 
value of top-down approaches to industrialization in 2007-8, just as it had done the 1990s.427 One 
scheme that fell within the broader Southern Seaboard initiative was for a 'land bridge' and associated 
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port and industrial development across the Thai-Malay peninsula. The 'bridge' would transport cargo 
overland from one coast to the other, apparently reducing shipping costs between East Asia and Europe. 
In May 2008, a feasibility study was approved by the Thai Cabinet to be carried out by Dubai World, the 
investment company owned by the United Arab Emirates Government.428 The conflict in the Far South 
of Thailand presented an obstacle: it was an unavoidable issue for a company based in a Muslim 
country, given the upsurge in violence from 2004 on. Dubai World chairman Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem 
justified the project to reporters in 2008: 
In the past, our company had experience in developing projects in many conflict-impacted areas. 
We found that local residents are not easily lured to violence if they have jobs and enjoy higher 
incomes ... in our view, building economic stability is a key to creating political stability (Nation 
2008). 
In this repeat of the ADB’s expectation that economic growth brings peace, the more complex issues of 
who benefits, and how projects are perceived locally, are not entered into. 
Development planning under IMT-GT inevitably followed political interests, as seen in the promotion of 
halal food production as an export for global Muslim markets. Re-launched by former Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra, and presented as an initiative to help Muslims in the Far South, it has widely been 
seen instead as a means to channel support to major financial food processing companies whose 
owners built close business relationships with the prime minister (Supara 2004:19).429 
After a long gap, during which time IMT-GT consisted of inter-governmental talking shops with little 
concrete follow-up action,430 the project was resuscitated in January 2006 when leaders of the three 
countries agreed to a new growth triangle initiative. The new expanded project area covered the entire 
south of Thailand, Indonesian Sumatra, and peninsular Malaysia, with a similar set of objectives as 
before. Despite a major upsurge in violence in the Far South of Thailand, conflict and related inequalities 
again received no attention. The ADB was involved once more, in November 2006 agreeing a new 
programme of US$1 million of technical assistance for development planning. This time the ADB 
received financing for its support from the Chinese Government. Once more, project documentation 
and the terms of reference for consultants gave no indication that any specific attention should be given 
to conflict or related issues (ADB 2006). 
The ADB recognized that institutional weaknesses hampered the continuity of the earlier project. In 
response, effort was made to build lasting structures as well as to secure high-level backing.431 But 
despite the emergence of serious violence, the ADB is still apparently 'flying over' the issue of conflict, 
demonstrating no greater ability to understand local political realities than was the case in the 1990s.432 
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At that time, when there was very little overt violence in the Far South of Thailand, failing to factor in 
conflict was more forgivable than it was in 2006. Fifteen years on, with regular and overt violence in the 
area, such oversight is still more notable. Greater global awareness of existing donor tools such as 
conflict sensitivity frameworks or viable alternative ways of providing foreign aid could all have 
influenced the project, yet have had no impact. 
In IMT-GT’s first and second phase, the ADB was never in a position to exert strong influence, being 
constrained by a relationship in which they provided limited technical assistance in response to 
government requests. But they still might have been able to support a range of positions, perhaps 
through careful selection of technical expertise. Alternative voices still acceptable to the Thai 
Government include representatives of SBPAC, who hoped to harness development funds in order to 
build peace in a more considered version of the ‘peace through economic growth’ argument proposed 
by the director of Dubai World.433 NGOs and academics like Preeda Prapertchob have promoted a locally 
rooted version of development that would have involved more devolved decision-making and popular 
participation. In the event, IMT-GT and the ADB's support to the scheme have repeatedly served to 
support top-down economic planning, in doing so weakening the scope for promoting any alternative 
vision (King 2005). 
7.5 How representative is IMT-GT? 
With aid usually provided through the interface between donors and recipient states, it is often hard to 
isolate the impact of a specific project. The IMT-GT project is not led by the ADB, so care should be 
taken before attributing blame for any shortcomings. The key agencies are the governments of the three 
countries involved. 
In this case there is no evidence that the ADB tried to increase the sensitivity of IMT-GT to tensions 
between Malay Muslims and the government in the Far South of Thailand. There is also no evidence to 
suggest that its involvement increased the likelihood of more locally rooted planning that could have 
responded better to the needs of both smaller investors and the Malay Muslim population more widely. 
Indeed, extensive use of international consultants and national consultants based outside the conflict 
area, along with little if any local consultation, served the purposes of central planning authorities 
regarded as alien by many Malay Muslims in the Far South. 
Efforts to reduce domestic horizontal inequalities might have helped redress the subsequent imbalance. 
Development approaches more focused on local people’s definitions of need – from small-scale farmers 
to local businessmen – were encouraged by various Thai commentators already referred to, including 
some working within government agencies, but were not promoted by the ADB nor by their 
counterparts in the NESDB. Such approaches might have been more able to respond to the interests and 
demands of the Malay Muslim population in the Far South. 
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IMT-GT's relationship with conflict in Aceh was similar, suggesting that the context in the Far South of 
Thailand is not an exception. ADB documentation reveals no evidence of efforts to take into account the 
likely impact of the province's long-term instability on potential inward investment, let alone a set of 
broader developmental issues. For example, the perceived preference on the part of the Indonesian 
Government for offering opportunities to rival businesses based in the large city of Medan, in the 
neighbouring province of North Sumatra, was resented by business leaders in Aceh.434 IMT-GT 
exacerbated this perception, with enterprises based in Medan more able to benefit from the scheme 
than poorly capitalized and less networked Acehnese traders. IMT-GT’s originally proposed investments 
in Indonesia clearly prioritized capital-intensive sectors active in North Sumatra, with little attention to 
smaller businesses and logistical needs in more isolated Aceh (ADB 1995). 
The revival of IMT-GT from 2006 repeated the same pattern. It occurred at a time when a peace process 
had gathered steam in Aceh, leading to an agreement on increased autonomy for the province in August 
2005. The newly elected Governor of Aceh, former insurgent leader Irwandi Yusuf, initially hoped that 
this time round IMT-GT might support his efforts to attract investment and provide a needed peace 
dividend. However, after initial meetings appeared once more to offer nothing to Aceh and only benefit 
larger Medan-based concerns better linked into central government, Irwandi informally commented 
that in future he would ignore all IMT-GT related issues, choosing not even to read any communication 
sent to him.435  
Some of the ADB's more recent public documents on Thailand mention a wider set of concerns including 
social issues and inclusive development strategies (ADB 2007). But there is little incentive for the 
government or the ADB itself to promote these issues unless failing to do so presents a risk to larger 
projects.436 The ADB does now pay more attention to identifying local concerns in project design, 
although this appears chiefly to be a marginal exercise to ensure that mainstream loans are not 
threatened. In 2007-8 the ADB provided a US$300,000 grant to help plan new elements of the long-
awaited Southern Seaboard scheme. Among other inputs, it funded a rapid series of short meetings with 
chambers of commerce across the south of Thailand to feed local ideas into the central planning 
mechanism. It was hoped that this would then lead to a longer participatory process carried out by local 
universities for the NESDB, the government's central planning body, thereby improving their long non-
consultative tradition. Yet ADB support did not consider the political economy and ethnic diversity of 
the south or the conflict beyond these measures. One meeting did take place in Pattani, within the 
conflict area, although the risks of marginalization of the local population in proposed plans, or the 
question of the degree to which participants were representative of anything beyond personal interest, 
were not addressed. Given the history of political and economic interests dominating policy 
implementation over economic planning in the south, ethnic disparities and the perceived injustice that 
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results, it seems unlikely that a little consultation in chambers of commerce with business 
representatives will make a meaningful difference.437 
Regional projects may be especially prone to overlook specific sub-national actors given their 
international perspective, with project formulation often taking place outside the remit of a donor's 
country level office. However, similar trends can also be seen in projects operating solely within 
Thailand. As explained in Chapter Six, the majority of international aid provided to Thailand has rarely 
incorporated issues of minority groups and their relations with government, whether configured as an 
issue of peacebuilding, core-periphery relationships, horizontal inequality, or any other relevant 
approach. 
7.6 Chapter conclusion 
The ADB’s inputs to IMT-GT were in practice blind to conflict and to horizontal inequalities. The ADB 
supported central planning bodies within the Thai Government that had little interest in addressing 
issues of horizontal inequality associated with conflict in the Far South. The ADB had little engagement 
with other bodies and individuals including academics, NGOs, inhabitants of the Far South and at least 
one government agency (SBPAC) that were concerned with inequalities and the associated history of 
unrest. ADB support to IMT-GT backed the dominant trajectory of growth and government 
policymaking, with proposed inputs promoting an enabling environment for larger private investors. As 
has been widely addressed by many researchers and explained in this chapter and earlier chapters, the 
most likely main beneficiaries of such initiatives – had they come to fruition in the 1990s – would have 
been networks of well-connected local economic and political actors including politicians, senior civil 
servants, and businessmen. Historically, these local elites have operated in close association with central 
state institutions, both in the Far South and elsewhere in Thailand (McVey 2000). IMT-GT was perceived 
by many in the Far South of Thailand as another typical government intervention assisting 
overwhelmingly Thai or Thai-Chinese Buddhist financial interests, rather than benefitting the majority 
Malay Muslim local population.438 Even the involvement of some Malay Muslim business 
representatives in projects stemming from IMT-GT may have done little to dispel a perception of 
inequality among many Malay Muslims in the Far South, with those in privileged positions often being 
regarded by insurgents as turncoats and more widely as a small co-opted elite that is too close to the 
central government and does not represent wider interests.439 
In 2007, the ADB announced a new Country Partnership Strategy with Thailand, stating in a press 
release: 
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This important new partnership aims to fortify our relationship with Thailand to jointly work 
towards achieving sustainable economic growth, both at the national level and within the 
region (ADB 2007b). 
The press release continues: 
The Country Partnership Strategy at the national level supports Thailand's efforts to enhance its 
competitiveness in the global economy and promote higher levels of private investment. Core 
strategic areas of partnership include development of infrastructure, capital markets, and 
environmental sustainability. At the regional level, the partnership focuses on increasing 
Thailand's role and capacity as a regional development partner through co-financing projects in 
neighboring countries, promoting subregional trade and investment, and further developing 
Asian bond markets. 
In this description of the ADB’s priorities there appears little scope for a more sophisticated perspective 
on the impact of development on ethnic relations in the Far South. The case study confirms the findings 
of Stewart et al. (2008) over the lack of policy level attention to horizontal inequalities shown by many 
aid agencies. Where connections between conflict and development are made by the ADB, as this 
chapter showed, underlying assumptions about the beneficial impact of increasing trade flows and 
investment also appear flawed. The longevity of peripheral conflicts in Southeast Asia and further afield, 
often in a rapidly developing context, suggests that economic growth is likely in cases to further the 
reproduction of horizontal inequalities rather than bring peace. A broader issue here concerns the 
challenge of building awareness of peripheral conflict problems into foreign aid agencies whose policies 
are primarily geared around the promotion of socioeconomic growth at the national level with little 
attention to distributive implications. 
In addition to the ADB’s overall orientation (or motivation in the terminology of this thesis) around 
socioeconomic growth, their engagement with state institutions appears further to limit the scope to 
address peripheral conflict. This relates to the role of the interface between donors and the state, as has 
already been explained in earlier chapters. Institutionally, the ADB remains state-centric, central 
government agencies (especially those addressing economic planning and infrastructure) being a 
necessary recipient of most donor funds and loans. The ADB interacted in IMT-GT with central planning 
institutions and not with other government bodies including SBPAC that demonstrated greater 
awareness of horizontal inequalities and concern for conflict in the Far South. The ADB did not engage in 
any extensive way with governmental or non-governmental agencies more representative of people 
themselves. This is not simply a matter of the ADB’s own preference, but that of the Thai Government 
too. As this chapter has explained, international agencies are kept away from sensitive institutions like 
SBPAC that address tensions relating to conflict in the Far South.  
More widely, good relations with key central ministries and agencies are essential to fulfil pledged aid 
targets and to maintain what aid officials call a 'spending pipeline'. For the ADB and also for the World 
Bank, the two large multilateral development banks operating in Thailand, their main aim is to re-
168 
 
establish a significant portfolio of loans.440 This is nothing new: as already stated, the ADB’s original 
interest in IMT-GT was partly motivated by the possibility that the project’s proposed infrastructure 
plans would lead to future loans. In July 2008, the ADB talked of efforts to establish funding for an 
infrastructure ‘mega-project’, competing with loans already offered by the Japanese and Chinese 
Governments for new subway train lines in Bangkok (ADB 2008c; Bangkok Post 2008b). 
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Chapter Eight  The Interface between Donors and Central Government  
   Agencies as a Barrier to Addressing Conflict 
 
“Everything donors try to do in the South clashes with nationalism.” 441 
Having explored in the previous chapter an example of a Group One donor initiative that does not try to 
address conflict issues in the Far South of Thailand, this chapter considers Group Two donors that try 
but fail to engage with peacebuilding. Some international development agencies have tried to set up 
programmes of assistance in the Far South of Thailand since the re-emergence of significant violence at 
the start of 2004. Building on increasing global experience of aid in conflict situations, they have 
attempted to support steps towards a just future peace and occasionally to help redress the impact of 
violence on people’s lives. UNDP and the World Bank are two of the largest agencies that attempted to 
do so, yet at the time of research they had failed in their efforts to start a programme. The two agencies 
form the basis of this chapter. 
The chapter continues the investigation of the reasons why aid agencies differ in their ability to address 
peripheral conflicts, considering how and why both UNDP and the World Bank initiated yet struggled to 
implement related programmes for the Far South of Thailand. It finds that, despite some desire to 
address the conflict, the interface between donors and their key interlocutors in the recipient state 
steers donors away from such programmes. The chapter shows the practical obstacles that donors 
encounter in trying to promote a peacebuilding agenda. It considers the low overall levels of interest in 
peacebuilding that the two agencies demonstrated, before describing how recent promotion of aid 
‘partnerships’ in Thailand and elsewhere returns aid delivery to a consensual  norm that reduces the 
scope to take a nuanced and critical view on the central state. 
The quotation at the start of this chapter reflects recipient government concerns over maintenance of 
sovereignty that, I argue here, have a significant impact on how aid agencies operate and how aid is 
used. When dealing with conflict and peacebuilding the concern is often still greater. In Thailand as 
elsewhere, relationships across the interface between aid donors and the government are played out 
through these ongoing tensions. 
In order to understand how and why donors approach peripheral conflict in the Far South of Thailand, it 
is important to consider the ‘aid relationship’ between donor and recipient that was described with 
reference to peripheral conflicts more widely in Chapter Three.442 For donors, a perennial tension exists 
between forming a necessary relationship with government on the one hand and promoting changes on 
the other (Gibson et al. 2005). ‘Common ground’ may be hard to identify when donor policy is not 
sufficiently aligned with government action. Conflict contexts usually exacerbate these tensions (Potter 
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1996, Barnett & Zuercher 2008). Nationalist sentiment that often surrounds peripheral conflicts, as 
already described in Chapter Two, may make them especially sensitive sites for external engagement.443 
This chapter uses case study material to explore the perspectives of Thai government officials whose 
support is critical for any donors offering to support promotion of peace in the Far South. It shows how 
donor efforts to address peripheral conflicts encroach on sensitive issues of national identity that are 
themselves often critical elements contributing to and perpetuating peripheral conflicts.444 Protection of 
sovereignty is not the preserve of war-hungry reactionaries: a pro-peace perspective may be seen as 
fully compatible with strong nationalist sentiment. For example, elderly statesman and former Prime 
Minister Anand Panyarachun, head of the former National Reconciliation Commission for the Far South, 
when asked by an American journalist in 2005 what his country could do to help with the conflict, 
responded: “Tell them to stay the hell out of here” (Pauker 2005/2006:85).445 
There are some strategic reasons for rejecting international involvement, given that anti-government 
groups in the Far South look to build international concern in order to strengthen their case (Pathan 
2007). Much more widely, however, ‘internationalization’ of the conflict is seen as a loss of sovereignty, 
something that stokes a nationalist reaction almost as much as concern that any concessions to 
insurgents will ‘divide the nation’.446 Fear of external intervention, especially in a sensitive location, 
raises strong sentiments among many Thais over the unity of the Thai nation.447  
Other examples demonstrate similar concern over external involvement. Following the case of Imam 
Yapa Kaseng, an Islamic preacher from the Far South of Thailand who was beaten to death in a military 
camp in Narathiwat’s Rue So district in March 2008, Thai Army commander General Anupong Paochinda 
instructed his soldiers not to injure or kill any Muslims during interrogations at military camps. Such 
acts, he said, might provide justification for intervention by the United Nations or the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference, bodies that the Thai state has repeatedly managed to keep at arm’s length.448 
Rather than being concerned over the human rights abuses themselves, or over a violent local backlash 
that the incident might provoke, General Anupong’s misgiving was over the risks of subsequent foreign 
involvement. 
A common perspective even among Thai peace activists is that foreign bodies can play little role in 
finding a solution.449 This fits in with a nationalist line held more widely across Thailand that sees foreign 
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aid as well as other external interventions as primarily exploitative. It does not help that most aid 
agencies attempting to address conflict in the Far South are Western or seen as dominated by Western 
interests, playing into a legacy of past fears of colonization and a perceived neo-imperialist present 
(Connors 2006). Many people in the Far South are also suspicious of foreigners, fitting their own 
situation into a global context of tension between Islamic communities and the USA.450  
8.1 UNDP and the World Bank 
As is explained below, while the World Bank has typically promoted economic liberalization through 
promotion of structural adjustment and subsequent reforms, UNDP has taken a more critical line on 
such policies. At the same time, both UNDP and the World Bank have tried over several decades to 
modify their overall approach to development, responding to long-term criticism over the ‘collateral 
damage’ and ineffectiveness of many interventions by moving away from the conventional 
socioeconomic modernization paradigm. Aspects of these changes include more critical perspectives on 
the role of the state and greater concern over conflict issues. These shifts have been closely scrutinized, 
some recognizing them as significant steps, others considering them – in the case of the World Bank in 
particular – as a facade that obscures continuity based around the vested interests of wealthy nations, 
powerful elites and capital (Pincus 2002, Easterly 2002, Harrison 2004). 
In looking at the two agencies’ work across Thailand, this section builds on themes introduced earlier, in 
particular the interface with the state. The next section then considers their attempted involvement in 
the Far South. Since both UNDP and the World Bank approach the conflict in the Far South as part of 
their overall aid provision in Thailand, analysis has to start from their national level programmes and 
relationships with the Thai state. Over time, the Thai Government has demonstrated its capacity to 
accept foreign aid only when it suits specific domestic interests and to shape any assistance that is 
provided (Muscat 1990). As explained in Chapter Five, those interests, defined by national level 
politicians and influential civil servants in the central bureaucracy, only at times match the priorities of 
donors. The gap between global donor priorities and recipient interests is especially apparent when 
dealing with peripheral conflict, an area of considerable ethnic and political tension that intensifies the 
nationalist sentiment affecting how foreign agencies can approach the interface with the state. 
UNDP’s global policy and operations apply a broad definition of development based on a “Vision of 
societies built around people’s genuine needs” (UNDP 1993:95). This stretches well beyond an emphasis 
on economic growth alone, beyond even the broader notion of socioeconomic progress seen in the 
Millennium Development Goals. A wider perspective on development is seen in UNDP’s Human 
Development Index and annual Human Development Reports. With a more holistic definition of what 
constitutes progress, these are intended largely as a check and balance on the perceived economism of 
the IMF, the World Bank and the regional development banks (UNDP 1990). From an early stage, UNDP 
incorporated human rights approaches into its overall framework. It has continued to show a strong 
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policy commitment to reducing poverty as well as responding to social and environmental concerns that 
have emerged over time.451 
UNDP also has a more political role, with in-country responsibility for heading up and coordinating the 
overall UN development effort. It has a higher-level relationship with governments than is the case for 
most other donors, the UNDP country head often also acting as a UN in-country figurehead. Given that 
both recipient and donor nations have representational rights at the UN, UNDP not only responds to 
donor interests but is also more closely linked to the recipient government than is the case for bilateral 
agencies (Murphy 2006). Partly as a result of this, and partly out of a broader commitment to reduce 
externally defined aid provision by stressing local ‘ownership’ of development funds, UNDP tends to 
prioritize the role of domestic institutions and focus on ‘capacity building’ measures (Fomerand 
2004:180). UNDP provides grants rather than loans and normally offers technical assistance rather than 
hardware. It is, however, ultimately dependent on donor nations for funding. 
UNDP has worked in many different sectors in Thailand, with current programmes on HIV/AIDS 
prevention and care, environmental management, community development, decentralization, and 
improving aid partnerships. It has never been a large donor to Thailand: the role of Bangkok as a UN hub 
for much of Asia is institutionally more significant for UNDP than its country programme.452 UNDP’s 
annual project budget for Thailand in most years is small, just US$600,000 in 2007, with the country 
office having to seek extra funding from donors for any additional work.453 Since Thailand reached 
middle-income status, UNDP has focused on specific development challenges rather than overall 
economic development. It has aimed to find ways to promote human rights and equal access to 
development. Prominent in UNDP’s approach, in keeping with its global stance, is a focus on improving 
the way in which government operates. Recent projects include a ‘people’s audit’, a planning tool that 
promotes popular feedback on the delivery of public services.454 
With little funding of its own, UNDP promotes ‘harmonized’ approaches, emphasizing its role as a 
coordinator of UN agencies and the wider international development effort in Thailand. Within the UN 
system, UNDP takes a lead role in planning national approaches through a UN Partnership Framework 
(or UNPAF).455 In 2005, UNDP managed what was described as a “Global first” by conducting the UN 
national planning process “In partnership” with the Thai Government.456 UNDP then discussed five 
separate sectors with different stakeholders including government departments, before finally 
submitting the plan for approval by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.457 
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The World Bank, meanwhile, has considerably altered many of its policies since its original commitment 
to post-war reconstruction and subsequent modernization following World War Two. These changes in 
many ways reflect dominant concurrent trends in aid provision being adopted more widely, especially 
among Western donors and most notably the USA, the World Bank’s dominant shareholder. The World 
Bank’s policy history is well documented, moving towards a neoliberal view of the state as 
predominantly predatory during the era of structural adjustment in the 1980s (Caulfield 1996), before 
adopting positions that combine liberal economic prescriptions with a range of other priorities. The 
World Bank has embraced a series of wider issues, aiming to integrate for example peacebuilding, 
environmental sensitivity, gender equality and poverty reduction (Pincus & Winters 2002). From the 
1990s on, it followed the wider trend of promoting modified recognition of the importance of an 
accountable state within a liberal democratic framework, as seen in the concept of ‘good governance’ 
(Rich 2002:30). One specific change is the promotion of a role for non-state actors, conceived as civil 
society, rather than relying on the recipient state as a sole counterpart (Stiglitz 2002).  
The World Bank was a major lender and a key influence in Thailand’s early development approaches, 
along with the USA, in the 1950s and 1960s (Muscat 1990). Over time, the World Bank’s lending 
portfolio in Thailand declined. Thailand has been a reluctant borrower from the World Bank since the 
1980s (Shivakumar 2005). The agency came close to shutting its country office before the Asian financial 
crisis began with the crash of the Thai Baht in 1997. Emergency financing agreed during the Asian 
financial crisis was seen within Thailand as a national humiliation and repaid ahead of schedule. By 
2005, the World Bank’s loan portfolio was once again minimal, with just the tail end of one transport 
project remaining (World Bank 2009). The business case for remaining in Thailand was chiefly to keep a 
presence and maintain government connections, in case opportunities for further lending should open 
up.458 World Bank country managers, like other senior donor figures, are usually keen to establish 
relationships with high-level government representatives in order to build a basis for future work. They 
often try to meet incoming politicians or officials after a change of administration as rapidly as possible 
in order to build relationships that could facilitate future loans.459 The World Bank encouraged the 
incoming government following elections in December 2007 to launch large infrastructure projects that 
require major long-term loans (Nation 2007c). 
In Thailand, as elsewhere, the World Bank has been a principal target of criticism for promoting 
economic liberalization as an agent of ‘globalization’ in the interests of Western capital, despite the 
agency’s various policy permutations over time. Criticism has been angled at the World Bank for pushing 
a neoliberal consensus alongside the IMF and other donors, funding corrupt governments and damaging 
the environment (Caulfield 1996, Bello et al. 1998). Longstanding censure from academic and activist 
quarters is directed at the undemocratic and opaque relationships between recipient governments and 
donors, including the World Bank and UNDP. Both agencies are still commonly cast as being 
intermediaries between donor and recipient governments that support existing power structures and 
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further disenfranchise others (Gibbon 1993, Pasuk & Baker 1998). With international aid seen as a 
supporter of controversial government development schemes in Thailand, the World Bank became a 
regular target of protesters who saw political value in linking domestic causes with a nationalist agenda 
opposing external involvement, focusing on the relationship between government and donors. The 
World Bank was in the firing line for its funding of the Pak Mun Dam in the northeast of Thailand, a 
government project that damaged local livelihoods more than had been predicted and produced less 
electricity than expected (TDRI 2000). The Asian Development Bank received similar treatment from civil 
groups for its funding of the corruption-ridden Klong Dan Wastewater Management Project in Samut 
Prakan, just outside Bangkok (Bello & Focus on the Global South 2002). 
Over decades of operation globally, a range of safeguard policies and advisory groups within UNDP and 
the World Bank have been established with the aim of ensuring that projects do not unwittingly support 
human rights violations or lead to environmental degradation. Participation, decentralization, 
accountability and democratization are all embraced, along with peacebuilding. For example, a review of 
the Pak Mun Dam project found that it would not have been approved under new World Bank policies 
introduced after the loan was first agreed (TDRI 2000). For the World Bank in particular, however, many 
such measures are widely criticized as fig leaves, with the agency’s endurance seen as: ”…partly 
attributable to the institution’s ability to successfully politically manage new issues while leaving 
underlying realities undisturbed” (Gibbon 1993:35). For example, World Bank support for the US$ 1.45 
billion Nam Theun 2 hydropower scheme in Laos went ahead despite what opponents of the project saw 
as a failure to apply principles previously agreed through the World Commission on Dams (WCD 2000, 
Imhof 2005). Allegations of infringements of environmental and social safeguards have continued to 
plague an initiative that critics see as a test-case for the World Bank’s ambitions to continue funding 
large dams and other infrastructure projects in many countries (International Rivers et al. 2010). 
8.2  Encountering state institutions 
Jonathan Pincus comments that one trend seen since the 1990s – a return to institution-building in 
World Bank policymaking – has been undermined by weak understanding of the state and of how 
external aid interacts with recipient institutions (2002). In Thailand, as has been observed elsewhere, 
the institutionally mediated interactions fundamental to the translation of policy commitments into 
practice within the World Bank’s and other donors’ projects are rarely incorporated into agency analysis 
(Orlandini 2003, Bebbington et al. 2007). As a concessional lending institution, the World Bank is 
ultimately dependent on recipient states as borrowers. It also relies on donor nations for 
replenishments of its reserves and for a range of separate trust funds backed by bilateral donors that 
enable it to offer grants. Trust funds such as the Post-Conflict Fund can be especially significant when 
supporting peacebuilding, as loans may be inappropriate or governments especially unwilling to borrow 
(World Bank 2006b).460 UNDP, meanwhile, relies on donors for its grant funds and on recipients to 
execute projects. There is pressure on both agencies to build a good relationship with senior 
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government officials and politicians: while the World Bank needs to loan funds, UNDP resident 
representatives are notoriously concerned over offending their host government for fear of damaging 
their programmes or having their posting cut short: “UNDP lives in terror of doing or saying something 
that will annoy the government.” 461 
It is reasonable to assume that the incentive for donors to satisfy their recipient counterparts is greater 
in middle-income countries like Thailand whose governments find it easier to turn down concessional 
financing and therefore have more bargaining power.462 The need for donors to maintain the support of 
officials and politicians at senior levels of central government is especially significant for their efforts to 
address conflict in the Far South of Thailand, where the highly centralized Thai Government is seen by 
many local inhabitants as the main problem. As is explained in Chapter Five, government actions are 
perceived by many Malay Muslims in the area to have usurped local political voice, undermined cultural 
integrity, and stymied economic opportunity. Foreign aid is commonly welcomed on the ground in the 
Far South if it is considered to act as check and balance on the state rather than a prop to corrupt vested 
interests.463 
The previous chapter showed how foreign aid interventions in peripheral areas can play into the 
prevailing national political economy and associated perceptions of horizontal inequality. Both the 
World Bank and UNDP encourage newer approaches in efforts to avoid the problems that ensnared 
projects like IMT-GT. Promotion of local consultation and devolved planning that is more likely to reflect 
people’s interests is sometimes part of World Bank policy statements in Thailand, and often part of 
UNDP’s. These plans are occasionally implemented too. Examples include the World Bank Social 
Investment Fund (Ammar & Srawooth 2002), and various UNDP ‘democratic governance’ projects.
464
  
However, attempts to promote such alternative ways of working that aim to increase local 
accountability frequently hit major blockages, stemming from the need of donors to maintain a 
relationship with the central state as well as resistance at many levels of government. One such example 
was given in Chapter Six, where American-funded efforts to improve local accountability as far back as 
the 1960s ran into multiple barriers. Further examples are provided later in this chapter. In Thailand and 
other countries that are not dependent on aid, efforts to challenge government agencies and political 
policies often result in programmes simply being cancelled or loans not being drawn. For example, not 
long after winning the general election in 2001, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra decided that 
Thailand would no longer accept any foreign aid (ABC 2003). The position was subsequently softened to 
allow technical assistance but not financial assistance.465 It shifted again following the fall of Thaksin’s 
government in September 2006 although a decision not to accept loans from the World Bank and the 
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ADB remained and central government bodies still aimed to control closely what forms of aid were 
accepted.466 
The Thai Government has rejected external assistance on various occasions. When IMF debt repayment 
was settled ahead of schedule by Thaksin’s government in 2003, according to many commentators this 
was done for chiefly symbolic purposes, given outstanding government loans from commercial banks at 
higher interest rates (Connors 2006). A perspective of independence from external powers is central to 
Thai identity, the country never having been a long-term colony.467 The earlier IMF-led rescue package in 
response to the financial crisis of 1997-8 had widely been seen in Thailand as a national humiliation and 
a loss of sovereignty (Ukrist 2001:24).  
Technocratic government officials and politicians took a more pragmatic line than Thaksin on external 
assistance in Thailand, having long used it to support specific agendas without necessarily sharing aid 
agencies’ policy objectives (Unger 1998:61-62). From this perspective, foreign aid may be regarded as 
both clumsy and self-interested, with foreign experts often seen as incapable of understanding the way 
in which Thailand works (Piew 1971).468 Interviews with Thai civil servants who regularly engaged with 
aid agencies revealed a broad expectation that external assistance was commonly employed in the self-
interest of the provider. With little expectation of adherence to universally established liberal values, 
foreign aid was rarely distinguished from other aspects of donor countries’ foreign policies.469 For 
example, one interviewee from the Thai donor liaison agency, TICA, felt that bilateral aid agencies 
should all be integrated with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of their respective countries in order to 
enable synergy with each country’s wider diplomatic objectives.470 
Conditions attached to aid may make it less desirable from the recipient government’s perspective, 
including policies designed to protect human rights and the environment, reduce conflict, or promote 
transparency. While the Government of Thailand reduced borrowing from the ADB and the World Bank 
from the mid-1990s, it considered further borrowing from both Japan and China, whose loans are not 
necessarily offered at lower interest rates but come with fewer strings attached in the shape of 
accountability checks, human rights concerns, or screening for other issues including what donors call 
‘conflict sensitivity’ (Harmer & Cotterell 2005). Japanese and Chinese state concessional lending 
agencies were played off against each other by Thai government officials in 2007 in order to secure the 
most advantageous terms for funding expansion of the Bangkok subway system, one US$400 million 
loan from China being described by a Thai government spokesman as a “Bargaining chip.” 471 
In summary, the scope of the Thai Government to reject aid means that donors are more likely to be 
successful in establishing projects by following consensual, pro-state policies. As is explained in 
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subsequent sections of this chapter, newer approaches followed by the World Bank and UNDP’s 
promotion of a human rights-based development agenda tend only to work when key brokers in the 
central Thai Government want them to. 
8.3 UNDP and the World Bank’s approaches to conflict 
Globally, both UNDP and the World Bank have embraced, at least rhetorically, the post-Cold War fusion 
of development and peacebuilding. For UNDP, this rests primarily within a broader UN framework, 
linking development with direct engagement in conflict through peacekeeping and negotiation. UNDP 
manages conflict prevention inputs from its Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in New York as 
well as its country offices, with staff focusing on conflict-related programming in many field locations 
and regional headquarters. A broad policy adherence to a concept of Human Security gives theoretical 
cohesion between security and development inputs, even if practical application of the concept may be 
less seamless (UNDP 2009). UNDP’s work also includes concerted involvement in dialogue and post-
conflict reconstruction and statebuilding, for example coordinating a temporary national government in 
East Timor from 1999 to 2002. Other, more specific inputs include work on elements of ‘DDR’ 
(Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) in post-conflict settings and efforts to integrate 
conflict prevention into its wider programmes at times of ongoing or latent conflict (UNDP 2006).472 
The World Bank’s original full name – the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – 
demonstrates its roots in post-war rebuilding. In keeping with its core areas of business, its main 
peacebuilding role today consists of loans for reconstruction. It is also involved in specialist fields like 
security sector reform and provides some grants through non-governmental organizations.473 The World 
Bank’s general policy line is that active engagement is only possible in a post-conflict scenario and not 
while conflict is ongoing. In active conflicts, involvement is officially reduced to ‘watching brief’ status 
(World Bank 1998b:42). Fitting a conventional and misleading expectation of peace as a norm (Howard 
2000), this approach gives little space to consider how to engage in situations of long-term conflict that 
persist alongside otherwise normal development, as occurs with peripheral conflicts. 
The World Bank has commissioned extensive research on the causes and effects of war. Predominantly 
approaching conflict from an economic development perspective, the direction of the research and its 
findings and recommendations have been the subject of contentious debate (Cramer 2002, Collier et al. 
2003). While World Bank approaches to conflict have moved from post-conflict reconstruction to more 
holistic ‘conflict sensitivity’ (World Bank 2004), they have been largely premised on contentious notions 
of state fragility and failure that tend not to view power and conflict as intrinsic to the phenomenon of 
the state (Hameiri 2007). Issues surrounding the state’s relationship with horizontal inequality and other 
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core aspects of peripheral conflict, and the implications of how aid agencies relate to state counterparts, 
are afforded little space in such approaches. 
Barriers against incorporating peacebuilding as a part of aid operations have been especially evident 
when donors aim to address peripheral conflict in the Far South of Thailand, as is explained below. 
UNDP and the World Bank have been reluctant to mention conflict in the Far South at all. Their websites 
reveal very little on conflict-related programming. During interviews conducted for this research, senior 
and mid-level donor officials were often initially reluctant to talk about any issues relating to the 
conflict, in cases openly expressing concern over the damage it might do to their relationship with the 
government.474 
Both UNDP and the World Bank reacted to the escalation of violent conflict in the Far South from 2004, 
attempting to start up programmes in keeping with their global policy statements on conflict sensitivity 
and peacebuilding.475 In an ongoing conflict with an unrecognized, anonymous and violent opposition 
confronting a government that is pursuing a predominantly military approach, implementing such policy 
is not straightforward, as subsequent events showed. 
8.4 UNDP’s frustrated attempts to address conflict in the Far South 
In September 2005, UNDP funded and helped to organize a meeting held at the JB Hotel in Hat Yai, the 
largest city in southern Thailand. Hat Yai lies just outside the conflict-affected area and has itself 
suffered from occasional bombings. This particular event was run by the Thai Government’s National 
Research Council and Prince of Songkhla University. The meeting was titled “Reconciliation and 
Rehabilitation Process for Local Communities in Southern Thailand”. Its aims were: 
1. To seek academic cooperation and find appropriate ways for reconciliation and rehabilitation 
of local communities in southern Thailand among academic institutions, private businesses, 
particularly in the trade and tourism industries, and civil society. 
2. To gather and assess existing body of knowledge in political science and public administration 
among leading academics in regards to theories and case studies about an appropriate 
reconciliation process and mitigation of conflicts in the Muslim South. 
3. To learn from views of experts in the areas of political science and public administration on 
recommended solutions of existing political, security, social and economic challenges in southern 
Thailand (UNDP 2005). 
The event was publicized on UNDP’s website as part of a planned series of academic conventions to 
address issues in the Far South. The press release following the meeting was the last public UNDP 
statement relating to the conflict. Since then, no further meetings have been announced and the UNDP 
staff responsible have moved on to work elsewhere. A UNDP representative confirmed that the 
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organization had not managed at the time of research to implement this or any other programme 
addressing conflict issues in Thailand.476 
The failure to take this or other programmes forward was chiefly a result of Thai Government reticence 
over external involvement, meaning that even a series of workshops was blocked by officials in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.477 According to confidential information provided by UN staff, UNDP 
involvement was resisted still more strongly than that of many other agencies, given the agency’s 
overall coordination role and links with the United Nations at a political level.478 
The relationship between donors and government in Thailand has never been straightforward. Donor 
funding – especially from the USA – was originally instrumental in setting up the government’s 
Department for Technical and Economic Cooperation (DTEC), renamed the Thailand International 
Cooperation Agency (TICA) in 2004 and subsequently moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (TICA 
undated). In spite of this, donor projects were rarely able to build access to high levels of decision-
making and were typically kept at arm’s length. We have already seen that foreign aid has rarely had a 
direct impact on Thai government policymaking. Many Thai officials have long held a clear idea of how 
international aid can support their predetermined aims in a technical capacity, rather than expecting it 
to provide direction (Caldwell 1974:90-92). In addition to these attitudes, a complex language that is 
difficult to learn provides another barrier against foreign intrusion into Thai institutions. Donor-imposed 
‘invention of ignorance’ (Hobart 1993) is consequently less pronounced than in some other contexts: 
with cultural, linguistic and bureaucratic walls keeping foreigners out, the capacity of external agencies 
to push an agenda and deny the relevance of local knowledge or skills is limited (Piew 1971:42). 
UNDP, like all donors, requires government approval in order to operate. Grant aid officially needs to be 
approved through TICA, and concessional loans through NEDA (the Neighbouring Countries Economic 
Development Cooperation Agency) in the Ministry of Finance. Most aid agencies work with a line 
ministry in addition to TICA or NEDA.479 The general objective is that TICA and NEDA retain overall 
control while more downstream issues are left to line ministries, although roles and divisions of 
responsibilities are not consistent. The extent of higher-level involvement from top officials in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or at ministerial level also varies depending on the sensitivity of any particular 
issue.480 
For UNDP’s work in Thailand, TICA is a key government body. UNDP also needs support from another 
part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Department of International Organizations.481 The UN’s 
UNPAF country planning framework, coordinated by UNDP themselves, forms the basis of the approval 
process with TICA. The 2007-2011 UNPAF was approved in 2006, after a year-long negotiating process. 
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Conflict-related issues do not figure in the plan, with one UNDP staff member stating that it “...did not 
touch on southern issues at all.” 482 
The main approval process still leaves the separate and time-consuming task of building and maintaining 
a functioning relationship with the line ministry or agency responsible for project implementation or 
oversight, although this process can at times be partially avoided by working through non-governmental 
channels. For UNDP, with a broad focus on governance, the relevant counterpart is often a section of 
the highly centralized and conservative Ministry of the Interior. This complicates UNDP’s work: civil 
servants in sectoral ministries in fields like health or education are often more willing to cooperate with 
donors.483 
Civil servants in TICA were more positive about including the conflict area within national approaches 
than on approaching it in isolation.484 This stance is in line with the government’s desire to ensure that 
the area is fully considered part of the Thai state. Even when extending national programmes to the Far 
South, however, barriers were encountered. One UNDP sector specialist said that TICA blocked 
approaches to meet local government counterparts in the conflict-affected provinces, frustrating efforts 
to adapt programming to specific needs in the area. 485 UNDP was effectively restricted to rolling out 
uniform national models – an approach that has in the past been counterproductive given a need to 
address the specificity of the current crisis as well as the Far South’s specific society and culture.486 
Bypassing government entirely was not an option UNDP considered: “We have to work with government 
or we cannot get involved.” 487 UNDP feels insufficiently confident of its standing with the Thai 
Government to want to push hard on controversial issues. UNDP staff felt that their organization does 
not aim to incorporate conflict issues into wider approaches, with one adviser expressing a fear for their 
general presence in the country: “We are welcomed at this stage, but cannot mention conflict.” 488 
In 2006-2007, UNDP staff tried to promote a shared multi-agency UN plan for addressing relevant 
conflict issues, including a round of internal planning and participation across UN agencies. A common 
approach would have shared the relative success of some other UN agencies, notably Unicef, in setting 
up programmes. The idea did not come to fruition and in hindsight staff informally accepted that it was 
probably a mistake to try.489 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs apparently received the plan and then 
simply failed to respond.490 Other UN agencies informally criticized the plan as a rapidly designed project 
wish list conceived by UNDP’s sectoral planners, with one interviewee feeling that it insufficiently 
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considered both central government sensitivities and the specific challenges of the conflict-affected 
area.491 
UNDP’s relative advantage at common planning and partnership with government given its elevated 
position within the UN system in comparison with technical agencies like UNFPA and UNICEF did not 
help it find a niche. A lack of funds has also hindered UNDP’s efforts, given little success at sourcing 
donor contributions.492 UNDP continued to try to find an entry point: in 2008, in-house specialists with 
experience of other conflict situations convened to redesign their overall approach. They considered 
whether it might be possible to form stronger alliances with other government ministries, given failure 
to make headway with their longstanding counterparts in the Ministry of the Interior. No immediate 
progress was forthcoming from this initiative, either.493 
8.5 The World Bank’s blocked efforts: interface barriers and practical constraints 
The World Bank’s experience has many parallels with UNDP. Interviews with World Bank staff about 
their work regularly included the phrase “The government invited us to...”, leaving it unclear how the 
invitation arose. Accordingly, I was told near the start of one interview with a World Bank staff member 
that they had been ‘invited’ by the Ministry of the Interior’s Community Development Department in 
2005-6 to commence a programme of grant support with resources from the World Bank’s global Post-
Conflict Fund.494 This Fund was set up in 1997 in recognition of the limitations of normal sources of 
World Bank finance in conflict situations. It is designed to be a flexible source of funding to support 
planning, piloting and analysis of new activities. Recipients can include governments, non-governmental 
bodies, or international organizations. It is not a large fund in comparison with most World Bank loan 
arrangements, amounting to an annual average of just over US$10 million to be divided between ten to 
twenty grants per year (World Bank 2006b). Post-Conflict Fund policy focuses attention on the 
restoration of the lives and livelihoods of war-affected populations. According to the World Bank, the 
fund “…has often ‘tested the limits’ of Bank operational procedures and ventured into subjects that are 
innovative for the Bank and are adding to state-of-the-art knowledge” (2002). 
In 2006-2007, the Post-Conflict Fund approved a request from the World Bank’s Thailand office to 
support initial background work on understanding community level dynamics and relationships between 
communities and public officials in the Far South.495 With an apparent invitation from the government, 
and funding secured, the country office assigned staff with high-level contacts and relevant experience 
to the new project. Using Post-Conflict Fund resources, the office then developed a programme for 
selected institutions within Thailand to build a body of research and devise a set of practical measures 
that could be implemented.496 Always concerned over government sensitivities, the office secured the 
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involvement of respected academics at Chulalongkorn, Thammasat and Mahidol Universities in or near 
Bangkok for initial studies costing some US$200,000. A subsequent programme expected to flow from 
these initial steps was to be in the region of US$1 million.497 
The inital aim of the programme was to exchange Thai and international experiences of government 
engagement at the community level.498 The wider goals were both to reduce the perceived distance 
between the state and people in the conflict area and to improve appropriate service provision. The 
final shape of the programme was not defined, with the research stage acting as an ongoing planning 
process. Research was designed to build the involvement of key figures as well as to produce a relevant 
approach. In keeping with many organizations that have experience of promoting social issues in 
Thailand, World Bank officials stressed the need to support locally defined activities and objectives 
rather than impose external planning.499 
With staff in place, funding available, and the scope to design a project through the kind of sensitive and 
flexible process that most development experts recommend, the signs were good. But in late 2006 a 
bloodless military coup in Thailand overthrew a government already incapacitated through political 
protest, and planning came to a halt. As outlined in Chapter Five, a military-led interim government 
remained in place until the end of 2007, and future World Bank initiatives were put on ice. As interviews 
were being conducted in late 2007 and early 2008, World Bank staff were hoping that they would be 
invited by the government to start their programme once more.500  
The relationship between a major donor like the World Bank and the government is more complex than 
one of invitations and cancellations. In order to re-start the programme, the World Bank would have 
needed to re-enter a series of negotiations with various government representatives.501 The World Bank 
and other concessional lending institutions engage primarily with the Neighbouring Countries Economic 
Development Cooperation Agency (NEDA), under the Ministry of Finance.502 Despite the huge misfit 
between the small grant-funded peacebuilding programme described above and the Ministry of 
Finance’s interests, the same contacts were still paramount. The World Bank coordinator stated: “We 
have to report to NEDA whatever we do.” 503 
Like other donors, the World Bank also had to engage with different line ministry counterparts 
depending on the sectoral focus of each project (in this case the Ministry of the Interior), an ongoing 
relationship that at significant points may involve the minister or high-level civil servants.504 More junior 
staff were involved on a day-to-day basis.505 Although overall government policy might have been to 
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keep foreign governments and organizations out of internal political conflicts, many line ministries, 
agencies and local authorities saw the situation differently – and, depending on the domestic political 
climate, often had some leeway to engage with donors.506 
Even where the central bodies TICA and NEDA were reluctant to offer support, scope existed for foreign-
funded technical assistance programmes in sectors where the World Bank had traditionally been 
involved and still maintained a presence – in education, for example.507 These conventional 
development sectors were less politically controversial. They offered softer entry points given the 
potential for support from within at least some parts of the government line ministry concerned. 
Approaches in these sectors might have enabled the World Bank to engage in issues relating to 
peacebuilding in the Far South despite a change of government – as some Group Three agencies have 
managed.508 However, as I explain below, such potential opportunities were not taken up owing more to 
barriers within the World Bank than resistance from government. 
World Bank staff with cross-sectoral remits saw benefits in coordinating across different fields of 
expertise within their country programmes in order to take advantage of such sector-specific 
opportunities. One specialist complained: ”It would be good if we could work as a team.” 509 However, 
even if such internal coordination were possible, further internal barriers emerged. Another World Bank 
specialist felt that such collaboration would not in any case be a good idea, since it risked an “Overly 
enthusiastic response”:510 a desire to set up projects as fast as possible through deploying short-term 
foreign consultants who need to be deterred from doing more damage than good, given a lack of 
understanding of local context.511 
8.6 Rhetoric and reality 
This practical reality sits uneasily next to policy statements over holistic approaches to conflict 
sensitivity. At a global policy level, UNDP and the World Bank have been at the forefront of donor efforts 
to recognize the significance of conflict, criticizing failure to consider the effect of their support on 
tensions that lead to violence. One report comments: 
 Because education, especially primary, is seen as an unambiguous public good, development 
agencies tend to focus on increasing coverage and/or quality without considering that 
education may exacerbate conflict. The education sector is rarely an innocent bystander in 
societies undergoing wrenching political and social turmoil—it is often an active player in the 
conflict, manipulated by the state or grievance-driven groups around issues such as the 
language of instruction, the content of curriculum and textbooks, and ethnic or geographic 
access [...] Applying a conflict assessment framework that carefully looks at the role of the 
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education system as part of the problem as well as the solution would better inform donor 
interventions in support of education access in conflict-affected countries (World Bank 2004:22). 
This positive statement may be the view of conflict experts, but is not necessarily adopted by education 
sector specialists, managers, or project partners. Indeed, outside the Post-Conflict Fund initiative, there 
appeared to be little awareness of conflict as an issue for the World Bank in Thailand. Despite a long 
history of lending for education in Thailand, World Bank reviews and evaluations of the sector over 
many years have made little specific reference to the different context of the Far South. Issues including 
language of instruction, incorporation of Islamic schools into the state sector, the role of religion in 
schools, and inadequate numbers and calibre of local Malay Muslim teaching staff, are all passed over 
(World Bank 1998; 2006c). 
Although by 2005 the World Bank was no longer providing new loans to the education sector in 
Thailand, it maintained a relationship with the Ministry of Education and funded analytical policy 
research.512 The 2006 issue of the World Bank’s Thailand Social Monitor focused entirely on secondary 
education in an impressively detailed 95-page analysis that addreses issues of equity and quality. 
Despite the level of detail, it makes no mention at all of challenges in the Far South such as major 
deficits in secondary level achievement as well as the broader role of education in the conflict.513 The 
fact that efforts to extend compulsory education from six to nine years were cynically regarded by some 
Malay Muslims as another element of imposed assimilation (Madmarn 2002:79) passed the authors by, 
despite their focus on equity. Language issues, central to conflict problems as well as to low educational 
achievement in the Far South, are mentioned in the report only with regard to migrant children from 
other countries (mostly Burma) rather than those born as Thai citizens. The 2006 report states that: 
“Language of instruction has also been a problem as alien children may not be fluent in Thai.”  The 
subtext is a false assumption that all Thai children speak fluent Thai. Many Malay Muslim children 
struggle to learn Thai at school as other languages are spoken at home (Unicef 2006:39, Liow 2009:107). 
One explanation for the World Bank’s oversight of education problems in the Far South might be that 
the issue was simply too politically sensitive to publish in any report. The Government of Thailand had 
been keeping international agencies away from such issues for decades. Interviews with World Bank 
sectoral staff in Bangkok (and in other recipient countries) repeatedly showed that they only 
occasionally regarded conflict as a development issue even if some of their colleagues were trying to 
address it. One interviewee regarded conflict as an issue for political resolution rather than 
development: “For us, conflict is a subtext, no more.” As far as internal conflicts are concerned, the 
adviser stated directly: “We do not tackle them.” 514 
A similar picture emerged from the perspective of a recipient of World Bank funding in Thailand. 
Gothom Arya, an academic and former senator who has spoken out in favour of greater autonomy for 
the Far South, accepted World Bank support for the peace research institute that he directs at Mahidol 
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University. His institute provided initial analysis and organized wider consultation before the Post-
Conflict Fund project on community-government relations was suspended. Gothom felt that the 
initiative had real potential to support local groups advocating for peace and related policy changes. Yet 
at the same time he felt that the World Bank is best seen as a business, siding with whoever would allow 
it to operate. Inevitably, it takes mainstream positions that lead to hypocrisy on issues like intellectual 
property, where it will defend Western donor interests. In Gothom’s view, the World Bank is: 
“Sometimes on different sides, sometimes cooperating. It’s the mainstream, it won’t disappear.” 515 
In Gothom’s experience, the World Bank’s flexible properties were underpinned by a need to ensure 
that its most influential shareholders are content. Its role extended only as far as such a position allows, 
with no expectation that policy commitments to peacebuilding (or indeed many other universal goals) 
significantly affect donor policy and practice. 
To summarize, the way in which the World Bank operated as a result of its mixed priorities, working 
structure, and interface with central government institutions tended to hinder the agency’s scope to 
address conflict in the Far South. The World Bank was not unique among donors in this regard. Despite 
its links with wider UN pursuit of peacebuilding and a more holistic view of development, UNDP 
demonstrated similar internal sectoral divisions, with only a small minority of staff incentivized to take 
forward peacebuilding as an objective. Many UNDP staff interviewed in their Bangkok office appeared 
to have little concern for or awareness of the peacebuilding issues that colleagues in a different section 
of the same office were struggling to pursue.516  
We have seen that the modus operandi of both aid agencies, including sectoral divisions and project-
based funding, made alternative approaches difficult to realize in practice in the context of the Far 
South of Thailand. The influence of the central government institutions that partner their operations 
meant that options for engagement were often already heavily circumscribed, with the World Bank and 
UNDP needing good relations with the government in order to operate. One World Bank interviewee 
stated: “That’s by definition. Our core partner is the central state. At best we can have a ‘do no harm’ 
policy. Everything we do has to be approved by the central state.” 517 
8.7 Contemporary aid trends: problems with partnerships 
Although Thailand is no longer directly relevant to global efforts to reduce extreme poverty given its 
middle-income status, most development agencies working there placed strong emphasis on the notion 
of ‘partnership’ with the Thai Government. It was referred to regularly in donor literature and 
representatives of donors including the World Bank and UNDP were keen to press the point without 
prompting in interviews undertaken for this research.518 UNDP’s website refers to the “Mutual Thailand-
UNDP Partnership” (2009b), while the World Bank describes its work with the Thai Government as a 
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“True development partnership” (2009b). Given this common use of the language of partnerships and 
the implications for donors working with a government that may be pursuing policies counter to their 
own stated objectives on peacebuilding, it is worth considering the issue in greater detail. 
UNDP places especially strong emphasis on relations with recipient governments. It has switched to 
‘national execution’ of its programmes wherever possible, handing project management responsibilities 
over to recipient authorities, usually a government agency (Ssekandi & Lynne Johnson 2000). UNDP is 
also at the forefront of contemporary partnership approaches and in Thailand it used its role in 
promoting the UN’s global Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to build a closer relationship with 
government.519 TICA and other government bodies also emphasized the notion of partnership during 
interviews.520 Global promotion of the MDGs coincided with former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra’s populist poverty eradication campaign, creating common ground with UNDP and leading 
to the creation of ‘Thailand MDGs’ in keeping with principles of national ownership.521 Based around the 
MDGs themselves, the government and UNDP then set higher ‘Thailand MDG Plus’ targets, in 
recognition of Thailand’s relatively advanced development status (NESDB 2005). 
UNDP’s partnership with Thaksin’s administration cannot be separated from Thailand’s wider divisive 
political context, with Thaksin himself at the centre. The establishment of MDG Plus targets received 
criticism from NGO leaders who said that the monitoring data were rigged to support Thaksin’s self-
promoting claims around poverty elimination.522 UNDP staff informally accepted that the targets were 
unrealistic and politically motivated.523 It was largely in tacit recognition of this that UNDP started a 
small project to help improve the capacity of their main high-level Thai partner, the National Economic 
and Social Development Board, to collate and interpret statistics impartially.
524
 Criticism was then 
levelled by Unicef at the use of simplistic targets, the risk being that they reduced efforts to understand 
complex reasons behind social problems, promoting uniform nationwide responses instead.525 This was 
especially significant for the Far South, given the region’s unique context within Thailand and the need 
for political solutions rather than quantifiable goal-setting.  
Even more significant were the controversial policies of Thaksin’s government. Thaksin promoted high-
profile pro-poor schemes yet at the same time ignored or intentionally undermined most of the 
principles of governance that many donors and NGOs promoted.526 UNDP was only able to partner 
Thaksin’s approach to poverty reduction by keeping its institutional gaze averted from what was 
happening elsewhere. Thaksin bungled the policy response to conflict in the Far South. He cancelled 
democratic decentralization in preference for directly appointed provincial governors, bypassed 
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constitutional checks and balances on executive authority, and committed widespread human rights 
abuses (McCargo & Ukrist 2005). Thaksin’s development policies and top-down approaches to 
governance may have helped Thailand towards ‘MDG Plus’ goals, but through an apolitical ‘partnership’ 
UNDP concurrently lent support to a government pursuing policies that were contrary to UNDP’s own 
stated policies on conflict reduction and human rights and had disastrous consequences for the Far 
South.527 
As well as risking a dangerously naive view of consensual development based around common goals, the 
notion of partnership also supported a pretence that aid was no longer infused with political self-
interest on the part of donor and recipient (Baaz 2005). To demonstrate this, one can look at how the 
Thai government agencies that run Thailand’s own foreign aid projects as well as channelling in-flows of 
external assistance, NEDA and TICA, themselves used notions of partnerships. Thaksin decided during 
his first term as prime minister that Thailand should emerge as an important contributor to the UN’s 
Global Partnership for Development by setting up its own foreign aid programme (United Nations & 
Government of Thailand 2004). The Thai Government began by concentrating initially on the 
neighbouring states of Burma, Laos and Cambodia, before extending to other Asian and African nations. 
It turned to donors to help it strengthen its own programme, receiving technical support from France, 
Japan, the UN and elsewhere for ‘trilateral’ partnership projects in other recipient countries (TICA 2009). 
Thailand’s own foreign aid programme has been used as a means to achieve foreign and domestic policy 
objectives. Presented using the global language of partnerships, projects including support for fish 
farming in Mozambique and forestry in West Africa respond to specific Thai business interests.528 
Programmes of cooperation nearer home, in neighbouring Cambodia, Laos and Burma, are still more 
closely aligned around Thai interests. For example, NEDA offered loan funding for road improvements in 
Cambodia that afford better access to and from Thailand (NEDA 2009). This pragmatic approach mirrors 
the aid programmes of many other European, North American and Asian donors: TICA is partly modelled 
on the South Korean official aid agency KICA, which was in turn influenced by Japanese JICA.529 
As has already been discussed earlier in this chapter, Thai officials expected that Western donors’ 
programmes were similarly designed around commercial or diplomatic self-interest and they entered 
into partnerships accordingly. There is little to suggest that the advent of a new form of aid ‘partnership’ 
might have involved relinquishing control or establishing shared goals that reduce self-interested 
approches unless common ground already existed. Indeed, at the same time as supporting the principles 
of the UN’s Global Partnership for Development, Thailand’s own external aid programme clearly 
promoted Thai interests abroad first and foremost (TICA undated). 
As a comparison, Japanese aid agencies adopt a different, counterfactual perspective. Notions of an 
‘ownership dilemma’ are not new to Japanese or other observers, with discussion of partnership around 
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the MDGs seen as a continuation of an old theme (Anuman 2005:259).530 In considering the legacy of 
Japanese lending for industrial development in Thailand, Shimomura finds that respect for domestic 
sovereignty promoted more effective aid projects. It did so by enabling government planners and 
politicians to find a viable way through local political struggles. By contrast, more rigid plans promoted 
by the World Bank met with failure (2008). Shimomura sees the common donor partnerships promoted 
by the UN and Western donors as implying more donor-led selectivity: "...this is a key question for a 
developing country with any ambition to explore ideas of its own that are not in accordance with the 
conventional wisdom of major donors" (2008:174). 
An expectation that shared goals within common partnerships can define a consensual aid relationship 
may, in contexts where donors are strong and governments weak, further support donor control over 
recipient governments – as Shimomura says. In Thailand however, where donors were typically relatively 
weak and government strong, the opposite was more likely to emerge. While recognizing the rights of a 
legitimate government to domestic sovereignty, continued donor support for a partnership agenda 
undermined donors’ limited efforts to address peripheral conflict in the Far South by tying them into 
tight relationships with a limited number of central state institutions. One recent study of how donor 
funded projects managed to achieve the domestic buy-in necessary for sustainable impact in Thailand 
concludes with a point raised in Chapter Three of this thesis – that many different approaches to 
relations between donors and recipients are possible, depending on local conditions and project 
attributes (Siriporn & Euamporn 2008). The aid partnership approach followed by the World Bank, UNDP 
and others appeared to take donors addressing issues in the Far South of Thailand away from the more 
considered interface management that could have helped to establish programmes addressing 
controversial fields, playing instead to a lowest common denominator. 
8.8 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the ways in which concern for protecting sovereignty affects Thai 
Government responses to donor assistance. This is in the context of dominant forms of Thai nationalism 
that are relevant to the emergence and perpetuation of violent conflict in the Far South, as was 
explained in earlier chapters. As well as limiting the scope for a domestic political solution to the 
conflict, strong fear of perceived threats to an imagined Thai nation (Thongchai 1994) also appeared to 
hinder the scope for donors to play a role in promoting or supporting efforts to build peace. 
At the time of research, the global peacebuilding policies of UNDP and the World Bank had not led to 
any concrete action addressing conflict in the Far South of Thailand. Both agencies had experienced 
setbacks, for two reasons: first, the Thai Government was reluctant to allow them to work on 
peacebuilding; and second, the aid agencies themselves were not sufficiently committed when faced 
with government resistance, retaining instead their reliance on established relationships with national 
state institutions in delivering aid programmes. At the same time as trying to work on conflict, other 
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work such as the promotion of Millennium Development Goals and research in the education sector 
continued unaffected through close ‘partnerships’ with state institutions. Little regard appears to have 
been paid to the overall impact of UNDP’s or the World Bank’s country programmes on the causes and 
dynamics of peripheral conflict in the Far South.  
This experience demonstrates that the scope for international involvement to promote a just peace is 
often limited for reasons that go beyond simple ignorance or a lack of local understanding on the part of 
donors. Their inability to achieve more stems in this case both from insufficient international 
commitment and a perennial issue of state sovereignty. In this regard, the significant issue is not 
whether international policies are more or less blind than domestic policies when it comes to addressing 
horizontal inequalities,531 but more the importance of the interface between both donor and recipient 
that can lead to peripheral conflicts being overlooked.  For the aid agencies considered here, it follows 
that in the absence of recipient government cooperation the conflict-aware aid policies that are now 
commonplace may not on their own enable implementation unless accompanied by shifts in the 
orientation of aid agencies in order to negotiate the interface with recipient state institutions more 
effectively. The steps required to move beyond this impasse are examined more closely in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter Nine   Islands of Donor-Funded Peacebuilding 
 
As already outlined in Chapter Six, a minority of aid agencies have managed to implement programmes 
around peacebuilding objectives in the Far South, spending relatively small budgets in the process. They 
comprise the third group in this study. Two contrasting donors from this group, Unicef and The Asia 
Foundation (TAF), are selected here in order to understand better why such agencies work on 
peacebuilding and how they manage to do so. This chapter explores both agencies’ motivations for 
working on conflict. It considers how they negotiated the interface with government counterparts and 
oversight bodies and the actual practice of establishing and implementing interventions. 
Earlier chapters showed that some of the priorities of some donors – for example, tackling problems 
that minority groups have in accessing government services, addressing human rights, and promoting 
local level accountability – are relevant to addressing peripheral conflicts. While several agencies which 
espouse these values, such as UNDP, failed to operationalize them to address problems in the Far South 
of Thailand, this chapter provides evidence to demonstrate that other agencies have managed to turn 
such policy commitments into practice. Unicef and TAF were, at the time of writing, the two 
international agencies with the most comprehensive programmes relating to peacebuilding in the Far 
South.532 As is explained below, Unicef concentrated its engagement in Thailand on making services 
more relevant to the needs of children and parents, working with government departments and NGOs. 
TAF worked in a similar way on education issues in the Far South and also took on more political 
concerns, including promoting thinking about political solutions to unrest and building civil networks. In 
this chapter, specific initiatives of both agencies are investigated to provide detail on why these two 
agencies have established programmes addressing conflict in the Far South while most other agencies 
did not. 
9.1 Background to Unicef and The Asia Foundation 
Unicef is rarely considered to be a cutting-edge or risk-taking organization. It has maintained a focus on 
neutral humanitarian support and child welfare since its formation as an agency of the United Nations 
just after the Second World War. It aims to remain apolitical, funding essential medical services where 
government has failed and contributing to global campaigns to promote mass vaccination, install clean 
water and sanitation facilities, and reduce infectious diseases (Egger 1986, Black 1996). Its annual 
budget is around US$3 billion (Unicef 2008). 
Unicef proudly states that it is: “...supported entirely by the voluntary contributions of individuals, 
foundations, corporations, non-governmental organizations and governments.” 533 It receives no share 
of national standing contributions to the UN and raises considerable sums from public contributions 
(Unicef 2008b:33). Well over half of the funds for Unicef’s Thailand programme is donated by the Thai 
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public and Thai businesses.534 This image of independent charity tells only part of the story, however. 
The most important single source of funds for Unicef globally has always been the US Government, 
followed by other donor governments, making it less fully independent than its publicity suggests.535 
As well as the compromises that come with official sources of funding, Unicef’s close relations with 
recipient governments cast it in a consensual light at the national level. Although often funding non-
governmental organizations, its global mode of operation is to work alongside recipient governments in 
support of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. These attributes lead some academics and activists 
to criticize Unicef’s approach. One strong critic, Vanessa Pupavac, sees its publicity-heavy approach, 
appealing to universal emotions through focusing on children, as a developmental facade justifying 
approaches that ultimately work to promote broader political and economic structures of exploitation. 
Its work in humanitarian emergencies and conflict environments has been similarly criticized (Pupavac 
2002). 
Unicef is unquestionably a marginal political player when considering how international bodies and 
powerful governments approach core political or economic issues, including conflicts and even decisions 
over humanitarian responses. But a negative view of Unicef that associates it with self-interested 
foreign policies of donor nations misses out various factors and in doing so risks creating a simplistic 
picture of the agency. Unicef’s strong track record of major contributions toward reducing child poverty 
in developing countries over many decades should not be ignored (Black 1996). In addition to providing 
services, Unicef has also actively advocated for policy change on many issues, using research and reports 
such as its State of The World’s Children publications to push for changes that support child welfare and 
uphold child rights. In the 1980s, Unicef drew attention to the negative impact of structural adjustment 
policies on the poor (Cornea et al. 1987). Since then, it has used child rights as a basis for advocacy on a 
range of issues, having adopted an overall approach based around the 1989 UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (Jonsson 2005). 
Unicef’s focus on rights, and a long-term humanitarian tradition of supporting the excluded as well as 
working with conflict-affected children, is reflected in its programmes across Thailand. These aspects of 
its purpose bring conflict and associated horizontal inequalities in the Far South of Thailand to Unicef’s 
attention. Unicef’s Thailand office increasingly concentrates on marginalized, peripheral groups: 
Burmese and other migrant workers and their families, ethnic minorities in the north, and Malay 
Muslims in the south. As is shown in this chapter, interviews with Unicef staff including senior managers 
and advisers demonstrated an outlook often rests outside conventional universal socioeconomic 
development thinking, prioritizing concern for equality and justice and emphasizing understanding local 
context through situational analysis and other research.536 This wider institutional background enabled 
Unicef to take the conflict in the Far South seriously within its remit for children’s development as part 
                                                             
534
 Interview (b) with Communications Specialist. 
535
 Unicef’s Executive Director has been an American since the agency’s inception in 1946. The US Administration 
proposes candidates, typically from a US public service background, to the UN secretary general (Lynch 2005). 
536
 Information is drawn from interviews with seven Unicef Thailand staff members in Bangkok, 2007-2008. 
192 
 
of its overall approach for Thailand.537 
Much the same could be said of UNDP, whose efforts to engage on issues relating to the Far South were 
not successful, as the last chapter explained. Unlike UNDP, however, Unicef has managed to build 
several active programmes, all of which aim to support Malay Muslim interests and tackle structural 
horizontal inequalities that underpin the conflict. Unicef has no long track record of working in the Far 
South, having only started planning specific programmes there from 2003-4.538 Since then, it has 
developed associations with government agencies and non-governmental groups without incurring the 
wrath of more conservative and nationalistic figures within the Thai Government who blocked the 
efforts of other donors including the World Bank and UNDP. As this chapter explains, by integrating the 
Far South into existing sectors of activity within national plans, Unicef managed to build a considerable 
programme covering several sectors in a fairly short time.  
Unicef’s work in the Far South covers various fields: juvenile justice (“Improved systems and procedures 
for children and young people in conflict with the law”); HIV/AIDS prevention (“Strengthening capacity of 
youth peer leaders”); pre-school (“Equipping of early learning centres and training of caregivers and 
parents”); and mainstream education. This last category includes interventions addressing specific 
peacebuilding issues: improving the quality of teacher learning centres to address the lack of skilled local 
Malay Muslim teachers in the area, introduction of bilingual language instruction into primary schools, 
and improving maths, English and science teaching in religious schools.539 Unicef staff expect to support 
further interventions for the Far South in future.540 
Unicef’s ability to manage a relationship with central government institutions has been critical to turning 
ideas into action, as this chapter explains. As with most other donors in Thailand, Unicef works to 
national plans agreed with the government. The agency has had an ongoing presence in the country 
since 1949 (Unicef undated (b)), with an annual budget for Thailand as a whole of around US$5 
million.541 As part of the UN family, Unicef has the additional task of keeping to the UN’s overall 
Partnership Framework for Thailand (United Nations and Government of Thailand 2006), working within 
the conventional barriers of sovereignty that hampered UNDP’s efforts to work on conflict in the Far 
South. Unicef has a fairly large office in Bangkok, with some forty professional staff.542 The agency 
maintains a consensual image in the country, with the respected establishment figure of former Prime 
Minister Anand Panyarachun as its ‘goodwill ambassador’. Within Thailand, Unicef is perhaps best 
known to the public at large through its domestic fundraising efforts and for its campaigns to encourage 
breast-feeding. 
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The causes, strengths and weaknesses of Unicef’s involvement in the Far South are explored through 
this chapter. To summarize, Unicef plays an astute game, maintaining a good relationship with critical 
gatekeepers in the central government and yet focusing on issues of minority rights and associated 
policy changes that at face value are potentially threatening to the state. This is achieved through 
careful management and through commissioning research that justifies a focus on specific groups. 
Various potential flaws in Unicef’s programme and approach are also addressed later in the chapter. 
TAF, the second agency considered here, diverges further from a conventional view of socioeconomic 
development. It is a more overtly politicized body, set up around politically defined as well as 
socioeconomic goals that brought it closer to conflict issues in the Far South from an early stage of its 
work in Thailand. Its head office has been based in San Francisco since it was first created in the 
1950s.543 It is a far smaller body than Unicef, with a global annual budget of some US$120 million. This is 
shared across twenty developing and developed Asian countries (TAF undated). 
Rather than being based around ostensibly apolitical poverty reduction or humanitarian aims, TAF’s 
ongoing interventions across Asia are more openly political: 
The Asia Foundation is a non-profit, non-governmental organization committed to the 
development of a peaceful, prosperous, just, and open Asia-Pacific region. The Foundation 
supports programs in Asia that help improve governance, law, and civil society; women's 
empowerment; economic reform and development; and international relations (TAF undated). 
Various elements combine to increase TAF’s scope to address conflict, including the stress placed on 
peace as an aim. It is non-governmental, giving it more freedom to operate outside the constraints of 
bilateral or multilateral agencies. Its relatively small budget means it need rely less on recipient 
governments, often the only viable channels for disbursing large amounts rapidly. Its overall vision is 
one not only of accelerating development but of improving how it takes place. The emphasis on justice 
as well as peace is significant in this regard. TAF staff, when talking privately and off-the-record, are 
often highly critical of government institutions, policies, and their impact on the causes and dynamics of 
conflict. 
TAF has not always enjoyed a reputation as a non-governmental body. Since the 1960s, it has moved 
away from one of its original funding sources, the CIA. With the end of the end of the Cold War it has 
become even less focused on directly extending American interests (Shelley 2005:116). It is still largely 
dependent on US Government financing, through core contributions and specific project grants from 
USAID as well as other parts of the US Government.
544
 TAF also retains some association with American 
political interests: the head from 2004 to 2011, Douglas Bereuter, was a former Republican senator. 
Recent success in raising sponsorship from other donor nations, multilaterals, and private sources have 
provided some balance.545 
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From the perspective of peripheral conflict, TAF has addressed highly relevant issues in various 
countries. A strong emphasis is placed on understanding “Drivers of conflict” through “Rigorous, 
objective analysis” (TAF 2008). TAF country programmes reflect this approach, often overtly recognizing 
the significance of identity and ethnic difference both to conflict dynamics and to government 
policymaking. This fits many of the recommendations made by analysts of aid-related interventions in 
horizontal inequalities and ethnic aspects of conflict (Hettne 1993, Uvin 1998, Stewart 2009). Across the 
region, TAF has implemented programmes addressing horizontal inequalities, development and justice. 
For example, it has promoted local level government consultations with Muslim mass-based 
organizations in Indonesia, and expanded access to the legal system and broadened the use of the Tamil 
language among police and officials in north and east Sri Lanka (TAF 2007). A stress on supporting 
accountable decentralization features prominently in TAF’s programmes in conflict-affected areas. It 
also works more directly to support peace negotiations where there is space to do so (TAF 2009b). 
TAF and Unicef both have strong links with the USA, as seen in the locations of their headquarters, their 
funding streams, and the nationaliy of their most senior staff. Both agencies claim to distance 
themselves from the more security-led and otherwise self-interested aspects of foreign policy, operating 
instead from a standpoint of justice and human rights and through context-specific, evidence-based 
responses. TAF aims to maintain an independent stance, reducing the likelihood of aligning with more 
controversial areas of donor funding or losing control of its programmes and ending up merely as a 
delivery mechanism for others. It has on occasion chosen not to tender for contracts from USAID despite 
being well positioned to do so, given concern about overly tight donor management control. TAF argues 
that in this way it also avoids the negative aspects of being associated with foreign agendas.546 
9.2 How both agencies understand conflict in the Far South 
As is explained below, in comparison with other donors, Unicef and TAF demonstrate fairly strong 
institutional understanding of the roots of conflict in the Far South and of the implications for 
development interventions. Both agencies have commissioned more extensive research on which to 
base their programming than have other donors, supporting institutional recognition of horizontal 
inequalities and the significance of identity. The research feeds into programming that aims to 
contribute to finding sustainable and equitable peace in the long term, given the absence of short-term 
options.547 
Unicef’s decision to work in the Far South from 2003 onwards led it to commission situational analyses 
and other background material prior to launching any programmes. Similarly, TAF has conducted 
surveys and research to examine the causes and dynamics of conflict in the Far South (Unicef 2006). 
TAF’s knowledge base has been established alongside more direct experience and long-term 
engagement with partners closer to the ground. Research has led the agency’s staff in Thailand to 
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conclude that people in the Far South do largely want developmental progress, yet need support to take 
advantage of available opportunities on their own terms and to push for more just government actions 
in future.548 The perspective is compatible with views commonly expressed by Malay Muslims in the Far 
South.549 
Like Unicef, TAF has a long track record of operations in Thailand. Whereas Unicef only started 
prioritizing the Far South of the country in around 2003, TAF has worked there since 1961 (Liow 
2009:162). This legacy shapes TAF’s programme. Its country representative for Thailand, Jim Klein, 
begins his interview with a historical explanation of TAF’s involvement in the Far South. He is an 
experienced hand himself, coming originally from the USA yet having lived in Thailand over many years. 
In 1961, Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat was overseeing a round of assimilationist efforts pushing Islamic 
private schools to join the state education system. TAF provided small grants to enable schools to fulfil 
the stipulated criteria to receive government funding, thereby avoiding forced closure or a likely future 
of isolated penury. TAF has continued to work in the Far South since then.550 
The long term of TAF’s involvement in the Far South stands out against other international agencies. The 
agency’s various initiatives there total roughly US$1 million per year.551 The Far South has remained high 
up their list of priorities. TAF’s country summary sheet for Thailand mentions conflict in the Far South as 
one of only two key fields of involvement, along with promoting democracy. The concentration on 
education has continued and been expanded to other fields over time. Recent engagement has included 
promoting civil participation in political discussion on the Far South at the local and national levels (TAF 
2009). 
 TAF programmes are: “...based on the premise that the current violence can be traced to long-term 
grievances of the local Thai-Muslim population over discriminatory policies and treatment by the 
government, and a perception of marginalization in Thai society” (TAF 2008:12). This recognition of 
minority concerns has placed TAF in a strong position to engage with the core issues behind the conflict, 
while keeping to its overall mandate and direction. TAF staff viewed critically the politically 
compromised form of much government development work in the Far South, which is chiefly designed 
to win the conflict and maintain state control rather than to address local frustrations. 552 
A decentralized and context-specific approach to planning implementation helped to put these overall 
aims into practice. TAF country representatives and other staff have often come from an applied 
political science background, with a strong emphasis placed on in-country knowledge and experience. 
Senior and programme staff in both TAF and Unicef stressed their independence from head office in 
formulating policy direction within broad institutionally defined approaches.553 This has resulted in 
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programmes looking at how services are delivered by addressing cultural and symbolic issues such as 
language policy, rather than focusing on quantifiable targets alone. TAF promotional literature states: 
Programs in the south are designed to create equal rights and opportunities for Muslim citizens. 
*…+ The Foundation places a priority on strengthening effective institutions of democracy and 
resolving conflict in the three Muslim-dominated southernmost provinces [...] While the causes 
of conflict are complex, The Asia Foundation recognizes that identity, education, economic 
opportunity, and participation in local decision-making are the basis from which peaceful 
development will emerge (TAF 2009c). 
Unicef staff also demonstrated strong awareness of the roots of conflict in discussions. A more cautious 
approach, however, was underpinned by closer links with Thai government departments that keep them 
to a milder, reformist line. Unicef funded NGOs and more progressive parts of government bodies, while 
aiming to keep an apolitical profile. One Unicef adviser stated: “We are really not political. Our policies 
are so neutral ... we are not trying to mediate.” 554 
Unicef’s scope to work on conflict when the rest of the UN has struggled to do so is a point of interest, 
with some Unicef staff regarding the wider UN system as a brake on their potential. Efforts to 
coordinate UN programmes can be seen as a lowest common denominator that risked damaging 
Unicef’s gradually developed relationships and operations by associating them with the clumsier efforts 
of other agencies.555 
Addressing peacebuilding in the Far South is not an easy task, given political sensitivities and the 
practical challenges of finding effective partners. Unicef’s 2006 data-gathering exercise, seen as an 
essential tool to build their engagement, cost roughly US$1 million – a large sum for a fairly small overall 
programme.556 There are certainly other, easier issues to approach in Thailand, so an obvious question 
to ask is why TAF and Unicef have gone out of their way to address conflict in the Far South.  
The dominant reasons can be found within the underlying directions and political orientation of both 
agencies rather than local practice. An overview of typical aid agency motivations is given in Chapter 
Three. Motivations encompass individual and institutional incentives, and include deeper values and 
aims as well as responses to more immediate political priorities. In terms of deeper approaches to 
development, Unicef advisers repeatedly emphasized humanitarian goals and child rights during 
interviews rather than socioeconomic development alone. TAF staff, meanwhile, emphasized their 
politically engaged approach that stresses justice and democracy. 
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9.3 Programming on the Far South: building relationships 
The next two sections explore how TAF and Unicef managed in practice to find a way to work on 
peacebuilding. This section considers how TAF and Unicef build associations with a range of 
organizations in aiming to address conflict-related issues in the Far South (while remaining on good 
terms with central state institutions). The next section focuses on the interface with central government 
institutions. 
Unicef, and to a lesser extent TAF, used the same in-vogue language of ‘partnership’ as many other 
agencies. However, their partnerships were not as focused around the relationship with recipient 
governments as was the case with the Group One and Group Two agencies already explored in previous 
chapters. Instead, emphasis was placed on both government and non-governmental bodies. For 
example, Unicef’s publicity material states that: 
UNICEF works in close partnership with the Royal Thai Government, the private sector, NGOs, 
faith-based groups, youth groups, local communities and vulnerable children themselves to 
ensure the realization of child rights for all children in Thailand. (Unicef undated (b)) 
This reference to multiple domestic actors differs from the narrower use of the word partnership to 
refer to high-level inter-governmental relationships that typically emerged from interviews with Group 
One and Group Two donors.557 
While Unicef has established relationships with local non-governmental bodies like the NGO Young 
Muslims Association of Thailand, it also aimed to associate with the government even when most 
funding was channelled to NGOs.
558
 It developed close links with high-level officials in various ministries; 
senior staff like Andrew Morris mentioned the significance of these links in giving Unicef room to 
operate. For Unicef advisers and sector-specific staff responsible for operational relationships within 
specific programmes, a key element was building relationships with key officials in sub-departments 
most open to changing established working practices. By doing this, Unicef has made some inroads. One 
Unicef adviser mentioned that officials in the Ministry of Education were “Very progressive, facilitative, 
open to change.” 559 
TAF’s longstanding work on education in the Far South has aimed to respond to the challenges of 
integrating traditional Islamic teaching with a modern, national education system (TAF 2009). Similar 
issues affect education policy in many countries, including Muslim majority Indonesia and Malaysia.560 In 
Thailand, with an education system based heavily on national integration around a model that is partly 
secular and partly reflective of the majority Thai Buddhist population rather than a small Muslim 
minority, these tensions have not been well managed (as explained in previous chapters). The school 
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system is a prominent cause of tension between the state and many Malay Muslims in the Far South 
(Madmarn 2002, ICG 2009). 
A majority of Malay Muslim parents in the Far South send their children to Islamic private schools rather 
than government secondary schools. Despite having considerable autonomy over management and 
teaching practices, Islamic private schools in the Far South are now mostly state-funded, receiving a levy 
per student. Their standards vary enormously, the best ones operating selective entry procedures and 
sending many students on to universities, whereas the worst are often small and poorly managed, 
employing sub-standard teachers while competing to attract students and the attached government 
subsidy.561  
TAF has concentrated its efforts on improving the standard of secular teaching in Islamic private schools, 
aiming to demonstrate how to raise academic standards without compromising cultural and religious 
heritage (Liow 2009:162). In comparison with ordinary government schools, Islamic private schools 
dedicate less curriculum time to secular subjects. In addition, they often have fewer well-qualified 
teachers. Students are already at a disadvantage as they tend to speak local Malay dialect rather than 
Thai outside school. Poor Thai language ability hampers many school leavers in the search for private or 
public sector employment, or in higher education. As a result it exacerbates resentment, increasing 
youth unemployment and encouraging people to look to Malaysia or Muslim countries elsewhere for 
opportunities rather than within Thailand.562 
Improving secular education standards makes good developmental and cultural sense. It has been a key 
theme of TAF in Thailand since the 1960s. TAF worked on vocational training with education institutes in 
the Far South in the 1980s.563 It used high-level connections with heavyweight southern politicians from 
the Democrat Party (Surin Pitsuwan, subsequently foreign minister, and Chuan Leekpai, then education 
minister and subsequently prime minister) to promote government take-up of its pilot projects.564 The 
promotion of positive popular engagement with wider Thai society while maintaining Malay Muslim 
identity runs through much of TAF’s and Unicef’s work. It is seen in other initiatives including Pattani 
Malay language training for officials, translation of official documents, legal assistance, and support for 
local media initiatives (TAF 2009). 
TAF’s most recent education initiative has promoted a contemporary science curriculum, beginning with 
a network of twelve Islamic private schools. Teachers and administrators were provided with training 
and tasked with devising a viable, modern and appropriate curriculum. The project was initially run by 
an NGO called Thailand Centre for Muslim and Democratic Development, or TCMD. TCMD was 
established using TAF funds, with much of the motivation coming from a former TAF staff member from 
the Far South, Alyas Haji Salah. TCMD’s structure includes various respected civil figures from the Far 
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South such as Ahmed Somboon Bua Luang, a former lecturer and local politician.565 The aim was to build 
a cohesive NGO, thereby strengthening disparate local civil society at the same time as delivering 
specific projects like the development of a science curriculum.566 
The project ran into difficulties, chiefly through the limited capacity and weak oversight of TCMD. As a 
new organization it needed more time and attention to develop than TAF initially gave it. Some training 
was carried out but deadlines were then missed, financial flows were not sufficiently transparent and 
the project was delayed. The expectation that oversight from senior figures in TCMD would ensure that 
the project worked proved wishful.567 TAF staff were open about these shortcomings and at the time 
they responded in several ways. They adjusted their overall policy for building civil institutions in the Far 
South, placing emphasis on networks rather than on formal institutions. They also adapted their specific 
work on the science curriculum by reducing TCMD’s role.568 Coordinating responsibilities for developing 
the network of science teachers to build, test and promote a new curriculum were passed to Phaisan 
Toryib, the manager of Attarkiah Islamiah school and president of the Islamic Private School Association 
for Narathiwat province.569 
TAF’s mixed experience in this instance shows the limits to the external promotion of domestic 
institutions and also underlines the value of experience and flexibility. It is possible and perhaps 
justifiable to criticize the lack of institutional rigour in expecting TCMD to perform a role without 
adequate support. The initiative was described by one of TAF’s officers as “An experiment that didn’t go 
so well.” 570 However, according to several informants, TAF’s subsequent response rescued the 
programme and created opportunities to build on it in future.571 The value of a flexible ‘process’ over 
pre-ordained ‘blueprints’ is recognized in development practice literature, in effect balancing a desire 
for greater rigour and accountability with a political realism and bottom-up perspective that appreciates 
the value of local experience and the scope to change when things inevitably do not go to plan (Porter, 
Allen & Thompson 1991). 
TAF’s politically aware approach, in which specific interventions fit into a broader perspective rather 
than sitting as ‘project islands’, enabled it to use a network of contacts to respond to changing 
circumstances. More conventional development agencies may have struggled to show such flexibility 
when faced with a lack of suitable operating partners in a politically complex environment, as was 
explained in Chapter Eight. The ability to find ways to work with local organizations that may have 
serious capacity constraints was mentioned regularly by staff of TAF, Unicef and other bodies as a 
critical prerequisite for working in the Far South. 
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Unicef also showed capacity to disaggregate government into its many constituent parts, enabling it to 
find allies within government agencies.572 This gave scope to find and respond to domestic agendas 
rather than impose solutions – a basic element of promoting change through external intervention 
(Grindle & Thomas 1991, Eade 2002). 
9.4 Negotiating the interface with the government 
Unlike UNDP and the World Bank (the Group Two case studies in the previous chapter), TAF and Unicef 
gained permission from central government institutions and were able to implement their programmes. 
Managing a relationship with government takes considerable care. Although no distinct evidence is 
available explaining the reasons for such decisions, it seems likely that Unicef’s task was eased by its 
non-threatening child focus, while also possible that TAF’s US funding base probably increased Thai 
officials’ reluctance to cause problems for fear of wider repercussions.573 But for both agencies that still 
left work to be done. 
TAF and Unicef recognized the importance of government counterparts both to their own viability as 
actors and to any future hopes for peace in the Far South; they did not follow a tempting path that aims 
to keep as clear of officialdom as possible. Two examples of interface management in practice follow, 
one each from Unicef and TAF. The first is Unicef’s commissioning of a situational analysis of the conflict 
context in the Far South in 2004.  
Situational analyses are used by Unicef in many countries as a core tool both to build knowledge and, as 
in this case, to gain government support and promote efforts to change policies. Unusually for 
development agency publications that typically avoid discussing ethnicity (see Hettne 1993, Cohen 
1995), Unicef’s situational analysis begins with detailed historical background and an explanation of 
ethnic differences before mentioning specific development issues. Inequalities between ethnic groups – 
such as the greater school drop-out rates among Malay Muslims as compared with Buddhists – are 
addressed overtly through disaggregated data that demonstrate specific developmental challenges in 
the Far South (Unicef 2006:44). The analysis keeps a focus on social and economic issues of relevance to 
Unicef’s mandate while providing broader explanation of the politics and cultural norms that lie behind 
such inequalities. 
Analysis is based on wide datasets that give Unicef a body of information for planning purposes. Data 
presented in the final public document appears to be carefully selected to provide a socioeconomic 
justification for engagement that fits within nationally agreed plans. The southernmost provinces are 
compared with national data on progress towards Millennium Development Goals, in doing so 
demonstrating that they fall far below the national average. For example, poverty incidence (according 
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to nationally defined levels) of almost 30% in the Far South compares with just under 10% nationally 
(Unicef 2006:25). The report concludes with a set of recommendations restricted to areas of child 
development where involvement is likely to be acceptable, keeping clear of political issues. So, while the 
analysis mentions “...the long-standing gap between government and local communities”, and states 
that “The current strife has further isolated government agencies from the population...”, 
recommendations are carefully worded, proposing that Unicef “Involve communities and young people 
in planning interventions”, and “Harness the power of information” (ibid.:59-60). 
Unicef’s subsequent success in implementing a programme addressing issues in the Far South suggests 
that through commissioning and guiding the written output of the situational analysis, the agency 
managed to build both a knowledge base and a basis for action. By avoiding politically controversial 
conclusions even if evidence pointed in that direction, the report helped to create a national level 
developmental justification for engagement in the Far South. 
In this case, Unicef negotiated the interface with the state by finding acceptable approaches within its 
own expected socioeconomic remit. Unicef’s decision to build programmes in the Far South was 
explained with reference to the area’s relative deprivation and justified through its priotitization of the 
poorest regions across Thailand.574 The same tactic was also applied in specific sectors: Unicef’s child 
protection team commissioned research in the Far South, using it as an entry point without which 
involvement would “Raise a red flag” with government agencies.575  
It is worth noting that other datasets do not necessarily confirm Unicef’s national level justification, as 
already explained in Chapter Five. UNDP data suggests that the Far South is not more disadvantaged 
than many other border areas of Thailand when basing comparisons on socioeconomic data rather than 
on wider political and cultural perceptions. UNDP monitoring ranks the Far Southern provinces of Yala, 
Pattani and Narathiwat as less poor than many northern and northeastern provinces, according to most 
indicators.576 
A superficial reading of Unicef’s research outputs would lead to a conclusion that their focus on 
socioeconomic development indicators demonstrated the failure to understand cultural context often 
seen in Group One agencies.577 Or perhaps Unicef was simply too close to the government to offer any 
more realistic solutions. Elsewhere, Unicef demonstrated sufficient understanding of the roots of unrest 
in the Far South to suggest that an alternative explanation is more likely. Unicef adopted a brokering 
approach by producing a socioeconomic justification that would be acceptable to gatekeepers in central 
government institutions, while not entirely signing up to it.578 This enabled the agency to negotiate the 
interface with the state while maintaining contextually grounded objectives. 
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The second example of interface management is TAF’s support for high-level dialogue on future steps 
towards peace in the Far South. The aim was to support civil and academic pressure for peace, create 
space for public dialogue, and build practical ideas for future policy.579 At face value this was a highly 
political objective, one that most foreign and even many local bodies would probably not have been 
able to approach. However, by supporting domestic constituencies and building contacts with 
appropriate agencies, TAF managed to find entry points and use them – as is explained below. 
TAF has over many years developed a relationship with a key domestic partner on a range of issues in 
Thailand, the King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI). KPI is a semi-autonomous Thai think-tank and training 
body with an image of being relatively progressive while keeping within the boundaries of mainstream 
and elite central Thai perspectives. A specific act of parliament defines it as a state agency that operates 
under the supervision of the national assembly, rather than a government agency reporting to the prime 
minister. It is associated with the Thai royal family, yet supports open civil and academic involvement in 
policymaking on various issues including peace in the Far South (KPI 1998). Like TAF, KPI aims to bring 
disparate voices together, thereby promoting more coherent debate and advocacy. Most of KPI’s 
funding comes from public resources, with occasional external funds for specific projects.580 
In 2006, KPI identified a lack of space for advocates to engage mainstream policymakers on the conflict 
in the Far South. The initial aim was to build on the recently published report of the National 
Reconciliation Commission given the failure of the government to adopt any of its more significant 
recommendations. For TAF, KPI’s high-level contacts and respected status were as valuable as their 
capacity to build networks across governmental and non-governmental bodies. An opportunity to work 
with an established partner on such a sensitive issue was accepted and TAF provided KPI with 
US$200,000 to help them “Pick off low-hanging fruit” from the Commission’s report.581  
Over time, KPI looked for additional ways to build on this base. General Ekachai Siwilat, Director of KPI’s 
Office of Peace and Governance, proposed the idea of a peace study course that would expand and 
deepen senior level engagement in considering significant policy changes for the future in order to 
promote peace.582 92 ‘students’ were selected, most of them experienced figures in a range of public 
and private institutions. At the end of the study course they produced a report that was considerably 
more practically grounded than other, earlier recommendations (KPI 2009). After some delays (caused 
partly by changing national politics and partly because the participants struggled to agree on a single 
approach for the report), it was launched in June 2009 at a high-profile day-long seminar that 
culminated in an address by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.583  
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TAF kept a low profile thoughout. In addition to providing funding, it followed the process and engaged 
to help address some of the perceived weaknesses in KPI’s plan through discussing relevant issues with 
KPI’s senior staff. This role included promoting a more effective advocacy strategy in order to maximize 
impact, rather than relying on the individual efforts of the course participants upon returning to their 
respective institutions. TAF also managed the relationship with its own funder, USAID, ensuring that 
diplomatic involvement was kept out of the picture so that the process remained a domestic one.584 
KPI’s role in peace promotion arguably took still more authority away from local voices. According to 
this line of thought, KPI has promoted minor reforms to the establishment rather than wholesale 
changes to how the Far South, and indeed the rest of the country, is governed. The various parallel 
peace initiatives organized by Bangkok-based organizations created some resentment, as many 
interviewees in the Far South were eager to explain.585 KPI’s approach can be defended, though: even if 
some people within KPI promoted conservative solutions rather than more fundamental changes, its 
work aimed to engage many different figures from the Far South, providing in the process a rare 
platform for policy engagement (Jitpiromsri & McCargo 2008:407). From TAF’s perspective, KPI’s work 
has been part of a long-term effort to open space for domestic discussion of critical issues essential for 
building peace in future rather than an attempt to find a rapid solution.
586
 The process has encouraged 
discussion on possible decentralization and touched on issues of autonomy that are often hard to 
engage with in a state where criticism of direct central authority is frequently avoided, in part for fear of 
transgressing lèse-majesté laws.587 
For TAF, efforts to promote pro-peace reforms by supporting positive elements of government policy 
appeared to have satisfied gatekeepers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Annual reporting according to 
a memorandum of understanding with TICA did not lead to the difficulties encountered by other foreign 
agencies and was usually discussed over an informal annual lunch.588  
As interviews revealed, Unicef and TAF staff understood clearly that they were viewed with scepticism 
by some in the Thai Government and in non-governmental bodies, both in the Far South and Bangkok.589 
Agencies needed to retain the confidence of the Thai Government that they were keeping to their 
agreed mandate and working to support government policy, as well as ensuring that they were not seen 
as alien imposters by some residents of the Far South. The context is not only one of needing to remain 
neutral in a conflict area, but also of understanding the enduring colonial overtones of foreign aid and 
other perceived external interference.590 All too familiar to most recipients of aid, such concerns are 
often overlooked by the providers (Hayter 1971, Eyben 2006). 
Unicef and TAF have kept a very low profile in the Far South. Both agencies have preferred to send Thai 
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rather than international staff to the area and made concerted efforts to indigenize their operations. 
Unicef has a board of national trustees and raises funds domestically, and TAF employed Thai specialists 
in positions that might in the past have been occupied by foreigners.591 This degree of self-reflection on 
the part of aid agencies was not always evident in Thailand or more widely. Most donors typically 
emphasized ‘partnerships’ with an associated and often false assumption that domestic groups – 
especially government institutions but also NGOs – saw them as allies.592 
Overall, TAF and Unicef have managed relationships with government actors, appreciating the 
importance of the central government even when working in a peripheral area. At the same time, they 
were not co-opted into every aspect of a government agenda and retained some independence. They 
worked with non-governmental and selected governmental groups at the same time, an approach also 
used by other international aid agencies in Thailand (ILO 2006, Save the Children 2009). 
9.5 Practice: some progress, some problems 
These interface management strategies were dependent on practical elements of how TAF and Unicef 
operated. We have already seen how both agencies invested time and funds in building a knowledge 
base, establishing relationships with domestic actors, and developing programmes that gradually 
responded to specific needs. These and other steps move away from technical approaches or 
methodologies and towards more process-based, incremental ways of working (Gasper 2000:22-23, 
Roper & Pettit 2002). In accordance with what development practitioners term a ‘process’ approach, 
TAF and Unicef have not based their work on off-the-shelf conflict assessment and sensitivity tools 
designed to support donor or NGO involvement in peacebuilding. For both agencies, their long-term 
presence in Thailand, including well-staffed central offices, helped provide continuity and space to 
engage rather than simply adapting generic project blueprints. The long-term Thailand experience of 
managers in both agencies is also likely to have been a significant factor in basing approaches on 
context.593 
TAF operated more flexibly than many agencies partly because it is a foundation rather than a typical 
donor. Freed from some of the constraints of conventional development practice (described in Chapter 
Three), TAF was able to fund a wide range of small programmes in response to the specific needs of 
local organizations. Its support for civil engagement in dialogue on peace enabled participating groups 
to take advantage of arising opportunities. For example, KPI was able to use TAF support to fund a one-
off seminar on autonomy in response to a last minute request from one of their key contacts, a 
university lecturer.594 The seminar used comparative experience across Southeast Asia as an entry point 
for raising issues otherwise unacceptable to more conservative elements in the government and the 
military. It was attended by many key figures in the Far South, helping to pave the way for future 
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debate.595 This small example may seem almost trivial, but the cumulative impact of flexibility at this 
level of implementation is significant. 
Despite learning from and applying experience more successfully than most other agencies in Thailand, 
practical constraints still limited Unicef and TAF at times. TAF’s less structured approach comes with 
some costs. Internal criticism was made of inadequate monitoring of partner programmes, for instance 
assuming that local NGOs speak for rural Malay Muslims without checking on the degree of their 
representativeness or participation.596 One staff member raised questions over the impact of so many 
small-scale activities, challenging the untested assumption that pilot training programmes, research, and 
exchanges would be taken up more widely or have a catalytic effect on local capacity.597 
Unicef ran into different constraints, created in part by the challenges involved in keeping government 
actors supportive. Some differences of opinion were apparent internally: Unicef advisers generally 
wanted to be more proactive on conflict issues while senior management was more cautious. One 
adviser stated confidentially that self-censorship was more of a problem than the government itself, 
feeling that more risk-taking would be rewarded: “We have not tested the boundaries ... we don't have a 
lot of say in Thailand as it is middle income status, you know they can take it or leave it.” 598 
Local NGO partners like the Young Muslim Association of Thailand also stressed to Unicef staff that as an 
international body they should be more outspoken on human rights.599 The tension between risking 
involvement in politically sensitive issues and accepting a conservative government lead was evident in 
the more consensual line expressed by some Unicef staff: 
At the end we have to find a consensus on how we work or it will have no impact, or be stopped. 
Although within that we should be more courageous. But a good relationship is more worth it in 
the long term.600  
Unicef and other donors have limited themselves through their own regulations, including UN security 
guidelines banning overnight stays and non-essential journeys to the Far South. This reduced the 
incentives for Bangkok-based staff to go to the area, compounding the refusal of the Thai Government 
to allow international agencies to open offices in the Far South.601 The guidelines are extremely cautious 
given the fairly low-level nature of insurgency outside specific rural areas and the lack of attacks 
targeting foreigners. Significantly, UN security guidance is not devised simply through technical, 
apolitical appraisal, but involves discussion with civilian and security wings of government. This provides 
an opportunity for recipient government agencies to use it as an effective and ostensibly apolitical 
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deterrent against close involvement.602 Some Unicef staff were dismissive of other UN agencies like 
UNDP who set a tone that other agencies then followed: 
There’s a lot of people in the UN in Thailand who have no experience of conflict environments. 
They think it’s big and scary and dangerous, and that results in action plans that don’t take into 
account the situation.603 
Further limits stemmed from Unicef’s own operating procedures. Some of Unicef’s international staff 
had long experience of working in Thailand, although many others arrived having been rotated in the 
three-year postings typical of donors and diplomats. In addition, most Thai national staff had little 
experience of the Far South and managers admitted that this held them back. Most development 
agencies aiming to work in the Far South, including TAF and Unicef, struggled to find sufficiently 
qualified staff from the area itself. Learning curves were flattened by travel restrictions, meaning that 
local partners have been relied on more than usual: 
We only really know how things are being presented so we’re entirely dependent on their 
situation … we can't speak to people at all. We’re not able to check our ideas. It’s hard when 
you can’t sit down with people; you’re never quite sure where they’re coming from.604 
The risks of partially-sighted engagement in a complex environment are considerable. Without careful 
adjustment in response to local feedback, programmes might either offend government and not get off 
the ground, or run too close to the government’s side and be rendered ineffective or even 
counterproductive. For example, Unicef supported production of a translation dictionary between 
Malay, Thai, and Yawi (local Malay dialect) and the teaching of Yawi in the Thai script. This was a 
controversial step given close and tense associations between language, religion and identity.605 The 
plan met some resistance from different ends of the social spectrum: conservative religious groups felt 
that local dialect should be printed only in the Arabic script, while some pragmatic parents wanted their 
children to learn normal Thai in order to get decent jobs.606 
The implications of language policy for cultural as well as economic needs are complex and subjective 
given ongoing peripheral conflict in the Far South that is associated with perceptions of horizontal 
inequality, requiring considerable understanding of context. Some longstanding observers saw such 
policy experiments as continued – albeit diluted – efforts at forced assimilation. They preferred to 
promote straightforward multilingualism that creates less controversy and accepts plural identities.607 
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The example serves to demonstrate the need for subtle approaches and a strong knowledge base, both 
of which are undermined by rapid staff rotations and failure to spend time in the field.608 
9.6 Impact: small but significant 
Definitive measurement of impact is difficult given a lack of thorough evaluation. The need to maintain a 
good relationship with government means that challenging questions over wider impact of initiatives on 
the scope for future peace often remain unanswered (see Chapter Six). Undertaking a comprehensive 
evaluation, with the political implications of sharing and addressing its results, could risk undermining 
the low profile and supportive approach that TAF and Unicef have needed to adopt in order to create 
the space to implement a programme in the Far South. 
Evaluation is also hampered by the perennial evaluation challenge of distinguishing the impact of 
external interventions from other ongoing processes (Roche 2001). As explained in Chapter Six, effective 
externally funded programmes in Thailand have always tended to support ongoing trends by backing 
specific domestic bodies pushing for change, resulting in significant attribution challenges. As with other 
sectors of foreign aid engagement, the impact of any single intervention is likely to be less significant 
than the incremental consequences of repeated projects over time (Muscat 1990:279 & 287). Impact on 
specific policy targets – for example on promoting certain proposals of the government’s 2006 National 
Reconciliation Commission such as improvements to the justice system or greater recognition of the 
Malay language in education – can rarely be attributed to donor-supported action as opposed to wider 
changes. 
Interviewees in the Far South repeatedly mentioned that external donor engagement including specific 
programmes funded by TAF and Unicef was on the whole viewed positively on the ground.609 TAF’s 
more political mandate and its historical associations made it more obviously aligned with US foreign 
policy than Unicef. Muslim organizations in Thailand – both in the Far South and in Bangkok – are in 
places suspicious of its intentions given that it is an American organization (Liow 2009:163). However, 
with an alienating Thai state seen as the chief cause of unrest and inequality, many Malay Muslims in 
the Far South welcome external support especially if based around straightforward improvements such 
as educational opportunity or increasing the space for local political participation. Currents of anti-
Americanism certainly exist although they are tempered by a desire for external support to counter 
perceived injustice. Interviews and more casual discussions in the Far South revealed little criticism of 
international development funding if it was attempting to redress inequalities. One NGO activist in 
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Pattani stated: “As long as money does not just go to the government in Bangkok, we welcome any kind 
of foreign support.” 610   
Ultimately, available evidence suggests that Unicef and TAF have probably made modest yet positive 
contributions towards the likelihood of a just peace in future. The fields that both agencies have 
addressed emerge repeatedly in academic analysis and proposals for action in the Far South, for 
example on education (Liow 2009) and decentralization (McCargo 2008). TAF’s support for Thai 
institutions promoting peace dialogue encouraged discussions on possible autonomy arrangements in 
2009 that were unthinkable just two years earlier, a potentially significant early step.611 
The two agencies’ most significant impact may have been in creating the scope for further action in 
future. At the time of research, there was a broad feeling among donors that more space was opening 
up for international developmental engagement. It is likely that careful, considered interventions to 
date have played some role in this. Bodies as diverse as KPI, local NGOs, and reformers within the 
Ministries of the Interior and Education may be better positioned to promote more tolerant government 
policymaking and meaningful steps towards decentralization in the future. Perhaps equally significantly, 
donors themselves also learnt from several years of engagement in what was for most of them a new 
field of engagement. Interviewees from several agencies including TAF and Unicef mentioned potential 
future plans, building on work conducted so far and in cases possibly expanding to work with a wider 
range of domestic partner organizations.612 Their learning encompassed not only the context on the 
ground, but also a practical understanding of what the Thai Government would allow and how to 
negotiate involvement. 
The various arguments that could be put forward to refute the benefits of external assistance for peace 
promotion in the Far South are not strong, as is explained below. Such assistance could be seen to act as 
a safety valve, enabling the state to avoid making more concerted reforms (Easterly 2002). The small 
amounts of funding put into peacebuilding and the limited extent of programmes are unlikely to exert 
an overwhelmingly negative influence in this situation, however. External assistance could also be 
criticized for displacing genuine civil activism with ersatz externally funded NGOs based around 
imported agendas and for privileging self-appointed local representatives who speak good English 
(Edwards & Hulme 1995). But, as this chapter explains, both TAF and Unicef aimed to counter capital 
city and dominant NGO bias through backing domestic networks and other support reaching into the 
rural Far South. They had clear objectives for improving how the state operates rather than simply 
funding high-level bodies to carry out development as part of government-led efforts to win the conflict. 
Further criticism could be made that foreign aid undermines sovereignty more broadly. In the case of 
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the Far South of Thailand, the small amounts and lack of influence of the international bodies concerned 
means that such views represent the kind of nationalist reaction that needs to be challenged. By finding 
ways around parts of the government (for example the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) or some sectors of 
public opinion that would prefer to block all forms of external involvement, TAF and Unicef were not 
succumbing to such extremism. A more substantive critical analysis would be that the reformist, 
conciliatory approach of both agencies bent over too far to accommodate and work with a government 
committing regular infringements of human rights in its ongoing military operations (Human Rights 
Watch 2007). Some staff working for human rights bodies shared this view. They cited disappearances, 
arbitrary detention, and use of local proxy militia as reasons why the government should not be 
partnered.613 Both Unicef’s and TAF’s inability to speak out over abuses for fear of damaging their 
standing with the government and jeopardizing their programmes is from a purists’ perspective 
untenable. More pragmatically, it could be countered that working with a government in order to 
promote change is perhaps better than carping from the sidelines. Either way, this critique emphasizes 
how the need to gain government approval limits what agencies can do, even for Group Three donors. 
Criticism can also be directed at Unicef and TAF’s relative inability to link programme aims in the Far 
South with their own national objectives effectively. The practical difficulty of ‘mainstreaming’ specific 
issues into overall national programme objectives that was referred to in Chapter Six is here apparent, 
given the peripheral status of the Far South within aid agencies as well as within Thailand. To 
mainstream peacebulding effectively it would have to be prioritized sufficiently for managers to address 
it across all sectors of work. Representatives of TAF, Unicef and other agencies commented that their 
overall programmes for Thailand were sensitive to problems in the Far South since they promoted 
democratization and decentralization. TAF for example, writes simply that: “…the Foundation places a 
priority on strengthening effective institutions of democracy and resolving conflict in the three Muslim-
dominated southernmost provinces.” (TAF 2009c). This statement is fairly uncontroversial in itself, but 
turning it into contextually valid action across a national programme involves more than relying on an 
unproven link between democracy and peace. Two issues arise here: the practical difficulty of 
mainstreaming and the continual risk of falling back on a range of inadequately questioned norms found 
in Western donor discourse. With only one exception, analysis of the assumed link between improved 
national democratic governance and peacebuilding in the Far South was absent from responses 
provided by TAF and Unicef interviewees, echoing much-criticized naive promotion of democracy and 
‘good governance’ within aid programmes (Leftwich 1993, Paris & Sisk 2009).614 
TAF and Unicef at times appeared to slip from the evidence-based, context-driven approach that drove 
much of their programming addressing conflict-related problems in the Far South to a more normative 
position that demonstrated little familiarity with the limitations of recent approaches to peacebuilding. 
Insufficiently sophisticated political analysis of this kind allows for little integration of the complex 
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challenges that minority rights present for democratic structures in many societies, relying on a national 
model of multiparty democracy rather than considering group discrimination and the need for inclusive 
government more widely (Stewart et al. 2005). Despite the availability of literature explaining Thailand’s 
convoluted, non-linear and partial democratic reforms (McVey 2000, Connors 2007, Askew 2008), as 
well as global analysis of the ways in which many forms of democracy can disenfranchize minority 
groups (Horowitz 2000, DeVotta 2004), unrealistic commitment to democracy has on occasion trumped 
more considered approaches. Analysis of how actual democratic process affects the specific context of 
the Far South of Thailand was not apparent.615 Globally, neither democratization nor decentralization 
provides definitive solutions to separatist struggles given the number of different factors involved and 
the need to respond to specific context (Woodward 2007).616 
9.7 Chapter summary 
The two aid agency case studies presented in this chapter have shown that space for international 
peacebuilding in peripheral conflict can exist, even in unpromising contexts where conflict is ongoing 
and the government resistant. Unicef and TAF’s interventions showed some of the possible ways to 
approach peripheral conflict. With careful practice, peripheral conflict could be addressed by these 
agencies while avoiding direct challenges to aspects of national identity that are typically too sensitive 
for foreign agencies to approach. More widely, the contrast between these Group Three agencies and 
the examples of Group One and Two agencies introduced in previous chapters demonstrates the varied 
spectrum of foreign aid provision. The contrast also brings out the factors that enabled some agencies 
to address peacebuilding despite the fact that it hindered others.617 
Unlike Group Two agencies, Unicef and TAF employed many of the institutional practices identified 
elsewhere as necessary to close the gap between policy and practice in the field of conflict and 
development (Caddell & Yanacopoulos 2006). This enabled them to follow through at least partially 
their global commitments to promoting peace. Many of the steps taken heed lessons that have 
repeatedly been stressed in studies and evaluations of development practice but which, as earlier 
chapters showed, are still regularly passed over by aid agencies. 
To summarize, TAF and Unicef demonstrated a basis for action in institutional experience and research. 
They showed awareness of the roots and dynamic of the conflict in the Far South of Thailand and an 
understanding of how centrally driven development processes can exacerbate horizontal inequalities. 
Unlike UNDP and the World Bank, the Group Two agencies discussed in the previous chapter, both 
agencies successfully negotiated the interface with the Thai state and other organizations. Although 
discussing ‘partnership’ with government, TAF and Unicef engaged selectively at different levels and 
adopted specific tactics (such as Unicef’s approach to their situational analysis) in order to negotiate 
space in which to operate. Their approaches depended on practical and institutional attributes, 
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including flexibility and devolved decision-making authority based on acquired knowledge rather than 
generic policies, technical toolkits, or preconceived norms. Both agencies relied on informed staff with 
experience of the specific context. 
Previous chapters explained that a failure on the part of many donors to address peripheral conflict in 
the Far South of Thailand was not simply a result of ignorance, with donor staff often well aware of 
problems in the area but not relating that knowledge to their work in any meaningful way. In order to 
understand why Unicef and TAF acted differently, it is important to understand the reasons why the two 
agencies were motivated to address conflict in the Far South and adopt practices that enable 
implementation. In both cases, a vision of development removed both from mainstream development 
agendas and an associated close relationship with the recipient state played major parts. By moving 
beyond standard socioeconomic development goals they demonstrated the fundamental difficulties of 
promoting peacebuilding in peripheral conflicts through the more conventional aid approaches that 
many donors follow. At a political level, both agencies’ close relations with the US Government provided 
incentives for their senior staff to promote peace between an American ally state and an Islamic 
minority, in alignment with US foreign policy for Thailand. As stated in earlier chapters, there is no 
evidence of any significant US military or security involvement in the Far South.
618
 Organizations like 
Unicef and TAF, with funding ties and policy links to the US Government, to some extent represented a 
softer form of US foreign policy. At the same time, mid-level project staff and advisers in Unicef and TAF 
were well aware of the wider context of aggressive Western foreign policies and associated polarization 
between the West and Islam. Discussions and interviews with Unicef and TAF staff repeatedly showed a 
strongly felt desire to engage positively with Islamic communities and to distance themselves from 
negative perceptions of America and the West more widely.619 
In looking at both agencies, the limits to what can be achieved also become apparent. Their 
programmes were limited not only by what the Thai state allowed them to achieve, but also by their 
own shortcomings. Unicef’s closer relationship with central government bodies presented influencing 
opportunities but also limited its scope to move beyond the promotion of relatively consensual reforms 
and restricted engagement at the local level, as some of its own staff themselves recognized. Neither 
agency could provide evidence to show how they ensured that other, larger programmes that they were 
funding in Thailand avoided backing the same government structures whose actions have over many 
years marginalized the minority in the Far South. 
This thesis has already shown that the overall influence of aid agencies in Thailand is relatively limited, 
especially when engaging in fields that require a change of government direction before sustainable 
progress towards peace is likely. Without a closer overlap between their own peacebuilding goals and 
Thai government policies, the space that Unicef and TAF created to promote peacebuilding was 
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restricted to relatively small initiatives. By contrast, the pressure of disbursing funds and greater 
scrutiny from Thai government authorities appeared, from a comparison between the three groups of 
aid agencies, to push donors with larger budgets into more consensual positions. TAF and Unicef on the 
other hand were able to negotiate space with the Thai Government, enabling them to address 
peacebuilding through small-scale initiatives from a perspective based around equality, justice and the 
rights of local inhabitants. 
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Chapter Ten  Conclusions 
 
10.1  Overview of approach 
Through a case study of foreign aid and peacebuilding in The Far South of Thailand, this thesis has 
responded to the following key research questions: do foreign aid agencies pursue peacebuilding 
objectives in the Far South of Thailand and what related patterns of aid practice emerge across different 
agencies; how do the characteristics and causes of conflict in the Far South of Thailand affect aid 
agencies’ ability to support peacebuilding; and what properties of aid agencies help explain the pattern? 
This section  provides a brief overview of findings before the research questions are addressed more 
directly in the subsequent sections.  
The Far South of Thailand is explored here as a case study of peripheral conflict in South and Southeast 
Asia. Peripheral conflicts are understood to be long-lasting subnational conflicts between members of a 
minority group concentrated in a remote area and the central government of the nation state. They are 
typically associated with perceptions of horizontal inequality among the minority population that have 
cultural and political as well as economic dimensions. Grievances and associated violence often persist 
through periods of relatively rapid socioeconomic development, as seen in much of South and Southeast 
Asia in the late twentieth century and beyond. 
The notion of horizontal inequality provides an analytical basis that links national development, 
ethnicity and peripheral conflict, as explored in Chapter Two in general terms and in Chapter Five with 
reference to the case study. Existing research addresses the common failure of foreign aid to address 
conflicts associated with horizontal inequalities and the mixed record of efforts to achieve peacebuilding 
objectives.620 The originality of this research lies in the fact that as well as asking how aid agencies act in 
the specific circumstances of peripheral conflicts, it also aims to explain why organizations behave in a 
variety of ways in such situations.  
In explaining the actions and operating context of a wide range of international aid agencies in Thailand, 
the empirical research presented in this thesis has drawn upon interviews and a variety of other sources 
including unpublished literature.621 The case studies of aid agencies presented in Chapters Seven to Nine 
built upon wider understanding of the context of foreign aid provision to Thailand and of the conflict in 
the Far South presented in Chapters Five and Six. The aid agency case studies focused in particular on 
practical aspects of implementation, including the agencies’ interactions with domestic government 
institutions and with the overall domestic environment. Data gathering and analysis concentrated on 
the national level, in order to examine in particular the translation of aid policies into practice and 
showing how, even when considering a sub-national issue, higher-level considerations often shaped 
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donor interventions before they were implemented. Existing studies addressing related concerns have 
adopted similar research methods that do not formally test hyoptheses.622 
Three groups of aid agencies were identified. Agencies in the largest group, Group One, tended not to 
address the conflict in the Far South of Thailand, a finding that chiefly supports existing analysis. This 
thesis found that a second group of aid agencies diverged from this default position by attempting in 
relatively modest ways to support peacebuilding processes. Yet the agencies in this group failed to 
operationalize their aims. By contrast, a third group of agencies not only aimed to promote 
peacebuilding in the Far South but also managed to implement relevant interventions. 
The variety of aid agencies’ responses to violent conflict in the Far South of Thailand is explained 
through applying a framework of three overarching themes that was refined during the research 
process. The three themes (motivation, interface and practice) supported analysis and interpretation of 
empirical material. They are based on a body of existing literature that extends beyond recent analysis 
of aid and conflict, building a holistic framework that explains the challenges and incentives confronted 
by aid agencies.623 The breadth of factors addressed reflects the diversity and complexity of 
development assistance, with no single factor emerging as a sole determinant of actions. 
10.2 Do foreign aid agencies pursue peacebuilding objectives in the Far South of Thailand and 
 what related patterns of aid practice emerge across different agencies? 
Early chapters reviewed literature explaining the context of peripheral conflict in South and Southeast 
Asia (Chapter Two), the varied ways in which aid agencies respond (Chapter Three), and the specific 
context of the Far South of Thailand (Chapter Five).  Empirical findings were summarized in Chapter Six. 
Chapters Seven to Nine provided supportive case studies. The two largest donors to Thailand since the 
1970s, Japan and the Asian Development Bank, were placed in the first of the three groups of aid 
agencies. They did not appear to have paid attention to ‘mainstreaming’ peacebuilding issues or to 
conflict sensitivity in their aid programmes, nor to have addressed the causes of horizontal inequalities 
that contribute to peripheral conflict in the Far South. Of other donors, smaller programmes in Thailand 
funded by France, Australia and Germany also fell into Group One. What is more, as the case studies of 
UNDP and The Asia Foundation showed, agencies that did aim to address conflict in the Far South with 
some of their programmes often failed to integrate the specific concerns of the Far South into the rest 
of their work in Thailand. 
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Demonstrating Group One donor tendencies through detailed analysis of policy and practice is 
challenging. It is hard to research an absence of peacebuilding-related interventions and it is not 
generally possible to map the direct impact of aid projects on the causes and dynamics of peripheral 
conflict given the often indirect way in which aid is provided through government institutions and other 
domestic bodies. The importance of people’s perceptions of horizontal inequality in peripheral conflict 
environments further complicates any efforts to draw direct links between donor action and violent 
unrest.624 It is possible, however, to show whether donors considered factors relating to peripheral 
conflict in project preparation and implementation. Chapter Seven presented an example of the ADB’s 
inputs into the design of the IMT-GT project that included the Far South (as well as Aceh) in its area 
during the 1990s. Recent resuscitation of the scheme and a similar lack of evidence of ‘conflict 
sensitivity’ in its work in Aceh suggest that conflict avoidance is an inherent trait rather than an outlier 
or relic of a past era before the explicit promotion of peacebuilding in aid agencies from the 1990s on. 
Some development interventions do aim to address peripheral conflict, however. After explaining the 
common properties of such conflicts including the ways in which development processes can 
marginalise peripheral minorities, Chapter Two showed how various interventions can promote 
peacebuilding, from supporting advocacy groups to funding peace processes directly. With specific 
reference to foreign aid agencies, Chapter Three explained that there are cases of peripheral conflicts 
where foreign aid agencies have made a positive contribution to peacebuilding. In peripheral conflicts 
such as in Sri Lanka and Aceh, some aid agencies have promoted peacebuilding explicitly and directly, 
although these efforts have been relatively small-scale in size. In Thailand, the identification of Group 
Two agencies that attempted but failed to establish peacebuilding initiatives demonstrates the 
challenges involved in trying to turn peacebuilding policy into practice in peripheral conflict settings. At 
the time of research, UNDP, the World Bank and the EU had all tried unsuccessfully to establish such aid 
programmes for the Far South of Thailand, failing to gain necessary government approval. While 
recognizing that Group Two may in cases represent a transitional phase that some donors pass through, 
its identification as a separate group serves to highlight specific trends identified by the research, 
including the difficulty of providing foreign aid to promote change in fields that are not congruent with 
recipient government policy. 
Chapter Nine introduced two aid agencies that fell into Group Three. The Asia Foundation and Unicef 
both managed to implement programmes promoting peacebuilding through small steps, working with 
local partners and negotiating a way through the donor-government interface. They showed that 
foreign aid could fund some peacebuilding-related work in the Far South even when the state was 
reluctant to allow it. Other agencies also addressing the conflict at the time of research and identified in 
Chapter Six included some German Foundations such as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, small funds offered by foreign embassies in Bangkok to international and domestic 
agencies promoting human rights, and international NGOs working with local partners especially on 
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community initiatives. Their projects varied from the promotion of locally specific education policies to 
support for civil groups engaging in high-level advocacy, all sharing the aim of supporting changes to 
Thai state policy to better reflect the concerns of Malay Muslims in the Far South. They were normally 
small initiatives, with budgets from a few thousand dollars up to several hundred thousand. 
10.3 How do the characteristics and causes of conflict in the Far South of Thailand affect aid 
 agencies’ ability to support peacebuilding? 
Stewart et al. (2008:299) find that national policies are generally more responsive to horizontal 
inequalities than are international policies. Evidence from the Far South of Thailand does not fully 
support this view. Domestic policymakers may on average be more aware than international actors of 
ethnic differences in Thai society but that does not equate to more progressive policies from the 
perspective of peripheral minorities. As Chapter Five showed, Thai government policy has demonstrated 
over several decades a concern for the well-being of Malay Muslims but only on terms defined by the 
central state and without envisaging devolution of power or meaningful mechanisms to end their 
continued political and cultural marginalization. Thailand’s legacy of centralized authority and a unitary 
national identity have to date given policymakers few incentives to deviate from a security-based policy 
in the Far South, a region of little relevance to national political process or economic performance. The 
concerns of people in the Far South are also marginal to the recent national political struggle in 
Thailand. 
Earlier chapters described how the form of central state policies and structures, as well as associated 
promotion of what is often an exclusionary or ethnically defined form of national identity, are highly 
significant factors in the onset and trajectory of peripheral conflict.625 For foreign aid agencies, close 
association with central institutions of recipient states is a core aspect of their working practice. Peter 
Uvin, with particular reference to ethnic conflicts, sees aid and the state as “Two sides of the same coin” 
(1998:226). In Thailand, with weak local government and an underground insurgency whose leaders 
cannot be contacted, representatives of the central state were the dominant if not sole domestic 
interlocutor for foreign aid agencies. In effect, aid agencies could only engage with one side of the 
conflict. 
Given that aid flows typically pass through recipient government institutions, and require government 
permission even if provided to non-governmental bodies, the reluctance of the Thai state to accept 
foreign involvement in a sensitive domestic field was a key factor defining the pattern of aid delivery. A 
middle-income state with a sound fiscal position since the onset of serious violent conflict in the Far 
South at the start of 2004,626 Thailand has had little economic need for donor assistance and aid 
agencies had little leverage with which to enforce what would be perceived by many Thai politicians, 
generals and senior civil servants as an infringement of sovereignty. What is more, as was described in 
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Chapter Five and subsequent chapters, government bodies that were willing to accept donor support 
typically pursued policies closer to pacification than peacebuilding, providing development funding 
through conventional means as part of efforts to win over the local population and promote national 
unity. With many government schemes typically seen in the Far South as part of the problem rather 
than the solution to conflict, this left little space for aid agencies aiming to promote more conciliatory 
approaches and to influence policymaking. Senior Thai policymakers and other influential figures have 
generally demonstrated little interest in pursuing a negotiated settlement or offering meaningful 
reforms. The failure of Group Two agencies to engage demonstrates the difficulty of starting even 
relatively small-scale and incremental interventions promoting long-term resolution of conflict, let alone 
establishing more comprehensive international involvement in a peace process.  
However, some opportunities for donor assistance did exist. Various central government bodies and 
sub-departments showed an interest in working with foreign aid agencies, often in association with a 
range of research institutes and non-governmental organizations. Group Two and Group Three agencies 
prioritized relationships with such partners and were sometimes able to initiate interventions 
addressing conflict in the Far South. The scope for such work was relatively limited. Aid agencies 
typically required the approval of government monitoring bodies including TICA in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, who filtered out initiatives that were not in line with their interpretation of government 
policy.  
The significance of identity in the conflict in the Far South of Thailand added futher challenges for aid 
agencies. As explained in Chapter Five, antagonistic ethnic differences that are associated with the 
construction of the Thai nation and of oppositional Malay Muslim identity are central to explanations of 
the violence. Political and economic inequalities are typically seen in the Far South through the prism of 
ethnic difference. This broadly corresponds with the findings of Stewart et al. over the importance of 
perceptions of inequality as well as material inequalities. From the perspective of many within the 
Malay Muslim minority, development may bring material benefit but is also part of conservative nation-
building and imposed assimilation. While development processes and specific development policies and 
interventions can take many forms, in peripheral conflict areas they have often been dominated by and 
contributed to unequal core-periphery relationships around an intrusive power imbalance, patronage 
networks, and political structures that reinforce or at least do not counter existing horizontal divisions. 
Empiricial data presented in this thesis showed that Group One foreign aid agencies did not take the 
prominence of ethnic identity and associated cultural status inequalities in the Far South of Thailand 
into account. For example, decades of donor assistance helped to expand and improve state education 
but did not significantly address the evident tensions in the sector in the Far South. Donors 
concentrating on poverty reduction and improving service provision have not prioritised the area. 
Conventional foreign aid policy, even if disaggregating national units and focusing on economic 
inequalities, appears in the case of many current and past interventions in Thailand not to have 
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considered the complex relationships between the implementation of development initiatives and the 
wider range of horizontal inequalities that have led to conflict in the Far South. 
Foreign aid may generally be a poor tool for addressing issues that relate to cultural and political aspects 
of horizontal inequalities but there were identifiable entry points in the Far South, assuming that aid 
agencies were able to move away from conventional socioeconomic approaches and to develop an 
understanding of the multi-dimensional context of the area. Examples include some of the issues 
addressed by Group Three aid agencies that worked to help integrate Malay Muslim concerns over 
questions relating to government service delivery such as language policy in education, and to support 
discussion on forms of decentralization and political changes that would promote more representative 
local government. 
The pattern of donor interest and involvement in peacebuilding seen in the Far South of Thailand is 
specific to the research period as well as the location, although it is considered to be fairly 
representative of other peripheral conflict contexts over longer periods. Many of the features of the Far 
South of Thailand are also found in other peripheral conflicts, with similar implications for foreign aid.  
Peripheral conflicts are characterized by a lack of donor interest and strong domestic government 
protection of sovereignty that keep almost all interventions aiming to address conflict at bay. Examples 
include Xinjiang, Tibet, various regions of Burma, and Aceh before the 2005 peace process. In some 
cases, such as Sri Lanka during the failed 2002-2005 peace process, or Mindanao over a longer period, a 
more supportive recipient government stance has led to a higher level of donor involvement in 
peacebuilding-related funding. The Far South of Thailand lies somewhere between these extremes, with 
relatively low overall levels of foreign aid provision. 
10.4 What properties of aid agencies help explain the pattern? 
This section chiefly considers the politics and processes of aid delivery itself. While accepting that 
international policies and statistics are often blind to or ignorant of many of the factors associated with 
horizontal inequalities (Stewart et al. 2008:297), the findings of this research indicate a range of 
structural and practical reasons why aid agencies tended to avoid addressing peripheral conflicts even if 
their staff were well aware of their existence. Interviews with representatives of all three groups of aid 
agency often demonstrated a relatively strong personal understanding of the dynamics and causes of 
conflict in the Far South of Thailand. However, that understanding was only occasionally translated into 
actual practice, even in agencies such as UNDP, the World Bank, GTZ, or the EU that have generic 
policies on how to address conflict. 
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10.4a Motivations 
Findings are summarized here according to the three intersecting themes of motivation, interface and 
practice. First, many aid agencies were not strongly motivated to address the conflict. This theme is 
broad and the key trends identified require further explanation. Of particular relevance to peripheral 
conflicts, successful promotion of linkages between peacebuilding and aid in peripheral conflict settings 
has to counter the continued focus of development generally and of foreign aid more specifically on 
narrowly defined aims that prioritize the socioeconomic progress of nation state units (Hettne 1993a), 
as was explained in Chapter Three. Peripheral conflict in the Far South has had little impact on 
Thailand’s development indicators or economic performance and no impact on global development 
goals, so it can be fairly comfortably ignored by many aid agencies. Donors that prioritized 
socioeconomic progress at the national level often appeared to have limited scope to identify horizontal 
inequalities at the sub-national level, especially when the key indicators of inequality were political or 
cultural rather than socioeconomic alone. The findings presented here do not demonstrate a 
measurable negative impact of aid flows on peripheral conflict but they do show a common failure to 
conceptualize and address horizontal inequalities. The case study of ADB involvement in IMT-GT 
presented an example of project design that focused on national and regional economic interests 
despite operating in sub-national areas of both Thailand and Indonesia with minority populations and 
histories of conflict. Reports compiled by both international and national consultants did not identify the 
context of unrest in either place. An institutional approach that prioritized national economic 
considerations, avoided politically difficult issues, and provided little opportunity for the involvement of 
people in the project area gave little space to address horizontal inequalities or other aspects of 
peripheral conflict. 
Foreign aid policy is seen here to be influenced by contested politics, different interest or advocacy 
groups promoting different agendas across different parts of donor governments. For bilateral donors in 
particular, but also for multilateral agencies, aid programmes form part of wider diplomatic 
relationships. Unrest in the Far South that is politically insignificant internationally has always received 
little attention from foreign aid agencies. A comparison can be drawn with the stronger response to a 
perceived communist threat in the 1960s and 1970s, showing that dominant aid flows did address 
conflict concerns when they were a central part of donor and recipient policy agendas.627 However, this 
thesis has shown how aid practice is a result of many issues and process, with macro-political factors 
influencing but not defining how aid is provided in peripheral conflict contexts. In Thailand, aid agencies 
also had a more direct need to maintain a good relationship with the recipient government in order to 
be able to transfer resources. Agencies including the World Bank and the ADB aimed to persuade the 
Thai Government to resume borrowing and were reluctant to jeopardize their relationships with key 
individuals and institutions in the government by addressing politically sensitive issues. UNDP, 
meanwhile, aimed to lever its comparative advantage as a key interlocutor between the recipient state 
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and donors, a role that brought it closer to central government planning agencies and limited its room 
for manoeuvre. 628 
By contrast, Group Three donors that did address conflict in the Far South including Unicef, TAF and 
others demonstrated certain properties: a stronger commitment to operationalizing principles of 
equality and justice, while recognizing the negative aspects of centrally defined development policies 
from the context of a peripheral minority; political awareness rather than a technical mindset; and an 
understanding of the developmental significance of difference and ethnicity in addition to economic 
inequalities.629 Unicef, for example, from an apolitical platform of universal child rights promotion, 
recognized and responded to internal disparities within Thailand. Work including their situational 
analysis (Unicef 2006) demonstrates strong understanding of horizontal inequalities and their causes in 
the Far South, while their interventions in fields such as education language policy responded to them 
(see Chapter Nine). TAF, meanwhile, has addressed problems with government approaches to the 
education of Malay Muslims in the Far South for several decades, reflecting a more politically engaged 
basis and prioritization of justice and human rights. In the case of the US Government donor USAID, 
interviews conducted as part of this research as well as other complementary written sources suggest 
that support for small initiatives addressing conflict in the Far South of Thailand including funding 
provided to TAF stemmed from similar interests and possibly from concern over potential future 
escalation of unrest in a Muslim area.630 Group Two donors also demonstrated some of these qualities, 
but rarely with sufficient commitment or prioritization to turn intentions into practice. 
Research shows that although Group Three agencies did not follow a single consistent approach, they 
did all aim to moderate the policies and practice of the Thai state in a variety of ways: through 
partnerships with well-connected institutions such as elite universities or the think-tank KPI (in the case 
of TAF); through involving more progressive government agencies or units that appear interested in 
addressing Malay Muslim concerns (in the case of Unicef); and through supporting independent 
advocacy aiming to change government policy (in the case of human rights promotion that received 
USAID funding, or the work of FES). Community-based approaches that a small number of donors 
backed in the Far South, for example in the World Bank’s preliminary work or programmes funded by 
Oxfam and Raks Thai, also aimed as a primary objective to influence the government rather than 
transfer resources or skills at the local level. They supported engagement with government institutions 
either directly at the village or commune (tambon) level and at a higher level through networks and 
advocacy, aiming at wider policy change as well as localized impact.631 
The focus on directly or indirectly changing how the central state operates partly reflects the limited 
alternatives in Thailand given a high level of centralization and the absence of a peace process. Even aid 
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agency initiatives that aimed to address local conditions typically did so by pushing for change in the 
centre. Alternative approaches to addressing peripheral conflict, through development assistance 
identified in Chapter Two including strengthening local structures and backing supporting measures 
alongside peace negotiations, were less viable. 
While there may be more options for local engagement in other peripheral conflict contexts, the focus 
of Group Three aid agencies in Thailand on changing how the state operates is not merely a response to 
the specific case. Given that the main underlying dynamic of peripheral conflicts involves the 
marginalization of peripheral minorities within developing nation states, it is understandable that those 
agencies aiming to address the long-term causes of unrest should consider how the central state 
engages in the periphery rather than focusing on more traditional localized development 
interventions.632 
10.4b Interface 
The second theme is the way in which aid agencies approach the interface with key recipient 
government institutions. A comparison between UNDP and Unicef illustrates the key findings under this 
theme. Working alongside recipient government departments, both Unicef and UNDP promoted a 
‘reformed’ approach to development that recognized inequality as an issue of concern, aiming to 
address issues such as human rights and justice as well as considering inequalities within nation states. 
Both agencies aimed to influence government policies in their respective fields. However, while Unicef 
managed to establish projects addressing policies that exacerbated horizontal inequalities in the Far 
South, UNDP’s efforts to address the conflict were unsuccessful as they failed to obtain government 
permission to implement their plans. 
In Thailand and elsewhere, UNDP operates through an especially close ‘partnership’ with government. 
UNDP’s country director also acts as the most senior UN representative to Thailand and the agency has 
a relatively high profile. Desire to limit political (rather than less threatening developmental) concern in 
UN headquarters over the conflict in the Far South made Thai civil servants more reluctant to allow 
UNDP to set up any related programmes. At the same time, UNDP’s circumstances forced it into a close 
relationship with the government. UNDP promotes ‘national execution’ of foreign-funded aid projects 
by recipient governments and in Thailand it worked closely with central government planning agencies 
in devising and reporting against a set of national performance goals in support of the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals. 
These factors presented an especially challenging task for UNDP in comparison with other agencies. The 
difficulties were compounded by UNDP’s own approach. While Unicef entered into a gradual process of 
programme development, commissioning a situational analysis and presenting their work as part of a 
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national strategy to focus on the most deprived areas rather than a specific initiative for the Far South, 
UNDP began by launching a forum for discussing reconciliation. A more political step that was less 
carefully brokered, this led the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to cancel the forum and subsequent plans. 
The differences between the two agencies were compounded by the availability of resources. With fairly 
independent and steady financing, Unicef was well positioned to develop a gradual approach, 
commission research and dedicate the time of their advisers to the issue. By contrast, interviews with 
UNDP staff suggested far less internal interest in addressing conflict in the Far South. Given little in the 
way of resources of its own, UNDP promoted itself as a coordinating body and devised a multi-agency 
plan for donor involvement in the Far South, a step that is likely to have further increased central 
government concern. UNDP was also hampered by its traditional association with project 
implementation alongside the Ministry of the Interior, in Thailand as in many countries a conservative 
body with a primary remit for maintaining authority. Unicef’s ability to work with selected departments 
of line ministries such as the Ministry of Education offered greater opportunities to promote policy 
reforms to respond to Malay Muslim concerns. 
The significant amounts of time and attention that Unicef put into developing a programme addressing 
conflict in the Far South also suggest a higher degree of commitment to the issue. Building working 
relationships with specific government units as well as non-governmental bodies was partly the result of 
the careful approaches of staff who appeared motivated to take forward a difficult agenda. Unicef staff 
who were interviewed uniformly expressed a desire to find ways to address inequalities and to support 
a peaceful resolution of conflict in the Far South more widely, with inputs planned or ongoing across a 
range of sectors. 
Aid literature on government-donor relationships stresses the importance of government ‘ownership’ of 
donor-funded projects. Studies of contemporary and historical aid programmes in Thailand show that 
foreign aid projects often failed to achieve their objectives where they diverged from the interests of 
important central government bodies (Muscat 1990, Shimomura 2008). Economic assistance supporting 
socioeconomic modernization at the national level was easier to agree on than assistance for resolving 
social, cultural and political problems, as seen in the struggles of Group Two agencies. Problems arose 
for donors working in Thailand where the steps necessary to gain government approval for a project 
encouraged interventions aligned with the interests of the central state and not those of a peripheral 
minority. Interface processes meant that in practice donors often ended up supporting government 
objectives even if that was not their original intention, as case study research on countries affected by 
peripheral conflicts including Sri Lanka (Herring 2003) and Thailand (Orlandini 2003) has shown. Recent 
promotion of ‘partnerships’ and ‘harmonization’ around the Millennium Development Goals promotes 
closer ties to the state and sets disaggregated national targets for a relatively limited set of depoliticized 
interventions, limiting donors’ options still further (Call & Cousens 2008:10, von Trotha 2009). The scope 
to promote policy change is likely to be especially limited in such circumstances. 
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10.4c Practice 
Finally, the everyday practice of how aid agencies operate also shapes how they can address conflict. 
Practical measures are necessary to turn global statements and commitments to promoting peace 
through aid provision into action. Group Two agencies including UNDP and the World Bank placed 
insufficient emphasis on the steps that would have been required to engage in the Far South of 
Thailand. For both agencies, concern with peripheral conflict was secondary to their interests in 
maintaining a good relationship with the government. The World Bank’s main priority was to resume 
lending to the Thai Government and they put insufficient time or resources into the practice of initiating 
a programme for the Far South. Similarly, UNDP’s commitment to ‘partnerships’ with the state and to 
their overall coordination function made it hard to maintain independence and plan the careful, low-
profile approaches that would have been necessary for them successfully to negotiate the interface with 
the government. More widely, many donors in Thailand appeared poorly set up to approach complex 
issues that require flexible, contextualized responses. 
Chapter Nine showed how Group Three agencies demonstrated specific practical attributes. They were 
able to respond to experience gained from decades of development work that has been documented in 
a wide body of literature yet is often passed over.633 They committed time and resources to 
understanding the context of the conflict in the Far South, through commissioning research such as 
Unicef’s situational analysis. It is also probably not a coincidence that key international managers in both 
Unicef and TAF had spent many years working in Thailand, giving them an informed and specific rather 
than a generic institutional outlook. The role of prominent individuals in responding to evolving 
circumstances and in using their experience to create opportunities for engagement appears significant, 
as was also seen in Chapter Three with reference to aid agency programming in Aceh. At the same time, 
staffing is not simply a matter of chance but reflects at least in part agencies’ recruitment and 
deployment processes. All advisers and managers in both TAF and Unicef who were interviewed 
demonstrated a concern for rights-based principles and relevant analytical skills, while both agencies 
were willing to leave experienced managers in post in Thailand for long periods. 
Unicef and TAF did not operationalize generic conflict guidelines or checklists that appear in 
international donor guidance on conflict-affected areas, but operated instead through careful 
engagement with and support for domestic institutions. They employed a high proportion of staff with 
political or broad social science training, enabling them to address political problems rather than retain 
narrow technical approaches. These skill-sets and associated outlooks contrasted with the small number 
of staff in UNDP and especially in the World Bank who demonstrated any expectation that factors 
leading to or perpetuating conflict in the Far South were relevant to foreign aid provision and their own 
organizations’ remit. 
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Group Three agencies made considerable investments to gain overall government approval, while 
finding ways to work with identified governmental and non-governmental partners to promote 
incremental policy changes. They demonstrated the flexibility to adapt to circumstances, supporting a 
range of locally devised interventions that responded to the need to build functional working 
relationships with domestic institutions. Such flexibility was important given a dynamic national political 
scene and changing relationships between government institutions. 
Despite their positive attributes, practical barriers still held back Group Three agencies. Their ground 
presence in the Far South was limited by government restrictions and by virtue of their country office 
being located in Bangkok. They had conducted little evaluation of their impact on the dynamics of 
conflict. The need to work through domestic institutions created a further barrier, with only a small 
number of institutions existing in the Far South that had the neutrality, technical capacity and financial 
transparency that donors require before transferring funds or even providing less tangible items like 
training. Finally, while their initiatives in the Far South demonstrated strong understanding of the 
horizontal inequalities affecting the area, Group Three agencies’ work elsewhere in Thailand including 
national level interventions was not always as alert to the same issues. For example, the promotion of 
national democratic institutions undertaken by The Asia Foundation and other international funding 
agencies did not appear to reflect the specific representational challenges faced by ethnic minorities 
(Lijphardt 2008).634 
Overall, certain attributes exhibited by aid agencies enabled them to establish programmes by taking 
advantage of specific circumstances. Case studies of aid engagement in other peripheral conflicts (see 
Chapter Three) suggest that the three themes identified here can go some way towards explaining the 
pattern and variety of foreign aid in other peripheral conflicts, although practices and patterns are likely 
to vary given the specificities and changing nature of operating environments and of aid agencies 
themselves. Some agencies demonstrate common tendencies in many countries. For example, a recent 
review offered little evidence that the ADB showed any deeper consideration of the links between 
development and conflict in other conflict environments (Balbosa 2010). Other agencies vary more 
considerably over space and time, as seen by comparing the World Bank’s emphasis on addressing 
conflict in Indonesia in the mid-2000s with its weaker commitment in Thailand. 
10.5 Can donors do more? 
It has already been explained that the onset and prolongation of peripheral conflicts are not inevitable. 
To recap, where overt violence persists, various measures including a range of development 
interventions can help address grievances that sustain conflict and can on occasion support negotiated 
solutions to conflict. With neither side likely to win militarily and the creation of an independent nation 
from the peripheral area equally improbable, a sustainable end to violence in peripheral conflicts 
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225 
 
commonly requires reforms to the central state that decrease the political, cultural and economic 
marginalization of a peripheral minority.  
However, governments often have little incentive in peripheral conflict environments to undertake 
broader reforms or consider concessions to insurgents’ interests. In the Far South of Thailand, following 
the upsurge in violence from 2004, successive governments offered a fairly free rein to the military, 
agreeing to increased commitments of resources and troops.635 Development initiatives formed a 
second prong of the government response as part of efforts to win the conflict (Connors 2007, Pathan 
2008).636 As Chapter Five explained, development interventions have been applied to maintain control 
and to demonstrate the benevolence of the Thai state rather than to support any meaningful transfer of 
power, promotion of justice or other steps to address enduring cultural and political inequalities. 
The insurgents’ resilience and continued recruitment in an environment of widespread local support 
have not waned (ICG 2009).637 Most analyses of the conflict in the Far South find that a peaceful 
resolution is likely to involve significant changes in how the Thai state operates in the area, including a 
politically negotiated approach offering some degree of autonomy and greater acceptance of cultural 
diversity as well as more immediate security and immunity for insurgent leaders.638 Chapter Five 
explained how some space for promoting policy discussion on the devolution of power and associated 
measures does exist. Attempts to promote some limited yet substantial form of autonomy within the 
Thai nation state form a core element of most moderate attempts to support a negotiated solution, 
including external promotion by former Malaysian elder statesman Mahatir Mohamad (Nation 2010), 
repeated proposals of Thai politicians from different parties,639 and advocacy initiatives promoted by 
civil networks and academics (KPI 2009).640 Autonomy in one form or another has over time become less 
of a taboo subject, although it is still poorly received by influential military officers, the palace and 
senior civil servants (McCargo 2010), as well as holding little electoral appeal nationally. Significant 
changes at the national level may be necessary before meaningful devolution of power is viable.641 
Foreign aid alone is unlikely to achieve major policy changes in such a context but it can support 
progress towards them. Indeed, some of the issues addressed by Group Three donors like TAF and 
Unicef were effectively aiming to do so. Aid agencies addressing the conflict in the Far South aimed to 
improve how the Thai state operates in the area in a variety of different ways. Past experience of aid 
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provision in Thailand suggests that there is scope to support policy change through building the capacity 
and mandate of domestic institutions attempting to bring about improvements. Examples include long-
term assistance to the health sector and more recent interventions including Unicef’s support for 
bilingual education in the Far South. This suggests that Group Three donors have been making a modest 
contribution towards the changes needed to bring sustainable and just peace to the Far South by 
working with selected domestic governmental and non-governmental institutions. 
More donors have over time found small ways to support peacebuilding.642 By 2009, the World Bank 
had managed to gain approval for a low-profile programme providing small grants to local NGOs in the 
Far South and subsequently for a US$600,000 community development initiative.643 The Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung was able to expand its programmes using new funding from the European Union, while the Asia 
Foundation and its Thai counterpart KPI were continuing to build civil networks and to promote public 
debate on political solutions to the conflict.644 USAID also announced a programme of support for 
democracy promotion across Thailand through non-governmental bodies, with a component focusing 
on conflict in the Far South.645 
Successive governments from 2008 on have been marginally more supportive of a limited level of 
international involvement but concerns over internationalizing the situation in the Far South remain 
(McCargo 2008:187, Nation 2009) and these new initiatives are small in scale. Those aid agencies 
managing to establish new programmes also retain a range of objectives in Thailand, in which the 
conflict in the Far South does not feature prominently. The World Bank’s primary aim has continued to 
be the resumption of lending to the Thai Government, in 2009-20100 promoting a US$1 billion ‘Public 
Sector Reform Development Policy Loan’ (World Bank 2010). Meanwhile, USAID’s new programme hit 
practical challenges. The limited capacity of local non-governmental groups to absorb additional donor 
funds was mentioned by many interviewees during this research. With the European Union already 
experiencing trouble spending its own peacebuilding budget, one informed observer said with reference 
to the USAID project: “I know all the NGOs down there and can’t see who they can work with.” 646 
Overall, while some donors appear to have found some ways past the interface with the Thai 
Government, and it is possible that over time they will find ways to establish increasingly effective 
interventions, their terms of engagement still appear circumscribed by the factors that have been 
described in earlier chapters. Unless the environment in Thailand changes dramatically, realistically 
achievable peacebuilding measures that donors can undertake are likely to be limited to the following: 
continued small yet valuable steps to promote policy change, largely through supporting sympathetic 
domestic institutions, that could be multiplied further over time; further positioning of agencies to be 
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able to respond to changing circumstances in future; and further avoidance of programmes funding 
forms of state expansion and unequal development that may indirectly contribute to conflict. 
This research supports the existing literature which suggests that positive engagement in peacebuilding 
in peripheral conflict areas tends to be small scale, occurring where donors both prioritize inequalities 
and adopt practical steps that enable them to devise appropriate interventions and implement them 
(Esman 2003, Uphoff 2003). Foreign aid agencies (and their political masters) rarely have the influence, 
interest, scope or legitimacy to impose peace or significantly change the domestic context surrounding 
peripheral conflicts in the Far South of Thailand and elsewhere. Larger-scale interventions in such 
situations appear to be an option for donors only when domestic leaders are genuinely interested in a 
peace settlement rather than continued conflict or an imposed ‘victor’s peace’.647 Even where donors 
have found space to promote peace, the result is often mixed. This study corroborates other research 
findings which suggest that large foreign aid projects are often too unwieldy to address such conflicts 
effectively. They commonly avoid conflict-related issues completely, while occasionally they impose 
externally derived solutions that have little domestic support or fail to achieve their objectives for a 
variety of other reasons. More ambitious approaches may disburse larger budgets but risk being 
unresponsive to different contexts on the ground, and failing to take into account agencies’ own 
capacities to deliver.648 Recent evidence from Sri Lanka shows the difficulty of successfully implementing 
larger initiatives (Herring 2003, Goodhand & Klem 2005). As is the case concerning the impact of foreign 
aid on horizontal inequalities more generally,649 larger-scale foreign peacebuilding efforts in Sri Lanka 
have arguably had some negative impact, backing an externally oriented rather than domestically 
accountable government (Goodhand & Walton 2009) and swamping indigenous civil society by funding 
NGOs to run donor-defined projects (Liyange 2006).  
Overall, these findings have several implications for international aid agencies. First, this thesis argues 
that using foreign aid to support peace promotion in peripheral conflicts necessitates a broader 
definition of development that extends beyond socioeconomic issues, disaggregating the nation state 
unit and understanding multi-faceted horizontal inequalities.650 As has been described with particular 
reference to Thailand, development initiatives are themselves commonly loaded with identity-related 
significance as a result of the wider context within which they are devised and implemented. In order to 
address peripheral conflicts through foreign aid provision, inequalities along political and cultural as well 
as socioeconomic lines need to be understood. The associated rights of different groups require 
attention, rather than concentrating on narrow definitions of economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Agencies need commitment and incentives to turn common policy statements on rights, justice and 
equality into practice. Doing so is particularly challenging from within a conventional developmental 
                                                             
647
 Aid interventions in other peripheral conflicts –  in Aceh, Sri Lanka, Mindanao and elsewhere – have depended 
on the continued good will of domestic parties and been undermined when this has not been forthcoming 
(McKenna 1998, Aspinall & Crouch 2003, Frerks & Klem 2006, Barron & Burke 2008).  
648
 See Hulme (1995), Landell-Mills et al. (2007). 
649
 See Uvin (1998), Stewart (2008). 
650
 See also Uvin (1998:226). 
228 
 
approach, social and economic statistics and standard development indicators such as the Millennium 
Development Goals only demonstrating some aspects of horizontal inequalities even if disaggregated. 
Second, overarching or holistic peacebuilding approaches may sound good to concerned audiences in 
donor countries but are often unrealistic. The challenges of implementation explored in this research 
mean that narrower and less ambitious responses may be more effective at building on what has been 
learnt through evaluations of failed development projects over many decades, recognizing in the 
process the practical limits within which most aid agencies operate. Promotion of stronger government-
donor ‘partnerships’ and inter-donor ‘harmonization’ can create a debilitating consensus around a 
limited set of large-scale and conservative interventions (Maxwell & Riddell 1998, Eyben 2007). The 
flexibility to support a variety of organizations, to negotiate space to operate, and to respond to 
changing political context emerged as critical qualities of those agencies able to operate in the Far South 
of Thailand. At a practical level, specific circumstances determined which approaches to peacebuilding 
might be viable in any one context. Flexibility (or ‘process’ approaches) and an emphasis on context-
specific responses appear to be important qualities for agencies addressing peripheral conflicts.  
Third, recognizing that development is a political and not a technical process (Holland, Brocklesby & 
Abugre 2004) is even more important for aid agencies addressing politically complex conflicts than it is 
in more conventional fields. Approaches to peacebuilding in peripheral conflicts should concentrate on 
understanding domestic context and working out how to engage effectively rather than on producing 
guidelines and toolkits. Putting this into practice is not simply a matter of conducting better analysis. It 
also requires further attention to the details of engagement at the interface with the recipient state and 
closer to the field. This in turn has implications for how aid agencies operate. It implies placing greater 
emphasis on contextual knowledge and on understanding the nuances and shifts over time within 
government agencies in order to find ways to establish and successfully implement interventions in a 
difficult environment. Concrete steps undertaken by agencies managing to address peripheral conflicts 
include prioritizing long-term staff postings, engaging local expertise on a continual basis, and devolving 
authority so that decisions are informed by sound contextual understanding. 
The analysis presented in this thesis, and in a wider body of research on horizontal inequalities, suggests 
that sustainable and just resolutions of peripheral conflict require changes in how the central state 
works. This means that foreign aid agencies need to address the nature of the state in their 
interventions if they are to have any significant impact. In Thailand, some donors were able to do so 
through partnering sympathetic government agencies on policy changes or through supporting non-
governmental advocacy aiming to build the influence of Malay Muslims from the Far South. Such work is 
slow, difficult to establish, and does not enable donors to establish loans or spend large grants. Yet it 
emerges in this context – and by extension in other similar peripheral conflicts –  as the most useful 
input that donors can make. 
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This research was not able to assess local area-based development initiatives that aid agencies often 
fund elsewhere as part of conflict reduction approaches since there were very few such projects in 
operation in the Far South at the time of research. However, there is little reason to suppose that local 
grants or other investments would have had a significant impact on a conflict that is fundamentally 
about multidimensional horizontal inequalities and the marginalization of a peripheral minority by the 
central state. Studies have shown that many local initiatives in the Far South reproduce existing unequal 
power relationships (Cornish 1997, Bonura 2003). Even if it were to avoid doing so it is hard to see how 
the World Bank’s Community Driven Development grants, implemented in other conflict-affected areas, 
or direct ‘hearts and minds’ initiatives offering benefits as an inducement to gain local level confidence 
in government, would have any discernible impact in the context of the Far South of Thailand unless 
they promoted higher-level changes in how the government works.
651 If agencies do choose to engage 
at the local level, initiatives that address more politically engaged issues, for example supporting 
advocacy networks promoting non-violent political solutions, or addressing a climate of impunity over 
human rights abuses, are perhaps more likely to make a positive contribution than ones that prioritize 
funding transfers. 
Future research can build on some of the findings presented here. It would be valuable to explore 
further the reasons why aid agencies act in different ways when addressing peripheral or other similar 
conflicts. As has been explained, failures to put peacebuilding policies into practice are not simply the 
result of ignorance of operating contexts but can be related to agencies’ political and institutional 
motivations and practices. This generates a range of potentially useful fields to address through specific 
analysis including further understanding of the interface between foreign aid agencies and domestic 
partners, a field in which limited data is available. Future research could also consider the specific  
interests and decision-making processes of aid agencies in conflict contexts, as well as the multi-level 
networks and relationships needed to support long-term, domestically-led peacebuilding initiatives 
across different government and non-governmental institutions. Detailed case studies of specific 
projects would enable multi-level analysis that was beyond the scope of this research. Initiatives that 
were funded domestically rather than through external assistance would provide valuable comparative 
material, as would in-depth research on non-Western aid agencies’ work in peripheral conflict areas. 
Additionally, researchers could consider other fields of action that the merger of development and 
peacebuilding may overlook. With developmental options limited in peripheral conflict contexts, current 
or potential ways in which domestic and international agencies pursue other avenues to empower 
peripheral minorities could be explored. 
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Interview References 
 
Single names or nicknames are used in keeping with local nomenclature systems. Thai interviewees are listed by 
first name. Discussions considered too short or casual in nature to qualify as an interview are not included in this 
list. 
 
  
Interviewee Affiliation Date Location 
Relevant case 
study / status 
Abdurrahman Sebaru 
Manager, Community 
Development 
Department, Narathiwat 
province 
20 May 2008 
Cafe, Narathiwat 
Town 
Other 
ADB Official  
(name withheld)  
ADB Country Team 
Manager, Colombo 
June 2002 
ADB Resident 
Mission, Sri Lanka  
Other donor / 
recipient  
Adli 
Head of Panglima Laut 
fishing union, Banda Aceh 
July 2005 
Union office, 
Banda Aceh, 
Aceh 
Other 
Adviser to Provincial 
Governor  
(name withheld) 
Governor’s Office, Banda 
Aceh 
1 July 2008 
Restaurant, 
Banda Aceh, Aceh 
ADB / IMT-GT 
Ahmed Somboon Bua 
Luang 
Former lecturer and 
politician,  NGO activist 
31 October 2007 
CS Pattani Hotel, 
Pattani 
Other 
Alayas Haji Salah Manager, TCMD  16 March 2008 
New World Hotel, 
Samsen, Bangkok 
(and in vehicle) 
The Asia 
Foundation 
Aminah 
Teacher, local business 
promoter, Narathiwat 
town 
20 May 2008 
Business 
premises, 
Narathiwat Town 
Other 
Athikom Saengchai 
Programme Officer, 
Konrad Adenauer-
Stiftung, Thailand   
12 November 2007 
Thailand office, 
Sukhumvit Soi 61, 
Bangkok 
Other donor / 
recipient 
AUSAID Programme 
Officer  (name 
withheld) 
Australian Embassy 8 November 2007 By phone 
Other donor / 
recipient 
Bakrie 
Officer, Community 
Development 
Department, Narathiwat 
province 
21 May 2008 
Cafe, Narathiwat 
Town 
Other 
Barron, Patrick  
Conflict Unit Manager,  
Indonesia Social 
Development Unit, World 
Bank  
17 December 2008 
School of Oriental 
and African 
Studies, London 
World Bank 
Beloe, Tom 
Aid Effectiveness 
Specialist, UNDP Asia-
Pacific Regional Centre 
a) 28 February 2008 
b) 14 July 2009 
a) UNDP staff 
canteen, 
Bangkok; 
b) Cafe, Thonglor, 
Bangkok. 
UNDP 
Benveniste, Luis  
 
Human Development 
Unit Coordinator, World 
Bank East Asia Pacific 
Region 
12 January 2008 
World Bank 
office, Siam 
Discovery, 
Bangkok 
World Bank 
British Embassy  
Diplomat  
(name withheld) 
British Embassy, Bangkok 20 November 2007 
Cafe, Wireless Rd, 
Bangkok 
Other donor / 
recipient 
British High  
Commission Officials 
(2), Sri Lanka  
(names withheld) 
British High Commission, 
Colombo 
 
10 October 2002 
British High 
Commission, 
Colombo 
Other 
Chamroen Laopitak 
Vocational Education 
Lecturer, Narathiwat 
21 May 2008 
Cafe, Narathiwat 
Town 
Other 
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Chanintira Na 
Thalang 
Lecturer (Thammasat 
University) 
19 November 2007 
Restaurant, 
Sukhumvit Soi 39 
Other 
Chantana 
Banpasirichote 
Wungkaew 
Lecturer (Chulalongkorn 
University), Peace 
Promoter 
12 February 2008 
Chulalongkorn 
University, 
Bangkok 
World Bank 
Chatichai Ratanachai 
Lecturer ( Prince of 
Songkhla University Hat 
Yai campus), former 
consultant  to IMT-GT 
23 May 2008 
Prince of 
Songkhla 
University Hat Yai 
campus 
ADB / IMT-GT 
Chidchanok 
Rahimmula 
Lecturer ( Prince of 
Songkhla University 
Pattani campus), peace 
advocate 
31 October 2007 
Prince of 
Songkhla 
University Pattani 
campus 
Other 
Chueng Chatariakul   
Senior Adviser to NESDB 
& Deputy Director 
General SBPAC 
20 November 2007 
NESDB, Lan 
Luang, Bangkok 
Other donor / 
recipient 
Claypole, Andrew  
Chief of Social Policy, 
Unicef Thailand 
February 2009 By email  Unicef 
Cole, William TAF Senior Director 21 October 2009 
Cafe, Victoria, 
London 
The Asia 
Foundation 
Communications 
Specialist 
(name withheld) 
Former employee of 
Unicef Thailand & other 
agencies 
a) 15 April 2008 
b) 12 March 2009 
c) 14 June 2009 
a) & b) Cafe, 
Phahonyotin, 
Bangkok   
c) Cafe, Siam 
Square, Bangkok 
Unicef 
Consultant to TAF 
(name withheld) 
TAF, Thailand 
a) 17 December  
2007 
b) 18 July 2009 
a) Cafe, Silom, 
Bangkok 
b) Restaurant, 
Sukhumvit Soi 24,  
Bangkok 
The Asia 
Foundation 
DFID Senior Adviser 
DFID Southeast Asia, 
Bangkok 
19 October 2007 
British Embassy, 
Bangkok 
Other donor / 
recipient 
Dunbar, Judy 
Program Specialist, Office 
of Conflict Management 
& Mitigation,  USAID 
regional Office, Bangkok 
24 May 2011 
USAID office, 
Wireless Rd, 
Bangkok  
Other donor / 
recipient 
Eddin Khoo Researcher, activist 25 November 2007 
Cafe, Bhangsar, 
Kuala Lumpur 
Other 
Ekachai Siwilat 
Director of Office for 
Peace and Governance, 
KPI  
1 May 2009 JB Hotel, Hat Yai 
The Asia 
Foundation 
England, Robert  
Resident Representative, 
UNDP Thailand & UN 
Resident Coordinator 
23 October 2003 
UN Thailand 
Coordinator’s 
office, Bangkok 
UNDP 
European Union 
Official  
European Union Mission, 
Bangkok 
19 November 2007 
Thailand office, 
Lumpini, Bangkok 
Other donor / 
recipient 
Fan, Lilianne  
Consultant & researcher 
to UN and NGOs 
a) 24 November 
2007 
b) 3 July 2009 
a) Cafe, central 
Kuala Lumpur 
b) Thonglor, 
Bangkok 
Other donor / 
recipient 
Fernando, Nilan  
Representative, TAF, Sri 
Lanka 
February 2008 By email 
The Asia 
Foundation 
Field, Simon  Coordinator,  UNDP, Aceh 27 June 2008 
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UNDP 
Firmandes 
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Bangkok 
Other donor / 
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Wireless Rd, 
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Other donor / 
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19 November 2007 
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Thailand 
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Other donor / 
recipient  
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a) Thailand Office, 
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c) Cafe, Thonglor, 
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February 2009) 
Other donor / 
recipient 
IOM project manager 
(name withheld)  
Project Manager, Aceh  16 March 2006 
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Banda Aceh 
Other 
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(name withheld) 
JBIC Thailand office, 
Bangkok 
3 April 2003 
JBIC office, 
Ratchadamri, 
Bangkok 
Other donor / 
recipient 
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Project Manager 
(name withheld) 
Ministry of Education, 
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Ministry of 
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Other donor / 
recipient 
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Officer 
(name withheld) 
JICA Thailand office, 
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JICA Office, 
Petchaburi Rd, 
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Other donor / 
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21 November 2007 
Cafe, Fortune 
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Other donor / 
recipient 
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recipient  
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Bangkok 
Other donor / 
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